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ABSTRACT
Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first 
presidential term (Dec. 91-Jul. 96) was one that would have been unthinkable 
during the Soviet period. Russia, as a successor state to the former Soviet 
Union, had to make a fundamental re-evaluation of its policies towards the 
Korean peninsula in accordance with a newly emerging post-Soviet system and 
with rapid domestic changes during this transitional period. Ultimately, this led 
Russia to a policy towards the Korean peninsula that, rather than remaining 
firm, was in constant flux.
The thesis seeks to provide a better understanding of Russia’s foreign 
policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first presidential term 
based on a systematic and analytic approach. For this purpose, on the one hand, 
the thesis discusses how Russia has attempted to build up its new bilateral 
relations with the two states on the Korean peninsula to maximise its national 
interests in the post-Soviet era. On the other hand, the thesis discusses how 
Russia has attempted to maintain its role and influence in relation to Korean 
issues among other major powers in Northeast Asia. To this end, special 
attention is given to an examination of Russia’s major concerns regarding the 
Korean peninsula, both at the bilateral and regional levels.
The thesis also argues that Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean 
peninsula can be divided into the following three stages: (1) Still New Political 
Thinking towards the Korean Peninsula (Dec. 91-Dec. 93); (2) Reformulating 
Russia’s New Foreign Policy Consensus towards the Korean Peninsula (Dec. 
93-Dec. 95); and (3) Towards a Full-Scale Balanced Korean Policy (Dec. 95- 
Jul. 96).
This périodisation of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean 
peninsula is mainly based on Yeltsin’s power consolidation in Russian politics
11
in several Russian elections, which had a formative role in developing its new 
foreign policy direction as well as its domestic policies.
The thesis draws the conclusion that Russia’s foreign policy towards the 
Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first presidential term gradually became 
‘reactive’ in several distinct stages while not having a solid consensus within its 
own leadership both at the bilateral and regional levels, although Russia did 
attempt to pursue an ‘active’ policy towards the Korea peninsula.
Ill
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1. The Aims and Importance of the Present Study
After the eollapse of the Soviet Union, transformative changes in Russian 
foreign policy took place during Yeltsin’s first presidential term (Dec. 91-Jul. 
96). The questions of Russia’s new foreign poliey concept and national interests 
were raised as the main foreign policy agenda in Russian politics.^ At the same
' In analysing Russian foreign policy, a number of definitional issues need first to be clarified. Russian 
foreign policy began taking shape in the Soviet period, following the Russian Federation’s declaration 
of sovereignty on 12 June 1990. Thus, teclmically, Russian foreign policy began with the declaration 
of sovereignty within the Soviet order. According to Suzanne Crow, ‘the Russian Federation’s first 
decisive move to exert its influence over all Union foreign policy came with Boris Yeltsin’s decree of 
18 December 1991 on the diplomatic service of the Russian Federation. Based on this decree, the 
Russian Federation took over the leadership of the Soviet foreign ministiy and assumed conhol over its 
daily operations. The decree also gave Russian contiol over the USSR foreign ministry’s staff, assets 
and sh'uctures, including its cential apparatus in Moscow and missions abroad. It envisaged the 
complete reorganisation of these shuctures by the Russian Federation and was even optimistic enough 
to call for the completion of this reorganisation within one month (Suzamie Crow, ‘Persoimel Changes 
in the Russian Foreign Ministry’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 16, 17 April 1992, p. 18). It should be also noted 
that Gorbachev and Yeltsin agreed at a two-hour meeting on 17 December 1991 that the Soviet Union 
would cease to exist on 1 January 1992. On 25 December 1991, Yeltsin informed the UN secretary- 
general of Russia’s assumption of the Soviet Union’s seat in the UN. On 26 December 1991, the 
RSFSR Supreme Soviet voted to change the official name of the RSFSR to the Russian Federation (or 
Russia). Russia took over all USSR embassies in early January 1992. South Korea immediately 
recognised the independent Russia on 27 December 1991, and Soviet-South Korean relations were 
transformed into Russian-South Korean relations. On 18 March 1992, Russia confirmed that it would 
be responsible for all economic agreements made between the former Soviet Union and South Korea, 
with the exception of an agreement on double taxation (In-sung Lee, ‘Changing Patterns in Russian- 
Korean Relations’, Transition, vol. 1, no. 17, 1995, p. 29). Thus, the author sees the starting point of 
Russian foreign policy on 27 December 1991. For a more detailed account of the starting point of 
Russian foreign policy, see Mark Webber, ‘The Emergence of the Foreign Policy of Russian 
Federation’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 26, no. 3, 1993, pp. 243-263; and Dmitrii 
Rurikov, ‘How It All Began; an Essay on New Russia’s Foreign Policy’, in Teresa P. Joluison and 
Steven E. Miller, eds., Russian Security after the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow (Washington: 
Brassey’s, 1994), pp. 125-163.
time, Russia inevitably had to struggle to find a new place in world affairs in 
the ‘post-Soviet era’.^
In these circumstances, Russia, as a ‘successor’^  state to the foimer Soviet 
Union, had to make a fundamental re-evaluation of its policies towards the 
Korean peninsula in accordance with a newly emerging post-Soviet system and 
with rapid domestic changes. Thus, in many respects, Russia’s foreign policy 
towards the Korean peninsula was one that would have been unthinkable during 
the Soviet period based on Russia’s new post-Soviet views in the region during 
this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). Ultimately, this led Russia to a policy towards the 
Korean peninsula that, rather than remaining firm, was in constant flux."^
The thesis seeks to provide a better understanding of Russia’s foreign 
policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first presidential term. 
The main aim of the present study is to examine and analyse the development 
of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula based on a systematic 
and analytic approach in order to contribute towards a better understanding of 
Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era. For this 
purpose, the main question of the thesis is that how Russia’s foreign policy 
towards the Korean peninsula developed and changed during Yeltsin’s first 
presidential term, and why. Especially, this study aims to answer two main 
questions: (1) how Russia has attempted to build up its new bilateral relations
 ^ The author will use the teim of ‘the post-Soviet era’ instead of ‘the end of the Cold War era’ 
thi'oughout this thesis because the basic situation in the Korean peninsula, which divided into two 
nations on the basis of the Cold War system remained unchanged since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.
 ^ It should be noted that on the issue of ‘Russia as a successor state to the former Soviet Union’. 
Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that ‘we formulated the concept of a continuer-state 
[gosudarstvo-prodolzhatel]. It is not a successor state [gosudarstvo-preyenniik]. Strictly speaking, all 
the states that have emerged in the place of the former Soviet Union are its successors. WIrile a 
continuer-state means that the thread of communication with the outside world has passed to Russia. 
Thus, Russia inherited the Soviet Union’s seat on the Security Council - that demonstrates our role as a 
great power’ {Rossiiskaia gazeta, 21 Jairuary 1991, p. 5).
The changing Russian perceptions and defmitions of security aird ecorromic interests constituted a 
furrdamental reason for the charrges in Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula. This shift 
reflected inevitable changes in Russia’s foreign policy goals and priorities towards the Korean 
peninsula.
with the two Koreas; and (2) how Russia has attempted to maintain its 
influence and role in relation to Korean issues in Northeast Asia.
The study covers the transformative years 1991-96 in Russia’s foreign 
policy towards the Korean peninsula for the following reasons. First, it was a 
period of fundamental change in international relations from the end of the 
Cold War system towards new post-Soviet one. The Cold War international 
system was over and a new international period, the post-Soviet era, had begun. 
In this respect, Russian foreign policy had to fundamentally adjust to the new 
international environment.^
Secondly, it was also a period of profound domestic change during which 
Russia developed its new political system, pursuing democratic and market- 
oriented policies and departing from previous Soviet totalitarian and ideological 
structures.^ In particular, it should be noted that by holding the first fully 
competitive Russian presidential election in the middle of 1996,^ the period of
 ^For a detailed account of new order in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) in the post-Soviet era, see James 
C. Hsiung, ed., Asia Pacific in the New World Politics (Boulder, Colorado: L. Rieimer, 1993).
® For a general comprehensive analysis of the development of Russian politics, see Stephen White, 
Russia’s New Politics: the Management o f a Postcommunist Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). For a history of Russian contemporary politics, see Vladimir V. Sogrin, 
Politicheskaia istoriia sovremennoi Rossii: 1985-1994: ot Gorbacheva do E l’tsina (Moscow: Progress 
Akademia, 1994), pp. 109-191; and F. M. Buiiatskii, Russkie gosudari: epokha reformatsii: Nikita 
Smelyi, Mikhail Blazhennyi, Boris Krutoi (Moscow: Fimia ‘Shark’, 1996), pp. 311-467. On the 
sociological analysis of the evolution of post-Soviet political culture in 1991-95, see M. M. Nazarov, 
Politicheskaia ku l’tura rossiiskogo obshchestva 1991-1995 gg.: opyt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia 
(Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1998). For the comprehensive description of the first four years of Russia’s 
transition, see Jolm Lowenhardt, The Reincarnation o f Russia: Struggling with the Legacy o f 
Communism, 1990-1994 (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1995); and Dmitiii Mikheev, Russia Transformed 
(Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1996). On the first year of Russia’s transition and its diffieulties, see 
Oliver Blanchard, Maxim Boycko, Marek Dabrowski, Rudiger Dornbusch, Richard Layard and Andrei 
Shleifer, Post-Communist Reform: Pain and Progress (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1993).
’ For the first time in its history, Russia democratically elected a head of state in an entirely new 
geopolitical and historical situation. On the meaning of the first Russian presidential election, see 
Michael McFaul, ‘Russia’s 1996 Presidential Elections’, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 12, no, 4, 1996, pp. 
318-350; Richard Rose and Evgeny Tikhomirov, ‘Russia’s Forced-Choice Presidential Election’, Post- 
Soviet Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4, 1996, pp. 351-379; and Yitzhak M. Bmdny, ‘In Pursuit of the Russian 
Presidency: Why and How Yeltsin Won the 1996 Presidential Election’, Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, vol. 30, no. 3, 1997, pp. 255-275. For a general analysis of the 1996 election 
focusing on the rivalry between Yeltsin and Zhuganov, see L. N. Dobrokliotov, ed., Ot Yeltsina k 
Yeltsinu: prezidentskaia gonka-96 (Moscow: Terra, 1997). For sociological data on the 1996 
presidential elections, see L. D. Gudkov (compiler), Prezidentskie vyboiy 1996 goda i obshchestvennoe 
mnenie (Moscow: VTsIOM, 1996).
Yeltsin’s first ‘presidency’^  ended while demonstrating two significant aspects 
of Russian domestic circumstances.
On the one hand, despite many difficulties in the démocratisation of 
Russia, considerable progress was made towards the consolidation of a post- 
Soviet system with distinct channels of power and authority and a means of 
assuring checks and balances during this period.^ On the other hand, there 
emerged a new consensus on Russian foreign policy, characterised by a firmer 
pragmatic and nationalistic trend within the Russian leadership by the end of 
Yeltsin’s first presidency.
There are two primary reasons for the importance of the present study: (1) 
the fundamental change fiom Soviet foreign policy to Russian foreign policy 
towards the Korean peninsula; and (2) the existence of two still divided Koreas 
on the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.
Russian foreign policy was basically different fiom that of the Soviet 
Union.’® One of the central challenges facing Russian foreign policy during this 
transitional period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96) was how to make new relations with the 
outside world and how to define Russia’s national interests in the international 
arena.” The most pressing task in Russian foreign policy, therefore, was the
® On the assessment of the role of the presidency in Russia’s difficult transition from communist rule, 
see Oleg Poptsov, Khronika vremen ‘tsaria Borisa’ (Berlin and Moscow; ‘Sovershenno sekietno’,
1995); Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia (Annonk, New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 
1999); and Thomas M. Nichols, The Russian Presidency: Society and Politics in the Second Russian 
Republic (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
 ^ For a brief general history of Russian democracy (before and after 1917 up the present), see A. N. 
Medushevskii, Demokratiia i avtoritarizm: rossiiskii konstitutsionalizm v sravnitel’noi perspektive 
(Moscow: Rosspen, 1998). On the general problems of the Russia’s transition to democracy, see A. In. 
Mel’vil’, Demokraticheskie tranzity: teoretiko-metodologicheskie i prikladnye aspekty (Moscow: 
Moskovskii obshchestvennyi nauchyi fond, 1999). For the obstacles of Russian refoiTn, see James R. 
Millar, ‘From Utopian Socialism to Utopian Capitalism: the Failure of Revolution and Reform in Post- 
Soviet Russia’, Problems o f Post-Communism, vol. 42, no. 3, 1995, pp. 7-14.
These were based on new priorities of Russia’s foreign policy: (1) entry into the civilised 
community; and (2) economic development. See Heinz Timrnermami, ‘Russian Foreign Policy under 
Yeltsin: Priority for Integration into the Community of Civilised States’, The Journal o f Communist 
Studies, vol. 8, no. 4, 1992, pp. 163-185. For the details of Russia’s new national interests in the post- 
Soviet era, see Li len Kvon, Vneshniaia politika Rossii v 1990-e gody: problemy i tendentsii (Moscow: 
Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1999).
" For a comprehensive analysis of Russian foreign policy, see Peter Shearman, ed., Russian Foreign 
Policy since 1990 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995); Neil Malcolm, et al.. Internal Factors 
in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Celeste A.
development of new policies towards specific countries and regions based on 
this new ‘Russian foreign policy concept’’^ , which could replace Gorbachev’s 
New Political Thinking or previous Soviet ideology. However, Yeltsin’s 
Russian foreign policy was increasingly overtaken by events at home and 
abroad, and the new Russian foreign policy concept became obsolete as a guide 
for Russian foreign policy. Simultaneously, there emerged many problems in 
Russian foreign policy.’^
In these circumstances, on the one hand, Russia started developing totally 
new approaches towards the Korean peninsula, as it did for relations with other 
countries in the post-Soviet era. However, it proved soon that it was a very 
difficult and unprecedented task for Russia to establish and develop such a new
Wallander, ed., The Sources o f Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1996); Roger E. Kanet and Alexander V. Kozhemiakin, eds.. The Foreign Policy o f 
the Russian Federation (London: Macmillan, 1997); Mike Bowker, Russian Foreign Policy and the 
End o f the Cold War (Aldershot, Hants, England and Brookfield, Vt., USA: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 
1997); Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy o f Russia: Changing Systems, 
Enduring Interests (Aimonk, New York and London: M.E, Sharpe, 1998); and Ted Hopf, ed.. 
Understandings o f Russian Foreign Policy (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1999).
Russia’s foreign policy concept was debated in academic and scientific circles and government 
quarters as well as among experts. In the end, by order of President Yeltsin, the ‘Basic Provisions of 
the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Concept’ were approved as the basis for the foreign economic 
activities of executive government bodies by the Security Council in April 1993. See Nezavisimaia 
gazeta, 29 April 1993, pp. 1-3; Foreign Policy Concept o f  the Russian Federation (Washington, DC: 
Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, 1993); ‘Russian Foreign Policy Concept’, International 
Affairs (Moscow), no. 1, 1993, pp. 14-16; and Milton Kovner, ‘Russia in Search of a Foreign Policy’, 
Comparative Stt'ategy, vol. 12, no. 3, 1993, pp. 314-316. The ultimate goals of this new foreign policy 
concept was to maximise Russia’s national interests while making a peaceful international environment 
for Russia’s domestic reform. Yeltsin’s new policy towards the Korean peninsula unravelled in the 
broad context of this new concept (Olga Alexandrova, ‘Divergent Russian Foreign Policy Concepts’, 
Aussenpolitik, vol. 44, no. 4, 1993, pp. 363-372). In the process of establishing a new identity and 
filling the vacuum left by Marxism-Leninism, a number of ‘concepts’ and ‘doctrines’ were articulated 
in Russia, for example, the foreign policy concept in April 1993, the military doctrine in November 
1993, and the national security blueprint in December 1997. These statements of principle fulfilled 
substantial roles. However, they did not have the attributes of an ideology - they included neither a 
description of the past, nor a blueprint of an ideal future and they were vague about the means to be 
used to achieve Russia’s foreign policy goals (Margot Light, ‘In Search of an Identity: Russian Foreign 
Policy and the End of Ideology’, BASEES conference paper, March 1998, p. 2).
On the problems of Russian foreign policy, see Suzaime Crow, ‘Russian Federation Faces Foreign 
Policy Dilemmas’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 10, 1992, pp. 15-19; N. Kosolapov, ‘Vneslmiaia politika Rossii: 
problemy stanovleniia i politikoformimiushchie faktory’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniia, no. 2, 1993, pp. 5-19; Leon Aron, ‘The Battle for the Soul of Russian Foreign Policy’, The 
American Enterprise, vol. 3, Nov./Dec. 1993, pp. 10-16; Mohamed M. El-Doufani, ‘Yeltsin’s Foreign 
Policy: a Third-World Critique’, The World Today, vol. 49, no. 6, 1993, pp. 105-108; Franklyn 
Griffiths, ‘From Situations of Weakness: Foreign Policy of the New Russia’, International Journal,
and mutually beneficial relations with each of the Koreas in new circumstances 
because its relationship with them had to be something basically different and 
new that would have been unthinkable during the Soviet period. As is well 
known, for instance, the ideological factor no longer figured in Russia’s policy 
towards the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.
On the other hand, the question of Russia’s capacity to be a real power in 
relation to Korean issues in Northeast Asia was seriously raised during this 
period in Russian foreign policy. This meant that Russia suffered a serious 
weakening of its claim to Great Power status on the Korean peninsula where 
the former Soviet Union had exercised its superpower role during the Cold War 
era.’"’ Therefore, Russia struggled to maintain its power status against other 
major powers in the region during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). As a result, 
Russia’s new status in the post-Soviet era was reflected when the new order in 
Northeast Asia was emerging in association with other major powers such as 
China, Japan and the US.’^  Simultaneously, however, this also demonstrated 
that Russia’s policy and its relations with the two Koreas in Northeast Asia was 
of importance not only to themselves, but also to other major powers that were 
seeking to play a major role in this region with the vacuum that had been 
created by the collapse of Soviet power in 1991.
During Yeltsin’s first presidential term, unlike other regions, Russia had 
to develop its new policies and relations with each Korea on the Korean 
peninsula, which was still divided into the two Koreas because the end of the 
Cold War had little impact on the Korean peninsula, which had long been 
described as a symbol of the Cold War system in Northeast Asia.’® The Korean
vol. 49, no. 4, 1994, pp. 699-725; and Scott Parrish, ‘Chaos in Foreign-Policy Decision-Making’, 
Transition, vol. 2, no. 10, 17 May 1996, pp. 30-33 and 64.
Peter Frank has argued the difference between a ‘Great Power’ and a ‘Great Country’ (Peter Frank, 
‘Russia’s Moral Dilemma’, West o f  Scotland Politics Seminar at the University o f Glasgow, 11 March 
1997).
For an analysis of the decline of the Russian state: (1) the vertical weakness; and (2) the horizontal 
weakness, see Dmitrii Shlapentokh, ‘The End of the Russian State and Its Geopolitical Implications’, 
The Round Table, no. 330, 1994, pp. 135-142.
For an account of the meaning of the post-Soviet era towards the Korean peninsula, see Il-yung 
Chung, ed., Korea in a Turbulent World: Challenges o f  the New International Political Economic
peninsula still remained the principal source of instability challenging peaee 
and security in Northeast Asia during this period. In other words, unlike other 
regions, the basic structure of the Cold War system elaborated in the wake of 
World War Two still governed the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era,”
These continuing conflicts in the Korean peninsula during this period 
affected the general trends and goals in Russia’s foreign policy towards the 
Korean peninsula. In fact, any state’s policy with regard to the Korean 
peninsula even in the post-Soviet era had to take account of these unique 
circumstances. The case of Russian foreign policy towards the Korean 
peninsula was no exception. Russia had no more allied relations with North 
Korea while having a normal diplomatic relationship with South Korea, 
although South Korea had still an allied relationship with the US based on the 
Cold War system in the post-Soviet era. In short, Russia faced an 
unprecedented relationship building from the previous Soviet ideological basis 
to the de-ideological post-Soviet realities regarding Korean issues in Northeast 
Asia during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96).
These two primary reasons for the importance of the present study greatly 
affected not only Russia’s primary perceptions and attitudes, but also its basic 
foreign policy conceptions, interests and implementation towards the Korean 
peninsula.
Order mid Policy Responses (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1992); Man-woo Lee and Richard Mansbach 
eds., The Changing Order in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula (Seoul: Kyungnam University 
Press, 1993); and Young-whan Kliil, ed., Korea and the World: beyond the Cold War (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1994).
As Bruce Cumings points out, ‘the legacy of the Cold War still persisted on the Korean penmsula 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union... It is a Museum of that [Cold War] awful conflict’ (Bruce 
Cumings, ‘The Wicked of the West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch of the East’, in Michael J. 
Hogan, ed., The End o f the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992], p. 98).
1.2. Literature Review
A considerable amount of research has been conducted concerning Russian- 
Korean relations in the post-Soviet era.’^  But in spite of the number of much 
works, no systematic and comprehensive study of Russia’s foreign policy 
towards the Korean peninsula during the period of Yeltsin’s first full 
presidential term (Dec. 91-Jul. 96) has yet been undertaken. In other words, a 
review of the literature on the subject revealed little research on Russian foreign 
policy towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96).
Substantial problems in understanding Russia’s policy towards the Korean 
peninsula and their relations include the following. First, much of this work has 
been descriptive and narrative rather than analytical and systematic in its
Several articles and books provide valuable infomiation on Russia’s foreign policy towards the 
Korean peninsula and their relations. Although they are general work rather than an analytical one, 
they give a broad range of information on their relations. See Il-yung Chung, ed., Korea and Russia 
toward the 2P' Centwy (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1992); Peggy F. Meyer, ‘Gorbachev and Post- 
Gorbachev Policy towards the Korean Peninsula: the Impact of Changing Russian Perceptions’, Asian 
Survey, vol. 32, no. 8, 1992, pp. 757-772; Hanro gyongjehypiyuk [The Economic Cooperation between 
Russia and Korea] (Seoul: Daeoi gyungjeyonguso, 1993); Chang-jae Lee, Hanro kyungchehyupiyuk'ui 
hyonhwanggwa kwache [The Current Situation and the Issue of Russian-Korean Economic 
Cooperation] (Seoul: Hanruchinsunhyophoe, 19 May 1993); Strengthening the ROK-Russian 
Cooperation in a New World Order (Seoul: Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 1993); 
Kap-young Jeong, ed., Cooperation between Korea and Russia (Seoul: The Institute of East and West 
Studies, 1993); Eugene and Natasha Bazlianov, ‘The Evolution of Russian-Korean Relations: External 
and Internal Factors’, Asian Swwey, vol. 34, no. 9, 1994, pp. 789-798; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ‘Russia and 
North Korea: the End of an Alliance?’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 18, no. 3, 1994, pp. 486-508; 
Vladimir S. Miasnikov, ‘Russian-South Korean Security Cooperation’, The Korean Journal o f Defence 
Analysis, vol. 6, no. 2, 1994, pp. 313-341; L. A. Anosova and G. S. Matveeva, luzhnaia Koreia: 
vzgliad iz Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1994); Yoke T. Soh, ‘Russian Foreign Policy toward the Two 
Koreas’, in Peter Shearman, ed., Russian Foreign Policy since 1990 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1995), pp. 181-200; Alexander Zhebin, ‘Russia and North Korea: an Emerging Uneasy 
Partnership’, Asian Smwey, vol. 35, no. 8, 1995, pp. 726-739; Stephen Blank, ‘Russian Policy and the 
Changing Korean Question’, Asian Swwey, vol. 35, no. 8, 1995, pp. 711-725; V. M. Grishanov and P. 
Kir. Kan, eds., Koreia: Raschlenenie, voina, ob”edinenie (Moscow: Znanie, 1995); A. N. Lan’kov, 
Severnaia Koreia: Vchera i segodnia (Moscow: Nauka, 1995); Charles E. Ziegler, ‘Russia and the 
Korean Peninsula: New Directions in Moscow’s Asia Policy?’, Problems o f  Post-Communism, vol. 43, 
no. 6, 1996, pp. 3-12; Seung-ho Joo, ‘Russian Policy on Korean Unification in the Post-Cold War Era’, 
Pacific Affairs, vol. 69, no. 1, 1996, pp. 32-48; Vladimir B. Yakubovsky, ‘Economic Relations 
between Russia and DPRK: Problems and Perspective’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 20, no. 3, 1996, 
pp. 451-473; Charles E. Ziegler, ‘Russian Politics and Foreign Policy after tire Elections: Implications 
for Korea and East Asia’, Korean Journal o f Defense Analysis, vol. 8, no. 2, 1996, pp. 297-316; V. 
Volkov, ed., Rossiia i Koreia: Modernizatsiia, reformy, mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (Moscow: 
Vostochnaia literatura, 1997); James Clay Moltz, ‘Russia and the Two Koreas: the Dilemmas of Dual 
Engagement’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal o f Post-Soviet Démocratisation, vol. 6, no. 2, 1998, pp. 
380-395; and L. V. Zabrovskaia, Rossiia i KNDR: Opyt proshlogo i perspektivy budushchego [1990-e 
gody] (Vladivostok: Izdatel’stvo Dal’nevostochnogo universiteta, 1998).
approach. This problem led a lack of more scientific and systematic approach to 
the study of Soviet/Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula.
Secondly, most analysts in this field tend to examine key political, 
security and economic issues separately in explaining Russia’s Korean policy 
and their re la tions.T h is indicates that no in-depth examination and analysis of 
the most cmcial aspect of Russia’s Korean policy, which can embrace all the 
key political, economic and security issues, has yet been undertaken in the 
academic literature, although there have always been such important issues 
among them. In this respect, the development of relations between Russia and 
the two Koreas requires further study to focus on the most important issues, 
which can integrate other issues in their relations.
Thirdly, it is not sufficient to explain the development and change in 
Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula by reference to Russia’s 
policy alone. This ‘great power approach’, which traditionally viewed 
Soviet/Russian-Korean relations as a by-product of the power polities of four 
major powers (China, Japan, Russia and the US) surrounding the Korean 
peninsula cannot fully explain the development of Russia’s new Korean policy 
and their relations in the post-Soviet era.^° Although this power approach still
For example, see Hong-chan Chun and Charles E. Ziegler, ‘The Russian Federation and South 
Korea’, in Stephen Blank and Alvin Rubinstein, eds.. Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Role in 
Asia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 185-210; and Alvin Rubinstein, 
‘Russia’s Relations with Nortlr Korea’, in Blank and Rubinstein, eds.. Imperial Decline, pp. 155-184.
For example, see Alexander G. Yakovlev, ‘Russian-Chinese Relations; the Impact on the DPRK’, 
Sino-Soviet Affai?'s (Seoul), vol. 18, no. 1, 1994, pp. 177-184; and William E. Odom, ‘From US-Soviet 
to US-Russian Relations: the Implications for Korea’, The Korean Journal o f Defence Analysis, vol. 9, 
no. 2, 1997, pp. 45-62. In fact, most previous studies examined Soviet foreign policy towards the 
Korean peninsula by heavily relying on the ‘great power approach’, which attempted to explain Soviet 
foreign policy towards the two Koreas largely in teims of its relations with China, Japan and the US 
whilst focusing on the way in which Korean issues were featured in Sino-Soviet, Soviet-Japanese and 
Soviet-US relations. On the literature of Soviet Korean policy based on great power approach for the 
period of 1945-84, see Charles McLane, ‘Korea in Russia’s East Asian Policy’, in Young C. Kim, ed.. 
Major Powers and Korea (Silver Springs, Md.: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973), pp. 3-14; 
Myung-sik Lee, ‘The Soviet Union’s Asian Policy and Its Impact on South-North Korean Relations’, 
in Roger E. Kanet and Donna Barby, eds., Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the 
Developing World (New York and London: Praeger, 1975), pp. 203-216; Chang-yoon Choi, ‘The 
Korean Question in Soviet Asian Policy’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1, 1979, pp. 3-26; Ralph 
Clough, ‘The Soviet Union and the Two Koreas’, in Donald Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in East Asia 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 175-199; Gerald Segal, ‘The Soviet Union and Korea’, 
in Gerald Segal, ed.. The Soviet Union in East Asia: Predicaments o f Power (Boulder, Colorado:
has some relevance, it has serious shortcomings in explaining the dramatic 
changes in Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula/^ This is primarily 
because of its overestimation of external factors, i.e. the influence of the major 
powers’ power politics on the peninsula, rather than the dynamic of Russian- 
Korean relations. It means that changes in relations were primarily motivated 
by Russian-Korean relationships rather than by the influence of major powers. 
Another defect of the major power approach is its underestimation of the 
importance of internal determinants in the Russian and Korean policy-making 
process.Furtherm ore, it underestimated each Korea’s role in analysing the 
development of their relations. Only rare attempts were made to review the two 
Koreas’ foreign polices towards Russia as a conditioning factor in analysing
Westview Press, 1983), pp. 70-87; Hak-joon Kim, ‘Changes in the Soviet Union under Andropov: 
Their Impact on International Politics and the Korean Peninsula’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 7, no.
I, 1983, pp. 21-39; Byung-joon Aim, ‘The Soviet Union and the Korean Peninsula’, Asian Affairs, vol.
II, no. 4, 1985, pp. 1-20; Peter Berton, ‘The Soviet Union and Korea: Perceptions, Scholarship, 
Propaganda’, Journal o f  Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, 1986, pp. 3-28; and Joseph M. Ha and 
Lind B. Jensen, ‘Soviet Policy toward North Korea’, in Jae-kyu Park, ed., The Foreign Relations o f  
North Korea: New Perspective (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 139-168. Hak-joon 
Kim argued that the Soviet Union did not have its own independent policy towards the Korean 
peninsula. The Soviet Union’s policy towards the Korean peninsula is a by-product of its relations with 
the major powers. See Hak-joon Kim, Korea in Soviet East Asian Policy (Seoul: The Institute of 
International Peace Studies, Kyunghee University, 1986).
It should be noted that this is not to deny totally the utility of the great power approach. But, the 
great power approach is too simplistic to provide adequate explanations for the many questions about 
Soviet policy towards the two Koreas, especially during the Gorbachev era. The studies of Soviet 
policy towards the Korean peninsula had to be diversified by adopting various kmovative new 
approaches that were emerging in the study of foreign policy and Soviet foreign policy during the 
Gorbachev era. Most obviously, the rational actor model, by assuming foreign policy-making as 
rational process in which governmental officials respond to stimuli from the international environment, 
could not explain fully why Gorbachev’s Soviet foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula was so 
different from that of his predecessors. For instance, in Tae-kang Choi’s thesis {Linkage between 
Domestic and Foreign Policies under Gorbachev: the Case o f  Korea [PhD Thesis: University of 
Glasgow, 1993]), he examined Seoul-Moscow relations, focusing on the linkages between Soviet 
domestic and foreign policies. His approach was, however, exclusively based on the great power 
approach and it largely ignored the political bargaining factor and Korean factors as well.
The changes of Russia’s foreign policy perceptions were direct result of their internal determinants. 
Since a close connection between Russian domestic politics and foreign policy has become more 
visible, this connection should be systematically analysed. Seeking an explanation of foreign policy 
behaviour in a variety of externally detennined variables has largely ignored the decision-making 
process which provides practical insights into the core of the motivation of states’ external behaviours. 
In this respect, as Margot Light pointed out, the rational actor models are not favoured by modern 
student of foreign policy (Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom, eds.. International Relations: a Handbook 
o f Current Theory [London: Pinter, 1985], p. 157).
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Russian foreign policy towards the peninsula?^ More precisely speaking, some 
previous studies have not ignored these issues, but they have usually addressed 
them implicitly rather than explicitly, and rarely in the rigorous manner that 
such questions deserve.
Another problem in the previous studies in this field is a lack of balance in 
attention towards the Korean peninsula. Few researchers in this area attempted 
to view the two Koreas as equally important in Russian foreign policy.^"  ^ And 
almost no one has treated the two Koreas as independent and determinant 
variables in their own right. Especially, it should be noted here that the existing 
literature on Russia’s foreign policy towards the two Koreas during the early 
years of post-Soviet period (1992-93) has comprised mostly articles which 
emphasised economic more than any other factors in Russian foreign policy. 
Their focus was on Russia’s urgent economic need for co-operation with South 
Korea.^^ By contiast, the literature on Russian-North Korean relations started to
The Korean factor in tire bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union had been largely ignored. In 
fact, the Korean peninsula in itself was not a significant factor in Soviet foreign policy. The Korean 
states assumed significance only in the context of Soviet relations with other major powers. As a result, 
in the pre-Gorbachev’s era, Soviet foreign policy towards the two Koreas was largely determined by 
the Soviet Union’s overall geo-strategic and ideological considerations tilted towards North Korea. 
However, the Korean peninsula became more independent factor for the Soviet foreign policy under 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin. See James W. Riordan, ‘Korea-Soviet Union Relations: the Seoul Olympics as 
Catalyst and Stimulator of Political Change’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4, 1988, pp. 754- 
779; Byung-joon Aim, ‘South Korea’s New Nordpolitik’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4, 
1988, pp. 693-705; Sung-joo Han, ‘Russia in South Korean Policy in an Age of Transition’, Sino- 
Soviet Affairs (Seoul), vol. 16, no. 3, 1992, pp. 25-40; Seung-ho Joo, ‘South Korea’s Nordpolitik and 
the Soviet Union (Russia)’, The Journal o f East Asian Affairs, vol. 7, no. 2, 1993, pp. 404-450; and 
Kook-chin Kim, ‘South Korea’s Policy toward Russia: a South Korean View’, Journal o f  Northeast 
Asian Studies, vol. 13, no. 3, 1994, pp. 3-12.
On Russian-North Korean relations, for example, see Zabrovskaia, Rossiia i KNDR; Zhebin, ‘Russia 
and North Korea’, pp. 726-739; and Lan’kov, Severnaia Koreia. On Russian-South Korean relations, 
for example, see Anosova and Matveeva, luzhnaia Koreia; and Miasnikov, ‘Russian-South Korean 
Security Cooperation’, pp. 313-341. However, there were some articles which attempted to examine in 
balanced ways. See Moltz, ‘Russia and the Two Koreas’, pp. 380-395. During the Soviet era, see 
Meyer, ‘Gorbachev and Post-Gorbachev Policy toward the Korean Peninsula’, pp. 757-772; Tae-hwan 
Kwak, ‘Recent Soviet Policy toward the Two Koreas: Trends and Prospects’, Korea and World Affairs, 
vol. 3, no. 2, 1979, pp. 197-208; and Jae-kyu Park and Joseph M. Ha, eds., The Soviet Union and the 
East Asia in the 1980s (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1983), pp. 3-62.
Since the late 1980s, Korean affairs in Soviet/Russian literature have more frequently appeared 
compared to the previous times, especially concerning South Korea’s economic achievements as an 
appropriate economic partner. See Oleg Davydov, ‘South Korea: Capitalist “Modernisation” and Some 
Aspects of Its Political Development’, Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 2, 1988, pp. 72-84; Soo- 
hyun Chon, ‘South Korea-Soviet Trade Relations’, Asian Survey, vol. 29, no. 12, 1989, pp. 1177-1187; 
Yuri Ognev, ‘Doing Business with South Korea: a Bit too Late?’, International Affairs (Moscow), no.
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be relatively neglected while emphasising Russian-South Korean relations. This 
study attempts to weigh more equally Russia’s relations with each of the two 
Koreas.
In sum, we suggest there is room for a new approach to correct the 
problems mentioned above to better understand Russia’s foreign policy towards 
the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.
1.3. The Analytical Framework for the Present Study
The central premise of the thesis attempts to explain the basic nature of 
Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first 
presidential term as ‘reactive’^ *' in several distinct stages as compared with 
Gorbachev’s much more ‘a c t iv e p o l ic y ,  although it did attempt to undertake 
an active policy towards this region. In order to explain this, the present study 
challenges many dominant assumptions regarding Russia’s policy towards the 
Korean peninsula and provides alternative interpretations of particular policies 
and events.
6, 1989, pp. 107-111; Vasily Mikheev, ‘USSR-Korea: Economic Aspects of Relations’, Sino-Soviet 
Affairs (Seoul), vol. 13, no. 1, 1989, pp. 73-79; Byung-joon Aim, ‘South Korea-Soviet Relations: 
Issues and Prospects’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 14, no. 4, 1990, pp. 671-686; Il-chung Whang, 
‘Korea’s Direct Investments in the USSR: Present Status and Prospects’, Sino-Soviet Affairs (Seoul), 
vol. 14, no. 3, 1990, pp. 33-41; Yang-taek Lim, ‘Cooperation between South Korea and the USSR’, 
Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 1, 1991, pp. 104-113; Young-shik Bae, ‘Soviet-South Korean 
Economic Cooperation Following Rapprochement ’, Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, 
1991, pp. 19-34; and L. V. Zabrovskaia, Rossiia i Respublika Koreia: ot konfrontatsii k 
sotrudnichestvu, 1970-1990 (Vladivostok: Dal’nevostochnoe otdelenie Rossiiskoi akademii nauk,
1996). For a comprehensive analysis of Russia’s views to South Korean economy, see Anosova and 
Matveeva, luzhnaia Koreia: vzgliad iz Rossii; A. V. Vorontsov, ‘Respublika Koreia i strany SNG: 
razvitie politicheskikh i ekonomicheskikh sviazei v 1992-1996 gg.’, in A. M. Khazanov, ed., Rossiia, 
blizhnee i dal‘nee zarubezh’e Azii (Moscow: Institut Vostokovedelenüa RAN, 1997), pp. 132-143; and 
Clizhun Mi Ken, ‘Investitsii iuzhnokoreiskikli konglomeratov v Rossii’, Mirovaia ekonomika i 
mezhdunarodnye otiiosheniia, no. 1, 1997, pp. 131-143,
‘Reactive’ means reacting rather than taking the initiative in this thesis. In other words, Russia’s 
policy towards the Korean peninsula had to be reactive as a result of both internal and external reasons, 
although Russia did attempt to take actively the initiative during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96).
‘Active’ means marked by action in this thesis. Gorbachev actively led both domestic and 
international policies. By contrast, ‘passive’ means not acting but acted upon subject to or produced by
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Basically, this thesis contends that changes in the Russian domestic 
environment rather than changes in the external environment were the primary 
factors that brought about the changes in Russia’s reactive Korean policy, 
although this study recognises both internal and external factors are key to an 
explanation of changes of Russian foreign policy towards the Korean 
peninsula/^
In this author’s view, the appropriate way to analyse Russia’s foreign 
policy towards the two Koreas during this period is not through any single 
mode of analysis, but rather through an explanation of trends and specific 
policy actions through several distinct s tag es .T h u s , in an attempt to analyse
an external agency in this thesis. In other words, the former Soviet Union did not actively take the 
initiative against the US, although it had considerable ability to do that.
Under Yeltsin, to a large extent, foreign policy served as an instrument for domestic bargaining. As 
the domestic crisis deteriorated after October 1993, the salience of domestic factors in Russian foreign 
policy became more obvious. For the domestic sources of Russian foreign policy, see Malcolm, et al., 
Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy', Donaldson and Nogee, The Foreign Policy o f Russia, pp. 
108-154; and Nicolai N. Petro and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Russian Foreign Policy: from Empire to 
Nation-State (New York: Longman, 1997), pp. 91-160.
Foreign policy is generally defined as acts and decisions affecting relations between the one state and 
another and is also the outcome of a complex interaction among various variables. According to Joseph 
Frankel, ‘foreign policy consists of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent 
relations between one state and others’ (Joseph Frankel, The Making o f Foreign Policy: an Analysis o f 
Decision-Making [London, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1963], p. 1). Russian 
foreign policy is a complex process of interaction of domestic and external factors. In general, students 
of foreign policy have tended to choose either one of two general framework for analysis. One focuses 
upon domestic factors such as the nature of the political and economic system, the various domestic 
interest seeking advancement and the ideological preconceptions and perceptions of political elite. An 
alternative approach examines the influences of the external or international enviromnent such as the 
international stiucture, prevailing balance of power, and specific threats posed Western specialists on 
previous Soviet foreign policy can be divided into two major schools: those who stress the role of 
domestic factors (Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Conuiiunist political system, Russia’s cultural 
traditions and the personalities of its political leaders) in explaining Soviet behaviour, and those who 
focus on tlie determining role of the international environment. The emphasis in each case is rather 
different. The former ‘micro-analytic’ approach explains Soviet foreign policy primarily in terms of 
internal needs. The second school stresses the ‘macro-analytic’ approach, focusing on variables 
external to the Soviet Union. For a description of these two approaches and the behavioural 
characteristics associated with each, see Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy o f the USSR: Domestic 
Factors (Enrico, CA: Dickinson Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 1-4. For domestic politics and the 
formation of Soviet foreign policy, see Erik P. Hoffmann and Federic J. Fleron, Jr., eds.. The Conduct 
o f Soviet Foreign Policy, 2"‘* ed. (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1980), pp. 31-90; Seweiyn 
Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context o f  Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981); and 
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Alex Pravda, eds.. Perestroika: Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policies 
(London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs and Sage Publications, 1990).
According to Holsti, there are certain dangers in employing any approach, theory, model, or 
framework in analysing social sciences. Although these devices help the investigator select data and 
relate concepts and variables, they may also act as blinders to other significant facets of the subject (K.
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Russian foreign policy towards the two Koreas, a systematic explanatory 
method is employed, with an emphasis on the interaction of multiple factors in 
a chi'onological and inductive framework.
In this respect, first, a case study approach will be useful to better 
understand Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula. These case studies 
have been carried out to get a clearer picture of the larger extent - to see 
whether the miniature gives the same understanding of the broader 
phenomenon. For this purpose, four special cases are considered in connection 
with the changes in Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula; (1) 
Russia and the development of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which was signed in Moscow on 6 
July 1961 (henceforth, the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty); (2) 
Russia and the development of the Russian-South Korean Bilateral Treaties; (3) 
Russia and the North Korea’s Nuclear Crisis; and (4) Russia and the issues of 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Tumen River Area 
Development Project (TRADP).
Secondly, the multi-level approach employed here provides a more in- 
depth and comprehensive understanding of changes and developments in 
Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first 
presidential term. For this purpose, the present study attempts to explain 
Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula at both the bilateral and 
regional levels.
Thirdly, by employing a chronological approach, the development of 
Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula can be explained in 
several stages.
So far, no similar approach to understanding Russia’s policy towards the 
Korean peninsula has been conducted. The advantages of these approaches in
J. Holsti, International Politics: a Framework for Analysis [Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- 
Hall International, Inc., 1992], p. 5).
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my opinion outweigh their limitations. Based on these new approaches, the 
author attempts to answer the two main questions of this study: (1) how Russia 
has built up its new relations with the two Koreas; and (2) how Russia has 
attempted to maintain its influence and role in relation to Korean issues in 
Northeast Asia.
A. At the Bilateral Level of Understanding
The thesis will argue that by focusing on the issue of bilateral treaties between 
Russia and the two Koreas we will be able to see more clearly the development 
of Russia’s Korean policy, which became gradually reactive during Yeltsin’s 
first presidential term (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). Simultaneously, through this analysis, 
the thesis attempts to reveal a certain ‘political bargaining’^^  and ‘power 
struggle’^  ^over Korean issues in Russian domestic politics.
One of the main reasons for this approach is that a comprehensive 
understanding of the development of major bilateral treaty issues, which can 
embrace the most important political, economic and security aspects between 
the sides, can be the best way to a better understanding of how Russia’s policy 
towards the Korean peninsula developed and changed in the post-Soviet era.
In fact, bilateral treaties between states can be an important means of 
establishing relations between them.^^ These treaties and agreements, as they 
were called by the participants following their own legal traditions, were the
For a detailed analysis of foreign policy based on political bargaining and bureaucratic politics, see 
Graham T. Allison, Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1971); and Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968: Anatomy o f a 
Decision, revised ed. (Baltimore and London: The Jolins Hopkins University Press, 1991).
For a comprehensive explanation of power straggle in the Kremlin from the late 1940s up to 1960, 
see Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR (London: Macmillan, 1961); Abraham Brumberg, 
ed., Russia under Khrushchev: an Anthology from Problems o f Communism (London: Methuen & Co. 
Ltd., 1962); Sidney Floss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: a Case Study o f Agricultural 
Policy 1953-1963 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965); and Anthony 
D’Agostino, Soviet Succession Struggles: Kremlinology and the Russian Question from Lenin to 
Gorbachev (Boston and London: Allen & Unwin, 1988).
‘Treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed 
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two more related instruments and 
whatever its particular designation (Louis Henkin, et al., Basic Documents Supplement to International
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most concrete elements in the process because they were in black and white and 
often marked the culmination of other cooperative actions, such as meetings 
and negotiation sessions. Consequently, bilateral treaties and summit meetings 
can be regarded as the highest level of diplomatic relations between states. 
They are instruments of stability as well as change in international relations, 
catalysts and moderators of political forces in the international arena, 
decentralising, and at the same time assimilating tools of progress. Indeed, 
treaties normalise and order relations among several kinds of states and can be 
adapted to general as well as particular situations.
By focusing on bilateral treaty issues, the beginning of Russian-Korean 
relations can be traced back to the middle of the 19th centuiy. Imperial Russia 
and the Korean Kingdom officially started to develop their relations on the 
basis of a Treaty of Trade and Commerce concluded on 7 July 1884.^^ Soon, 
however, as a result of the Russian-Japanese War (1904-05), Imperial Russia 
and its successor state, the Soviet Union, did not have any kind of official 
relations with Korea based on bilateral treaties up to the end of World War 
Two.^^
During the Cold War era, the former Soviet Union mainly developed its 
relations with North Korea on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean
Law: Cases and Materials [St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1993], p. 86 [Vienna Convention I
of The Law Treaties - Part I Introduction Article 2 a). 1
To identify the various Soviet theories, practices and policies associated with Soviet international |
agreements and treaties and to analyse those theories, practices and policies in their own context and to |
contrast them, horizontally as well as vertically, among themselves, see Jan Triska and Robert Slusser, I
The Theory, Law and Policy o f  Soviet Treaties (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962). For a 
detailed analysis of Soviet treaty diplomacy, see Arnold Beichman, The Long Pretence: Soviet Treaty 
Diplomacy from Lenin to Gorbachev (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991).
It should be noted here that the treaty of Amity and Commerce between Korea and the US was 
concluded on 22 May 1882. See Chu-jin Kang, ‘Diplomatic Relations between Korea and the Soviet 
Union’, in Chu-jin Kang, ed., Hankuk Kwa Soiyon [Korea and the USSR] (Seoul: Chungang Chulpan 
Inswe, 1979), pp. 14-45.
On the development of Imperial Russian-Korean relations, see Eugene Kim and Han-kyo Kim,
Korea and the Politics o f Imperialism, 1876-1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967);
Boris Pak, Rossiia i Koreia (Moscow: Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury 1979); Hangiiksa 
Yonguhyphowe, Hanro Kwangae paiknyonsa [The History of 100-Year Russian-Korean Relations]
(Seoul; Chungwa Inc., 1984); and Seung-kwon Synn, ‘Imperial Russia’s Strategy and the Korean 
Peninsula’, in Il-yung Chung, ed., Korea and Russia toward the 21st Century (Seoul: The Sejong 
Institute, 1992), pp. 3-29.
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Friendship Treaty. By contrast, the former Soviet Union and South Korea had 
no official relations until the second half of the 1980s. This indicated that there 
had been no equally important bilateral issues between the Soviet Union and 
the two Koreas by the end of the 1980s.
From the 1980s onwards, however, Gorbachev’s new active policy 
towards the Korean peninsula started to concentrate on building good relations 
with South Korea on the basis of his ‘New Political Thinking’, although the 
Soviet Union still tried to maintain its influence over North Korea based on the 
1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. This demonstrated that, to a 
certain extent, and for the first time, Gorbachev was attempting to make an 
effort to establish bilateral relations with the two Koreas simultaneously, and 
there were also parallel bilateral issues between the Soviet Union and the two 
Koreas.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia had to begin 
developing its new bilateral relations with the two Koreas for the first time. 
There were equally important bilateral treaty issues between Russia and the two 
Koreas, which were qualitatively different from those of the late Soviet years. 
Finally, the development of each of the bilateral treaties between Russia and the 
two Koreas became the centre of their relations because new treaties attempted 
to define their new relations in the post-Soviet era.
For Russian-North Korean relations, it is worth focusing on the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which could be seen as an example of 
the new relations between the two sides in the post-Soviet era. In other words, 
the re-examination of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, one of 
the last relics of the Cold War in Northeast Asia, raised the question of how 
previous Soviet-allied relations based on the Cold War system changed into 
new relations based on the post-Soviet system. Thus, the expiration of the 
Treaty in September 1996 was the key bilateral issue in their relations during 
the whole period of Yeltsin’s first presidential term.
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By contrast, for Russian-South Korean relations, it is worth focusing on 
the development of bilateral treaties between the two sides such as the treaty on 
basic relations between Russia and South Korea signed in 1992 (henceforth, the 
Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty), and subsequently their military treaties, 
which demonstrated how further their previous relations based on the Soviet 
system could develop into new relations based on the post-Soviet system.
At the level of bilateral analysis, the thesis argues that Russia, as a 
successor state to the former Soviet Union, had to start building up 
fundamentally new bilateral relations with the two Koreas in an entirely new 
environment, which implied yesterday’s ally to North Korea and enemy to 
South Korea on the basis of the Cold War system, but did not succeed in 
developing new relations with the two Koreas during this period (Dec, 91-Jul. 
96) as the Russian side expected, thus demonstrating its reactive policy towards 
the Korean peninsula, although it attempted to do actively. This emphasis upon 
treaty issues will help us understand how and why Russia’s new interests and 
views towards the Korean peninsula developed and changed in the post-Soviet 
era.
B. At the Regional Level of Understanding
The thesis will argue that by focusing on the regional issues regarding Russia 
and the two Koreas, we will be able to see more clearly the development of 
Russia’s Korean policy, which became gradually reactive during Yeltsin’s first 
presidential term. Simultaneously, through this analysis, the thesis also attempts 
to consider other major powers’ interests and their responses to Russia’s 
regional policies and interests in the Korean peninsula.
While Russia struggled to develop its new relations with the two Koreas 
on the Korean peninsula, one must also come to grips with a larger complex of 
interlocking relations, which was closely related to Russia’s new role among 
other major powers (China, Japan and the US) in Northeast Asia. In other
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words, in order to fully understand Russia’s reactive Korean policy, we must 
also examine some important Northeast Asian regional issues, which can reflect 
Russia’s new role in the Korean peninsula in the region. This clearly shows that 
Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula was still a function of its 
broader Asian strategy aimed at creating international stability, although the 
Korean factor was still an important one in Russian foreign policy.
For this reason, to understand more comprehensively Russia’s policy 
towards the Korean peninsula, the present study will consider how and why 
Russia’s regional security/economic policy developed and changed, whilst also 
focusing on how Russia has attempted to maintain its influence and role in the 
Korean peninsula by participating in regional security/economic cooperation 
and its organisation in the post-Soviet era.
Especially, it should be noted here that in relation to its new role in 
Northeast Asia, Russia’s loss of supeipower status in the post-Soviet era 
entailed a painful effort to identify its new status as an ‘Eurasian’ power, 
which was related to its ‘isolation’^  ^in the international a re n a .T h is  led Russia
Eurasianism is a quasi-political and intellectual movement. Eurasianists emphasised the historical 
links of Russia with the East. For more detailed account of the origins of Eurasianism, see David Kerr, 
‘The New Eurasianism: the Rise of Geopolitics in Russia’s Foreign Policy’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 
47, no. 6, 1995, pp. 977-988; and Dmitiii Shlapentokh, ‘Eurasianism: Past and Present’, Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 1997, pp. 129-151.
Soviet Union has been isolated from regional contact and exchanges. First, its capitals were located 
far from the region. Secondly, during the Cold War era, under military-strategic purposes, it was 
difficult to have normal development and participate in the regional integration as a Pacific country. 
Thirdly, Russia culturally shares with European countries, not Asian countries, Christian civilisation. 
See F. G. Safronov, Russkie na sevew-vostoke Azii v XVII - seredine XIX v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1978); 
and Alan Wood, ed.. The History o f Siberia fr-orn Russian Conquest to Revolution (London: Routledge, 
1991).
For four hundred years, Russia has been a great power in the international arena-sometimes a 
regional power, sometimes a Great European power, and sometimes a Eurasian Great power, and 
sometimes a superpower, but always a great power. The collapse of the Soviet Union as a Eurasian 
superpower cannot but affect the development of the situation in Asia. In all likelihood, it will lead to a 
serious regrouping of forces in that part of the world and to the transformation of old and the 
development of new centres of influence, with individual parts of the former Union drawn into them. 
For the place of Asia in the Russian mind and about the Soviet position in the Asian space, see Milan 
Hauner, What Is Asia to Us?: Russia’s Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 
1990). Despite the Soviet Union’s effort to present itself as an Asian as well as an European power, as 
Gerald Segal has observed, the Soviet Union, during the early 1980s, still remained as ‘a power in East 
Asia, and not an East Asian power’, although geography and history exerted a pervasive influence over 
Russian/Soviet relations with Nortlieast Asian countries (Gerald Segal, ed.. The Soviet Union in East 
Asia: Predicaments o f Power [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983], p. 1). According to Thomas
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desperately to search for a new role in world affairs while revealing its identity 
crisis in the post-Soviet era."^  ^ In other words, Russia suffered a serious 
weakening of its claim to ‘Great Power’"^’ status on the Korean peninsula by 
contrast with the superpower status that the Soviet Union exercised during the 
Soviet era/^
In these circumstances, consequently, Russia attempted to take several 
significant initiatives towards multilateral cooperation in its international 
relations. As a result, unlike the Soviet period, Russia’s foreign policy became 
increasingly multilateral, based on associations with other pow ers.Indeed , it 
was a period of transition not only from the Soviet Union to Russia, but also 
from a supeipower to a regional power and from bilateral relations to 
multilateral cooperation. In this respect, the post-Soviet era can be characterised 
as an ‘era of multilateralism’
Robinson, ‘the very character of the Soviet Union constrains it to face West, not East’ (Thomas W. 
Robinson, ‘The Soviet Union and East Asia’, in E. A. Kolodjieg and R. Kanet, eds.. The Limits o f 
Soviet Power' in the Developing World [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989], p. 
172).
‘Who are we?’ is a question that has haunted Russians for centuries. The crisis of identity that 
underlies Russia’s efforts to answer that question and the country’s attempts to grapple with modernity 
- the inventions of an alien civilisation - are explored in this book. See Wayne Allensworth, The 
Russian Question: Natiorralisrn, Modei'nisation and Post-Cornrnunist Russia (Lanliam, Boulder, New 
York and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998). For a brief explanation of general Russia’s identity 
crisis, see Iain Elliot, ‘Russia in Search of an Identity’, RFE/RL, vol. 2, no. 20, 14 May 1993, pp. 1-3.
Yeltsin stated that ‘Russia is rightfully a great power by virtue of its history, of its place in the world, 
and of its material and spiritual potential’ {Rossiiskaia gazeta, 8 April 1992, p. 3). On the evolution of 
Russia’s perceptions of its role in world affairs, see Hannes Adomeit, ‘Russia as a ‘Great Power’ in 
World Affairs: Images and Reality’, International Affairs (London), vol. 71, no. 1, 1995, pp. 35-68.
In this respect, the view that the demonstration of great military power in war is either a necessary or 
a sufficient condition of being a great power. A great power is one whose reputation for existing or 
latent military strength may be equalled, but not significantly surpassed by that of any other power. See 
G. R. Berridge and John W. Young, ‘What is a Great Power?’, Political Studies, vol. 36, no. 2, 1988, 
pp. 224-234.
Georgiy Kunadze, Russian deputy foreign minister and ambassador-designate to South Korea, 
supported this trend as saying that ‘Russia’s prmcipled position is that Russia is not unconditionally 
against the international community even though it srrpports a certain counby, unlike its past position. 
The age of such confrontation is gone’ (‘Ambassador-Designate to ROK Views Korean Issues’, Radio 
Moscow, 29 December 1993 in FBIS-80V 93-249, 30 December 1993, p. 17).
Multilateralism is characterised by the increasing need for collective action in the management of 
world affairs in the post-Soviet era. The term multilateralism is ‘a brief or ideology rather than a 
straightforward state of affairs.’ As an ordering mode, multilateralism has three properties: (1) 
individuality; (2) generalised principles of conduct; and (3) diffuse reciprocity (James A. Caporaso, 
‘International Relations Theoiy and Multilateralism: the Search for Foundation’, International 
Or'ganisation, vol. 46, no. 3, 1992, pp. 601-602).
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Northeast Asia’s security and economic context have largely shifted from 
the management of superpower competition to a greater emphasis on regional 
cooperation among the major powers in the region in the post-Soviet era, 
theoretically at least/^ This was no exception in the case of Russia’s relations 
with other major powers, including the two Koreas in Northeast Asia. There 
were two major reasons for this. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
ti'ansformed the world order from superpower rivalry to multilateral 
cooperation. Thus, the end of the Cold War signalled the start of a new era and 
was greeted with the hope that it would pave the way for greater world 
integration and a new level of international cooperation. The absence of 
superpower rivalry in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era led to a multipolar 
relationship among the major powers in the region."^^
Secondly, Russia, as a successor state to the former Soviet Union, had not 
become one of the most influential powers where the former Soviet Union 
exercised superpower status in the region. This led Russia to lose much of its 
influence and political leverage in countries such as North Korea, Vietnam and 
Mongolia in Northeast Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By contrast, 
during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96), China and Japan sought to enhance their 
political power as much as possible in the absence of Soviet influence in the 
region.^^
On regionalism, see Norman Palmer, The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific (Lexington, 
Mass; Lexington Books, 1991); L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell, Regionalism in World Politics: Regional 
Organisation and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Analiz tendentsii 
razvitiia regionov Rossii v 1991-1996 gg.: politicheskie orientatsii naseleniia regionov (Moscow: 
1997).
The concept of multilateralism as a replacement for bilateralism in Northeast Asian security matters 
was a reasonable by-product of the end of the Cold War. For the discussion of multilateralism in 
Northeast Asia, see Young-whan Kliil and Kongdan Oh, ‘From Bilateralism to Multilateralism in 
Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific’, Korea Observer, vol. 25, no. 3, 1994, pp. 395-419.
In particular, there is the strong tendency among its Asian neighbours to view China as a regional 
hegemonic power. The United States also views China as a countiy that needs to be watched in the 
wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. For an overview of power competition among the powers in 
the region in the post-Soviet era, see Suisheng Zhao, Dynamics o f Power Competition in East Asia: 
from the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1997).
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In this situation, Russia was not able to implement its regional interests in 
the region without other powers’ support (or cooperation)/^ Russia inevitably 
attempted to expand its multilateral dialogue with other states and was actively 
willing to engage in multilateral cooperation with regional states in the name of 
common prosperity and peace in the region. In this respect, the issue of the 
North Korean nuclear crisis and some regional economic issues (APEC and 
TRADP) in the APR clearly demonstrated how seriously Russia’s role in the 
region had been undermined and the degree to which this had affected its 
influence over the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.
At the level of regional analysis, the thesis argues that Russia had yet to 
find a solid place in Northeast Asia as one of the major political and economic 
powers during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96), thus demonsti'ating its reactive 
policy towards the Korean peninsula, although it sought to maintain and 
solidify its position as a key regional player in new circumstances. This 
emphasis upon regional issues will help us understand how and why Russia’s 
new role towards the Korean peninsula developed and changed in the post- 
Soviet era.
C. The Périodisation of Russia’s Foreign Policy Towards the Korean 
Peninsula
Another proposition of this thesis is that Russia’s foreign policy towards the 
Korean peninsula can best be examined through a series of chronological stages
Russia’s interests in Northeast Asia fall into two broad categories in the post-Soviet era: (1) regional 
security issues; and (2) regional economic issues. For a detailed account, see Mikliail L, Titarenko and 
Alexander G. Yakovlev, ‘Russia’s Asia-Pacific Policy in the New International Situation’, The Korean 
Journal o f International Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, 1993, pp. 97-114; Alexei D. Bogaturov, ‘Russia in 
Northeast Asia: Setting a New Agenda’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 17, no. 2, 1993, pp. 298-315; 
and R. Abazov, ‘Politika Rossii v ATP: smena paradigm’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezltdunarodnye 
otnosheniia, no. 2, 1997, pp. 23-34. It should be noted that, in particular, in a speech to the Chinese 
People’s Diplomacy Association in Beijing in January 1994, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev 
spelled out five principles underlying Russia’s policy in the APR. See Segodnia, 4 February 1994, p. 3.
2 2
in order to see more clearly the development of Russia’s Korean policy, which 
became gradually reactive during Yeltsin’s first presidential temi/^
As a matter of fact, foreign policies of any country at any time are rarely 
static. Normally they are in constant flux and sometimes experience profound 
change. This was especially true of Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin’s first 
presidential term. In reality, Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean 
peninsula constantly changed during each period based on its changing 
perceptions of national interests and foreign policy conceptions, together with 
the external environment.
By way of this chronological analysis, the thesis argues that Russia’s 
foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula can be divided into the following 
three stages: (1) Still New Political Thinking towards the Korean Peninsula 
(Dec. 91-Dec. 93); (2) Reformulating Russia’s New Foreign Policy Consensus 
towards the Korean Peninsula (Dec. 93-Dec. 95); and (3) Towards a Full-Scale 
Balanced Korean Policy (Dec. 95-Jul. 96).
It should be mentioned that these three distinct stages were mainly based 
on Russian elections, which had a fonnative role in developing Russia’s new 
foreign policy direction, not to mention its domestic policies (1) the Collapse
There were few studies attempted to focus gradual change in Russia’s Korean policy based on 
several stages. Moltz divided into the tlnee periods when explaining Russia’s Korean policy: (1) 
moving from an exclusive alliance with North Korea (1985-89); (2) a singular focus on relations with 
South Korea (1990-94); and (3) a policy of so-called dual engagement (1995-98), but it did not cover 
the full period of Yeltsin’s first presidential tenu (See Moltz, ‘Russia and the Two Koreas’, pp. 380- 
395. For an account of Soviet Korean policy, Zhebin dealt with the Soviet-North Korean relations 
during the period 1980-91 as follows: (1) 1980-82; (2) 1983-89; and (3) 1990-91 (See Zhebin, ‘Russia 
and North Korea’, pp. 726-739). Seung-ho Joo attempted to explain Gorbachev’s Korean policy by 
dividing tliree stages: (1) March 1985-Summer 1988; (2) Fall 1988-Summer 1990; and (3) Fall 1990- 
December 1991 (See Seung-ho Joo, ‘Soviet Policy toward the Two Koreas, 1985-1991: the New 
Political Thinking And Power’, Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 14, no. 2, 1995, pp. 23-46) 
Russian elections can be regarded as an integral part of tire fundamental transformation of a Soviet 
system into a democratic one. On the importance and functions of Russian elections, see Jon H. 
Pammett and Joan Debardeleben, ‘The Meaning of Elections in Transitional Democracies: Evidence 
from Russia and Ukraine’, Electoral Studies, vol. 15, no. 3, 1996, pp. 363-82; and Matthew Wyman, 
Stephen White and Sarah Oates, eds.. Elections and Voters in Post-Communist Russia (Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar, 1998). By contiast, elections during the Soviet period had served primarily to allow 
elites to maintain social contiol. On the procedures and functions of elections in the Soviet period, see 
Ronald Hill, ‘Continuity and Change in USSR Supreme Soviet Elections’, British Journal o f  Political 
Science, vol. 2, no. 1, 1972, pp. 47-68; G. Heimet, R. Rose and A. Rouquie, Elections without Choice 
(New York: Wiley, 1978); Victor Zaslavsky and Robert Brym, ‘The Functions of Elections in the
23
of the Soviet Union and Russian Refomiers (Dec. 91-Dec. 93); (2) the 
December 1993 Russian Parliamentaiy Election and Anti-Refoimers (Dec. 93- 
Dec. 95); and (3) the December 1995 Russian Parliamentary Election and 
Primakov (Dec. 95-Jul. 96).
In other words, to get to grips with the changing momentum of Russian 
foreign policy that helped shape Yeltsin’s policy towards the Korean peninsula, 
the present study emphasises the significant role of several Russian elections - 
where key elements of the new policy were hammered out and approved.
Furtheraiore, it should be emphasised that these three stages of Russian 
foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula indicated that there were several 
stages of Yeltsin’s ‘power consolidation’ in Russian politics. In other words, to 
a certain extent, Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula became reactive 
as a result of a power consolidation within the Russian leadership. 
Consequently, Yeltsin’s new Russian foreign policy led to the ‘polarisation’^^
USSR’, Soviet Studies, vol. 30, no. 3, 1978, pp. 362-71; Stephen White, ‘Noncompetitive Elections and 
National Politics: the USSR Supreme Soviet Elections of 1984’, Electoral Studies, vol. 4, no. 3, 1985, 
pp. 215-229; and Alex Pravda, ‘Elections in Communist Party States’, in Stephen White and Daniel N. 
Nelson, eds., Communist Politics: a Reader {LonAon: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 27-54.
By contrast, to get to grips with the changing momentum of Gorbachev’s Korean Policy that helped 
shape his active policy towards the Korean peninsula, this study emphasises to examine in detail the 
CPSU Party Congresses and Party Conference. Gorbachev’s Korean policy can be divided into the 
followings: (1) the 27"’ Party Congress and the Evolution of New Political Thinking (Spring 1985- 
Summer 1988); (2) the 19"’ Party Conference and the Activation of Soviet Korean Policy (Summer 
1988-Autumn 1990); and (3) the Continuation of New Political Thinking towards the Korean 
Peninsula (Autumn 1990-Winter 1991).
”  This led the polarisation of Russian foreign policy. Three main groups have emerged: (1) the radical 
liberals; (2) eurasians (close to the Centiists); and (3) neo-communist and an extremist right-wing 
(Jean-Francois Thibault and Jacques Levesque, ‘The Soviet Union/Russia: Which Past for Which 
Future?’, in Philippe G. Le Prestre, ed., Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in 
Transition [Montreal & Kingston, London, Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997], pp. 21- 
22). Olga Alexandrova divided Russian foreign policy as follows: (1) the westerners; (2) the Russian- 
nationalistic conceptional frame; (3) eurasianism; and (4) the geopolitical realism school of thought 
(Alexandrova, ‘Divergent Russian Foreign Policy Concepts’, pp. 363-372). Vladimir Lukin identified 
as follows: (1) ideological democratic internationalism; (2) antithetical to A and amounts to crude 
Russian chauvinism (more traditional); and (3) the third school searches for an enlightened 
understanding of Russia’s national interest based on the notion of ‘self-interest properly understood’ 
(Vladimir Lukin, ‘Our Security Predicament’, Foreign Policy, no. 88, 1992, p. 65). Arbatov divided 
Russian foreign policy as follows: (1) pro-western; (2) moderate liberal; (3) centrist and moderate- 
conservative; and (4) neo-communist and nationalist (Alexei Arbatov, ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy 
Alternatives’, International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, 1993, pp. 5-43). Zimmerman categorised four 
Russian foreign policy elites as follows: (1) market democrats; (2) market authoritarians; (3) social 
democrats; and (4) socialist authoritarians (William Zimmerman, ‘Markets, Democracy and Russian 
Foreign Policy’, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 10, no. 2, 1994, pp. 103-126). Russian scholars Sergei
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of the Russian leadership into refoimers and conseiwatives while demonstrating 
internal ‘power stmggles’ between them/^ The reformers consisted of his inner 
circle, reform-minded academics and intelligentsia, while the conservatives 
came primarily from the past Soviet-military-industry-party apparatus complex. 
The conseiwatives’ interests were adversely affected by Yeltsin’s reform 
policies, causing them to line up against Yeltsin and his policies. As a result, 
their different opinions and interests and the changes helped to bring about a 
new Russian policy towards the Korean peninsula.^'^
Based on these new approaches to Russia’s foreign policy towards the 
Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first presidential term, this study hopes to 
enable the existing fragmentary knowledge to become more substantive. It is 
believed that the contribution of this study is significant, since there are still 
few major works on this particular subject and period. These new approaches of 
Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first 
presidential teim (1991-96) will help us better understand how and why
Kortunov and Andrei Kortunov divided into two forces: (1) reds [red-browns]; and (2) anti­
communists (Sergei Kortunov and Andrei Kortunov, ‘From Moraiism to Pragmatics: New Dimensions 
of Russian Foreign Policy’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 13, no. 3, 1994, pp. 261-276). Paul Marantz 
divided as follows; (1) eurasianists; (2) ultianationalist; and (3) political moderates (Paul Marantz, 
‘Neither Adversaries nor Partners: Russia and the West Search for a New Relationship’, International 
Journal, vol. 49, no. 4, 1994, pp. 730-732). Leszek Buszynski categorised four Russian foreign policy 
groups: (1) pro-westem group; (2) the geopoliticians and geostiategists; (3) eurasianists; and (4) 
nationalists, neo-Bolsheviks and communists (Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the 
Cold War [Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1996], pp. 4-15).
For the domestic power struggle among Russian elite, see Gordon M. Hahn, ‘Russia’s Polarised 
Political Spectrum,’ Problems o f Post-Communism, vol. 43, no. 3, 1996, pp. 11-22; Glenn Chafetz, 
‘The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. I l l ,  no. 
4, 1996-97, pp. 661-688; and Virginie Coulloudon, ‘Elite Groups in Russia,’ Demokratizatsiaya, vol. 
6, no. 3, 1998, pp. 535-549. For example, for the power struggle in Russiair government aird the 
resulting changes in Russian foreign policy towards Moldova periodically, see Kate Litvak, ‘The Role 
of Political Competition and Bargaining hr Russian Foreign Policy: the Case of Russian Policy toward 
Moldova’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 29, no. 2, 1996, pp. 213-229. It should be 
mentiorred that there was the power struggle between the ministry of foreign affairs (Andrei Kozyrev) 
and the Security Council (Yuri Skokov) for the making of this Russian Foreign Policy Concept. The 
struggle between the Security Council’s Foreign Policy Commission and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs for authorship was a struggle for real and effective irrfluence orr the formation of foreign policy. 
For an account of behind-the-scenes battle for power between the Security Council and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, see Moskovskie novosti, 16 May 1993, pp. A8-A9.
For a discussion of the conflict between Yeltsin and the parliament, see Richard Sakwa, Russian 
Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1993), Chapter 2; and Ruslan Khasbulatov, The Struggle for 
Russia: Power and Change in the Democratic Revolution, in Richard Sakwa, ed. (London: Routledge, 
1993), esp. part III.
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Russia’s new role towards the Korean peninsula developed and changed in the 
post-Soviet era.
Those new approaehes to Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean 
peninsula during Yeltsin’s first presidential temi ultimately support the central 
premise of this thesis: ‘Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula became 
gradually reactive, although it did attempt to pursue an active Korean policy in 
the post-Soviet era’.
1.4. Chapter Overview and Sources
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents an overview of the 
study as a whole. It examines the importance of the present study setting out the 
questions on the study, and provides the research aims, literature review and the 
analytical framework.
Chapter 2 attempts to define the basic nature of each periodic 
Soviet/Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula based on power 
and policy changes in Soviet/Russian foreign policy-making. First, this chapter 
defines Russian/Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula up to the Cold War 
era (1860-1984) as ‘status quo’ (or ‘passive’). Secondly, this chapter describes 
Gorbachev’s Korean policy (1985-91) as an ‘active’ Soviet policy towards the 
Korean peninsula based on his power consolidation and policy changes in 
Soviet politics. Thirdly, this chapter attempts to explain the development of 
Yeltsin’s policy towards the Korean peninsula (1991-96) as a ‘reactive’ one 
based on his power consolidation and policy changes in Russian politics. This 
chapter provides a general overview of how Soviet/Russian policy towards the 
Korean peninsula developed.
Chapters 3 to 6 begin with brief historical reviews, before moving on to 
analyse each development during the Yeltisn’s first presidential term.
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Chapter 3 analyses how Russia’s new relations with North Korea 
developed and changed focusing on the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty in the post-Soviet era. The re-examination of the Treaty, one of the last 
relics of the Cold War in Northeast Asia, raised the question of how previous 
Soviet-allied relations based on the Cold War system changed into the new 
relations based on the post-Soviet system. It is argued that Russia’s policy 
towards North Korea during this period had to be reactive through several 
periodic stages, although it increasingly tried to establish a new and mutually 
beneficial relationship (from party-to-party relations to a normal state-to-state 
relations) whilst looking for a new legal foundation for their relations in the 
post-Soviet era.
Chapter 4 examines how Russia’s new relations with South Korea 
developed and changed, focusing on bilateral treaties between the two sides. In 
this respect, the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty in 1992 
demonstrated a new example of relations between the two sides during this 
transitional time. Furthermore, the conelusion of military related treaties 
between the two sides also demonstrated how far their relations could develop 
in the post-Soviet era. It is argued that Russia’s policy towards South Korea had 
to be reactive in several periodic stages, although Russia did emphasise its 
relations with South Korea on the Korean peninsula whilst looking for 
partnership-level relations in the post-Soviet era.
Chapter 5 examines how Russia’s regional security policy developed and 
changed, whilst focusing on the North Korean nuclear issue, which reflected its 
role and status in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era. The main focus of this 
chapter is to demonstrate how Russia has attempted to maintain its influence 
and role in the Korean peninsula. In addition, this chapter considers other major 
powers’ interests and their responses to Russia’s regional security policies and 
interests in the Korean peninsula. The chapter argues that Russia has yet to find 
a solid place in Northeast Asia as one of the major political powers during this 
period, thus demonstrating its reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula.
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Chapter 6 examines how Russia’s regional economic policy changed and 
developed, whilst focusing on the regional economic organisation (APEC) and 
the regional economic cooperation (TRADP), which reflected its economic role 
and status in the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era. The main focus of this 
chapter is how Russia has attempted to participate in regional economic 
cooperation and its organisation in the post-Soviet era. In addition, this chapter 
considers other major powers’ interests and their responses to those issues 
regarding Russia’s regional economic policies and interests in the Korean 
peninsula. The chapter argues that Russia has yet to find a solid place in 
Northeast Asia as one of the major economic powers during this period, thus 
proving its reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula although it sought to 
maintain and solidify its position as a key regional player under new 
circumstances in the post-Soviet era.
A brief summaiy of these chapters and a list of findings as well as some 
limitations of this study can be found in Chapter 7.
The present study employs materials from Russian, Japanese and Korean 
journals and newspapers, as well as the relevant Western literature. This thesis 
draws upon a variety of sources, both primary and secondary, including some 
historical archives, personal memoirs, military and eeonomic data, treaties and 
other official documents and published statements and speeehes by 
governmental officials in the West, North Korea, South Korea and Russia.
The principal sources of this study are statements of Soviet/Russian 
politieal, economic and military leaders, analysts and commentators. Daily 
newspapers from both Russia and Korea have been very important information 
sources for the purposes of my research. In addition, the following were very 
useful information sources: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-Daily Soviet Union and Russia 
and the CuiTent Digest of the Soviet/Post-Soviet Press (CDSP). Especially, the 
FBIS-Soviet Union (and later Russia) have provided me with a useful
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comprehensive chronological understanding of the development of Russia’s 
foreign policy and domestic policy as well.
These primary sources are also supplemented by information from the 
various journals and newspapers that have been published in the Korean, 
Russian and English languages.
To approach more closely the core of Russia’s intentions to the Korean 
peninsula, the author conducted a couple of interviews with senior 
academicians: Vyacheslav Amirov, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for 
Japanese and Pacific Studies at IMEMO and Chris Coward, Director of APEC 
Edunet at the University of Washington, Seattle. However, it must be noted that 
it was very difficult for me to have more direct contacts with Russian officials 
as a postgraduate. Consequently, many Soviet/Russian officials were not 
available. In addition, this study suffers from the limited availability of 
government documents for the most recent period.
Most of the information used for this research was collected in several 
places: (1) the University of Glasgow, UK; (2) the University of Melbourne, 
Australia; (3) the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, the Institute of Far 
Eastern Affairs and the Korean National Congress Library, Seoul, Korea; and 
(4) the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (University College 
London) and School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London) 
collection of Russian, Korean and Japanese newspapers and journals.
During the course of my research, I gave several papers about 
Soviet/Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula including: (1) 
‘Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula (1985-91)’ at the Department of Political 
Science at the University of Melbourne, Australia on 5 December 1995; (2) 
‘The Study of Soviet/Russian Policies towards the Korean Peninsula’ at the 
Politics Departmental Seminar at the University of Glasgow, UK on 9 March 
1998; and (3) ‘Russia and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis’ at the British 
Association for Slavonic and Eastern European Studies Annual Conference at 
Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge on 4 April 1998. The author will also be giving
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a paper, entitled ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy towards the Korean Peninsula under 
Yeltsin (1991-96)’, at the ICCEES VI World Congress in Tampere, Finland, on 
30 July 2000.
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Chapter 2
The Development of Soviet/Russian Foreign Policy 
Towards the Korean Peninsula:
From a Status Quo to Reactive Policy?
2.1. The Development of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union’s ‘Status 
Quo’ Korean Policy (1860-1985)
Imperial Russia’s policies towards the Korean Kingdom were based on 
‘imperialism’\  but did not seek greater influence on the Korean peninsula/ 
This meant that instead of an aggressive imperialistic policy, Imperial Russia 
pursued a ‘wait and see’ policy towards the Korean peninsula/ There were 
several reasons for this. First, of primary importance to Russian foreign policy 
in the Far East was the defence of Siberia and Manchuria against Japan and 
other Great Powers. Secondly, Imperial Russia’s policy towards the Korean
' Imperial Russia became part of Asia as a result of its eastward expansion from the 17th century. The 
most distinctive characteristic of Russian Imperialism in Asia was that it did not benefit from either 
capitalism or nationalism, the two elements that were widely held to be responsible for modem 
imperialism. On the whole, therefore, Russian activities in this region were not related to the search for 
a monopoly of markets. It did not fit the type of the Age of Imperialism (Sung-hwan Chang, ‘Russian 
Designs on the Far East’, in Taras Hunczak, ed., Russian Imperialism from the Ivan the Great to the 
Revolution [New Bmnswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974], p. 321).
 ^ Russia did not show any significant interest in the Korean peninsula (Seung-kwon Synn, ‘Imperial 
Russia’s Shategy and the Korean Peninsula’, Il-yung Chung, ed., Korea and Russia toward the 21st 
Century [Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1992], pp. 26-27).
 ^ Formal diplomatic relations and a Korea-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Connnerce were 
concluded on 7 July 1884 in Seoul, Korea. Eight years behind Japan (1876) and only after such 
countries as the US (1882), Britain and Germany had established diplomatic relations with Korea 
(Boris Pak, Rossiia i Koreia [Moscow: Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1979], pp. 58-60).
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peninsula could be attiibuted to its militaiy and financial weaknesses and the 
sheer distance of Russia from the Far East/
Imperial Russia’s interests in the Korean peninsula mainly derived from 
the latter’s geo-strategic importance rather than from any other factors in 
Russian foreign policy agenda. Russia’s need for a passage tlirough the Korean 
Straits was the prime motive for its actions on the Korean peninsula.^ By 
contrast, economic penetration into the Korean peninsula was not as important 
as a stiategic consideration. As a market, the Korean peninsula was all but 
ignored.^ In the meantime, Korea’s policy regarding Imperial Russia involved a 
desperate struggle to protect that countiy’s sovereignty through the 
maintenance of a balance of power among the Great Powers.^
However, as a result of victories in both the Sino-Japanese (1894-95) and 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05),^ Imperial Japan gained the dominant 
position on the Korean peninsula.^ The Korean peninsula was forced under
According to David Dallin, thr ee fundamental factors made up the framework of Russian policy in 
Asia during this period: (1) the great political vacuum in the vicinity of Russia’s eastern borders; (2) 
the peculiar configuration of Russia proper; and (3) the basic divergence in the recent evolution of 
China and Japan (David Dallin, The Rise o f Russia in Asia [London: The World Affairs Book Club, 
1950], p. 2).
 ^ Imperial Russia was interested in obtaining warm ports on the Korean peninsula. As Nicholas II 
wrote, ‘it is absolutely necessary that Russia should have a warm port which is free and open during 
the entire year. This port must be on the mainland (south-eastern Korea) and must be connected with 
our existing possessions by a strip of land’ {Krasnyi Arkhiv, 52 [1931], cited in Robert M. Slusser, 
‘Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1945-50: Stalin’s Goals in Korea’, in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, 
eds.. The Origins o f  the Cold War in Asia [Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977], p. 143).
® In the history of other empires, colonisation often proceeded from an economic to a political basis. 
But, in the history of the Russian Far East, the reverse was true. The region was first occupied and 
amiexed for politieal reasons: economic development occurred later (Dallin, The Rise o f Russia in Asia, 
p. 24).
’ Korea was forced to open by the Japanese power in 1876 and exposed to the stonn of interirational 
rivalry that raged around it. For a detailed accourrt of iirternational shirggle for control of Korea in late 
19"' century, see H. F. MacNair and D. F. Lach, Modern Far Eastern International Relations, 2"" ed. 
(Toronto, New York and Lorrdon: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1955).
® See I. I. Rostunov, ed., Istoriia russko-iaponskoi voiny 1904-1905 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1977); and 
V. A. Zolotarev and I. A. Kozlov, Russko-iaponskaia voina 1904-1905 gg. Bor'ba na more (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1990).
 ^According to Sung-hwan Chang, Imperial Russian-Korean relations can be roughly divided into three 
period: (1) the geographical neighbouring and an establislmient of Russian-Korean diplomatic 
Relations [1860-84]; (2) Russian policy towards Korea up to the Sino-Japanese War [1885-95]; and (3) 
Russian-Japanese rivalry over Korea and Russian-Japanese War [1896-1905] (Chang, ‘Russian 
Designs on the Far East’, pp. 299-302).
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Japanese colonial rule (1910-45) until the end of the Second World War.'® In 
short, the pattern of Russian involvement in the Korean peninsula prior to 1917 
was marked by an attempt to maintain influence on the Korean peninsula while 
denying any one power complete control over the Korean peninsula due to its 
geo-strategic importance.
After the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union supported North 
Korea’s position on the Korean question and refrained from any official 
contacts with South Korea. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not have a clear 
policy towards the Korean peninsula, attempting to maintain some influence 
over the region based on the Cold War system, while denying complete control 
over the peninsula to any one Great Power - especially the US. In other words, 
the Soviet Union aimed to maintain the status quo against US power in 
Northeast Asia during the Cold War era. This also demonstrated that the 
Korean peninsula was of relatively minor importance to the Soviet leaders as a 
principal area of Soviet foreign policy in the region. Even Soviet interests in 
North Korea were not a central concern for the Soviet leadership in its foreign 
policy agenda in Northeast Asia."
The Soviet Union considered North Korea’s position as a key variable in 
this region mainly in terms of its geo-strategic importance with an ideological 
aspect. On the one hand, with the beginning of the Cold War and the 
establishment of a communist regime in the northern part of the Korean 
peninsula, ideological ties with North Korea became a crucial concern of Soviet
Under Japanese colonial mle over the Korean peninsula (1910-45), the Soviet Union supported the 
national liberation movement in Korea and Korean nationalists accepted such support from the 
Socialist government. For a more detailed account of the early Korean communist movement and its 
interaction with Russian communists, see Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918- 
1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); and Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, 
Communism in Korea, Part I: the Movement (Berkeley, Cab: University of California Press, 1972).
" Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula was rather subordinate to its policies towards China, 
Japan and the US. Soviet strategies on the Korean peninsula should be viewed in the context of other 
Soviet commitments and concerns, whilst emphasising China, Japan and the US powers in Northeast 
Asia. According to Harold C. Hinton, ‘if the account stresses China in Northeast Asia, that is because it 
has been the most important of the three countries to Soviet policy-makers’ (Harold C. Hinton, ‘East 
Asia’, in Kurt L. London, ed., The Soviet Impact on World Politics [New York: Hawthorn Books, 
1974], p. 114).
33
foreign policy in Northeast Asia. Consequently, since the establishment of the 
North Korean communist regime in 1948 with the help of the Soviet Union, the 
survival of the Kim Il-sung’s regime had been of great concern to the world 
communist movement, especially to the Soviet U n i o n . T h e  Soviet Union, in 
this connection, wanted to form a satellite government that would faithfully 
execute its policies in Northeast Asia as did the puppet governments in Eastern 
Europe. On the other hand, the Soviet Union regarded Northeast Asia primarily 
in the context of the worldwide confrontation with the US during the Cold War 
era. Accordingly, the highest priority of Soviet foreign policy in the region had 
been placed on searching for strategic allies and reducing threats to Soviet 
security interests that originated fiom the rivalry with the US.’  ^ In this respect, 
the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict from the late 1950s onwards 
further enhanced North Korea’s strategic importance.'"^ The Soviet Union 
continued to view the Korean peninsula as of geo-strategic importance as 
Imperial Russia had done in the late 19"’ centuiy.
Nonetheless, it must he noted that Soviet-North Korean relations during 
the Cold War era changed constantly, reflecting Soviet domestic political
For the details of histoiy of communism in Korea, see Suh, The Korean Communist Movement.
Because of its location, historically the Korean peninsula has become an arena for an international 
competition. The Korean peninsula is located in the heart of the Northeast Asia, bordered by both the 
Soviet Union and China along the north and Japan 120 miles across the sea to the Southeast (Kyung- 
cho Chung, Korea Tomorrow: Land o f the Morning Calm [New York: Macmillan, 1961], p. 5). Basil 
Dmytryshyn lists five reasons for Soviet interest in the Korean peninsula from the geo-strategic 
perspective as follows: (1) in Soviet hands the area could serve to extend a Soviet semi-circle around 
Manchuria to intimidate or neutralise China as a great power; (2) Soviet domination of the peninsula 
would effectively remove American presence from the mainland of Asia; (3) such a development 
would give the Soviet Union powerful leverage (military, economic, diplomatic and psychological) to 
compel Japan to cooperate with Soviet designs in the Far East; (4) in their hands, Korea would provide 
many excellent warm-water ports to the Soviet fleet, thus giving the Soviet Union a nearly complete 
monopoly in the North Pacific; and (5) Soviet control of the entire Korean peninsula would place at 
their disposal rich human and natural resources to assist the economic development of the Soviet Fax- 
East—from Lake Baikal to the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk (Basil Dmyhyshyn, ‘Soviet Perceptions of 
South Korea’, Asian Perspective [Seoul], vol. 6, no. 2, 1982, p. 73).
Another important reason for the strategic importance of North Korea to the Soviet Union was 
China’s challenge Soviet hegemony in the world’s ‘Socialist Camp’ and its emergence as a major 
regional power in Northeast Asia, North Korea’s value was greatly enhanced in terms of Soviet 
security interests in the region. The Soviet perception of China became the dominant factor influencing 
its policies towards North Korea (Joseph M. Ha, ‘Soviet Perceptions of North Korea’, Asian 
Perspective [Seoul], vol. 6, no. 2, 1982, pp. 120-121),
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situation, together with the external input of the Cold War.'^ In this respect, two 
important domestic factors which influenced changes in Soviet policy towards 
the Korean peninsula should be considered: (1) the characteristics of Soviet 
foreign policy under successive leaders;'^ and (2) the positions taken by CPSU 
Party Congresses and by the 19"’ Party Conference on Soviet foreign policy.'^
A. Stalin’s ‘Status Quo’ Korean Policy (1945-53)
Up to the middle of 1953, Soviet influence over North Korea was greater than 
that of any other power in the region, primarily because of Stalin. It was Stalin 
who put Kim Il-sung in power in North Korea. Stalin was both a mentor and 
model for Kim Il-sung.'® Apart from Lenin, no other leader received the 
acclaim that Stalin did in North Korea.
Nevertheless, Stalin’s Korean policy was neither active nor well-designed. 
There were two good examples of his status quo policy towards the Korean 
peninsula. First, when Stalin defined his demands for Soviet gains in the Far
Donald Zagoria described Soviet-North Korean relations as the ‘strained alliance’, see Donald S. 
Zagoria, ‘Moscow and Pyongyang: tlie Strained Alliance’, in Young C. Kira and Abraham M, Halpern, 
eds., The Future o f  the Korean Peninsula (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 119-129. On problems 
between the Soviet Union and North Korea, see Nam-shik Kim, ‘Causes of Friction between North 
Korea and the Soviet Union’, Vantage Point, vol. 9, no. 8, 1986, pp. 1-10.
Bunce and Echols point out that ‘the study of Soviet politics is first and foremost a study of eras, 
periods associated with specific leaders doing specific things’ (Valerie Bunce and John Echols III, 
‘Pluralism or Corporatism?’, in Donald R. Kelley, ed., Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era [New York: 
Praeger, 1980], p. 1). For a more detailed account, see James M. Goldgeier, Leadership Style and 
Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1994).
Soviet Party Congresses tended to provide authoritative statements of Soviet perspectives on the 
current international and domestic situation, and to lay down both strategic and tactical lines for Soviet 
actions over the following years. Preparations for the Congresses involved enormous efforts on the part 
of virtually all major Soviet institutions-anticipated requirements were projected, were tlien 
coordinated and reconciled after considerable debate, and finally were embodied in the Congress 
speeches and resolutions, as well as in the Five-Year Plans which were approved at the Congresses. On 
the general role of the CPSU Party Congress, see Karl Ryavec, Soviet Society and the Communist Party 
(Amlierst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978). For the role of CPSU in the making of Soviet 
foreign policy, see V. L. Israelian, ed., Vneshniaia politika SSSR (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi 
literatuiy, 1965), pp. 3-33; and G. A. Aliev, ‘KPSS - znamenosets politiki mira’ i bezopasnosti 
narodov’, in A. L. Narocluiitskii, ed., Sovetskaia programma mira v deistvii (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 
pp. 7-24.
See Erik van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945-47 (Oxford: Berg, 1989).
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East following the defeat of Japan in 1945 as a return to Imperial Russia’s 
position prior to 1905, with regard to the Korean peninsula that meant not 
annexation of the peninsula but rather the establishment of some sort of 
influence among the competing Great Powers. Stalin postponed his long-term 
goal of communising the entire Korean peninsula and shifted his focus to a 
short-term goal, the establishment of a firm base in northern Korea, when he 
accepted Truman’s proposal to divide the Korean peninsula along the 38th 
parallel in August 1945.^" This meant that Stalin accepted the US proposal for 
the division of Korea rather than taking control of the entire peninsula in order 
to maintain good relations with Truman and to gain an equal voice in 
determining Japan’s future development.
The Korean War (1950-53) also provides another good example of Soviet 
status quo policy towards the Korean peninsula. In many respects, the Korean 
War could be described as the combination of ‘Kim Il-sung’s active initiative, 
Stalin’s reluctant support, and Mao’s agreement’ During the Korean War, 
Stalin died in March 1953. The height of Soviet influence in North Korea began 
and ended with Stalin.
B. Khrushchev’s ‘Status Quo’ Korean Policy (1954-64)
After Stalin’s death in 1953, the new Soviet leadership made certain 
adjustments to doctrines and strategies including its policy towards the Korean 
peninsula. While adhering to its former vision of the world based on a two- 
dimensional conflict between socialism and capitalism and the notion of
Wayne S. Kiyosaki, North Korea’s Foreign Relations: the Politics o f Accommodation, 1945-75 
(New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 33.
Slusser, ‘Soviet Far Eastern Poliey, 1945-50’, p. 138.
According to Sang-cho Lee, who was North Korea’s deputy chief of general staff at that time, ‘Kim 
Il-sung was the actual mastermind behind the war of National Liberation and he did his best to 
convince Stalin of the plan’s guaranteed success and received the latter’s go-ahead despite Stalin’s 
concern about the possibility of the US getting involved’ {Moscow News, no. 6, 6-12 July 1990, p. 13). 
Nikita Khrushchev also stressed that ‘the Korean War was started by North Koreans, upon Kim Il- 
sung’s initiative, and Stalin gave him support’ (N. S. Klimshchev, Vospominaniia: Vrernia, liudi, 
vlasti’, vol. 4 [Moscow: Moskovskie novosti, 1999], p. 164).
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unavoidable ideological struggle in international relations, Khrushchev started 
to emphasise ‘peaceful coexistence’^  ^with the West. On the Korean peninsula, 
this translated into a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to maintain the 
status quo against the US in Northeast Asia.
At this point, it should be noted that the 20"’ CPSU Party Congress in 
1956 greatly affected Soviet foreign as well as domestic policy, even towards 
the Korean peninsula.^® For instance, the aftermath of the 20"’ CPSU Party 
Congress and ‘de-Stalinisation’^ "' gave Kim Il-sung the opportunity to purge 
those who were hostile or neutral and to build a political network loyal only to 
him.^^ In many respects, the 20"’ CPSU Party Congress became a great turning 
point for Soviet-North Korean relations.^"
These ideological differences and Kim Il-sung’s disapproval of what 
was going on in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev did not help both countries 
develop close allied relations. For example, the abrupt cancellation of 
Khmshchev’s plan to visit North Korea in 1960 suggested that all was not well 
in Pyongyang-Moscow relations. Furthermore, ideological and political
On Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence, see N. S. Khmshchev, Mir bez oruzhiia - mir bez voiny 
(Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatuiy, 1960), pp. 44-63.
It should be noted that there were two more CPSU Party Congresses during the Klu-ushchev era. The 
2T‘ Paity Congress in 1959 was an 'extiaordinary’ congress, because it took place only tluee years 
after the spectacular 20"' Party Congress (for a detailed account, see Seweiyn Bialer, ‘The 2T' 
Congress and Soviet Policy’, Problems o f  Communism, vol. 8, no, 2, 1959, pp. 1-9). There was also the 
22"" CPSU Congress in 1961, which demonstrated growing discord and even a tug-of-war within the 
communist camp. For a more detailed account, see Richard Lowentlial, ‘The Congress and Its 
Aftermath’, Problems o f  Communism, vol. 11, no. 1, 1962, pp. 1-14). For the report of the CC of the 
CPSU to the 20"' Party Congress, see Pravda, 15 February 1956, pp. 1-11.
See Donald A. Filtzer, The Khrushchev Era: de-Stalination and the Limits o f Reform in the USSR, 
1953-1964 (Basingstoke; Macmillan, 1993).
There were several factions in North Korean politics up to the late 1950s known such as Soviet- 
faction, Yenan faction, Seoul faction and Marxist-Leninist group and so on. For a detailed account of 
factionalism in North Korea, see Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea.
For a more detailed analysis of changes in their relations, see Chong-sik Lee and Ki-wan Oh, ‘The 
Russian Faction in North Korea’, Asian Survey, vol. 8, no. 4, 1968, pp. 270-288; and Koon-woo Nam, 
The North Korean Communist Leadership, 1945-65: a Study o f Factionalism and Political 
Consolidation (Alabama; University of Alabama Press, 1974).
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conti'adictions developed between Moscow and Pyongyang, the latter 
eventually siding with China in the worsening Sino-Soviet dispute
In return, in 1962 Khrushchev cut off all economic aid to North Korea in 
an effort to blackmail that countiy into supporting the Soviet Union against 
Beijing in the early days of the Sino-Soviet conflict.^® This meant that in the 
Kremlin’s eyes, North Korea’s policies and plans looked quite adventurist. 
Finally, North Korea’s relations with the Soviet Union ebbed to their lowest 
point at the end of the Khrushchev era in 1964.^^
Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula under Khrushchev was not 
elaborated in a detailed and explicit doctrine. Nevertheless, North Korea still 
played a crucial role in Soviet stmtegic considerations. In other words, because 
of the strategic importance of North Korea, the Soviet Union did not expel 
North Korea from the socialist camp, and continued to provide the country with 
economic and military assistance. The Soviet Union could not afford to lose 
North Korea to its main rival in Northeast Asia, China.®" By contrast, 
Khrushchev continued to demonstrate a completely hostile attitude towards 
South Korea in spite of the relative cooling of relations with North Korea.
In general, the Soviet Union was in a difficult position in Northeast Asia 
in relation to the Sino-Soviet disputes during the Khrushchev era. But the 
Soviet Union would have been in a more difficult position in Northeast Asia if 
it had lost North Korea altogether.
For the details of this, see Chin 0 . Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's 
Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975 (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 
1978).
Donald S. Zagoria, ‘North Korea between Moscow and Beijing’, in Robert A. Scalapino and Jun-yop 
Kim, North Korea Today: Strategic and Domestic Issues (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1983), p. 352. For the details of Sino-Soviet conflict, see O, B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, Sovetsko- 
kitaiskie otnosheniia (Moscow: Mysl’, 1980); and Herbert J, Ellison, ed.. The Sino-Soviet Conflict: a 
Global Perspective (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1982).
In September 1963, Rodong Shinmün was openly criticising the Soviet Union, accusing the latter of 
having exploited North Korea economically and of practising ‘big power chauvinism’ and 
‘xenophobia’ {Rodong Shinmun [Pyongyang], 30 January 1963, p. 2).
Ralph N. Clough, ‘The Soviet Union and the Two Koreas’, in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy 
in East Asia (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 187.
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c. Brezhnev’s ‘Status Quo’ Korean Policy (1964-82)
Relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea changed rapidly after 
October 1964 when Khrushchev was succeeded by Brezhnev and Kosygin as, 
respectively, first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chahman of 
the USSR’s Council of Ministers. This marked the beginning of a move to 
improve the badly deteriorated relationship between the two sides. As early as 
September 1965, Brezhnev, in his speech at a CPSU Central Committee 
Plenum, was able to report that ‘interstate and inter-party contacts and ties 
between the Soviet Union and North Korea [had] been considerably 
strengthened’.®' A change in Soviet-North Korean relations was also signalled 
by the visit of a high-level Soviet delegation led by Premier Kosygin to 
Pyongyang in Februaiy 1965.®^  As regards improved Soviet-North Korean 
relations during this period, it should be also mentioned here that Brezhnev, in 
his report to the 23rd CPSU Party Congress in 1966,®® declared that ‘the CPSU 
and the Soviet people fully support the fraternal Korean people, who are 
struggling against US imperialism for the unification of Korea’.®"'
Nonetheless, Soviet-North Korean relations once again deteriorated in the 
second half of the 1960s, with the hijacking of the Pueblo (a US Navy ship) in 
Januaiy 1968 and the shooting down of a US EC-121 reconnaissance aircrart in 
April 1969. The Soviet leadership did not support North Korea’s aggressive 
actions against the US because peace and stability in the Korean peninsula 
remained key themes of Soviet foreign policy pronouncements in the second 
half of the decade.®®
Pravda, 30 September 1965, p. 2.
During his visit, Kosygin emphasised that his puipose was to seek strengthen the relationship 
between the two countries tlnough ‘an exchange of opinions on the question of the international 
situation and other problems of concern to our Parties and our countr ies’ (Izvestiia, 13 February 1965,
p. 1).
On the 23‘" CPSU Party Coirgress, see XXIII s ”ezd Kommtmisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: 
Stenograficheskii otchet, 2 volumes (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatuiy, 1966); and 
Materialy X X IIIs”ezda KPSS (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatuiy, 1966).
Pravda, 30 March 1966, p. 2.
For a more detailed account of this, see Chapter 3.1.
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Brezhnev did not want another war on the Korean peninsula, but 
attempted to bring North Korea back from its new-found relationship with 
China. This meant that North Korea was still perceived in primarily strategic 
rather than ideological terms: as a Far Eastern outpost in the overall picture of 
the Soviet Union’s confrontation with the US in the region. Indeed, North 
Korea’s stiategic importance in the region was of primary importance to the 
Soviet Union, overriding the ideological conflicts between them. Nevertheless, 
the Soviet leadership did not accept North Korea’s Juche (self-reliance) 
doctrine.®^
It should be noted that there were three more CPSU Party Congresses that 
led to changes in Soviet foreign policy during the Brezhnev era. The 24'" CPSU 
Party Congress in 1971 set forth a ‘Peace Programme’ in the field of Soviet 
foreign policy.®  ^In these circumstances, notably in the 1970s, for the first time, 
the Soviet Union and South Korea made personal contact at the unofficial and 
non-political level.®® In a sense, the Soviet Union was attempting to use the 
‘South Korean Card’ against North Korea as a hedge against closer ties
In the middle of the Sino-Soviet conflict, North Korea concluded that there was no more utility in 
Mai-xism-Leninism and began to formulate its own ideology. North Korea, however, had no deep 
theoretical tradition of socialist thought. This lack of solid foundation in philosophy resulted in the 
emergence of the Juche idea (self-reliance), a distorted version of Marxism. There were certain 
elements of Juche idea that mn encounter to the Mai-xist-Leninist tradition, with the element of 
nationalism being particularly problematic. For a detailed account of North Korea’s Juche idea, see 
Kim Il-sung, On Juche in Our Revolution: [selection from the author’s writings, speeches and reports, 
1931-1966] vol. 1 (New York: Weekly Guardian Associate, 1977); and Song-jun Yi, The 
Philosophical Principle o f  the Juche Idea (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Language Pub. House., 1986).
”  Its main puipose was, relying on the might, solidarity and activeness of world socialism and on its 
strengthening alliance with all progressive and peace-loving forces, to bring about a change of 
direction in the development of international relations. On the 24''’ CPSU Party Congress, see XXIV 
s ”ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: Stenograficheskii otchet, 2 volumes (Moscow: 
Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1971); and Materialy XXIV s ”ezda KPSS (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
politicheskoi literatury, 1971).
Détente between the US and the Soviet Union and rapprochement between the US and China in the 
early 1970s provided favourable circumstances for Soviet-South Korean contacts. By the same token, 
South Korean President Park Chung-hee’s Peace initiative on 23 June 1973 towards all Communist 
countries including North Korea also contributed to the process of reconciliation between Seoul and 
Moscow. This declaration was a turning point in the diplomatic policy of South Korea. Though South 
Korea did not abandon its anti-communist policy, it would nevertheless establish diplomatic relations 
with communist countries. It seemed that the time for détente had finally arrived on the Korean 
peninsula. In this respect, the author would like to divide the development of Soviet-South Korean 
relations roughly into tlnee stages: (1) hostile relations (1945-71); (2) restricted unofficial non-
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between North Korea and China. However, the mood of détente between the 
Soviet Union and South Korea ended when the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979 after the 25'" CPSU Party Congress in 1976,®  ^ at which 
Brezhnev had addressed such strains in US-Soviet relations as the Cuban 
intervention in the Angolan civil war and the apparent US role in the overthrow 
of Chile’s elected Marxist President Salvador Allende. As a result, the Soviet 
Union reverted to a pro-North Korean policy on the Korean peninsula. During 
the 26'" CPSU Party Congress in 1981 Brezhnev reshuffled his programme, but 
it remained largely a conservative one."'"
D. Andropov and Chernenko’s ‘Status Quo’ Korean Policy (1982-85)
As compared with Brezhnev’s late pro-North Korean policy, no substantial 
changes in Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula were made under either 
Yuri Andropov or his successor Konstantin Chernenko during the first half of 
the 1980s. Rather, it was a period of the new Cold War and the importance of 
North Korea to the Soviet Union was enhanced.
Kim Il-sung’s visit to the Soviet Union in May 1984 reinforced Soviet- 
North Korean relations. As a result, for example, the Soviet Union began to
governmental contacts (1972-84); and (3) approaching each other closely and finally establishing 
diplomatic relations (1985-91).
On the 26"' Party Congress, see XXV s ”ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: 
Stenograficheskii otchet, 3 volumes (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1976); and 
Materialy X X V s”ezda KPSS (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1976).
The 26"’ Party Congress convened at a time of change in the Soviet Union’s domestic and 
international situation. Richard Coffman and Michael Klecheski described this congress as ‘the Soviet 
Union in a time of uncertainty’ (Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson, eds., Russia at the Crossroads: 
the 26”' Congress o f the CPiS'iY [London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982], pp. 192-219). While tlie 26"' 
Party Congress showed some recognition of the changing international and domestic environment, its 
attempt to grapple with the resulting issues was minimal. For a more detailed discussion of the 
changing circumstances under which the 26"' Party Congress was held, see Bialer and Gustafson, 
Russia at the Crossroads; Boris Meissner, ‘The 26"' Party Congress in Febmary 1981 and Soviet 
Domestic Politics’, Problems o f Communism, vol. 30, no. 3, 1981, pp. 1-23; and Aleksandr 
Tomashevskii, XXVI s ”ezd KPSS o razvitom sotsialisticheskom obshchestve: v pomoshch’ lektoru 
(Leningrad: ‘Znanie’, 1982).
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provide North Korea with advanced weapons and militaiy equipment, as well 
as economic and technological assistance/'
Nevertheless, it should be noted that a growing understanding of the need 
to reconsider policies regarding Korean affairs began to be detected in 
academic and political circles in the Soviet Union during this period. People 
began to speak (albeit only behind closed doors) in favour of more open, non- 
official ties with South Korea. Advocates of this policy argued that non-official 
ties would loosen the linkages between Seoul and Washington, ease tension on 
the Korean peninsula, and satisfy Soviet economic n e e d sIm p ro v e d  relations 
between the Soviet Union and South Korea, however, were not apparent during 
this period (Andropov and Chernenko), mainly as a result of the ‘KAL 007’ 
incident in late 1983."'®
2.2. The Development of Gorbachev’s Active Korean Policy (1985-91): 
Power and Policy Changes within the Context o f the New Political Thinking
Under Gorbachev’s leadership (1985-91) Soviet policy towards the Korean 
peninsula underwent a profound change, giadually evolving from a
For a more detailed analysis of Soviet-North Korean relations during this period, see Hak-joon Kim, 
‘Changes in the Soviet Union under Andiopov: Their Impact on International Politics and the Korean 
Peninsula’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 7, no. 1, 1983, pp. 21-39; and Suck-ho Lee, ‘Evolution and 
Prospect of Soviet-North Korean Relations in the 1980s’, Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 5, 
no, 3, 1986, pp. 19-34.
In this respect, the Soviet Union increasingly acknowledged South Korea’s remarkable economic 
achievements. For example, an article dealing with MNCs (Multinational Corporations) in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and South Korea was published m the Soviet Union. The author stated that the dynamic 
expansion of operations by these MNCs had resulted in the emergence of a fresh centre of economic 
power in the Far East (See A. Bereznoy, ‘Multinational Companies of Hong Kong, Taiwan and South 
Korea’, Far Eastern Affairs [Moscow], no. 1, 1983, pp. 180-189).
KAL (Korean Airline) Flight 007 was shot down by a Soviet Air Force Fighter in 1983, killing all 
269 passengers. For an analysis of the KAL incident, see Alexander Dallin, Black Box: KAL 007 and 
the Superpower (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985); David Pearson, 
KAL 007: the Cover-Up (New York: Summit Books, 1987); Jolm Lepingwell, ‘New Soviet Revelations 
about KAL 007’, RFE/RL, vol. 3, no. 17, 26 April 1991, pp. 9-15; G. M. Kornienko, Kholodnaia 
voina: Svidetel’stvo ee uchastnika (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), pp. 210-233; and 
Michel Brun, Incident at Sakhalin: the True Mission o f KAL 007 (New York: Four Walls Eight 
Windows, 1995).
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conventional pro-North Korean policy towards one centred more on South 
Korea, finally establishing diplomatic relations with that country in 1990. This 
demonstrated that for the first time the Soviet Union under Gorbachev took an 
‘active’ policy towards the Korean peninsula, and became the first major power 
to recognise the two Koreas on the Korean peninsula."’"'
From the late 1980s onwards, South Korea became one of the major Asian 
countries in Gorbachev’s ‘New Political Thinking’. Indeed, building up 
diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1990 became one of the priorities of 
the Soviet Union’s APR policy, together with the normalisation of relations 
with China."'® In this respect, the Korean peninsula became a more ‘independent 
factor’ in Soviet foreign poliey under Gorbachev, although the impact of his 
‘New Political Thinking’ on Soviet policy on the Korean peninsula was still 
largely a function of intricate and shifting relationships between the Soviet 
Union and the three major powers in Northeast Asia.
Gorbachev’s Asian poliey should be seen in the context of an effort to 
create a regional environment suited to the central goals of perestroika!^^ The
Changes in Soviet foreign policy during the Gorbachev era can be summarised as follows: (Î) 
functional changes - from the party apparatus to the state organs; (2) personnel changes - from old 
thinkers to new thinkers; (3) growing importance of academics in Soviet foreign policy-making; and 
(4) New Political Thinking. For a more detailed discussion of these changes, see Archie Brown, 
‘Change in the Soviet Union’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 64, no. 5, 1986, pp. 1048-1065; Mikhail 
Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira (Moscow: Politizdat, 
1988); Stephen M, Meyer, ‘The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking on 
Security’, in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, eds., Soviet Militaiy 
Policy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989); Eduard Shevardnadze, The World Has Become a Safer 
Place (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1989); and Oleg Nikolayevich Bykov, ‘The Concept of 
Peaceful Coexistence in Light of the New Thinking’, in Steve Hirsch, ed., MEM02: Soviets Examine 
Foreign Policy for a New Decade (Washington, D. C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1991), pp. 183- 
200 .
However, it should be noted that the outcome of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking towards 
Northeast Asia was not, as Gorbachev had expected, successful in the whole region. In contiast to the 
Korean case, the New Political Thinking did not make any remarkable achievements towards Japan 
due to deep-rooted, unresolved bilateral problems such as the Northern (Kurile) Islands dispute 
between the two countries. See Suzamie Crow, ‘The Soviet-Japanese Summit: Expectations 
Unfulfilled’, RFE/RL, vol. 3, no. 17, 26 April 1991, pp. 1-4. It should be even noted that there were 
domestic struggle over Kurile Islands, see Stephen Foye, ‘The Struggle over Russia’s Kurile Islands 
Policy’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 36, 11 September 1992, pp. 34-40; and V. K. Zilanov, et al., Russkie 
Kurily: Istoriia i sovremennost’ (Moscow: Sampo, 1995).
On the goals and strategies of the Gorbachev’s Asian policy, see Henry Trofimerrko, ‘Long-Term 
Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: a Soviet Evaluatiorr’, Asian Survey, vol. 29, no. 3, 1989, pp. 249-
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declining economic capability of the Soviet Union was perceived by Gorbachev 
as the most serious threat to its long-term security, and this perception forced 
him to adopt economic reform as his top priority. This led to a tendency in 
Soviet foreign policy to emphasise the APR with a decreasing ideological and 
strategic role, whilst simultaneously emphasising économie factors. 
Consequently, the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations and détente with the 
US led the Soviet Union to diminish North Korea’s strategic and ideological 
value to its foreign policy."'^
In these circumstances, Gorbachev’s leadership adopted a more 
‘pragmatic’ (or ‘active’) approach that would be more beneficial to the Soviet 
Union’s economic interests in the Korean peninsula. South Korea, in this 
connection, appeared to be one of the most attractive economic partners for the 
Soviet economy."'® As a result, the Soviet Union began to show more interest in 
South Korea than North Korea for the first time in its histoiy.
However, it should be noted here that Gorbachev’s active policy towards 
the Korean peninsula developed aecording to the power consolidation between 
conservatives and reformers in Soviet politics."'^ The refoimers consisted of 
Gorbachev, his inner circle, reform-minded academics and members of the 
intelligentsia, while the conservatives came primarily h'om the Soviet-military- 
industry-party complex. The conservatives were ideologically opposed to his 
reform policies, causing them to line up against him and his policies. They 
resisted and obstructed his refomi policies, including new foreign policy, in
250; and Charles E. Ziegler, ‘Soviet Sti'ategies for Development: East Asia and the Pacific Basin’, 
Pacific Affairs, vol. 63, no. 4, 1991, pp. 451-468.
For an account of the ideological factor in Soviet foreign policy during the Gorbachev era, see Sylvia 
Woodby, Gorbachev and the Decline o f Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, San Francisco, 
and London: Westview Press, 1989),
The idea of building economic relations with South Korea had been considered by the Soviet 
leadership. As Shipayev, senior scientific associate in the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies 
Institute, stated, ‘it must be admitted that this question of the possibility of economic relations with 
South Korea has been coming to a head for a long time. The overwhelming majority of European 
Socialist countries have now built economic relations with South Korea... I have absolutely no doubt 
that the Soviet Union could also derive considerable benefit from this kind of cooperation’ 
{Komsomol'skaiapravda, 25 October 1988, p. 3).
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order to protect their vested interests, interests that had long been nurtured 
under the old Soviet system.®"
As a result, Gorbachev’s Korean policy was also made in the context of 
shifting, overlapping coalitions of leaders bargaining with one another for 
mutual advantage.®' This in turn led to changes in both domestic and foreign 
policy. The reformers needed to establish a fiim power base and maintain 
widespread support within the Kremlin leadership before initiating new policies 
such as Soviet-South Korean noraialisation. They wanted to remove the 
ideological mist which shrouded relations between the two Koreas for many 
decades. Their views implied that North Korea was one of the last remnants of 
Stalinism on the globe. By contrast, the conservatives insisted on fully 
supporting North Korea as an ally, and recognising South Korea as a puppet of 
‘US imperialism’ in Northeast Asia. This indicated that the Soviet-South 
Korean normalisation in 1990 reflected the reformers’ view that this was an 
integral component in the overall restructuring of Soviet domestic policy. It was 
also a key element in Gorbachev’s successful consolidation of power, the 
establishment of New Political Thinking over the conservatives, and the re­
establishment of its role in the international community.
Gorbachev’s Korean policy can be divided into the following three 
stages.®^
For a detailed account of the general development of Soviet politics during the Gorbachev era, see 
Stephen White, Gorbachev and After (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Under Gorbachev, political power and reform policy were intrinsically intenelated because power 
was a prerequisite for tlie implementation of reforms whose success or failure in turn could enhance or 
erode his power. Perestroika’s opponents resisted Gorbachev and his reforms. The basic problem of the 
struggle against perestroika came down to the issue of power. For a more detailed account of the power 
struggle between Gorbachev and his opponents, see Baruch A. Hazan, Gorbachev and His Enemies: 
the Struggle for Perestroika (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990); G. Kli. Shakhnazarov, Tsena 
svobody: reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika (Moscow: Rossika Zevs, 1993); and 
Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn ' i reformy, vol. 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1995).
For instance, the Soviet-South Korean normalisation in 1990 could be explained by the outcome of 
‘political bargaining’ or ‘power struggling’ between conseiwatives and reformers in Soviet foreign 
policy over the Korean issue, linked to Gorbachev enhancing his power position within the leadership.
By contrast, to get to grips with the changing momentum of Gorbachev’s Korean policy that helped 
shape his active policy towards the Korean peninsula, this study emphasises to examine in detail the 
CPSU Party Congresses and Party Conference - where key elements of the new policy were hammered 
out. Especially, the 27"’ CPSU Party Congress in 1986 and the 19"’ Party Conference in 1988 had a
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A. Still Old Thinking Towards the Korean Peninsula? (Spring 1985- 
Summer 1988): The 27th Party Congress and the Evolution o f  New Political 
Thinking
During this period, Soviet policy on the Korean issue was formed in a 
conventional framework, with a tilt towards North Korea. This indicated that 
the time for the implementation of New Political Thinking towards the Korean 
peninsula in Northeast Asia had not yet arrived. Rather, it was a period of the 
evolution of New Political Thinking after the 27'" Congress of the CPSU in 
February 1986.®®
The basic message of Gorbachev’s speech upon his election to the post of 
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was the ‘continuity’®"' of 
previous Soviet policy. Thus, neither the internal and external conditions 
required for a new policy towards the Korean peninsula were in place. 
Internally, the conservative communist-dominated faction of ‘old thinkers’ 
remained largely intact. Externally, a Cold War atmosphere still prevailed on
great role in the changing momentum of Gorbachev’s domestic and foreign policy, because there were 
close links between them. On the linkage between Soviet foreign policy and internal politics, see Jolm
A. Amstrong, ‘The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy’, International Affairs (London), vol. 41, 
no. 1, 1965, pp. 37-47; and Erik Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., eds.. The Conduct o f  Soviet 
Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971).
The 27"’ CPSU Party Congress in Febmary 1986 had a special role to play in determining the 
strategy and tactics of the domestic and foreign policies pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet state. For 
instance, at the 27"’ CPSU Party Congress, Gorbachev introduced New Political Thinking as a 
comprehensive part of the basic framework of Soviet foreign policy. In his opening address, 
Gorbachev stated that ‘the situation has reached a turning point not only in internal but also in external 
affairs. Changes in current world development are so profound and so significant that they require 
rethinking and complex analysis of all factors. The situation of nuclear confrontation calls for new 
approaches, methods and foims of relations between the different social systems, states and regions’ 
(Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘Politicheskii doklad Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS XXVII s”ezdu 
Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza’, in Materialy XXVII s e ”zda Kommunisticheskoi 
Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986), p. 4. On the policy changes after the 27"’ CPSU Party 
Congress, see Jerry F. Hough, ‘Gorbachev Consolidatmg Power’, Problems o f  Communism, vol. 36, 
no. 4, 1987, pp. 21-43; and Vladimir Shlapentokli, ‘The 27"’ Congress - a Case Study of the Shaping of 
a New Party Ideology’, Soviet Studies, vol. 40, no. 1, 1988, pp. 1-20.
For example, Gorbachev stated in his speech at the extiaordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum 
in March 1985 that ‘... the stiategic line collaborated at the 26"’ Congress and subsequent CPSU 
Cential Committee plenums has been and remains immutable. This is the line of accelerating the socio­
economic development of the Soviet Union... It is a clear and consistent course of peace and progress. 
The Soviet Union and the CPSU, proceeding from the fact that a principled policy is the only conect
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the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia. Gorbachev continued to pursue his 
predecessor’s policy of improving relations with North Korea as a means of 
boosting the Soviet presence in the region with the signing of a bilateral 
agreement with North Korea in December 1985.®®
Gorbachev’s early Korean policy, with its tilt towards North Korea, was 
quite understandable if three points are taken into account. First, the Korean 
peninsula was not still the central focus of Gorbachev’s Asian policy. The re­
establishment of relations with China, Japan and the US were more urgent 
problems. Secondly, from the late 1970s onwards, a new strategic environment 
began to develop in Northeast Asia. China concluded a peace and friendship 
treaty with Japan in 1978 and normalised its relations with the US in 1979. In 
this situation, the Soviet Union perceived that the stmtegic balance was rapidly 
shifting against it, and sought to improve relations with North Korea. Thirdly, 
and more significantly, the Soviet conservatives’ attitude towards the Korean 
peninsula was not modified.
Soviet reform policies had not yet influenced its relations with the Korean 
peninsula. As a result, the Soviet Union continued to support North Korea’s 
stance due to its strategic and ideological importance, and political, military and 
economic co-operation were intensified.®" In contrast to the strengthening of
policy, will continue to firmly follow the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexistence’ (Pravda, 
13 March 1985, p. 5).
Gorbachev’s early Korean policy was characterised by the intensification of established 
commitments to North Korea which were set in the final communiqué issued at the end of Kim Il- 
sung’s 1984 visit to Moscow. In the communiqué, both sides agreed on the necessity of strengthening 
economic ties and security in the Far East and pacific zone in the light of ‘US militarist tendencies and 
rearmament policies in Japan’ (Michael William, ‘North Korea: Tilting towards Moscow’, World 
Today, vol. 40, no. 10, 1984, p. 403). For details of good Soviet-North Korean relations during this 
period, see Dae-sook Suh, ‘North Korea in 1986: Strengthening the Soviet Connection’, Asian Survey, 
vol. 27, no. 1, 1987, pp. 56-63. According to Gelman, the relations between the Soviet Union and 
North Korea during this period was ‘the heritage of the past’ (Hany Gelman, ‘Gorbachev’s Policies in 
East Asia after Two Years’, Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 1988, pp. 47-49).
Soviet Asian strategy in the first timee years of Gorbachev’s mle reflected five principal objectives:
(1) maintaining and strengthening tiaditional close relations witli friends and allies; (2) accelerating the 
process of political rapprochement with China, with the ultimate aim of bringing China back into the 
socialist fold on Moscow’s terms; (3) pursuing broader ties with the non-socialist countries of the 
region, leading with steps in the economic sphere; (4) downplaying the military factor; and (5) 
continuing to challenge US pre-eminence in the region (Stephen M. Young, ‘Gorbachev’s Asian 
Policy: Balancing the New and the Old’, Asian Survey, vol. 28, no. 3, 1988, pp. 318).
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relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea, there was still no change 
in official relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea. In other words, 
despite South Korea’s many efforts to attiact the Soviet Union’s attention, the 
Soviet Union did not respond with any positive signals.®^
Nevertheless, in some respects, it was a transitional period in Soviet 
policy towards the Korean peninsula as the conseiwatives and reformers were 
gradually vying for influence over foreign policy after the 27'" Congress of the 
CPSU. Gorbachev and his refoimers gradually started to view South Korea as a 
potential economic partner in Northeast Asia that could facilitate domestic 
economic reform.®® This indicated that Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking 
vis-à-vis South Korea, being formulated at a new ‘conceptual level’, mainly 
originated from Soviet domestic economic needs. Soviet policy towards South 
Korea was shifting in this reason from non-recognition to de facto recognition 
while demonstrating a flexible and pragmatic attitude, especially in the field of 
trade and economic co-operation. However, it should be noted that supporters 
of the two contradictory positions co-existed, adding confusion and ambiguity 
to Soviet policy towards Northeast Asia, particularly towards the Korean 
peninsula during the early years of Gorbachev’s rule.
For example, in the speech delivered at the Kwanhoon Club in Seoul in March 1987, South Korea’s 
foreign minister Kwang-soo Choi stated that ‘we have steadily pursued an open-door policy towards 
the Soviet Union’ (Kwang-soo Choi, ‘The Situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the Surrounding 
Region and Korea’s Foreign Policy Direction’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 11, no. 2, 1987, p. 227).
The Soviet Union’s willingness to establish economic ties with South Korea was expressed by many 
Soviet officials and academics before the Krasnoyarsk declaration, which was delivered in the summer 
of 1988. For example, amid reports of increasing indirect trade between Moscow and Seoul, Ernest 
Obminsky, the head of the Soviet foreign miiiistiy’s directorate for international economic relations, 
stated on 25 March 1988 that ‘the flow of goods and services is much internationalised at present, so it 
would be impossible to exclude the South Korean element’ (Sophie Quinn-Judge, ‘Olympic Overtures; 
Relations between Soviets and South Korea Improve’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 April 1988, 
p. 38).
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B. The Implementation of New Political Thinking Towards the Korean 
Peninsula? (Summer 1988-Autumn 1990): The 19th Party Conference and 
the Activation o f Soviet Korean Policy
During this period, Soviet Korean policy was no longer based solely upon 
North Korea’s own stance. Instead, for the first time throughout the whole 
history of Soviet-Korean relations, the Soviet Union started to emphasise 
relations with South Korea based on New Political Thinking. As a result, 
Soviet-South Korean relations rapidly developed from non-political to political 
relations. Yet, Soviet-North Korean relations deteriorated as Gorbachev’s new 
policy placed less emphasis on traditional ideological, sti'ategic and military 
ties with North Korea.®^
It was a period of implementation of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking 
towards the Korean peninsula on the basis of his successful power 
consolidation in Soviet domestic politics through the 19'" Party Conference."" 
After the Conference in the middle of 1988, which was used to create a climate 
of opinion favourable to political reform, to authorise institutional changes and
Soviet-North Korean relations deteriorated rapidly after the 19"' Party Conference in the summer of 
1988. There were several signs of worsening relations between the two sides. The main reasons for this 
deterioration were: (1) diverging Soviet foreign policy orientations after the 19"’ Party Conference; (2) 
the successful 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and South Korea’s Northern Policy; (3) events in Eastern 
Europe in 1989; (4) démocratisation of Soviet society; and (5) Soviet-South Korean normalisation in 
1990.
The 19"’ Party Conference endorsed Gorbachev’s plan for restructuring tire Central Party apparatus. 
For a more detailed account of the Conference, see Baruch A. Hazan, Gorbachev and His Enemies, pp. 
166-211; Michel Tatu, '19"’ Party Conference’, Problems o f Communism, vol. 37, no. 3-4, 1988, pp. 1- 
15; and Stephen White, ‘Gorbachev, Gorbachevism and the Party Conference’, in Walter Joyce, Hillel 
Ticktin and Stephen White, eds., Gorbachev and Gorbachevism (London: Cass, 1989), pp. 127-160. A 
form of pluralism within the CPSU may be argued to have existed in practice in the summer and 
autumn of 1990, and had existed more or less openly since the 19"’ Conference in the summer of 1988. 
See Ronald Hill, ‘The CPSU: from Monolith to Pluralist?’, Soviet Studies, vol. 43, no. 2, 1991, pp. 
217-235. It should be also noted tliat the 28"’ CPSU Party Congress held in July 1990 differed 
substantially from earlier CPSU party congress insofar as the CPSU had previously relinquished its 
power monopoly. Party Congress resolutions, therefore, no longer represented a binding general line 
for the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union. In spite of Gorbachev’s weakening position, 
the 28"’ Party Congress of the Soviet Union confirmed its previous New Political Thinking towards the 
Korean peninsula. For an account of the 28"’ CPSU Party Congress, see Boris Meissner, ‘The XXVIII 
CPSU Party Congress: Domestic and Foreign Policy’, Aussenpolitik, vol. 42, no. 1, 1991, pp. 37-47; 
John Gooding, ‘The 28"’ Congress of the CPSU in Perspective’, Soviet Studies, vol. 43, no. 2, 1991, pp. 
237-253; and Ronald Hill, ‘The Politics of the CPSU Congress’, The Journal o f  Communist Studies, 
vol. 7, no. 1, 1991, pp. 95-105.
49
to dislodge conseiwatives from the Central Committee apparatus,"' the Soviet 
Union officially pursued a ‘two Korean’"^  policy or an ‘active even-handed 
approach’"® aimed at maintaining good relations with both Koreas on the 
Korean peninsula.
Thus, Soviet-Korean relations during this period should be understood as 
incorporating the following assumptions: ‘the Soviet Union vigorously 
emphasised economic ties with South Korea with remarkable speed, as well as 
maintaining good security relations with North Korea’. Nevertheless, by early 
1990, the Soviet Union showed no sign of seeking a full diplomatic 
normalisation with South Korea. As regards its relations with South Korea, the 
Soviet Union continued to express the view that economic relations should 
develop first and that political relations would naturally follow. In other words, 
the Soviet Union still continued to ‘separate politics and economics’ to avoid 
provoking North Korea.""'
Finally, in New York in September 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze met his South Korean counterpart and signed a diplomatic 
accord between the two sides."® In doing so, the Soviet Union became the first 
major power to recognise the two Koreas on the Korean peninsula. Diplomatic
For example, the personnel shake-up of the CPSU apparatus greatly influenced Soviet foreign 
policy-making in September 1988. Most of the 22 Central Committee departments were abolished, and 
six new CPSU Commissions were created to supervise key domestic and foreign matters (See Pravda, 
29 November 1988, pp. 1-2).
It should be noted here that the Soviet Union did not choose to totally alienate North Korea. Instead 
it sought to maintain political influence through diplomatic persuasion and military/economic 
assistance. Thus, during this period, Soviet policy towards North Korea was remarkable in two 
respects: (1) the efforts to persuade North Korea’s hard-line was to adopt Soviet-style reform; and (2) 
the contmued consultation with North Korean leaders in an effort to ally their anxiety and misgivings 
witli regard to the Soviet-South Korean normalisation.
For example, deputy foreign minister Igor Rogachev stated on several occasions that ‘Moscow’s 
expanding contacts witli Seoul do not mean that it is about to officially recognise the South Korean 
government or establish diplomatic relations’ {Izvestiia, 5 January 1989, p. 5).
According to Vladimir Ivanov, the Kiemlin had three options for its relations with South Korea: (1) 
establishment of non-official contacts and development of economic ties with Seoul (China’s model);
(2) promotion of economic and full-scale political relations with Seoul while downgrading relations 
with North Korea (Hungary’s model); and (3) the development of comprehensive ties with Seoul and 
pursuit of an active role in the resolution of the Korean problem, including the maintenance of the 
balance on the Korean peninsula and the encouragement of an inter-Korean dialogue (Vladimir I. 
Ivanov, ‘The Soviet Union and the Asia-Pacific Region in the 1990s: Evolution or Radical Changes?’, 
The Korean Journal o f Defence Analysis, vol. 2, no. 2, 1990, pp. 57-58).
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normalisation between the two sides in 1990 was significant in two different 
ways. First, the Soviet Union was in a better position to play a mediator role in 
the inter-Korean dialogue and in the emerging contacts between North Korea 
and other states of the APR, particularly the US. Secondly, Gorbachev and his 
supporters had sufficient power to implement New Political Thinking towards 
the Korean peninsula against the conservatives through both structural and 
personnel changes in the Soviet foreign policy-making system, especially after 
the 19'" Party Conference in the summer of 1988.
C. The Continuation of New Political Thinking Towards the Korean 
Peninsula? (Autumn 1990-Winter 1991): Pro-South Korean Soviet policy
The third period of Gorbachev’s Korean policy was characterised by a 
continuous Soviet effort to implement the New Political Thinking towards the 
Korean peninsula, although there were serious domestic instabilities.
Gorbachev’s Korean policy was during this period characterised by an 
inexorable shift towards South Korea, at the expense of North Korea. New 
Political Thinking towards the Korean peninsula continued, despite the August 
coup and Gorbachev’s fall in 1991."" After the abortive coup, Soviet-North 
Korean relations became further sti'ained. When the coup was announced. 
North Korea showed its immediate support for the coup leaders. On the
See Izvestiia, 1 October 1990, p. 4.
The trend toward decentialisation of Soviet foreign policy became more clear after the August coup. 
Each of the Soviet republics became more actively involved in dealing directly with South Korea. On 
the August coup, lu. S. Sidorenko, Tri dnia, kotorye oprokinuli bol’shevizm: ispoved svidetelia, 
pokazaniia ochevidtsa (Rostov na Donu: Periodika Dona, 1991); A. G. Tuleev, Dolgoe ekho putcha: 
kakzh it’ dalshe? (Moscow: Paleia, 1992); G. A. Belousova and V. A. Lebedev, Partokratia i putch 
(Moscow: Respublika, 1992); and Joseph Whelan, Gorbachev’s Decline and Fall: from Failed Coup to 
Collapse o f Empire, August-December 1991 (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Research Slavic, 
1992). On Soviet foreign policy after the August coup, see Vernon Aspaturian, ‘Farewell to Soviet 
Foreign Policy’, Problems o f Communism, vol. 40, no. 6, 1991, pp. 53-62. The attempted coup in 
Moscow revealed the USSR ministiy of foreign affairs to be adrift without leadership. Gorbachev 
dismissed Soviet foreign minister Bessmertnykli for his passivity during the putsch, but Bessmertnykh 
denied allegations that he collaborated with the Emergency Committee. Foreign Policy initiative 
effectively passed to the RSFSR and President Yeltsin together with his foreign minister Andrei
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contraiy, the South Korean government quickly expressed support for 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin."^
Two historic Soviet-South Korean summits took place in Moscow and in 
Cheju Island, South Korea during this period. The first summit took place in 
San Francisco in June 1990. South Korean President Roh Tae-woo paid a 
official visit to Moscow in December 1990, to hold the second summit with 
Gorbachev. Roh Tae-woo was the first South Korean President to visit the 
Soviet Union. In April 1991, the third summit meeting between Gorbachev and 
Roh Tae-woo on Cheju Island marked the climax of the improvement in 
relations between the two sides."® This showed that Gorbachev increasingly 
believed that South Korea could seiwe as a vital economic link between the 
Soviet Union and the APR. Finally, Soviet relations with South Korea became a 
priority in the Soviet Union’s Asian-Pacific regional foreign policy.
In the meantime, Soviet-North Korean relations became increasingly 
fragile as the ideological and military ties that had bound the two sides became 
strained. De-ideologisation of Soviet foreign policy meant de-emphasising 
ideological ties with its traditional ally, North Korea, and emphasising 
economic and political ties with capitalist South Korea. Gorbachev’s policy 
towards North Korea centred around two themes during this period (autumn 
1990-winter 1991): (1) adjusting relations with North Korea from a militaiy 
alliance to a normal state-to-state relationship; and (2) diplomatic efforts for 
peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and the political settlement of the 
Korean problem."^ Accordingly, it should be noted that in the latter part of the
Kozyrev which in the wake of the putsch, raises the issue of ‘dual power’ in Soviet foreign policy 
(Sallie Wise, ‘Foreign Ministry Adrift’, RFE/RL, vol. 3, no. 36, 6 September 1991, pp. 28-30).
See Seoul Shinmun (Seoul), 31 August 1990, pp. 2-5.
Gorbachev became the first Soviet leader to visit the Korean peninsula. Gorbachev, in his speech in 
Cheju, stated that ‘there are no obstacles, objective or subjective between the two countries... Soviet- 
South Korean relations can be a model of bilateral relations for the APR...’ (See Izvestiia, 20 April 
1991, p. 1; diwà. Pravda, 20 April 1991, p. 6).
Vasily Mikheev, ‘New Soviet Approaches to North Korea’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 15, no. 3, 
1991, p. 443.
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Gorbachev period the Soviet Union began to lose its great influence on North 
Korea.
2.3. The Development of Yeltsin’s ‘Reactive’ Korean Policy (1991-96): 
Power and Policy Changes within the Context o f Russian Foreign Policy 
Concept in Russian Politics
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, not only Russia’s attitudes 
towards the Korean peninsula, but also its basic foreign policy interests and 
assumptions towards the region had to be changed during Yeltsin’s first 
presidential term (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). This indicated that Russia needed to 
restructure its foreign policy towards the two Koreas in accordance with a 
newly emerging world order and its new domestic situation. Finally, Russia’s 
foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during this period became 
‘reactive’, although Russia did attempt to develop a more active policy towards 
the region at this time.
Russia had a relatively clear-cut set of objectives towards the Korean 
peninsula based on Yeltsin’s new reform policies. Those objectives were no 
longer imperial, ideological and strategic, but primarily economic in character. 
Russia’s interests in the Korean peninsula fell into three broad categories: (1) 
expanding economic and trade ties; (2) maintaining its political role; and (3) 
participating in discussions on regional issues.^"
Mikhail Titarenko stated that ‘the Korean subject is turned to Russia with its two major facets: (1) 
the settlement on the Korean peninsula; and (2) Russia’s bilateral relations with the DPRK and the 
ROK’ (Mikliail Titarenko, ‘Russia in the Far East after the Disintegration of the USSR’, Sino-Soviet 
Affairs [Seoul], vol. 16, no. 3, 1992, p. 21). According to Zhebin, the new Russia’s priorities on tlie 
Korean peninsula were: (1) to strengthen political and military stability, to prevent from the crisis 
situations-to say nothing of the armed conflict on Korea; (2) to maintain de-ideologised, normal and 
well-balanced relations and to develop the mutually beneficial economic cooperation with North and 
South Korea; (3) to conti'ibute to the North-South rapprochement in view of their future reunification 
into a single friendly Korean state; and (4) to seek understanding with the US, China and Japan in 
order to find the mutually acceptable solution of the international aspects of the Korean problem 
(Alexander Z. Zhebin, ‘Russian-North Korean Relations: the States and Prospects’, Sino-Soviet Affairs 
[Seoul], vol. 16, no. 3, 1992, p. 141).
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Russia’s economic interests on the Korean peninsula were continuously 
emphasised by its leadership in the post-Soviet era. According to one Russian 
scholar, ‘business cooperation between Russia and South Korea was given the 
top priority in our countiy’.^ ' A number of Russian experts even suggested that 
South Korea’s experience was more appropriate for Russia than America’s or 
Europe’s .R u s s ia  continued to view South Korea as a substitute economic 
partner for Japan in the post-Soviet era.^ ® Russia regarded South Korea, to a 
large extent, as a country which, either in relation to other major powers in 
Northeast Asia such as China, Japan and the US, or on its own, could play a 
significant role in Russia’s regional relations and its interests in the region in 
the post-Soviet era.^"' In this respect. South Korea had become of primary 
concern to Russia’s Asian policy in the post-Soviet era.^ ®
To maintain its political role on the Korean peninsula, Russia concluded a 
historic political treaty with South Korea signed in 1992 (see Chapter 4), while 
pursuing a new friendship treaty with North Korea, which was intended to 
replace the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty (see Chapter 3). By 
being the first major power to establish bilateral political relations with both
Mikliail Titarenko, ‘Russia in the Far East’, p. 21.
Rossiiskie vesti, 26 May 1994, p. 3.
In the APR, South Korea seemed to be the most promising partner for Russia. Partnership with Japan 
was ruled out because of the Kurile Islands problem. China’s official ideology represented a major 
banier to closer economic cooperation with Russia {Izvestiia, 1 August 1992, p. 6). Later Russian 
officials realised that South Korea could not be a substitute for Japan. Russia found that South Korea 
was attiactive as an economic partner given the possibility of complementarity in the Russian and 
South Korean economies, but Seoul did not have the same level of financial resources as Japan and 
lacked Tokyo’s regional and international influence.
Vyacheslav Amirov, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Japanese and Pacific Studies at 
IMEMO, stated that ‘South Korea can be a Middle Power in the region’ (Interviewed with Vyacheslav
B. Amirov, Research Fellow at the Centre for Japanese and Pacific Studies at IMEMO by Ik Joong 
Youn at the University of Melbourne, Australia, 26 April 1996). According to Bazhanov, South Korea 
was regarded as a ‘bright spot’ in Russia’s interactions with the APR nations (Eugene Bazhanov and 
Natasha Bazhanov, ‘The Evolution of Russian-Korean Relations: External and Internal Factors’, Asian 
Survey, vol. 34, no. 9, 1994, p. 789).
Yeltsin stiessed South Korea’s importance in a speech to the National Assembly of South Korea 
(November 1992) which, in his eyes, had to be no less significant than the message delivered by 
Gorbachev in Vladivostok (1986). He argued that ‘nowadays, our policy is being transferred from 
West European and American lines to the Asia-Pacific region, and my visit to here [South Korea] is the 
first move in this process’ (see Rossiiskaia gazeta, 20 November 1992, p. 2). Georgiy Toloraya, chief 
of the Korean department in the Russian foreign minishy stated, ‘we regard relations with South Korea 
as one of the priorities in our Asian policy’ {Rossiiskaia gazeta, 28 August 1992, p. 7).
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Koreas, Russia hoped to put itself into a good position to play a mediating role 
for the Korean peninsula and to maximise its national interests in the region/"
Russia’s other intention in the Korean peninsula was to become actively 
involved in Korean issues as one of the major powers in Northeast Asia, both in 
terms of regional economic and security interests (see Chapters 5 and 6.) These 
were closely related to Russia’s new status in this region after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. At this point, it should be noted that historically, any state 
that has been able to exercise strong influence over the Korean peninsula has 
come to be a dominating power in the region.
All of these Russian interests in the Korean peninsula gradually evolved 
from an emphasis on economic relations to politico-security relations. In other 
words, Russia’s pro-South Korean policy in the early stage of Russian foreign 
policy emphasised its economic interests in the Korean peninsula. From the end 
of 1993 onwards, however, Russia started to give greater emphasis to its 
politico-security interests in the Korean peninsula, together with its continuous 
economic interests.
Nonetheless, the Korean peninsula was not a top priority on the Russian 
foreign policy agenda. Even by comparison with the late Gorbachev years, the 
importance of the South Korean factor in Russian foreign policy agenda 
gradually became less significant under Yeltsin.^^ The main reason for this was 
that Yeltsin’s Russian foreign policy during his first presidential term was 
dominated by a focus on two predominating areas: (1) a continuous emphasis 
on relations with the West/® and (2) a strong emphasis on relations with the
According to Valentin Moiseev, Russia’s foreign policy concept was aimed at creating a belt of 
‘good neighbours’ along its borders, and called for friendly, mutually advantageous, and equal 
relations to be forged with all its neighbouring states (Valentin Moiseev, ‘Russia and the Korean 
Peninsula’, International Affairs [Moscow], vol. 42, no. 1, 1996, p. 106).
For example, Alexei Zagorsky, the head of section for political studies at the Centre for Asian and 
Pacific Studies at the IMEMO, stated that ‘Asia Pacific in general and Korea in particular occupied a 
rather low priority in Russian foreign policy goal setting in the initial period’ (Alexei Zagorsky, 
‘Russian Policy on Korean Peninsula in Search of Identity’, Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asian 
Regional Affairs [Moscow: IMEMO and Korea Foundation, 1997], p. 73).
Yeltsin’s mam aim was to link Russia with the West, which was broadly defined in tenns of the 
whole Atlantic-European region together with Japan. For an account of Russia’s policy towards the 
West, see Heinz Timmermann, ‘Russian Foreign Policy under Yeltsin; Priority for Integration into the
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Near Abroad/" Some Russian scholars’ comments on Yeltsin’s Russian foreign 
policy clearly support this assessment as Titarenko and Kulik put it, ‘if we now 
call for more attention to “the Eastern Vector” of Russia’s foreign policy, this is 
not to mean we opt for it at the expense of the “the Western Vector”: we want 
to rectify the pro-Western tilt and bring Russia’s foreign policy course in line 
with the country’s national interests’/"
Although Yeltsin’s leadership attempted to pursue an ‘active partnership 
approach’ that would be more beneficial to Russia’s economic and security 
interests on the Korean peninsula, Russia’s policy towards the Korean 
peninsula during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96) gradually became reactive as 
compared with Gorbachev’s more active one. In addition, it should be noted 
that this reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula developed in parallel 
with the consolidation of Yeltsin’s own position in Russian politics.®' In other 
words, the reformers needed to establish a firm power base and maintain 
widespread support within the leadership in the Kremlin before initiating new 
policies for the Korean peninsula. Their views implied that North Korea was 
one of the last remnants of Stalinism on the globe. By contiast, the 
conservatives (or nationalists) still insisted on maintaining support for North 
Korea as an ally, while recognising South Korea in Northeast Asia.®^
Community of Civilised States’, The Journal o f Communist Studies, vol. 8, no. 4, 1992, pp. 163-185; 
Neil Malcolm, ‘The New Russian Foreign Policy’, World Today, vol. 50, no. 2, 1994, pp. 28-32; and 
Peter Shearman, ‘Russian Policy toward the Western Europe: the German Axis’, and ‘Russian Policy 
toward the United States’, in Peter Shearman, ed., Russian Foreign Policy since 1990 (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 93-109 and pp. 111-133.
For an account of Russia’s relations with Near Abroad, see Paul A. Goble, ‘Russia and Its 
Neighbors’, Foreign Policy, no. 90, 1993, pp. 79-88; and Wynne Russell, ‘Russian Relations with the 
Near Abroad’, in Shearman, ed., Russian Foreign Policy since 1990, pp. 53-70.
M. Titarenko and B. Kulik, ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy: the Far Eastern Vector’, Far Eastern Affairs, 
no. 1-3, 1993, p. 5.
For a general analysis of the development of Russian politics in the post-communist period, see 
Stephen White, Russia’s New Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Vladimir V. 
Sogrin, Politicheskaia istoriia sovremennoi Rossii: 1985-1994: ot Gorbacheva do E l’tsina (Moscow: 
Progress Akademia, 1994), pp. 109-191; and F. M. Burlatskii, Russkie gosudari: epokha reformatsii: 
Nikita Smelyi, Mikhail Blazhennyi, Boris Krutoi (Moscow: Firraa ‘Shark’, 1996), pp. 311-467.
For domestic power struggle among the Russian elite, see Judith Kullberg, ‘The Ideological Roots of 
Elite Political Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 46, no. 6, 1994, pp. 929-953; 
Gordon M. Halm, ‘Russia’s Polarised Political Spectrum,’ Problems o f Post-Communism, vol. 43, no. 
3, 1996, pp. 11-22; Gleim Chafetz, ‘The Shuggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia’,
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Reflecting Yeltsin’s gradual power consolidation in Russian politics, 
Russia’s Korean policy can be divided into the following three stages. In this 
respect, especially, the December 1993 and the December 1995 Russian 
parliamentary elections played an important role in changing the momentum of 
Russia’s domestic and foreign policy.®®
A. Still New Political Thinking Towards the Korean Peninsula? (Dec. 91- 
Dec. 93): Yeltsin and Russian Reformers After the Collapse o f the Soviet 
Union
During this period, Yeltsin attempted to consolidate his political power based 
on reform policies and at the same time he delineated a pro-South Korean 
policy towards the Korean peninsula, together with his pro-Western stance in 
Russian foreign policy. In this respect, Russia followed the same principles as 
Gorbachev’s late Korean policy.®"'
In these circumstances, Russia tried to move from diplomatic 
nonnalisation (1990) to ‘partnership’ relations with South Korea. As a result, 
high level politico-economic contacts between the two sides, which included 
Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea in 1992, were fiequent during this period. In the 
field of economic relations, Russia strongly emphasised economic relations
Political Science Quarterly, vol. I l l ,  no. 4, 1996-97, pp. 661-688; and Virginie Coulloudon, ‘Elite 
Groups in Russia,’ Demokratizatsiaya, vol. 6, no. 3, 1998, pp. 535-549. For example, for the power 
struggle in Russian government and the resulting changes in Russian foreign policy towards Moldova 
periodically, see Kate Litvak, ‘The Role of Political Competition and Bargaining in Russian Foreign 
Policy: the Case of Russian Policy toward Moldova’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 29, 
no. 2, 1996, pp. 213-229.
On the importance and functions of Russian elections, see the works cited in foohiote 50 in Chapter 
l ,p.  23.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula for 
some time lost its momentum. Above all, new Russia was too preoccupied with internal problems, and 
any room left for diplomacy was devoted to relations with the former parts of the Soviet Union and 
with the West. The urgent need to forge links to the Western world after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union prompted Yeltsin to continue Gorbachev’s policy, to a certain extent, at the early stage of 
Russian foreign policy.
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with South Korea, and called for ‘economic partnership’/® Furthermore, there 
were significant advances in the field of military cooperation between the two 
sides, which would have been unthinkable during the Soviet era.
Nonetheless, not everything was rosy between the two sides, and in 1993 
the atmosphere in their relations deteriorated to a certain degree.®" Several key 
disputes dating back to the Cold War era were not fully resolved as South 
Korea had expeeted. One of the best examples of this was Russia’s handling of 
the ‘empty’ black box of the Korean Airline (KAL) 007, which had been shot 
down by Soviet fighters in 1983, during Yeltsin’s visit to Seoul in November 
1992. South Koreans were disappointed with the conclusion of a special state 
committee in Russia that Russia could not be held responsible for the shooting 
down of the KAL 007N  Economic cooperation between the two sides was also 
constrained by Russia’s inability to repay its debts to South Korea. More 
importantly. South Korea was not as coneerned to improve its relations with 
Russia as it had been to improve relations with the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s. In the meantime, the Russian side was also dissatisfied with South 
Korea’s économie involvement in Russia.®®
On the other hand, Russian-North Korean relations moved from ‘allied’ to 
‘just old friend’ relations, which was an estranged and complicated stage.®"
During the first Russian-South Korean summit in Seoul in November 1992, Yeltsin vigorously called 
for an economic partnership with South Korea (‘Calls for Economic Partnership’, Itar-Tass, 19 
November 1992 inFBIS-SOV 92-224, 19 November 1992, pp. 10-11),
Georgiy Kunadze, Russian deputy foreign minister and ambassador-designate to South Korea at the 
time, stated that ‘... the three-year-long diplomatic relations with South Korea have been based on 
stable experiences. We can say that these three years have been a period of getting out of a certain 
‘vain dream’ and excessive expectations...’ (‘Ambassador-Designate to ROK Views Korean Issues’, 
Radio Moscow, 29 December 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-249, 30 December 1993, p. 16).
On 14 October 1992 Russian President Yeltsin turned over previously secret documents about the 
incident to the KAL-007. For detailed account of this, see Jolm Lepingwell, ‘Opening the KAL-007 
Black Box; New Documents and Old Questions’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 44, 6 November 1992, pp. 20-26.
Major problems for Russian-South Korean economic cooperation were: (1) the lack of a basic 
framework for economic cooperation between the two sides; (2) South Korea’s lack of knowledge 
regarding the Soviet Union and Russia (no previous experience of doing business in a socialist 
countries); and (3) the immaturity of Russia’s economic environment for international economic 
cooperation. For an account of Russia’s major economic problems with South Korea, see L. A. 
Anosova and G. S. Matveeva, luzhnaia Koreia: vzgliad iz Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1994).
Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov described relations between the Soviet/Russia and North Korea as a 
‘stormy alliance’ from the diplomatic normalisation between the former Soviet Union and South Korea
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Russia had to limit to a minimum its relations with North Korea, although it 
was unwilling to sever relations entirely during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).^^ 
The main factors behind this position were; (1) a policy of distancing Russia 
from North Korea for ideological reasons; (2) the question of North Korea’s 
non-compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and Russia’s pressure 
for North Korea to do so; (3) the reinterpretation of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty; and (4) the question of North Korea’s debts to 
Russia.
Consequently, high-level political contacts between Russia and North 
Korea were effectively halted, inter-parliamentary ties were broken, and 
exchanges of people were minimised. In the field of economic relations, trade 
between the two sides declined sharply, while contacts and exchange in all 
other economic areas were of a rather limited and formal character. 
Furthermore, North Korea together with other former socialist countiies did not 
enter the circle of Russia’s possible good friends in the outside world during the 
early years of post-Soviet foreign policy.
However, fr'om the beginning of 1993 Russia gradually started to reopen 
its contacts with North Korea and exchange opinions about bilateral and 
international issues.^^ In economic terms, despite the sharp decline in the trade 
turnover in 1992, Russia and North Korea retained their interests in some 
respects. Yeltsin appeared to have been aware that the conseiwatives were a 
threat to his political power and refonn policies at this time and that he did not
in September 1990 up to the end of 1993 (Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov, ‘The Evolution of Russian- 
Korean Relations’, p. 791).
Georgiy Toloraya, chief of the Korean department in the Russian foreign ministiy, stated that 
‘relations between Russia and North Korea have developed in a complicated manner m 1992’ 
(‘Foreign Ministry Official Discusses ROK, DPRK’, Radio Moscow, 1 January 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93- 
002, 2 January 1993, p. 13). Russian deputy foreign minister also stated that ‘the relations between 
Russia and North Korea have been complex and painful in 1993’ (‘Deputy Foreign Minister, 
[Yakovlev, in charge of Korean affairs], Inteiwiewed on Ties to Koreas’, Radio Moscow, 20 January 
1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-014, 21 January 1994, p. 20).
In Februaiy 1993, Russian deputy foreign minister visited North Korea. The puipose of both these 
visits was to discuss important bilateral issues between the two sides, especially the issue of the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, together with the issue of North Korean nuclear non- 
proliferation treaty.
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have the political clout to push through a pro-South Korean policy. In the face 
of resistance and obstmction from the conservatives, Yeltsin sometimes had to 
forge compromises with his adversaries so as to build a coalition in support of 
his reform policies.
B. Reformulating Russia’s New Foreign Policy Consensus Towards the 
Korean Peninsula? (Dee. 93-Dec. 95): Yeltsin Associated with More 
Conservatives After the December 1993 Russian Election 
Foreign policy problems as much played a veiy limited in Russia’s 1993 
preelection campaign, but the election results created a problem for the West’s 
foreign-policy practitioners and analysts. In the elections, the majority of 
Russian citizens, broadly speaking, rejected the option of moving Russia 
toward democracy and a market economy that had been suggested by the 
Gaidar government’s American advisors and by the International Monetaiy 
Fund (IMF). Rejecting, on the basis of the first two years’ results, the Western 
model for Russia’s development, one-fourth of the electorate in effect swung 
toward a nationalistic, neo-imperial model that existed mainly at the emotional 
level.^^
Ultimately, this strong showing of the former communists and ultra- 
nationalists in the December 1993 parliamentary elections pushed Yeltsin’s 
government in a more assertive and nationalistic foreign policy direction.^^ This
Izvestiia, 30 December 1993, p. 4. However, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev described the 
December 1993 parliamentary election results as a ‘success’ - not a ‘victory’ for Zhirinovsky. 
According to Kozyrev, the election result could not fundamentally alter Russia’s foreign policy 
{Nezavisimaia gazeta, 17 December 1993, p. 1).
The outcome of the December 1993 Russian parliamentary election represented a rebuff to the 
reform forces, which were represented on the ballot by four separate parties/blocs. Since the December 
1993 election, Russian politics has clearly shifted in a distinctly nationalistic direction: in particular 
foreign policy has more aggressively pursued Russia’s national interests. For a more detailed account 
of the December 1993 election, see Matthew Wyman, Bill Miller, Stephen White and Paul Heywood, 
‘The Russian Elections of December 1993’, Electoral Studies, vol. 13, no. 3, 1994, pp. 254-271; Peter 
Lentini, ‘Elections and Political Order in Russia: the 1993 Elections to the Russian State Duma’, 
Journal o f Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 10, no. 2, 1994, pp. 151-192; Jerry F. 
Hough, ‘The Russian Elections of 1993: Public Attitudes toward Economic Refoim and
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meant, in many respects, that election issues provided the Yeltsin leadership 
with the basis for a reconsideration of Russia’s foreign policy agenda because 
the opposition used the foreign policy issue to attack President’s reform-minded 
administration and its pro-Western and pro-South Korean policy. Thus, after 
the December 1993 election, which was a success for nationalists and 
communists, they had to compromise to a greater extent with the demands of 
the opposition.^"^
From this perspective, a new Russian foreign policy began to be 
implemented that was in line with the combined views of refomiers and 
conseiwatives. As a result, Yeltsin’s new policy towards the Korean peninsula 
also became a function of the delicate balance between the need to siuwive as a 
politician and the desire to implement reform policies. In general, the two 
groups (reformers and conseiwatives) within the Russian leadership had 
incompatible views and interests in the Korean peninsula. On the one hand, the 
reformers viewed Russian-South Korean relations in the context of the search 
for a new partnership relationship in the post-Soviet era. On the other hand, the 
conservatives emphasised the need to revive the countiy’s relations with North 
Korea. Nevertheless, the two groups had common views and goals in relations 
to the Korean peninsula, particularly the wish to maximise national interests in 
the region (both in South and North Korea).
A new consensus on Russia’s Korean policy started to emerge in favour of 
a more ‘balanced’ stance. This demonstrated that Russia attempted to 
reformulate its Korean policy in line with its new domestic environment and in
Démocratisation’, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 10, no. 1, 1994, pp. 1-37; Peter Lentini, ed., Elections and 
Political Order in Russia: the Implications o f the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly (Budapest, 
London and New York: Cential European University Press, 1995); and Richard Sakwa, ‘The Russian 
Elections of December 1993’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 47, no. 2, 1995, pp. 195-227.
The re-emergence of Russian nationalistic and revisionist attitudes must be seen against background 
of the ‘crisis of identity’ of the Russian nation up to and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Wliile the lack of democratic tradition should not be exaggerated, Russian political culture was still 
more than capable of preventing a consolidation of the foreign policy of modernisation and moderation 
represented by the wing of Kozyrev (Mette Skak, ‘Post-Communist Foreign Policies: Initial 
Observations’, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 27, no. 3, 1992, p. 295).
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the context of the new world order after the December 1993 e le c tio n sT h u s , 
the restoration of relations with North Korea, including economic ties, started 
to fit into the political views of the people who played a key role in Russia,^^
In these circumstances, Russia resumed its attempt to improve relations 
with North Korea whilst abandoning a pro-South Korean policy. This indicated 
that Yeltsin could not succeed in isolating the conservatives’ influence in 
foreign policy by radically restmcturing the Russian foreign policy-making 
process in the post-Soviet era. Yet, Yeltsin had not successfully consolidated 
his power by October 1993 and began to lose conti'ol of his reform-minded 
p o licy .T h e rea fte r, the President had to accommodate the policies of 
conservatives, not only for domestic policy reasons, but also for foreign policy 
reasons.
The principal reason for this trend was that the Russian leadership started 
to re-realise the importance of the North Korean factor in its foreign policy. 
Indeed, it should be noted that during the years of the pro-South Korean stance 
(Dec. 91-Dec. 93) some factions within the Russian leadership had maintained 
the view that there was no need to tilt towards South Korea at the expense of 
North Korea.^^ As a result, for example, by the end of 1993 and 1994, as 
international tension over North Korea’s nuclear developments mounted,
As Charles Ziegler pointed out, ‘Russia now must balance not only North and South Korea, but also 
the liberal and conservative forces within Russia’ (Charles E. Ziegler, ‘Russia and the Korean 
Peninsula: New Directions in Moscow’s Asia Policy?’, Problems o f Post-Communism, vol. 43, no. 6, 
1996, p. 5).
For instance, the Russian-North Korea Friendship and Cultural Cooperation Association, set up in 
April 1993, supported Pyongyang’s domestic and foreign policy line {North Korea News, no. 680, 26 
April 1993, p. 6).
For a discussion of the conflict between Yeltsin and the parliament, see Richard Sakwa, Russian 
Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1993), Chapter 2; and Ruslan Kliasbulatov, The Struggle for 
Russia: Power and Change in the Democratic Revolution (London: Routledge, 1993), esp. part III. For 
the analysis of changes of Russian domestic politics after the October 1993, see Julia Wisluievsky, 
‘Democratic Opposition in Russia: an Alternative to Yeltsin?’, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 
2, 1995, pp. 25-33.
For example, at the end of summer 1992, just before Yeltsin’s scheduled visit to South Korea, the 
Russian foreign ministiy had started to advance the thesis that ‘Moscow should seek more balanced 
relations with South and North Korea as saying that: ‘Russia will carry out an “active” and “well- 
balanced” policy toward South and North Korea, that is, the Korean peninsula. From now on these 
relations will be maintained on a non-ideological basis and on the basis of normal contacts between
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Russia clearly attempted to adopt a more balanced dual policy towards the 
Korean peninsula.
Russia was searching for constructive and mutually complementary 
partnership relations with South Korea during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). By 
and large, Russia and South Korea during this period involved frequent contacts 
in most fields. There were frequent high-ranking political, militaiy and 
economic contacts between the two sides, which included the second Russian- 
South Korean summit in Moscow in June 1994. In the field of economic 
relations, despite several unsettled problems, the two sides continued to show 
an interest in developing trade and economic cooperation and concluded many 
economic agreements. As regards military cooperation, there were remarkable 
developments between the two sides.
Nevertheless, relations between the two sides were not entirely stable 
during this period. One good example of this was the sudden postponement of 
the Russian side’s visit to South Korea in May 1994.^^  ^Moreover, it should be 
also noted that this was a time of acute crisis in North Korea and Russia’s 
proposal for an international conference was rejected immediately. (See 
Chapter 5.)
For the South Korean side, the political value of Russia had been 
decreasing given the latter’s internal instability and weakening international 
position, especially over the North Korean nuclear issue. In the meantime, for 
the Russian side, the rejection of its proposed international conference by South 
Korea greatly affected its Korean policy direction. Furthermore, Russia was
states’ (‘New Trends in Relations with DPRK Cited’, Radio Moscow, 6 July 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92- 
131,8 July 1992, p. 26).
For example, in July 1994, Russian foreign minister Andiei Kozyrev stated that ‘it is absolutely clear 
that our neighbours. North Korea, need a certain amount of time, and we are hoping for the 
continuation and development of the same ‘smooth and balanced’ relationship [with North Korea] 
which we had before and which, I am confident, we will continue to have with that country’ (‘Kozyrev 
Has Confidence in Continued DPRK Relations’, Itar-Tass, 11 July 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-132, 11 July 
1994, p. 11).
In May 1994, the first session of the joint intergovernmental Russian-South Korean economic, 
scientific and technical commission session, plaimed to open in Seoul, was postponed at the veiy last 
moment. See Izvestiia, 24 May 1994, p. 4; and ‘ROK-Russian Economic Cormnission Session 
Postponed’, Itar-Tass, 19 May 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-098, 20 May 1994, p. 8.
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very uncooperative when asked to abrogate the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty by the South Korean side during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 
95). The most problematic issue for economic relations was still Russia’s 
inability to repay loans made by South Korea to the former Soviet Union and to 
Russia, In the field of militaiy cooperation, there was obviously a limited 
boundary to progress, although the two sides made significant advances in their 
military relations.
By contrast, Russia was searching for a normalisation with North Korea 
and the Russian leadership tiied to establish a consensus towards North Korea 
during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). As a result, there were certain signs of an 
improvement in Russian-North Korean relations including some significant 
political and economic contacts between the two s i d e s . T h i s  demonstrated 
that a new component of bilateral relations was added with the establishment of 
contacts between some Russian communist and nationalist groups and the 
North Korean ruling paity (WPK), especially after the death of Kim Il-sung in 
the middle of 1994. Russia also tried to re-establish economic ties with North 
Korea during this period. In militaiy relations, to a certain degree, the two sides 
sought to revive relations. In this respect, Russia started to sell its defensive 
weapons to North Korea.
Nevertheless, there were no concrete results in Russian-North Korean 
relations during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). The two sides could not 
eliminate their fundamental differences of approach to key issues such as the 
North Korean nuclear problem and the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty issue. Moreover, the official visit to Russia by the South Korean 
President in June 1994 drew further attention to the problem of Russia’s
In particular, it should be noted that after the death of Kim Il-sung in July 1994, Russia tried to 
rebuild its previously good relations with Kim Jong-il’s regime. For instance, in July 1995, Russian 
deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Panov stated that ‘relations were normal in the period after the death 
of North Korean President Kim Il-sung’ (‘Spokesman: DPRK Intervention Clause under Discussion’, 
Itar-Tass, 25 July 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-142, 25 July 1995, p. 11).
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relations with North Korea. In trade relations with the two sides, there was still 
the question of North Korea’s debts to Russia.
C. Towards A Full-Scale Balanced Korean Policy? (Dec. 95-Jun. 96); 
Primakov and Lebed After the December 1995 Election 
The results of the December 1995 parliamentaiy election did have foreign 
policy consequences, although the elections (as before) mainly revolved around 
domestic economic and social i s s u e s . T o  a large extent, the results of the 
December 1995 parliamentary election confirmed the continuing strength of the 
conseiwative-nationalists who had constantly rebuked the Yeltsin 
administration for its emasculated foreign policy.
In particular, the appointment of Primakov and Lebed as Russian foreign 
minister and Security Council Secretary, respectively, in early 1996 were 
indicative of a more pragmatic and assertive Russian foreign policy direction. 
Kozyrev’s replacement by former director of the Foreign Intelligence Service 
Yevgeny Primakov as foreign minister was a sign of the new Russian foreign 
policy consensus, which had reconciled the competing arguments of Atlanticist 
and Eurasianists. Primakov’s consensus foreign policy held that Russia should 
cooperate with the West where appropriate, while seeking a selective,
The December 1995 election represented a collective decision as to whether to continue on the path 
of gradual moves towards a market economy and at least a partially democratic political system, or 
whether to move toward aggressive imperialism as desired by the more extreme nationalist elements 
within Russian politics, or to attempt to return to the past, as represented by one of the communist 
successor parties. Although the results of the elections did not lead to any dramatic change of political 
direction for Russia, the very fact that the campaign took place at all had some important political 
consequences. In particular, there was a change in the ‘political balance’ of the executive branch. For 
an account of December 1995 parliamentary election, see Stephen White, ‘The 1995 Elections to the 
Russian State Duma’, The Journal o f  Coimnunist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, 1997, 
pp. 107-114; Matthew Wyman, ‘The Russian Elections of 1995 and 1996’, Electoral Studies, vol. 16, 
no. 1, 1997, pp. 79-86; and Stephen White, Matthew Wyman and Sarah Oates, ‘Parties and Voters in 
the 1995 Russian Duma Elections’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 49, no. 5, 1997, pp. 767-798.
For example, the Chechen crisis which began in early December 1994 had play a major role in 
reformulating its foreign policy. The costs of Chechnya invasion weigh heavily on an already-fragile 
Russian political and economic system, and foreign policy as well. For the background necessary to 
understand the reasons for tire Russian military invasion of Chechnya in December 1994, see John 
Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots o f  a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).
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pragmatic and ‘equal’ p a rtn e rsh ip .Y elts in ’s decision to appoint Primakov to 
the post of Russian foreign minister was equally a symbol of the foreign-policy 
shift away from the heady idealism of the early 1990s toward a stance rooted in 
the Russian great-power tradition.
This consensus was a result of the internal power consolidation and a 
reassessment of Russia’s relationship with other countries, especially with the 
West. Indeed, through the December 1995 parliamentary election, a firmer 
consensus had emerged among foreign policy cognoscenti that Russia should 
no longer tailor its behaviour to US preferences and that Russia’s status as a 
great power also had to be restored on the Korean peninsula.
In these circumstances, the Russian leadership made a more concerted 
effort to improve relations with North Korea. Pro-North Korean forces came to 
the fore after the December 1995 parliamentary election. Indeed, across a 
broad spectrum of society, there was a feeling that improved relations with 
North Korea would seiwe to restore Russia’s weakened position on the Korean 
peninsula. These changes led to a more open and active implementation of 
Russia’s relations with North Korea. Furthermore, for the forthcoming Russian 
presidential election in the middle of 1996,^ ^® the Russian leadership also 
needed to demonstrate its good relations with previous allies such as North
For the debate of the need of more assertive foreign policy in Russia, for example, see Pravda, 5 
March 1996, p. 3.
Primakov’s views to the current [international] issues, see Izvestiia, 6 March 1996, p. 3.
These themes emerged in a January 1996 Nezavisimaia gazeta roundtable discussion of foreign 
policy officials and experts. See Analytica Moscow Politica Weekly Press Summaiy, vol. 3, no. 3, 20- 
26 January 1996.
It should be noted that the pro-North Korean lobby had existed in Russia even in the heyday of 
Russia-South Korean relations (1991-93). They just became more effective and vociferous after the 
election.
For an account of 1996 Russian presideirtial election, see Angela Sterrt arrd Lilia Shevtsova, 
‘Russia’s Election: No Turning Back’, Foreign Policy, no. 103, 1996, pp. 92-109; Richard Rose and 
Evgeny Tikhomirov, ‘Russia’s Forced-Choice Presidential Election’, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4,
1996, pp. 351-379; and Yitzhak M. Brudny, ‘In Pursuit of the Russian Presidency: Why and How 
Yeltsin Won the 1996 Presidential Election’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 30, no. 3,
1997, pp. 255-275. For discussion of the reasons for Yeltsin’s electoral victory, see Michael McFaul, 
‘Russia’s 1996 Presidential Elections’, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4, 1996, pp. 318-350. For a 
general analysis of 1996 election focusing on the rivalry between Yeltsin and Zhuganov, see L. N. 
Dobrokhotov, ed., Ot Yel’tsina k Yel'tsinu: prezidentskaia gonka-96 (Moscow: Terra, 1997). For
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Korea to maintain its major power status in Northeast Asia. In other words, to 
win the presidential election each Russian candidate had among other things to 
emphasise good relations with countries where the former Soviet Union had 
exercised its superpower status during the Soviet era. Finally, Russia started to 
undertake a full-scale ‘pragmatic’ Korean policy, which led to a more activist 
approach to the restoration of relations with North Korea without imperilling 
Russia’s successfully developing relationship with South Korea.
Russia attempted to unfold a ‘new page’ of relations with North Korea 
during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96). Russian-North Korean relations involved 
more active high-level political contacts. For the economic relations between 
the two sides, one of the main reasons for Russia’s decision to expand 
economic cooperation with North Korea was related to the progress being made 
by China in developing its own economic relations with North Korea.^^^ Unlike 
previous years, ideological concerns no longer presented an insurmountable 
barrier to relations.
Nevertheless, it was not likely that Russia and North Korea could restore 
their relations to the level they had attained during the Soviet era. This 
demonstrated that the basic linkage between the two sides ended with the 
collapse of former Soviet Union (from this time forward Russia was pursuing a 
market economy and North Korea was not). Moreover, the nature of the 
political system and worldview in each country was very different in the post- 
Soviet era. The two sides also had different positions on South Korea and the
sociological data on the 1996 presidential elections, see L. D. Gudkov (complier), Prezidentskie vybory 
1996goda i obshchestvennoe mnenie (Moscow: VTsIOM, 1996),
Valentin Moiseev, deputy director of the first Asian department of the Russian foreign ministry, 
stated that ‘the tendency for a complete restoration of ties [Russian-North Korean] has been bolstered 
since the December 1995 Russian parliamentary election and the appointment of Primakov as a 
Russian foreign minister in early 1996’ (Valentin Moiseev, ‘On the Korean Settlement’, International 
Affairs [Moscow], vol. 43, no. 3, 1997, p. 67).
Whereas trade with Russia accounted for 50% of Pyongyang’s foreign trade before 1990,. in 1995 it 
dropped to a minimum, amounting for just $US 100 million. Outmanoeuvring Russia, China became 
Noi1h Korea’s main trading partner. China accounted for 45% of North Korean trade {Moskovskie 
novosti, no. 14, 7-14 April, 1996, p. 13).
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u s  in Northeast Asia2^^ Most importantly, the North Korean nuclear issue, the 
1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty issue and North Korea’s 
economic debts to Russia, which were the most important pending issues in 
their relations, were still the biggest obstacles to enhancing their relations.
In the meantime, Russian-South Korean relations proved to be an ‘uneasy 
partnership’ during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96). Rather, relations between 
Russia and South Korea were undergoing an endurance test during this period. 
South Korea displayed its dissatisfaction with Russia’s policy of expanding and 
raising the level of political, military, economic and cultural ties with North 
Korea. Their relations were gieatly consti'ained by Russia’s exclusion from an 
international conference by the US and South Korean-led ‘four-party talks’.’
For example, theoretically, at least, South Korea and the US were not regarded as ‘enemies’ of 
Russia in the post-Soviet era. But, North Korea still regarded them as their first imaginaiy enemies.
Kim Young-sam and Bill Clinton put forward a four-party (two Koreas, China and the US) peace 
proposal on 16 April 1996. For the details of this, see Chapter 6.4.
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Chapter 3
Russia and the Development of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty Under Yeltsin: 
A  R elationship w ithout a Treaty?
3.1. In Search of a Strategic/Military Alliance? (1961-91)
The 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which included only six 
articles and a preamble, referring both to the ‘principles of socialist 
internationalism’ and to the ‘aims and principles of the United Nations 
Organisation’, was signed in Moscow on 6 July 1961 and came into force on 10 
September 1961.’
For the background to the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty three significant factors, at least, should be considered. First, 
the Treaty was mainly designed to act against both the US and South Korea on 
the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia. By concluding the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty, the Soviet Union and North Korea officially 
strengthened their ties based on a political friendship treaty in order to oppose
‘ It should be noted that, before concluding the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, there had 
also been numerous bilateral agreements and protocols in many fields between the two sides. For 
example, trade with North Korea was regulated by the Trade and Payments Agreement of 17 March 
1949 (K. Baklitov, ‘Torgovye dogorovy i soglasheniia SSSR s inostiamrymi gosudarstvami’, in G. 
Koftov, et al., Spravochnikpo vneshnei torgovle SSSR [Moscow: Vneshtorgizdat, 1958], p. 101). In the 
decade 1947-57, the Soviet Union concluded 4 cultural treaties with North Korea (See Jan F. Triska 
and Robert M. Slusser, The Theory, Law, and Policy o f  Soviet Treaties [Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1962], p. 367). The Soviet Union was North Korea’s partner in 203 agreements, which 
represented 14 per cent of North Korea’s entire treaty stock for the period between 1948-75 (George 
Ginsburgs and Roy Kim, Calendar o f Diplomatic Affairs Democratic People’s Republic o f Korea 
1945-75 [New Jersey: Symposia Press, 1977], p. 1). For the full contents of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty, see Pravda, 7 July 1961, pp. 1-3. See also Appendix 1.
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the US and South Korea, which themselves had concluded a Mutual Defence 
Treaty on 1 October 1953.^
Secondly, the Soviet Union attempted to make North Korea remain in a 
neutral position between the Soviet Union and China in Northeast Asia. This 
indicated that, for the Soviet side, the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty aimed at strengthening not only Soviet-North Korean 
relations, but also at increasing the Soviet Union’s influence over China.^
Thirdly, one of the important motives for the North Korean side to 
conclude the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was to secure Soviet 
aid in case the war (or warlike) situation in order to communise South Korea by 
force. In this context, two important events which provoked North Korea’s 
need to ensure a continual inflow of Soviet aid from the late 1950s to the early 
1960s should be mentioned: (1) South Korea’s 5.16 (16 May 1961) 
Revolution;'’ and (2) the Sino-Soviet dispute.^
The conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty had an 
additional significance in the politics of Northeast Asia, not to mention Soviet-
 ^The Mutual Defence Treaty between the US and South Korea came into force on 17 November 1954 
with the exchange of the instiuments of ratification at Washington, D.C, in accordance with Article 5. 
The US ratified the above-mentioned tieaty subject to the following understanding: ‘it is the 
understanding of the US that neither party is obligated, under Article 3 of the above Treaty, to come to 
the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in 
the present Treaty be construed as requiring the US to give assistance to South Korea except in the 
event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognised by the US as lawfully brought 
under the administrative eontrol of South Korea’. See Appendix 2.
 ^ The Soviet Union’s hegemonic position was unchallenged in North Korea until the middle of the 
1950s. However, after the 20‘'' Party Congress (1956) and de-Stalinisation in the second half of 1950s, 
North Korea gradually started to tilt towards China. For the details of this, see Chapter 2.
On the Korean peninsula, the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was also largely 
influenced by the South Korean situation at that time, namely, by ‘the seizure of power by the military’ 
headed by the General Park Chung-hee on 16 May 1961. Kim Il-sung found himself in need of 
assurances by the Soviet Union in his confrontation with South Korea.
 ^North Korea was also influenced by the Sino-Soviet dispute over the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet- 
North Korean Friendship Treaty. By concluding the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, 
North Korea was able to keep on receiving both Soviet and Chinese aid and at the same time, to a 
certain extent, free itself both from Soviet and Chinese control. In other words, this treaty gave Kim Il- 
sung a certain amount of autonomy to manoeuvre between the Soviet Union and China. It must be 
noted that the treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and North 
Korea was also signed several days after the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. For a more 
detailed explanation of North Korea’s position in the Sino-Soviet disputes, see Chin O. Chung, 
Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea’s Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-
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North Korean bilateral relations. The Korean peninsula had finally become the 
centre of the Cold War in Northeast Asia. In other words, the separation of the 
Korean peninsula into the two states (South and North) by the US and the 
Soviet Union in late 1940s was the initial ‘symbol’ of the spreading of the Cold 
War to Northeast Asia. In the subsequent ten years, the conclusion of military 
friendship treaties with both the US and the Soviet Union, respectively in 1953 
and 1961, made the Korean peninsula a ‘hot bed’ of the Cold War in Northeast 
Asia.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet- 
North Korean Friendship Treaty did not entirely change the previous Soviet 
'status quo'' (or defensive) policy towards the Korean peninsula.^ Rather, the 
conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty could be 
described as Soviet’s less status quo'' policy towards the Korean peninsula 
mainly due to a re-evaluation of North Korea’s strategic and ideological 
importance in the region.^
In this point, it should be mentioned that Soviet relations with North 
Korea had not always been good, although the Soviet Union mainly supported 
North Korea’s position against the US and South Korea based on the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty during the Cold War period (up to 
1985). Rather, the state of the relationship fluctuated always during the Soviet 
period, reaching its lowest point after the Soviet Union normalised its relations 
with South Korea in 1990. Ultimately, this represented a rather ‘passive’
1975 (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1978); and O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, 
Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia, 1945-1980 (Moscow: MysP, 1980).
® For tlie details of this, see Chapter 2.
’ The Soviet Union had shown little hiterest in the Korean peninsula. Instead, the Soviet Union devoted 
more attention to China and Japan in the context of Northeast Asian affairs. Thus, Soviet policy 
towards the Korean peninsula was rather subordinate to its policies toward China, Japan and the US 
until the late 1980s. The Soviet strategies on the Korean peninsula should be viewed in the context of 
other Soviet commitments and concerns in Northeast Asia, whilst emphasising China, Japan and the 
US powers in Northeast Asia. Even Soviet interests in North Korea were secondary for the Soviet 
leadership in its foreign policy agenda. Accordingly, the Soviet Union seemed to have no clear design 
(or idea) for the Korean peninsula. Instead, it pursued an ill-defined ‘defensive’ policy (or ‘wait and 
see’ policy), attempting to keep some influence over Korea while denying complete control over the 
peninsula to any one Great Power and particular, the US.
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involvement on the Soviet Union’s part on the Korean peninsula against the US 
and South Korea.
It is important to identify four issues when explaining the lack of activity 
in Soviet-North Korean relations during this period (1945-85). First, in the 
early 1960s, the effects of ideological differences between the two sides and the 
de-Stalinisation that took place after the 20”^ CPSU Party Congress did not help 
either country promote friendly allied relations. As a result, instead, the North 
Korean leadership started to draw closer to the Chinese and expressed solidarity 
with China.^
Secondly, the Soviet Union pursued a ‘limited’ military involvement 
strategy in the face of the unexpected situation in relation to the US on the 
Korean peninsula in the second half of 1960s. The Soviet Union attempted to 
make it clear that the only possible cause for military involvement on the Korea 
peninsula would be all-out and unprovoked armed aggression against North 
Korea. Such an explicit interpretation was unilaterally given by the Soviet 
Union to North Korea in 1968 after North Korea had seized the US ship 
‘Pueblo’.^  That incident clearly proved to the Soviet leadership that it could not 
rely on North Korea in politically delicate situations and prompted it to work 
out contingency plans for several scenarios in relation to the possible 
emergence of armed hostilities on the Korean peninsula, all of which would 
exclude the automatic involvement of the Soviet Union on the basis of the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.
® Nortli Korea reconsidered its relations with the Soviet Union at the end of 1964 after Khiaischev’s 
demise because North Korea’s open rebellion immediately made the Soviet Union cut its economic and 
military aid to North Korea.
 ^ North Korea hijacked the Pueblo (a US Navy Ship) in its territory in January 1968. See Vadim 
Tkachenko, ‘Lessons of Pueblo Crisis’, Korean Journal o f Defence Analysis, vol. 5, no. 2, 1993, pp. 
207-226.
At the time of the Pueblo incident, the Soviet Union was engaged in developing a dialogue with the 
US on various questions of mutual concern-notably, Vietnam, the Middle East and aims limitations. 
The meeting was held between Soviet Premier Kosygin and the US President Johnson at New Jersey in 
June 1967. Plans were being developed for a nuclear non-proliferation tieaty. These steps undoubtedly 
raised the hopes of Soviet leaders that they might be able to divert some of their limited resources into 
non-military areas and move forward with economic development (Donald Zagoria and Janet Zagoria,
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Thirdly, there was North Korea’s serious challenge to the 1961 Soviet- 
North Korean Friendship Treaty (or to the Soviet Union itself) after the 
announcement that it had joined the ‘non-aligned movement’ in the first half of 
the 1970s.” To a large extent, this could be understood as a measure of North 
Korea’s discontent with the Soviet policy because the latter did not actively 
support North Korea’s position against the US and South Korea on the Korean 
peninsula in the second half of the 1960s. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union 
took a negative view of North Korea’s intention to join the non-aligned 
movement.’^
Fourthly, there was a further disagreement over Korean unification 
between the Soviet Union and North Korea in the middle of the 1970s. The 
Soviet Union was strongly against the idea of a ‘Vietnam-style’ solution to 
Korean unification, which was pushed by Kim Il-sung after the fall of Saigon in 
the middle of the 1 9 7 0 s .T h e  1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty 
implied the desirability of unification under North Korea’s guidance and 
covertly implied that there would be no objections on the Soviet part should 
events take this course. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union preferred peaceful 
methods based on Article 5 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.
‘Crises on the Korean Peninsula’, in Stephen Kaplan, ed.. Diplomacy o f Power: Soviet Armed Forces 
as a Political Instrument [Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981], p. 373).
It should be also noted that, after the signing of the North-South Korean Joint Statement on 4 July 
1972, North Korea made pronouncements about the need to renounce the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty as unnecessary considering the new situation on the Korean peninsula and the 
international environment. The Soviet Union was lukewaim about the proposal, suggesting official 
discussions should be held (Alexander Zhebin, ‘Russia and North Korea: an Emerging Uneasy 
Partnership’, Asian Swwey, vol. 35, no. 8, 1995, p. 727).
North Korea, Vietnam, Angola and the PLO were all admitted to the non-aligned movement at the 
1976 Colombo sununit. The Soviet Union has traditionally been critical of links between Western 
states/political groups and the non-aligned movement, fearing that such links might dilute the anti- 
Westenr, anti-colonial tluust of the non-aligned and suggest or support alternative developmental 
patterns to those of the ‘non-capitalist path’ or ‘socialist orientation’. Soviet officials had supported 
neutralism as a foreign policy course since the late 1950s, but initially they were ambivalent in their 
responses to the non-aligned movement. In early 1960s the meetings of the non-aligned states had to 
compete with the Afro-Asian movement for legitimacy in representing Third World views. Another 
factor which contributed to Soviet reluctance to encourage multilateral diplomacy based on non- 
aligmnent was the association of this concept or policy with Yugoslavia (Roy Allison, The Soviet 
Union and the Strategy o f Non-Alignment in the Third World [Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988], pp. 32, 53 and 56).
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Those examples clearly indicated that the Soviet Union was reluctant to 
support any kind of ‘active’ military operation by North Korea on the basis of 
the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.’'’
At this point, it is worth noting that ‘Soviet aid’’^  to North Korea had 
become the barometer of Soviet-North Korean relations.’*’ In other words, the 
Soviet Union gradually cut its aid to North Korea when the North Korean 
leadership did not have good relations with their Soviet counterparts. 
Simultaneously, the cutting of Soviet aid was one of the most important factors 
that prompted North Korea to reconsider its relations with the Soviet Union.
As Figure 3.1 indicates, Soviet trade with North Korea had been 
increasing after the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty.
For the details of the Vietnamese unification, see Tiziano Terzani, Saigon 1975: Three Days and 
Three Months, 2"'^  ed. (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1997).
Even Soviet researchers, expressing official views, for example, publicly stressed the clearly 
manifested ‘defensive’ character of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty (USSR and Korea 
[Moscow: n.p., 1988], p. 285).
Soviet aid took two forms: (1) economic aid; and (2) military aid. For the Soviet side, aid had 
become an important instrument which was used to achieve its strategic objectives in its bloc countiies 
and the Third World. See Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid: the New Aid and Trade Policy in 
Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958); Roger E. Kanet, ‘Soviet 
Military Assistance to the Third World’, in John F. Cooper and Daniel S. Papp, eds., Communist 
Nations' Militaiy Assistance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 39-71; and Andrei I. 
Chekliutov, Nataliya A. Ushakova and Leon Z. Zeviii, ‘Economic Assistance to Developing 
Countries’, in Richard E. Feinberg and Ratchik M. Avakov, eds.. From Confrontation to 
Cooperation?: US and Soviet Aid to Developing Countries (New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction 
Publishers, 1991), pp. 93-122. For the Soviet military and economic aid and integration with socialist 
countries in Europe m 1970s, see A. L. Narochnitskii, ed., SSSR i bratskie sotsialisticheskie strany 
Evropy v 1970-e gody (Moscow: Nauka, 1988).
For a more detailed analysis of Soviet aid to North Korea during the Cold War era, see George 
Ginsburgs, ‘Soviet Development Grants and Aid to North Korea, 1945-80’, Asia Pacific Community, 
no. 18, Fall 1982, pp. 42-63; B. N. Slavinskii, Vneshniaia politika SSSR na Dal'nem Vostoke 1945- 
1986 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1988), pp. 109-116, 136-144, 184-190 and 254-269; 
and Erik van Ree, ‘The Limits of Juche: North Korea’s Dependence on Soviet Industiial Aid, 1953- 
76’, The Journal o f Communist Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, 1989, pp. 50-73.
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Figure 3.1 Soviet Trade with North Korea, 1960-66
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Source: S. L. Tikhvinskii, ed., Otnosheniya Sovetskogo Soyuza s Narodnoi Koreei, 1945-80: 
Dokumenty i Materialy (Moscow; Nauka, 1981), p. 400.
Entering the 1980s, however, relations between the Soviet Union and 
North Korea were notably improving on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty. Indeed, it could be argued that relations in the early 
1980s - including the initial period of Gorbachev’s leadership - were at their 
closest since the 1945-53 period.”
As regards the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, Gorbachev’s 
North Korean policy could be divided into the following three stages. Relations 
between the Soviet Union and North Korea were tightened in the search for a 
‘new higher level’ of cooperation on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty during the early period of Gorbachev’s rule (1985-86). As a 
result, there were numerous celebratory events and high-ranking political 
contacts between the Soviet Union and North Korea to mark the 24”’ (1985) and 
25”’ (1986) anniversaries of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.’^
Some scholars define this period (early 1980s) as the end of the détente (or New Cold War), see 
Stephen Goode, The End o f  Détente? : US-Soviet Relations (fiew Y  ox\a\5Rdi\Xs,, 1981).
For example, around the 25^ '' amiiversaiy of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, Andrei 
Gromyko, member of the CPSU CC Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium 
and L. N. Zaykov, member of the CPSU CC Politburo and secretary of the CPSU CC stated that ‘the 
Soviet Union, guided by the 27th CPSU Congress (1986) decision, would continue to do everything
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In particular, it should be noted that the goodwill visits of military ships and 
aircraft on this occasion were designed to underline the significance of the 
military component of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.”
During the late 1980s (1988-89) the Soviet Union started to look for ‘new 
reciprocal’ fbims of cooperation with North Korea, although it still emphasised 
its ties with North Korea on the basis of ‘socialist internationalism’. Ironically, 
the 19”’ Party Conference, which heralded a new stage of the Soviet reform 
process and became the guiding direction of de-ideologisation [de-militarisation 
and humanisation of international relations] of Soviet foreign policy, was held 
around the 27”’ anniversary of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty 
in July 1988.^” This soon resulted in rapidly deteriorating relations between the 
two sides on the basis of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking, which 
emphasised relations with South Korea. As a result, there were no particularly 
high-level political contacts between the two sides on the occasion of the 27”’ 
anniversaiy, although there were still a number of celebratory events.^’
During the period of 1990-91, the Soviet Union tried to make an effort to 
look for a ‘responsible’ stage of relations with North Korea concerning the 
1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. In reality. New Political 
Thinking and rapprochement with South Korea ruled out any kind of ‘strategic
possible to ensure that Soviet-North Korean friendship and cooperation grow stronger' {Izvestiia, 4 
July 1986, pp. 1-2).
For example. Admiral Vladimir Sidorov, commander of the Pacific fleet of the Soviet Union, and 
Lieutenant General of the Air Force, Viktor Bulankin, conuuander of the Air Force of the Far Eastern 
Military District, who headed the Soviet Naval squadron aiTived in North Korea to attend the 
celebrations of the 25th amiiversary of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty ( ‘Navy, Air 
Force Representatives Visit DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 7 July 1986 in FBIS-SOV 86-131, 9 July 1986, p. C5).
For the context of 19“' Party Conference, see Materialy XIX Vsesoiuznoi konferentsii 
Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, 28 iiunia - 1 iiulia 1988 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
politicheskoi literatury, 1988).
Notably, on the day of the 27“' (1988) aimiversary of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty, Kim Il-sung stopped over in Khabarovsk 4-5 July en route home from Mongolia {Pravda, 6 
July 1988, p. 5). Just before the 28“' (1989) anniversary of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty, a CPSU delegation led by Politburo member and CPSU CC secretary Viktor Nikonov arrived 
on an official visit to North Korea and stated that ‘our visit is a continuation of the good and mutually 
advantageous tradition that has evolved between the leaderships of the two parties’. However, he went 
on to state that ‘the CPSU CC leadership pays much more attention to developing relations between the 
CPSU and the WPK, between the Soviet Union and North Korea, to improving these relations, filling
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alliance’ with North Korea on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship T rea tyF urtherm ore , a re-examination of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty was inevitable following the Soviet Union’s decision 
to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea in September 1990, 
theoretically at least. This meant that the Soviet Union had to start seriously 
reviewing the contents of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, 
shifting the emphasis from socialist internationalism to national interests based 
on its reform policies and New Political Thinking. Nevertheless, Gorbachev’s 
North Korean policy during the period of 1990-91 attempted to maintain Soviet 
influence over that country while retaining the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty, which was based on ideological ties.
Changes in Soviet aid to North Korea during the Gorbachev era should 
also be considered when understanding their relations. For instance, following 
Kim Il-sung’s 1984 and 1986 visits to Moscow, the Soviet Union provided 
North Korea with advanced fighter aircraft, gunships and nuclear technology 
for power generation. In return for this, the Soviet Union received access to 
North Korean ports and the right to use North Korean airspace for 
reconnaissance between the Far East and Vietnam.
The Soviet Union also increased its economic aid to North Korea during 
the early period of Gorbachev’s leadership. For example, the Soviet Union built 
70 industrial projects that produced about 25 per cent of North Korea’s gross 
output, and the volume of trade also increased from 1987 to 1988. The Soviet 
Union also accounted for about 60 per cent of North Korea’s foreign trade in 
1990.^'’
them with “new content”, developing “new forms” of cooperation and drawing broad segments of the 
population of the two countries into these links’ {Pravda, 30 June 1989, p. 7).
North Korea emphasised the fulfilment of its responsibilities as stipulated by the treaty, while the 
Soviet Union pointed out that the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was based on the 
existence of the two states on the Korean peninsula (Joachim Glaubitz, ‘The Soviet Union and the 
Korean peninsula’, Aussenpolitik, vol. 43, no, 1, 1992, pp. 90-91).
Robert A. Manning, Asian Policy: the New Soviet Challenge in the Pacific (New York: Priority 
Press, 1988), pp. 61-62.
Vasily Miklieev, ‘USSR-North Korea: Economic Aspects of Relations’, Sino-Soviet Affairs (Seoul), 
vol. 13, no. 1, 1989, p. 74.
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However, as Figure 3.2 indicates, trade between the Soviet Union and 
North Korea was decreasing rapidly and Soviet aid to North Korea nearly 
stopped after the diplomatic normalisation with South Korea in September 
1990.
Figure 3.2 Soviet Exports to North Korea, 1985-91
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Source: Derived from Vneshniaia Torgovlia, various issues.
As seen above, during the Cold War era (from the end of World War Two 
up to 1984), the Soviet Union emphasised its relations with North Korea based 
on the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. Nevertheless, Soviet 
policy towards the Korean peninsula had never been active because the Soviet 
Union did not seem to have active goals towards the region. Rather, it had been 
passive or defensive because of the external factors, especially the US factor.^^
As regards the détente (1970s) in Northeast Asia, the order of Northeast Asia had been led by the US 
(and China and Japan). See Peter Poticluiyj and Jane Shapiro, eds.. From the Cold War to Détente 
(New York: Praeger, 1974); and Robert Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign 
Policy and the Pursuit o f Stability, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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By contrast, during the Gorbachev era, although Soviet-North Korean 
relations still developed on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty as the legal foundation of their relations, Soviet policy 
towards the Korean peninsula had been changed into an active one towards 
South Korea for the first time on the basis of Gorbachev’s New Political 
Thinking. Notably, Gorbachev’s new reform policies led to a greater emphasis 
upon relations with South Korea due to the latter’s expected economic benefits 
for the Soviet economy. Furthermore, it should be noted that the politics of 
Northeast Asia had been eventually led by Gorbachev’s active initiatives such 
as New Political Thinking rather than any other great powers’ initiatives in this 
region.
3.2. From ‘Special Character’ to ‘Commercial’ Relations Based on Post- 
Soviet Existing Realities? (Dec. 91-Dec. 93)
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
attempted to consolidate his political power based on reform policies and at the 
same time he delineated a pro-South Korean policy towards the Korean 
peninsula, which was a part of a more generally pro-Western stance in Russian 
foreign policy.
As a result, high-level political contacts between Russia and North Korea 
were effectively halted, inter-parliamentary ties were broken, and the exchange 
of people was minimised except for two important high-ranking Russian 
officials’ visits to North Korea during the early period of Russian foreign policy 
(Dec. 91-Dec. 93).^^ These were as follows. In January 1992, Igor Rogachev,
It must be noted that even several Russian citizens in North Korea were attacked by the local 
population in the port of Chirmampo, 50 km west of Pyongyang in the middle of 1993. The victims 
were Sergey Bulekov, a representative of the Gorkiy ‘GAZ’ joint stock company, his wife and their 
son. Representatives of the Russian Embassy in the DPRK are preparing an official protest over the 
incident. Then, in response, the Russian govermnent has decided to restrict the movements of North
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special envoy of the President of the Russian Federation, visited North Korea.^^ 
Then, in February 1993, Russian deputy foreign minister Georgiy Kunadze 
visited North Korea.^^ Not surprisingly, the purpose of these visits was to 
discuss important bilateral issues between the two sides, especially the issue of 
the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, together with the issue of 
North Korean nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Russia had to begin re-examining the contents of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).^^ Soon, the re­
examination of the Treaty became the key issue between the two countries 
because it embraced all the major political, economic and security aspects of 
their relations. For this reason, relations between Russia and North Korea were 
heavily dependent upon a re-examination of the Treaty in the new political and 
economic circumstances. In other words, this indicated that previous Soviet- 
allied relations based on the Cold War system had changed into the new 
relations in the post-Soviet era.^°
As a matter of fact, the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty had 
already become obsolete when the Soviet Union established diplomatic 
relations with South Korea in September 1990. Thus, theoretically, at least, a 
re-examination of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was
Korean diplomats and their direct contact with Russian government official (‘Russian Citizens Beaten 
in DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 5 July 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-129, 8 July 1993, pp. 19-20).
See ‘Rogachev, DPRK Talks of Mutual Benefit’, Tass International Service, 18 January 1992 in 
FBIS-SOV 92-013, 21 January 1992, p. 42-43.
For the details of his visit to North Korea, see ‘Kunadze Arrives in DPRK to Discuss New Ties, 
Disarmament’, Itar-Tass, 29 Januaiy 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-020, 2 Febmary 1993, p. 9; and ‘Brifing 
zamestitelia ministra inostiaimykh del RF G. F. Kunadze 5 fevralia: O konsul’tatsiiakli mezhdu 
ministerstvami inostramiykli del RF i KNDR’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 5-6, March 1993, pp. 28- 
31.
Russia has a unique position and is the successor state to the USSR as a state. A prominent diplomat 
said that while agreements with North Korea, Iraq and Cuba did not conform to ‘the criteria of 
expediency’ by which Russia was guided, as the successor state to the USSR, Russia was nonetheless 
bound to observe existing agreements and tieaties with these and other countiies (RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 
3, 17 January 1992, p. 63).
In the post-Soviet era, Russia encountered a quite unprecedented situation in Northeast Asia 
regarding the Korean issue. Russia had no more allied relations with North Korea while nonnalising its 
relationship with South Korea, although the latter still had a close relationship with the US based on the 
Cold War system in the post-Soviet era. This meant that Russia had to upgrade its relations with the
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inevitable before the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 because 
the Treaty was mainly directed against South Korea and the US on the Korean 
peninsula. In other words, it was contradictory for the former Soviet Union to 
normalise its diplomatic relations with South Korea while still adhering to 
Article 1 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which provided 
for military cooperation in the event of war on the Korean peninsula.
According to Article 6 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty, the foimer Soviet Union should have informed North Korea of its 
intention to reconsider the Treaty by July 1990 if it wanted to change its 
content.^^ However, during the late Soviet period, due to the lack of a declared 
intention by the Soviet side to reconsider the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty by this date (July 1990), it was renewed automatically up to 
1995, when it had to be abrogated or extended for a flirther five years.
There appear to be two main reasons for the Russian leadership’s decision 
to re-examine the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty during this 
period (Dec, 91-Dec. 93). First, Russia was no longer interested in maintaining 
an alliance relationship with North Korea in the post-Soviet era because it 
sought to maximise its basic national interests which harnessed democratic 
means to its foreign policy objectives: (1) to ensure the external conditions for 
refoim; and (2) to gain entry into the world com m unity ,bo th  of which were 
contradictory to the contents of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty. In some respects, this also meant that Russia was no longer able to 
supply any kind of bilateral aid to North Korea in an allied relationship on the
two Koreas while the two countries were still caught up in the Cold War atmosphere in the post-Soviet 
era.
The contents of Article 6 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty are as follows. ‘The 
Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which shall 
take place at Pyongyang. This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years. If neither of the Contracting 
Parties gives notice one year before the expiration of the said period that it wishes to denounce the 
Treaty, it shall remain in force for the succeeding five years and shall thereafter continue in force in 
accordance with this provision’ {Pravda, 7 July 1961, p. 1).
Rossiiskaia gazeta, 21 January 1992, p. 5.
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basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty in the post-Soviet 
period.
Secondly, the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty 
became a serious obstacle to improved relations with South Korea in the post- 
Soviet era. Indeed, Russia had to re-examine the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty not only in terms of its relations with North Korea, 
but also its relations with South Korea, which had become one of the most 
important states in Northeast Asia. In this regard, Russia even had faced 
sustained South Korean pressure, which demanded that Russia renounce the 
1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty as a pre-condition for the 
conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty that was signed in 1992, 
together with expansion of the economic relationship which included Russia’s 
debts to South Korea.^^ (See Chapter 4.)
In particular, it should be emphasised that Article 1 of the 1961 Soviet- 
North Korean Friendship Treaty, which stated that ‘should either of the 
Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and 
thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately 
extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal’, became 
a crucial disputed point for reinterpretation among the Russian leadership.
In this respect, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the refoim-minded 
Russian leadership tried to abrogate or revise parts of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty, stating that they would not renew it and would only 
support North Korea against an unprovoked attack, which was a most unlikely 
scenario. Instead, they proposed a softening of security obligations to North 
Korea, limiting them to the case of an unprovoked attack from outside. 
Simultaneously, they argued that military relations (both cooperation and 
assistance) with North Korea which were previously of a ‘special character’ 
would come to an end with the move to a ‘commercial basis’ in the post-Soviet
”  For a more detailed analysis of Russia’s debts to South Korea, see Sang-moon Hahm and Joon-hwan 
Im, Debt Management and the Russian Debt Problem (Seoul: Korea Institute of Finance, 1996).
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era.^ ^^  In November 1992, Yeltsin, on a visit to Seoul, clearly expressed the 
view that the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty needed to be either 
cancelled completely or drastically revised.^^ In February 1993, Russian deputy 
foreign minister Georgiy Kunadze also stated that ‘...Russia and North Korea 
agreed that the 1961 Treaty should be changed according to existing realities
One of the main reasons for Yeltsin and the reform-minded Russian 
leadership to support the abrogation or modification of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty was that they desperately needed to receive economic 
assistance from South Korea in order to support their own domestic reform 
programmes. As a matter of fact, this was the basic conception of the early 
Russian foreign policy direction not only towards the Korean peninsula, but 
also towards other regions of the world.
In general, their basic view of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty was as follows: ‘Today’s Russian-North Korean relations are passing 
through a complicated stage. Russia is trying to develop Russian-North Korean 
relations so they can be maintained on the basis of the freedom of selection and 
complete equality, in conformity with the national interests of each side, and on 
the basis of the principle of mutual interests of both sides’. In this point, 
surprisingly, it should be mentioned here that even the Russian parliament 
would reject clauses in the Moscow-Pyongyang alliance treaty that contiadicted
For example, on 19 May 1992, speaking about Russian-North Korean relations in South Korea, the 
Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that as a legal successor to the foimer Soviet 
Union, Russia recognises all international ti'eaties. However, it is perfectly obvious that the present 
[1961] treaty with North Korea was signed in somewhat different conditions and is overloaded with 
ideological terminology and at present, naturally, should be perceived in line with the current state of 
affairs’ (‘Kozyrev Gives News Conference on ROK Trip’, Tass, 19 March 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-055, 
20 March 1992, p. 31). Regarding military cooperation on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty, foreign minister Kozyrev declared in the spring of 1992 that Russia would stop all 
military cooperation with the North and put pressure on it to drop its nuclear plans. Furthermore, asked 
about military deliveries to North Korea by the CIS Chief of Staff Viktor Samsonov stated that ‘till 
1990 deliveries were made either gratis or in return for Korean raw materials and goods. Such 
deliveries are rrow made only along the state line in the framework of the conversion of the military- 
industrial complex and only on a “commercial basis’” (‘Chief of Staff Samsonov Meets Kim Il-sung’, 
Tass, 3 March 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-043, 4 March 1992, p. 17).
See Rossiiskaia gazeta, 20 November 1992, pp. 1-2.
‘Details Nuclear, Military Ties’, Itar-Tass, 1 February 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-020, 2 February 1993, 
p. 9.
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Moscow-Seoul amity. Meeting Kim Dae-jung, leader of South Korea’s main 
opposition Democratic Party, parliament chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov stated 
that he had told the parliament’s intention to the North Korean ambassador to 
Moscow shortly after he returned from a visit to South Korea the previous year 
(1991). The Russian parliament, which was responsible for setting foreign 
policies and implementing them, had already ordered the Russian foreign 
ministry to look into clauses apt to cause trouble in Seoul-Moscow relations, 
Khasbulatov said.^^ Khasbulatov’s remarks clearly implied that the Russian 
parliament would abrogate or revise parts of its 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty. In the meantime, for the South Korean side, the abrogation 
of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty would have meant that 
South Korea would predominate over North Korea on the Korean peninsula in 
the post-Soviet era.^^
However, the refonn-minded Russian leadership’s view of the new 
interpretation of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was not easy 
to put into practice immediately. Under the temis of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty it could be renounced, for all practical purposes, only 
at the end of a regular five-year extension - i.e., in 1995. Furthermore, those 
members of the Russian leadership that supported the North Korean side 
opposed a pro-South Korean stance in the revision of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty.
For example, in an inteiwiew an official from the Far Eastern department 
of the Russian foreign ministry was reported to have stated that ‘as a legal 
successor of the Soviet Union, Russia would observe the provisions of all 
formerly signed treaties, including the Soviet-North Korean Treaty on 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1961. Such was the official
‘Khasbulatov: DPRK Treaty Clauses to Be Rejected’, Yonhap, 9 September 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92- 
175, 9 September 1992, p. 15.
In particular. South Korea was concerned about Article 1 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty, which contained the military involvement while growing tension of the North 
Korea’s nuclear crisis during this period. For a more detailed account of this, see Chapter 5.
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position of the Russian government.,. of course, the Treaty was signed over 30 
years ago and was out of date, having clauses which had to be made more 
specific... negotiations were needed to sort it out. Nobody seemed to be in a 
hurry, however, which meant the Treaty would not be revised in the near 
future’ On 7 July 1992, on the 31^ anniversary of the conclusion of the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, Russian Vice President Aleksandr 
Rutskoi was in the North Korean embassy to confnm the Russian pledges in 
respect of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty On 10 July 1992, 
at a reception on the anniversaiy of the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty in the North Korean embassy, Rutskoi and Russian 
deputy foreign minister Kunadze assured the ambassador that the 1961 Soviet- 
North Korean Friendship Treaty, which had been concluded at a time when 
both states belonged to the same ‘peace camp’ and adhered to the principles of 
‘socialist internationalism’, remained in force for present-day Russia. Kunadze, 
added that ‘the 1961 Treaty contains certain wording that is archaic fi'om 
today’s position, but the main thing for us is not this wording but the essence. A 
selective approach to this legacy is not possible. We have accepted it the way it 
was, and we intend to fulfil the commitments stemming fi'om it. This applies 
also to the treaty with North Korea... We believe that the treaty makes an 
effective contribution to the cause of stability. Consequently, it benefits not 
only our two countries but also all states which seek to eliminate the hotbed of 
tension which still exists in this region even after the end of the Cold War. I 
believe that the Treaty must be regarded as a constituent part of the legal 
context which also includes the treaties concluded by South K o r e a O n  28 
July 1992, the Russian foreign ministry even stated that ‘Russia is obseiwing all 
the Soviet Union’s obligations as regards international treaties and agreements.
‘Government to Observe Soviet-DPRK Treaty’, Moscow Interfax, 13 January 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92- 
009, 14 January 1992, p. 29,
‘Friendship Treaty with DPRK Extended’, Russian Television Network, 1 July 1992 in FBIS-SOV
92-131,8 July 1992, p. 27.
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 10 July 1992, p. 4.
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Needless to say, this also applies to the said treaty with North Korea, which 
retains all its force and is still an important element in the military and 
economic stability on the Korean peninsula’ On 5 January 1993, Russian 
ambassador to South Korea Aleksandr Panov stated that ‘there will be no 
revisions in the inteipretation of the tieaty for the time being. There will be no 
additional revisions in the interpretation of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty for the time being to become a partner. I believe this treaty to 
some extent helps to stabilise the situation in this region’.
Those who tried to defend the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty wanted to maintain its advantages in North Korea mainly because of the 
latter’s strategic importance to Russia’s security (rather than economic 
interests). For this reason, many figures among the Russian leadership seemed 
to resent pressure ft’om South Korea which demanded that Russia renounce its 
ti'eaty with North Korea.'^ ^^  Nevertheless, it was true that the Russian leadership 
(even those who wished to keep the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty) unilaterally renounced the defence [military] assistance clauses of the 
Treaty
In the meantime. North Korea even accused Russia of violating the Treaty 
while insisting on an alternative consideration of this ti'eaty This implied that
Izvestiia, 28 July 1992, p. 4.
The Korea Herald (Seoul), 5 January 1993, pp. 2 and 5.
For example, already in July 1992, within the Russian foreign ministry the view was expressed that 
Russia as a great power should not bow to South Korean demands concerning its relationship with 
North Korea {Izvestiia, 31 July 1992, p. 6). On 1 August 1992, a Russian foreign ministry diplomat 
stated that ‘attempts from whatever quarter to dictate to Russia how to organise its relations with other 
countries are unacceptable to us...we did it ourselves, deliberately; nobody pressured us’ {Izvestiia, 1 
August 1992, p. 6). On 14 August 1992, Russian deputy foreign minister Georgiy Kunadze stated that 
‘... we must strive to preserve and strengthen the good-neighbourliness which is the basis of the 1961 
inter-state treaty... as we see, it is a question of unacceptable attempts by certain circles in South Korea 
to pressure Russia ahead of the Russian president’s visit on the question of our relations with a third 
country... Russia intends to fulfri the provisions of this important interstate agreement’ {Izvestiia, 14 
August 1992 , p. 6).
For example, with reference to military cooperation between the two countries, Russian deputy 
foreign minister Georgiy Kunadze stated that ‘Moscow would not supply Pyongyang with military 
equipment and special property on credit’ ( ‘Kunadze Comment on DPRK and Japan Ties’, Interfax, 3 
February 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-022, 4 Febmary 1993, p. 9).
However, it should be noted here that North Korea has officially expressed its position on the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty signed between the former Soviet Union and North Korea,
8 6
North Korea had a good excuse to obseiwe what was going on over this issue on 
the Russian side while concealing its intentions about the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty issue in the post-Soviet era. As a matter of fact, for 
the North Korean side, the existence of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty in the post-Soviet era could be a substantial factor when 
dealing with other major powers such as China, Japan and the US."^ ^
In any case, nevertheless, it should be noted that the two sides reseiwed 
the right to interpret the scope of obligations imposed by it because the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty existed and was in force during this 
period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).
As a result, the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty 
during this period proved to be a very difficult one for the Russian leadership, 
which struggled to satisfy the interests of the both states. Especially 
domestically, there was little consensus on the fiiture of the Treaty. There were 
even veiy obviously conflicting opinions within the foreign ministry itself about 
how to develop the Treaty. For example, in July 1992, the Russian foreign 
ministry continued to regard the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty as 
active, despite Yeltsin’s and Kozyrev’s intention to abrogate it.'^  ^Furthermore, it 
should be noted that even several important Russian high-ranking officials often 
changed their opinions about the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty. For example, in August 1992, deputy foreign minister 
Kunadze stated that ‘Moscow and Pyongyang are long-standing partners in 
various spheres of human activity. And, we believe that there is no need to
saying the ti’eaty is inappropriate under today’s circumstances (‘DPRK Official Says Treaty 
“Inappropriate”’, Radio Moscow, 21 December 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-246, 22 December 1992, p. 16.)
North Korea’s accommodation to pressures from other major powers has never resulted in passive 
acquiescence to their demands. In every instance. North Korea has resorted to a policy of positive 
accommodation in its relations with the two countiies. For analysis of North Korea’s accommodation 
during the Cold War era, see Wayne S. Kiyosaki, North Korea's Foreign Relations: the Politics o f  
Accommodation, 1945-75 (New York, Washington and London: Praeger Publishers, 1976).
The Russian foreign minish-y stated that ‘Russia is obsei-ving all the USSR’s obligations as regards 
international tieaties and agreements. Needless to say, this also applies to the said tieaty with North 
Korea, which retains all its force and is still an important element in the military and economic stability 
on the Korean peninsula’ {Izvestiia, 28 July 1992, p. 4).
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break off our relationship [with North Korea]... we must strive to preserve and 
strengthen the good-neighbourliness which is the basis of the 1961 inter-state 
tieaty... the treaty corresponds to the UN Charter’ However, in Pyongyang in 
Februaiy 1993 Kunadze as a special representative of the Russia’s president 
demonstrated his changed views to the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty. He stated that ‘Russia has proposed to North Korea that they revise the 
1961 treaty in accordance with the UN Charter, and North Korea has not 
objected to this proposal
To a certain extent, such conflicts and contradictions were indicative of a 
power stiTiggle taking place at the top level of the Russian government over the 
issue of the Treaty. Ultimately, this lack of consensus, together with the 
inconsistency within the Russian leadership on the issue of the Treaty, led to 
Yeltsin’s last minute cancellation (or postponement) of a visit to South Korea 
scheduled for September 1992.^'
Other significant bilateral treaties between the two sides during this period 
were few and less important. In terms of economic relations between the two 
sides, for example, nine timber production locations in Khabarovsk Kiai and 
four in the Amur Oblast belonging to North Korea would be closed. The 
decision terminated the agreement between North Korea and the Soviet Union 
for the procurement and joint processing of timber, and the rehabilitation of
Izvestiia, 14 August 1992, p. 6.
‘Kunadze Reports No DPRK Objection to Treaty Proposal’, Yonhap, 5 February 1993 in FBIS-SOV
93-023, 5 Febmary 1993, p. 9.
The official timetable for Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea was determined between 16 and 18 
September 1992. Regarding the postponement of this trip to South Korea and Japan, most Western 
analysts on Russian-Asian affairs mainly raised the question of Russia’s domestic constraints in the 
context of the Northern territorial disputes with Japan (for example, see Peggy F. Meyer, ‘Moscow’s 
Relations with Tokyo: Domestic Obstacles to a Tenitorial Agreement’, Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 10, 
1993, pp. 953-967; and Yakov Zinberg and Reinhard Drifte, ‘Chaos in Russia and the TeiTitorial 
Dispute with Japan’, The Pacific Review, vol. 6, no. 3, 1993, pp. 277-284). However, the author would 
like to put the similar weight the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty and other 
unresolved problems with South Korea to the last minutes postponement of Yeltsin’s visits to South 
Korea and Japan. Together with the Northern territorial dispute, there was clearly the question of 
Russia’s domestic constraints in the contexts of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty and 
other umesolved problems with South Korea.
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forests on the territory of the Soviet U n i o n . I n  the field of military relations, 
Colonel-General Viktor Samsonov, chief of the general staff of the CIS Joint 
Armed Forces, signed a military cooperation between the two sides in North 
Korea in March 1992. A plan for the development of ties between the command 
of the CIS Armed Forces and North Korea was signed in the course of his visit 
as well.^^
As regards Russia’s aid to North Korea during this period, Yeltsin 
intended to cut off all defence assistance and all arms sales to North Korea. 
As Figure 3.3 indicates, Russia’s arms sales to North Korea in the early 1990s 
were less than 1 per cent of its total sales.
Figure 3.3 Russian Arms Deliveries, Cumulative Value, 1992-94
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Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington D.C.: US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, 1995).
‘Moscow Terminates USSR-DPRK Timber Anangement’, Vladivostok radiostantsiya tikhiy okean 
Maritime Network, 20 July 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-138, 21 July 1993, p. 15.
‘Aimy Chief Signs Plan on DPRK Army Ties’, Moscow Radio Rossii Network, 3 March 1992 in 
FBIS-SOV 92-043, 4 March 1992, p. 17.
In Seoul in November 1992, Yeltsin stated that ‘Russia will discontinue any military assistance to 
North Korea. We are ready for cooperation in the military-technical field with South Korea’ (‘No More 
Military Aid to DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 19 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-224, 19 November 1992, p. 
10).
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Russian-North Korean trade dropped to roughly $US 500-600 million in 
1992 (which was almost the same level as in the 1970s) from $US 2.4 billion in 
1990.^^ In 1993, Russian-North Korean trade dropped to $US 130 mi l l i o n . In  
1992, Russian Far East trade volume with North Korea was only $US 2.3 
million, constituting about 0.1% of the total volume of Russian Far East trade.^^ 
Furthermore, the problem of North Korea’s debt, which was estimated by about 
$US 3.5 billion, had a major impact on relations between the two countr ies . In  
the field of militaiy cooperation, there had been few contacts between the two 
countries during this period. In effect, military relations with North Korea of a 
‘special’ character came to an end in the post-Soviet era.^^
One serious question arises at this point. As we have seen, aid was 
actually the main instrument used to influence North Korea during the Soviet 
period. In the post-Soviet era, without giving any aid to North Korea, how 
could Russia, for example, persuade (or influence) it to reconsider its 
withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT)?^°
Russia had limited resources with which to assist and influence North 
Korea after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result. North Korea naturally 
started to focus its attention on the US and other major powers instead of 
Russia as a source of support and aid in the post-Soviet era. In other words. 
North Korea started to look to improve relations with other major powers such
B. C. Koh, ‘Trends in North Korean foreign policy’, Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 13, no. 
2, 1994, p. 66.
The Korea Times (Seoul), 16 March 1995, p. 3.
P. Minakir and G. Freeze, eds.. The Russian Far East: an Economic Handbook (New York: 1994), p. 
173.
For the discussion about how to return the money that other countries owed Russia including North 
Korea, see L. Zevin and V, Karpunin, ‘Vneshniaia zadolzhennost’ razvivaiushchiklisia stran: 
finansovyi rezeiw dlia rossiiskoi ekonomiki?’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 
8, 1992, pp. 18-26.
The head of the first division of the Asia-Pacific department A. Bely argued that ‘cooperation in the 
military field has been completely hansferred to a “commercial” basis and North Korea no longer 
enjoyed preferential terms in acquiring arms. Russia did not hansfer offensive weapons to North 
Korea’ {Nezavisimaia gazeta, 9 September 1992, p. 2).
It should be noted that Russia has rather been a country that has received substantial economic 
assistance from the IMF in the post-Soviet era. See Nigel Gould-Davies and Ngaire Woods, ‘Russia 
and the IMF’, International Affairs (London), vol. 75, no. 1, 1999, pp. 1-22. For more detailed account
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as the US, Japan and China, although North Korea simultaneously provoked a 
serious international dispute by withdrawing from the nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty in the first half of the 1990s.
As seen above, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began 
seriously re-examining the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty based 
on the new circumstances of the post-Soviet era. However, on the one hand, 
there was a lack of consensus, together with the disagreements within the top 
Russian leadership on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty. On the other hand, unlike the Soviet years, even Russia’s intentions 
about the conclusion of the new treaty as the basis of the new legal foundation 
in the post-Soviet era had to be postponed by North Korea. Those [internal and 
external] reasons eventually hindered Russia fi'oni developing new good 
bilateral relations with North Korea during this early stage of Russian foreign 
policy towards the Korean peninsula. In other words, those reasons finally led 
Russia’s foreign policy towards North Korea to be reactive despite its 
considerable efforts.
3.3. In Search of a New Legal Foundation? (Dec. 93-Dec. 95)
After the December 1993 parliamentary elections, there were certain signs that 
Russia had vigorously started to restore its previously good bilateral 
relationship with North Korea.*’' Especially, the Russian leadership intended to
of foreign aid to Russia, A. Vetrov and lu. Churakov, ‘Kak Rossiia mozhet ispol’zovat’ vneshniuiu 
pomoshch’?’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 11, 1993, pp. 39-49.
For example, a goodwill gathering was held at tlie North Korean embassy in Moscow on 12 January 
1994. Members of the Central Committee of the Russia-North Korean Friendship Association, Korean 
diplomats and reporters were present at the gathering. Polshchekov, chairman of the Russian 
Association of Veterans of the Korean Liberation War, summed up the association’s work for last year 
(1993) and explained the schedule of main events for 1994. A work plan for the association was 
approved (‘Goodwill Gathering Held at DPRK Embassy in Moscow’, Radio Moscow, 13 January 1994 
in FBIS-SOV 94-010, 14 Januaiy 1994, p. 40). In the second half of 1994, a delegation of the LDPR 
by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy arrived in the North Korea. ’Zhirinovskiy declared for the strengthening and 
development of relations between Russia and North Korea (See ’Zhirinovskiy Meets Korean Party 
Representatives’, Itar-Tass, 3 October 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-192, 4 October 1994, p. 4).
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establish a dialogue with the new North Korean leader, Kim Jeong-il, after the 
death of Kim Il-sung in the middle of 1994.'’^
In many respects, this indicated that after the December 1993 
parliamentary election, the Russian leadership had to more actively re-examine 
the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which became the 
core issue of their relations, in a bid to safeguard its interests in the Korean 
peninsula in the post-Soviet era. In other words, the Russian leadership seemed 
rather passively to re-examine the issue of the Treaty in the light of changes in 
both internal and external circumstances in the early stage of Russian foreign 
policy (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).
In these circumstances, the Russian leadership strongly emphasised that 
the existing 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was outdated and did 
not conform with the new reality of Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era. It 
hoped to find a ‘new legal foundation’ for its bilateral relations to uphold its 
interests and strengthen its position on the Korean peninsula,
There were several important motives for the Russian leadership to take 
the above position on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty. First, tensions grew over the North Korean nuelear crisis, especially in 
the first half of 1994 (see Chapter 5), and Article 1 of the Treaty had become an 
increasingly disputed issue between Russia and the two Koreas. In fact, the
Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed confidence that Russia and North Korea would 
continue to have ‘smooth and balanced relationship’ and that they would develop it. Asked at a 
meeting with journalists how the deal of Kim Il-sung might change the situation on the Korean 
peninsula and bilateral relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, he recalled that Yeltsin ‘has 
expressed condolences and the wish that the continuity of political dialogue should be preserved... it is 
absolutely clear that our neighbors, North Korea need a certain amount of time, and we are hoping for 
the continuation and development of the same smooth and balanced relationship which we had before 
and which, I am confident, we will continue to have with that country’ (‘Kozyrev Has “Confidence” in 
Continued DPRK Relations’,/tor-Thj'i', 11 July 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-132, 11 July 1994, p. 11).
For example, on 15 September 1995, Segodnia reported that ‘we must start from reality. Russia is 
not extending the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, while China is preseiwing a similar 
tieaty with North Korea, and the US, one with South Korea. At the same time, Moscow is prepared to 
conclude a legal document with North Korea, one which should help lay a new legal foundation for 
bilateral relations which would help resolve the Korean peninsula’s problems on the basis of a peaceful 
democratic process. The new treaty, it seems, must fix such basic principles of inter-states relations as 
mutual respect of sovereignty, non-intervention in one another’s internal affairs, equality, mutual 
benefit and so forth’ {Segodnia, 15 September 1995, p. 9).
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existing Treaty still provided that in the event of either of the two parties 
coming under armed attack from outside forces, the other would promptly 
provide militaiy and other support. For this reason, Russia urgently needed to 
have grounds for the decision not to help North Korea in the event of war on 
the Korean peninsula because it strongly wanted to have a peaceful external 
environment for its domestic reform programmes in Northeast Asia.
Secondly, Russia was no longer indifferent to North Korea’s increasingly 
improving relations with other major powers in Northeast Asia in the post- 
Soviet era while it had a reduced role on the Korean peninsula. In other words, 
basically Russia could not oppose North Korea’s decisions to establish relations 
with other powers in the region in the post-Soviet era, but at the same time it 
realised that it needed to maintain its role and influence over North Korea, in 
whatever form.*’"' This clearly indicated that a new international order in 
Northeast Asia was taking shape after the collapse of the Soviet Union.*’^
Thirdly, the Russian leadership had to adopt a firm position on the issue of 
the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty during this period (Dec. 93- 
Dec. 95) because of the deadline for renewal or denunciation in early 
September 1995 on the basis of Article 6 of this treaty. The Treaty would 
expire in September 1996, and the two sides had to give notice of their 
intention either to continue or to revise or not to denounce it by early
The leading powers of Northeast Asia were quick to take advantage of the pause in Russian-North 
Korean relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. North Korea also has changed its trade, 
economic and foreign policies towards the major powers in Northeast Asia since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. For example, the US, despite its loud anti-Korean rhetoric, stepped up both economic 
relations and political contacts with North Korea during this period. See S. M. Shuja, ‘Pyongyang’s 
Adjustment in the post-Cold War: Modifying the United States’ North Korean Policy’, Issues and 
Studies, vol. 32, no. 4, 1996, pp. 89-103. China forged full-scale relations with North Korea and, to a 
considerable extent, took over the key place in North Korea’s commercial and economic relations that 
the former Soviet Union had occupied during the Cold War era. Japan initiated a dialogue on 
establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea. Thus, Russia urgently needed to re-define its 
relations with North Korea by concluding the new [bilateral] tieaty replacing the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty because the case for Russia’s retaining some kind of treaty relationship rests 
on the assumption that its ability to play an effective role will depend greatly on maintaining normal 
relations with both South and North {Nezavisimaia gazeta, 17 Febmaiy 1993, p. 4).
For the details of account of new international order in Northeast Asia, see, for example, Man-woo 
Lee and Richard Mansbach, eds,. The Changing Order in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula 
(Seoul: The Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University Press, 1993).
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September 1995. Ultimately, this led the Russian leadership desperately to 
attempt to achieve a consensus on the issue during this period.
Those factors led Russia to consider having some kind of new bilateral 
treaty as the legal foundation its relations with North Korea, which would allow 
it to maintain its influence over the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.
In this respect, it should be noted that some of the Russian leadership were 
still considering the possibility of ‘military assistance’ to North Korea, which 
had nearly ceased after the collapse of the Soviet U n i o n . S o m e  Russian 
leadership also intended to resume selling defensive weapons to North Korea.^^ 
On the one hand, this indicated that Russia was seriously considering a dual 
Korean policy to maintain its influence over North Korea rather than its 
previous pro-South Korean stance. Especially, there was the fact that Russia 
never appeared to be as satisfied with its relations with South Korea during the 
early stage of Russian foreign policy (Dec. 91-Dec. 93) as it had expected. This 
naturally resulted in a new recognition of the importance of its relations with 
North Korea, especially the latter’s ‘potential’ in promoting Russia’s interests
For example, when offered the UN sanction against the North Korea’s nuelear issue by the UN 
Security Council in March 1994, the Russian foreign ministry stated that ‘despite the fact that the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty is still in force, just like the article providing for military aid in 
the case of aggression against North Korea. But if the matter does get as far as a diseussion of sanctions 
by the Security Council, our experts believe that Russian diplomats’ main task will be not to back the 
North Koreans into a corner’ {Izvestiia, 22 March 1994, p. 3). In March 1994, Russian deputy foreign 
minister (the former Russian ambassador to South Korea) Aleksandr Panov stated that ‘Moscow will 
render assistance to North Korea in the event of unprovoked aggression against it because Russia, as 
successor to the Soviet Union, is linked with North Korea by a corresponding treaty of 1961, according 
to the Russian foreign ministry officials distorts the essence of Russian position’ {Segodnia, 31 March 
1994, p. 2).
Some members of goverrrment who argued for more active support of domestic industry trrmed their 
attention to the possibility of reviving certain aspects of military cooperation with North Korea. They 
found supporters in military circles who had special interests in keeping contacts open with Nortli 
Korea. In the Russian academic world, there were also expectations that certain types of military 
cooperation with North Korea (Vladimir B. Yakubovsky, ‘Economic Relations between Russia and 
DPRK: Problems and Perspectives’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 20, no. 3, 1996, p. 463). Valentin 
Moiseev, head of the Korean office of the Asian department of the Russian foreign ministry, told the 
TASS commenting on South Korean reports about possible MiG-29 production in North Korea ‘North 
Korea is an eqiral member of inter-national conmrunity and has the right to purchase weapons and the 
necessary defence means wherever it believes it necessary’ (‘Foreign Ministry Official on Ties with 
DPRK and ROK’, Itar-Tass, 5 October 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-193, 5 October 1995, p. 22).
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on the Korean peninsula.^^ On the other hand, this also indicated that the 
Russian leadership still could not achieve a solid consensus in its policy 
towards the Korean peninsula.
By September 1995 (the deadline for renewal of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty) several significant steps in the development of 
bilateral relations between Russia and the two Koreas had been taken, 
especially focusing on a new draft treaty to replace the Treaty. During his visit 
to North Korea as a special envoy of the Russian president in January 1994,^^ 
Russian deputy foreign minister Georgiy Kunadze was reported to have stated 
that ‘Russia and North Korea had agreed to amend the treaties and the legal 
grounds of relations between the two countries, including the 1961 Soviet- 
North Korean Friendship Treaty, and to resume active contacts between the two 
eountiies’ foreign ministries, including contacts in the UN’.^ *'
The issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was also 
seriously discussed at the second Russian-South Korean summit in Moscow in 
June 1994. During the talks, according to Chung Jong-uk, chief foreign policy 
advisor to the South Korean president, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated 
that ‘article 1 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty stipulating 
Russia’s military intervention [could] be regarded as defunct’. '^ In September 
1994, Russian deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Panov amved in North Korea 
as a special envoy with a view to the development of bilateral relations, which 
was to include direct dialogue between the two countries. Panov stated that ‘the
Although North Korea had not always been a subservient ally to the Soviet Union, especially since 
the late 1950s, it still played a crucial role in Russian strategic considerations. One must realise that 
previously North Korea often acted against Soviet wishes and sometimes openly attacked Soviet 
policies. Because of the strategic importance of North Korea, however, the Soviet Union did not expel 
North Korea from the Socialist camp, and continued to provide the counhy with economic and military 
assistance (Ralph N. Clough, ‘The Soviet Union and the Two Koreas’, in Donald S. Zagoria, ed,, 
Soviet Policy in East Asia [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982], p. 187).
It should be noted that Georgiy Kunadze’s visit to North Korea was originally scheduled for the 
second half of 1992 but has been postponed three times (‘Kunadze to Visit DPRK to Realign Bilateral 
Relations’, Kyodo, 26 January 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-015, 26 January 1993, p. 25).
‘Deputy Minister (Kunadze) Inteiwiewed on Ties with Koreas’, Radio Moscow, 20 January 1994 in 
FBIS-SOV 94-014, 21 January 1994, p. 20.
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1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty remains in force until 1996, and 
measures will be taken one year before it expires, so there is still time to think 
things through’7^
In Seoul in May 1995, Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev also 
claimed that ‘we are giving the [1961 Soviet-North Korean] Treaty 
comprehensive consideration and analysis. We have repeatedly stated at 
governmental level that some provisions of the treaty have become outdated. 
Thus, the Russian side will inform its partner in the tieaty before August, or in 
August 1995, a year before the treaty expires’.F in a lly , on 7 September 1995, 
the Russian foreign ministry officially announced that Russia had proposed to 
North Korea to replace the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty with a 
‘New Friendship Agreement’
What kind of new friendship treaty did Russia expect to have with North 
Korea in the post-Soviet era?
According to sources in the Russian foreign policy, the draft of the new 
treaty sought to put greater emphasis on developing bilateral economic 
cooperation rather than military ties. Furthermore, unlike the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty, it would not contain an automatic military 
intervention clause which had been the core of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty, and would be basically similar in content to the goodwill 
treaty signed between South Korea and Russia as part of Russia’s dual Korean 
p o l i c y T h e  Russian side also hoped that the new treaty would establish a
‘Yeltsin Pledged Pressure on North Korea: Military Treaty with North Korea a Dead Letter’, Korea 
Newsreview, vol. 23, no. 23, 4 June 1994, p. 4.
‘Deputy Foreign Minister (Panov) in DPRK for Talks’, Itar-Tass, 22 September 1994 in FBIS-SOV
94-185, 23 September 1994, p. 14.
‘Cited on Plans for Treaty with DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 20 May 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-098, 22 May 1995, 
p. 14.
Nikita Matkovskiy, spokesman of the Russian foreign ministi-y, stated that ‘the text of the new treaty 
had been handed over to the North Korean side. The Russian side informed the North Korean side that 
the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which had played its role in the history of relations 
between the two countries, has become out-dated because of well-known objective circumstances and 
does not correspond to new realities’ (‘Moscow Proposes Scrapping Defence Treaty with DPRK’, Itar- 
Tass, 7 September 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-173, 7 September 1995, p. 26).
”  Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 10 September 1996, p. 2.
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mechanism for regular contact between Russia and North Korea, something 
that would make it possible to prevent any headlong rush to unification that 
could destabilise the Korean peninsula/*^ At the same time, by renouncing 
North Korea’s status as a military ally, even if only a pro forma one, Russia 
was now eliminating any ambiguity on this [the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty] issueF^
Russia’s proposal for negotiations to sign a new treaty with North Korea, 
which was put forward a year before the expiration of the existing treaty, was 
also aimed at demonstrating its commitment to improving relations with South 
Korea. The latter had sought to abrogate the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty while simultaneously maintaining relations with North Korea 
by concluding a new treaty after replacing the old one a year before its 
expiration date.
This Russian proposal for a new treaty with North Korea had a potentially 
significant impact on the international politics of Northeast Asia in the post- 
Soviet era. In reality, the expiration of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty, one of the last relics of the Cold War in Northeast Asia, 
could be seen as a symbol of the end of the Soviet era on the basis of Russia’s 
new perceptions and interests in the region in the post-Soviet era.
Nonetheless, it should be emphasised here that there still seemed to be no 
firm consensus on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty 
among the Russian leadership during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). For 
example, in March 1994, amidst rising tensions between the US and North 
Korea over that country’s refusal to permit IAEA inspectors to implement 
inspection of its nuclear facilities, Russian deputy foreign minister Panov stated
The Russian side proceeded from the position that the signing of such a tieaty would allow the 
upgrading of relations between Russian and North Korea to a ‘new level’, promoting their 
development in all directions, as well as making a considerable contribution to ensuring the solution of 
the Korean peninsula problem on the path of a peaceful, democratic process (‘Moscow Proposes 
Scraping Defence Treaty with DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 7 September 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-173, 7 
September 1995, p. 26),
’’ Moskovskie novosti, no. 61, 10-17 September 1995. p. 7.
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that ‘in accordance with the existing Treaty between the Soviet Union and 
North Korea Russia will provide North Korea with assistance in the event of 
unprovoked aggression against it, but it will decide this solely on the basis of its 
own analysis’/^ However, the Russian foreign ministiy took a somewhat 
different view. A Russian foreign ministry spokesman stressed that ‘the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty is valid today, albeit pro forma, and 
this means that Russia will provide North Korea with the requisite assistance if 
it decides that North Korea is the victim of aggression. What is more, under 
existing legislation the North Koreans will only receive military assistance once 
parliament has adopted a corresponding decision
Another contradictory remark on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty by the Russian leadership was made in May 1995 
during defence minister Grachev’s visit to South Korea. In Seoul, he was 
reported to have stated that ‘South Korea had been notified that the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty would be scrapped’. Russia’s embassy 
in North Korea immediately denied the report, stating that ‘options regarding 
the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty were under consideration and 
that North Korea would be informed of Russia’s decision flrst’.^ *' Even when 
the Russian foreign ministry officially announced that Russia had proposed to 
North Korea to scrap the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty on 7 
September 1995, a senior member of Russia’s foreign ministry told Interfax 
that ‘Russia has no intention of cancelling the treaty on friendship and 
cooperation signed between the Soviet Union and North Korea. The [1961 
Soviet-North Korean] treaty expires in the near future, and if none of the 
signatories proclaims the desire to cancel it, the treaty will be automatically 
prolonged for another five years’.^ '
Izvestiia, 31 March 1994, p. 3.
Ibid.
The Korea Times (Seoul), 2 June 1995, pp. 3-4.
81 c Ministiy Relutes Plan to Cancel the Treaty’, Interfax, 7 September 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-173, 7 
September 1995, p. 26.
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In November 1995, again in separate statements, two Russian foreign 
ministry offieials gave shaiply differing interpretations of the treaty which still 
governed relations between Russia and North Korea. ‘The treaty of friendship, 
cooperation and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and North Korea 
of 1961 as a result of well-known objective circumstances has become outdated 
and does not correspond to the new realities established in Russia, in the 
Russian-Korean relations and in the Northeast Asia.. .this treaty does not work’, 
Grigoriy Karasin, Russian foreign ministry official spokesman, declared. 
According to him, ‘the Russian side has proposed to North Korea to sign a new 
treaty on the principles of friendly relations between the two countries which 
meet the interests of both countries and nations, and handed over to the Korean 
side a draft treaty which is being s t u d i e d H o w e v e r ,  deputy foreign minister 
Panov noted that ‘the Russian side believes that the treaty of friendship with 
North Korea in its updated version continues to operate... in 1993 the Russian 
side unilaterally annulled Article 1 of the Soviet-North Korean treaty of 
friendship... we said that the automatic involvement is out of the question and 
that we ourselves will decide whether to take part or not on the side of North 
Korea if the latter is unprovoked attacked’
In the meantime, the North Korean side rejected the offer when the 
Russian foreign ministry proposed revising the agreement to eliminate the 
military assistance clause while not replying to Russia’s proposals for the new 
treaty promptly.
We can suggest several reasons for the North Korean side’s reluctance to 
reply its official position on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty and the new draft treaty replacing the latter as the Russian 
side expected: (1) Russia’s reduced role in relation to Korean issues in 
Northeast Asia;^"' (2) the official visit to Russia by the South Korean President
‘Foreign Ministry Disagrees over Treaty (1961) with DPRK’, Interfax, 9 November 1995 in FBIS- 
SOV 95-218, 13 November 1995, p. 20.
Ibid., pp. 20-21.
On the Russia’s reduced role in the post-Soviet era, see Chapters 5 and 6.
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in June 1994;^^ (3) North Korea’s ‘Russian Card’ against other major powers;®*^  
and (4) Russia’s inconsistent consensus on the issue of new draft treaty. In 
other words, faced with the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty, the North Korean side tried to take advantage of the uncertainty 
suiTounding the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty while refusing to 
immediately demonstrate its real intentions about the new bilateral treaty with 
Russia,
Other significant bilateral treaties between the two sides during this period 
(Dec. 93-Dec. 95) were few and less important. One of the important economic 
agreements between the two sides during this period was that Yi Song-tae, 
chairman of the North Korean Committee for the Promotion of External 
Economic Cooperation, and a governor of the Russian Maritime Territory, 
signed a memorandum on trade. The memorandum called for expanded 
cooperation in ‘fishery, agriculture, construction and machinery production’. 
But it should be noted that in the first half of 1994 Russia and North Korea had 
talks on the logging, nuclear and other pending issues but failed reach any 
substantial accord on key matters.
With regard to President Kim Young-sam’s visit to Russia, North Korea was worried that it might 
‘pour cold water’ on Russia-North Korean relations, which have been warming up of late (‘Russia, 
DPRK Discusses Visit by ROK President’, Yonhap, 9 May 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-089, 9 May 1994, p. 
17).
In the post-Soviet era. North Korea found itself increasingly isolated diplomatically. Moreover, 
confronted with a contemporary world that was on the march towards openness and reform, North 
Korea has changed its trade, economic and foreign policies. While maintaining the policy of 
deterrence, the US and Japan were increasingly able to utilise political engagement, and offered North 
Korea inducements and economic assistance to create an external enviroiunent that increased the 
chances of the gradual evolution of reform in North Korea and reduced tensions on the Korean 
peninsula. Even though it was isolated and was enduring an economic crisis, the nuclear crisis 
demonstrated that North Korea was capable of exerting significant pressure on the international 
community. In this respect, the author argues that the West’s perception that North Korea was 
developing an atomic bomb in fact stiengthened North Korea’s hand in international negotiations in 
general. Thus, fear of North Korea’s future nuclear weaponry allowed North Korea to accomplish 
multiple objectives, such as the enhancement of its prestige vis-à-vis South Korea and the attainment of 
an advantageous bargaining position in dealing with South Korea.
See ‘DPRK, Maritime Territory Sign Trade Memorandum’, Moscow Voice o f Russia World Service, 
4 November 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-214, 6 November 1995, p. 26.
The meeting took place between visiting North Korean vice foreign minister and Panov. See ‘DPRK, 
Russian Officials Fail to Reach Accord’, Yonhap, 15 May 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-094, 16 May 1994, p. 
1.
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In the field of economic relations, Russia made considerable efforts to re­
establish economic ties with North Korea due to the opportunities the latter 
offered for the Russian economy. To this end, especially, in late September 
1994 Russian and North Korean foreign trade experts held a number of three- 
day consultations to agree an agenda to be discussed at a forthcoming meeting 
of their joint intergovernmental commission for trade, economic, scientific and 
technical cooperation in North Korea.^^
As for trade and economic relations between Russia and North Korea 
during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95), they still tended to show signs of 
contracting, as Figure 3.4 illustrates. In 1995 a North Korean trade mission in 
Russia opened an office in Khabarovsk. Cross-border trade with Maritime and 
Khabarovsk krais developed along with those in Kamchatka and Sakhalin. The 
port of Raj in was actively engaged in the trans-shipment of Russian export and
import cargo 90
Figure 3.4 Trend in Russian-North Korean Trade, 1992-95
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Sources: Ekonomika Sodruzhestva nezavisimykh gosudarstv v 1993 g. (Moscow: GPO, 1994), p. 61; 
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Federatstii (Moscow: State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation, 1996).
‘Trade Officials Prepare DPRK Commission Talks’, Itar-Tass, 13 September 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94- 
178, 14 September 1994, p. 17.
Valentin Moiseev, ‘Russia and the Korean Peninsula’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 1, 
1996, p. 111.
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One of the persuasive reasons for Russia’s efforts to attempt to expand its 
economic cooperation with North Korea based on a new treaty was closely 
related to Chinese expansion of its economic relations with North Korea in the 
post-Soviet era. Whereas trade with Russia accounted for 50% of North 
Korea’s foreign trade before 1990, by 1995 it had dropped to just $US 100 
million. Outmanoeuvring Russia, China became North Korea’s main trading 
partner, accounting for 45% of North Korea’s foreign trade in the middle of the 
1990s.^' Thus, by early 1996 Russia had every reason to seek some of the North 
Korean market it had lost to China. This was one of the main reasons for the 
rebuilding of economic ties between the two sides, although neither side had 
high expectations.
During this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95), Russia’s efforts over the issue of the 
1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty did not produce any meaningful 
results for relations between the two countries, although Russia did display a 
new activism in its bid to take new initiatives to build up its relations with 
North Korea. Russia itself urgently increased the pressure for a new treaty as a 
new legal foundation with North Korea to replace the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty. This clearly indicated that fundamental differences 
between the two sides remained in their approaches to the issue of the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. Russia’s intentions about the 
conclusion of the new treaty as the basis of the new legal foundation in the 
post-Soviet era continued to be postponed by the North Korean side. 
Furthermore, there continued to be a lack of consensus, together with the 
differences among the top Russian leadership on the issue of the 1961 Soviet- 
North Korean Friendship Treaty. In short, Russia’s policy towards North 
Korea inevitably became reactive as a result of the internal and external factors 
mentioned above.
Aleksandr Volkov, ‘Ginseng Becomes Root of Cooperation’, Moskovskie novosti, April 7-14, 1996, 
cited in CDPSP, vol. 48, no. 14, 1 May 1996, pp. 22-23.
102
3.4. A Fulfilled Historic Role? (Dec. 95-Jul. 96)
After the December 1995 parliamentary elections, Russia’s policy towards the 
Korean peninsula adjusted towards a more balanced two Korean policy on the 
peninsula. Valentin Moiseev, deputy director of the first Asian department of 
the Russian foreign ministry, supported this changed position on the peninsula, 
observing that ‘the trend of a constructive restoration of bilateral ties with the 
former Soviet Union’s allies was more actively bolstered after the December 
1995 parliamentary election, together with the appointment of Primakov as 
Russian foreign minister at an early date in 1996’.^  ^ These changes led Russia 
more openly and actively to implement its decision to emphasise its relations 
with North Korea on the Korean peninsula.^^
In these circumstances, Russia’s proposal for a new ti'eaty with North 
Korea assumed greater importance for its leadership. On the one hand, there 
was the forthcoming Russian presidential election, which was scheduled to be 
held in the middle of 1996, and the Russian leadership needed to demonstiate 
its good relations with old allies such as North Korea to keep its major power 
status in Northeast Asia. In other words, to win the Russia’s first presidential 
election each candidate had to stress Russia’s good relations with old allies and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) over which the Soviet Union 
had formerly exerted a dominant influence. In this respect, by agreeing a new 
draft treaty with North Korea, which could indicate their good relations, the 
Russian leadership would be in a stronger position to win the forthcoming 
presidential election.
On the other hand, externally, Russia desperately needed to have any kind 
of relations with North Korea based on a bilateral ti'eaty so as not to be
Valentin Moiseev, ‘On the Korean Settlement’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 43, no. 3, 1997, 
p. 67.
The December 1995 parliamentary election confirmed the continuing strength of the conseiwative- 
nationalists who had constantly rebuked the Yeltsin administration for its emasculated foreign policy. 
On the Korean peninsula, pro-North Korean forces came to the fore after the December 1995 
parliamentary election. Indeed, across a broad spectrum of society, the assumption existed that one 
could trace a feeling that improved relations with North Korea would enhance Russia’s undermined 
position on the Korean perrinsula.
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excluded from the circle of the Northeast Asian power group in the post-Soviet 
era. In this respect, especially, ‘four-party t a l k s i n  April 1996, which 
marginalised Russia once again in relation to the security issue of the Korean 
peninsula in Northeast Asia, made the Russian government more aware of the 
importance of its continuing relations with North Korea. (See Chapter 5.)
Faced with this unexpected situation (the four-party talks), Russia again 
even considered resuming military assistance to North Korea to regain its 
influence on the peninsula. In April 1996, for example, Georgiy Kunadze, now 
Russian ambassador to South Korea and formerly deputy foreign minister, 
stated that ‘Russia has a powerflil economic potential for providing massive 
assistance to North Korea, even though Russia itself is undergoing economic 
difficulties of its own. The assistance may be major to North Korea, which is 
undergoing economic difficulties, but is not that major to R u s s i a . . D u r i n g  
his visit to Pyongyang in April 1996, Russian deputy prime minister Vitaliy 
Ignatenko also mentioned assistance to North Korea in eight areas, including 
the renovation of the Kim Chaek Steel Mill and the supply of oil, although the 
promise of this massive assistance was not easy for Russia to fulfil because it 
faced severe economic difficulties.^^ Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
concerning Russia’s military involvement in the Korean peninsula deputy 
foreign minister Panov stated that ‘we declared that automatic involvement is 
out of question, and we shall decide in accordance with internal procedures 
whether to take or not take part in the conflict on the side of North Korea if it is 
subjected to an unprovoked attack’
Kim Young-sam and Bill Clinton put forward a four-party peace proposal (the two Koreas, China 
and the US) on 16 April 1996. Responding to the ‘four-party talks’, Georgiy Kunadze, Russian 
ambassador to South Korea, stated that ‘Russia supports all realistic proposals that can ease tensions on 
the Korean peninsula... we supported the proposal for six-party talks in principle. I cannot understand 
why South Korea advanced the proposal for four-party talks’ (Hangyore Shinmun [Seoul], 25 April 
1996, p. 18).
Hangyore Shinmun (Seoul), 25 April 1996, p. 18.
Ibid., 3 June 1996, p. 4.
‘Official Stresses No “Automatic” Involvement in DPRK Issue’, Interfax, 9 April 1996 in FBIS-SOV 
96-070, 10 April 1996, p. 11.
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With only about six months left for the two sides to agree a new bilateral 
treaty before the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty expired during 
this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96), the Russian leadership informed North Korea that 
it was not interested in extending the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty. To a certain extent, the Russian leadership had to achieve a consensus 
that it had no plan to extend the Treaty for another five years by September 
1995 on the basis of Article 6 of the treaty, but eagerly looked for a new legal 
foundation that could replace the Treaty in the post-Soviet era.
With regard to the issue of a new draft treaty, it should be mentioned that 
there were two important Russian-North Korean high-ranking official contacts 
during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96). In April 1996, a Russian delegation led by 
deputy prime minister Ignatenko visited North Korea for the first session of the 
Intergovernmental Russian and Korean Commission on Trade, Economic, 
Scientific and Technological Cooperation. During the talks, particular concern 
was expressed about the need to agree a treaty and a strong legal basis for 
relations.
During a visit to North Korea by a Russian State Duma delegation in May 
1996, the two sides also discussed the status of preparations for a new Russia- 
North Korean treaty. When the State Duma delegation spoke to Hong Song- 
nam, deputy premier of the North Korean administi'ative council, the deputies 
discussed the need to conclude a new treaty between Russia and North Korea as 
soon as possible, and handed the countiy’s leaders a draft entitled ‘On the 
Fundamental Principles of Friendly Re l a t i ons Ge nna d i i  Seleznev, Russian 
Duma Speaker, also stated ‘it is time for Russia to see North Korea through 
different eyes. It is time for the two countries to promote bilateral cooperation.
In an exclusive interview on 13 April 1996 with Chosun Ilbo, Ignatenko stated that of course, a 
military alliance like the one that existed in the past is impossible. However, it is neeessary to upgrade 
the extent of our cooperation in the economic, cultural, scientific and technological fields to the same 
level of cooperation between the Soviet Union and North Korea. Russia and North Korea discussed the 
signing of a Russia-North Korea basie agreement that will replace the Soviet-DPRK friendship treaty, 
the abolition of which Moscow declared last September’ {Chosun Ilbo [Seoul], 15 April 1996, p. 8).
‘North Koreans “Cautious” over Closer Ties with Russia’, Moscow Pravda Rossii, 6 June 1996, p. 2 
in FBIS-SOV 96-111, 7 June 1996, p. 22.
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Today, we have again begun turning our attention to Pyongyang. Russia has 
mapped out a new ti'eaty with North Korea, which North Korea is now
* * 5 1 0 0reviewing .
At this point, it should be noted that although the Russian foreign ministry 
did not reveal the details of the new friendship treaty that was then under 
negotiation, according to one high-ranking official, ‘the Russia-Vietnam Basic 
Treaty would be a model for the new treaty between Russia and North 
Korea’. I n  the meantime, North Korea continued to delay revealing its 
intentions about Russia’s proposal for a new treaty during this period.'*'^ North 
Korea had postponed the negotiations for over a year, so it was almost 
impossible for the sides to conclude a new treaty prior to 10 September 1996 
(the date of expiry of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty).
Did North Korea ignore a Russian offer to draft and sign a new treaty to 
replace the existing 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty?
North Korea attempted to read more carefully Russia’s real intentions and 
interests in the proposed new draft treaty. It would not hasten to sign a bilateral 
tieaty with Russia to maximise its national interests, but would enter into 
negotiations in earnest before seeing the results of the Russian presidential 
election scheduled for June 1996. According to a Korean newspaper, ‘it was 
clear that the improvement in relations between Russia and North Korea would 
be hastened if Zyuganov, President of the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation, was elected Russian president’."'^
As seen above, before having the first historic Russian presidential 
election, there had been a continuous questions of relations between Russia and
‘State Duma Speaker Inteiviewed about Visit to DPRK’, Moscow Voice o f Russia World Service, 3 
June 1996 in FBIS-SOV 96-109, 5 June 1996, p. 23.
Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 10 September 1996, p. 7.
In May 1996, meeting with visiting Seleznev, North Korean foreign minister Kim Young-nam 
stated that ‘North Korea is carefully studying a new draft heaty, which Russia sent it last (1995) 
August’. At the same time, however, he also complained that ‘tactless’ reporting on North Korea by the 
Russian media was hampering the development of bilateral ties (‘North Korea Wants New Treaty with 
Russia’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 29 May 1996).
Hangyroe Shinmun (Seoul), June 1996, p. 4.
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North Korea. Even after 10 September 1996, would the existing 1961 Soviet- 
North Korean Friendship Treaty remain valid until a new treaty was signed? 
Was this Russia’s position or North Korea’s position? Or had the 1961 Soviet- 
North Korean Friendship Treaty just ftilfilled its historic role without being 
replaced by a new treaty in the post-Soviet era?
By the time of the first Russian presidential election, which was held on 
schedule in the middle of 1996, Russia was desperately attempting to improve 
its relations with North Korea while looking for a new legal foundation which 
could replace the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. Nevertheless, 
Russia continued not to succeed in accomplishing its goals towards North 
Korea, in spite of its considerable efforts. Finally, Russia’s policy towards 
North Korea proved reactive.
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Chapter 4
Russia and the Development of the Russian-South 
Korean Relations Under Yeltsin:
A R elationship B ased  on Treaties?
4.1. In Search of an Economic Relationship? (1985-91)
The beginning of Russian-Korean relations can be traced back to the middle of 
the 19th century, when Imperial Russia and the Korean Kingdom officially 
started to develop their relations on the basis of a Treaty of Trade and 
Commerce concluded on 7 July 1884.' However, as a result of the Russian- 
Japanese War (1904-05), Imperial Russia and its successor state, the Soviet 
Union, could not have any kind of official relations with Korea on the basis of 
treaties up to the end of the World War Two.
During the Cold War era (from 1945 up to 1984), the Soviet Union 
principally developed its relations with North Korea on the basis of the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. In the meantime, there were no official 
relations on the basis of a treaty between the Soviet Union and South Korea.^
During the Gorbachev era (1985-91), however, Soviet Korean policy 
increasingly started to concenti'ate on building good bilateral relations with
' For details of the development of Imperial Russian-Korean relations, see Eugene Kim and Han-kyo 
Kira, Korea and the Politics o f  Imperialism, 1876-1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1967); Hanguksa Yonguhyphowe, Hanro Kwangae paiknyonsa [The History of 100-year Russian- 
Korean Relations] (Seoul: Chungwa Inc., 1984); and Seung-kwon Synn, ‘Imperial Russia’s Strategy 
and the Korean Peninsula’, in Il-yung Chung, ed., Korea and Russia toward the 21st Century (Seoul: 
The Sejong Institute, 1992), pp. 3-29.
 ^During this period, the Soviet Union and South Korea only made personal contacts and exchanges at 
the unofficial level.
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South Korea on the basis of the New Political Thinking, although Gorbachev’s 
Korean policy still sought to maintain its influence on North Korea based on 
the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. In other words, Gorbachev 
was actively attempting to establish bilateral relations with each of the two 
Koreas for the first time. Gorbachev’s active development of Soviet relations 
with South Korea finally resulted in diplomatic normalisation between the two 
sides in 1990 when the former Soviet Union became the first major power to 
recognise the two Koreas on the Korean peninsula. Thereafter, there were 
significant developments between the two sides that ultimately looked for the 
conclusion of a political treaty (the so-called ‘Treaty of Good Neighbourhood, 
Partnership and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and South Korea’ or 
‘Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union 
and South Korea’) up to the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The development of Soviet-South Korean relations evolved from 
economic agreements towards political ones during the Gorbachev era in the 
context of the bilateral treaties. Ultimately, these treaties provided the basis of 
the Treaty on Basic Relations between Russia and South Korea signed in 1992 
(hereafter, the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty), one of the most important 
bilateral treaties between the two sides in the post-Soviet era. For this reason, it 
can be said that a solid foundation for the forthcoming Russian-South Korean 
Basic Treaty was created during the late Gorbachev period, although the 
conclusion of this political treaty between the two sides was not realised during 
these years due to the attempted coup of August 1991.
There were three main stages in the development of relations between the 
Soviet Union and South Korea during the Gorbachev era: (1) towards closer 
economic relations; (2) towards diplomatic normalisation; and (3) towards a 
political treaty.
There were noticeable developments between the two sides in the field of 
economics and non-govemmental issues as a precondition for diplomatic 
normalisation during the period fi’om spring 1985 to summer 1988. It should
109
especially be noted that the first Soviet programme for promoting peace and 
security in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) was set out in detail by Gorbachev 
during his speeches in Vladivostok in July 1986.^ Nevertheless, in contrast to 
the strengthening of relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea, there 
was still no change in official relations between the Soviet Union and South 
Korea. In other words, despite South Korea’s many efforts to attract the Soviet 
Union’s attention, as a whole, the Soviet Union did not respond with any 
positive signals,"* although Gorbachev and his reformers gradually started to 
view South Korea as a potential economic partner in Northeast Asia that could 
facilitate domestic economic reform.^
Pre-diplomatic normalisation efforts after the 19*'’ Party Conference in the 
summer of 1988 still were mainly designed to establish formal economic 
relations based on the economic agreements and quasi-political relations. To a 
large extent, this meant that, from the autumn of 1988 onwards, the Soviet 
Union granted de facto recognition to South Korea on the Korean peninsula. 
The following two significant factors should be considered when understanding 
Soviet-South Korean economic developments during this period. First, in a 
speech delivered in Krasnoyarsk^ in September 1988, Gorbachev for the first 
time officially expressed the Soviet Union’s willingness to establish economic
 ^ In his Vladivostok speech in M y 1986, Gorbachev declared the Soviet Union’s willingness to 
develop relations with every state in the APR, but fell short of specifically mentioning South Korea. 
For the details of Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech, see fzvestiia, 29 July 1986, p. 2.
 ^For example, in the speech delivered at the Kwanlioon Club in Seoul in March 1987, South Korea’s 
foreign minister Kwang-soo Choi stated that ‘we have steadily pursued an open-door policy toward the 
Soviet Union’ (Kwang-soo Choi, ‘The Situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the SuiTounding 
Region and Korea’s Foreign Policy Direction’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 11, no. 2, 1987, p. 227).
 ^The Soviet Union’s willingness to establish economic ties with South Korea was expressed by many 
Soviet officials and academics before the Krasnoyarsk declaration, which was delivered in summer 
1988. For example, amid reports of increasing indirect trade between Moscow and Seoul, Ernest 
Obminsky, the head of the Soviet foreign ministry’s directorate for international economic relations, 
stated on 25 March 1988 that ‘the flow of goods and services is much internationalised at present, so it 
would be impossible to exclude the South Korean element’ (Sophie Quirm-Judge, ‘Olympic Overtures: 
Relations between Soviets and South Korea Improve’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 April 1988, 
p. 38).
 ^For the details of Gorbachev’s Krasnoyarsk speech, see Izvestiia, 18 September 1988, p. 2.
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relations with South Korea/ Secondly, the Seoul Olympic Games, which were 
held on from 17 September to 3 October 1988, also provided a broader 
justification for the Soviet Union to establish formal economic relations and 
‘quasi-official’ political contacts with South Korea/ However, it should be 
noted that the Soviet Union continued to state that it did not recognise South 
Korea politically/
In particular, in connection with the attempt to achieve diplomatic 
normalisation after the Seoul Olympic games, Kim Young-sam’s visits to the 
Soviet Union should be examined. By the middle of 1989, the Soviet Union had 
hinted at its intention to upgrade relations with South Korea to a political level 
by inviting South Korean opposition leader Kim Young-sam, chaiiTuan of the 
opposition Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), to Moscow from 2 to 10 
June 1989 at the invitation of IMEMO (Institute of the World Economy and 
International Relations).*** During his visit, the two sides agreed in principle to 
normalise relations with South Korea. This marked the beginning of the 
normalisation process between the two sides, which meant that the Soviet
’ Gorbachev stated that ‘I think that in the context of the general improvement of the situation on the 
Korean peninsula, possibilities may open up for establishing economic ties with South Korea’, 
{Izvestiia, 18 September 1988, p. 2).
® On 11 January 1988, the Soviet Union officially announced its intention to participate in the 24'*' 
Olympiad in Seoul. The Soviet decision was reportedly made by the Communist Party’s ruling 
Politburo after Gorbachev’s visit to Washington in December 1987 {The Christian Science Monitor, 13 
January 1988, p. 8). For more detailed analysis of Soviet participation in the Seoul Olympic Games, 
see James W. Riordan, ‘Korea-Soviet Union Relations: the Seoul Olympics as Catalyst and Stimulator 
of Political Change’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4, 1988, pp. 754-779. In August 1988, the 
Soviet Union and South Korea agreed to exchange a note verbal allowing the Soviet consular corps to 
perform ‘consular’ functions during the Olympic period. An agreement for an exchange of trade 
offices with consular functions was signed on 2 December 1988, in Moscow between Sun-ki Lee, the 
president of Korean Trade Association (KOTRA) and V. I. Malkevich, chairman of the Soviet CCI 
{The Korea Times [Seoul], 8 October 1988, p. 1). South Korea’s KOTRA opened its office in Moscow 
on 7 July 1989, and the USSR CCI opened its office in Seoul on 3 April 1989.
 ^For example, Gennadii Gerasimov, the USSR Govermnent spokesman and chief of the Soviet foreign 
ministry information department, stated in 1989 that ‘We do not have political or diplomatic relations 
with South Korea and we have no intention to have them. But, South Korea is also one of the 
newcomers to the international economic market, so to say, so we can not really ignore that. Thus, on a 
non-political level, non-diplomatic, commercial level we are ready to develop relations with South 
Korea (Tokyo NHK General TV Network, 4 January 1989 in FBIS-SOV 89-003, 5 January 1989, p. 
11).
For the details of background of Kim Young-sam’s Moscow visit, see Tongil Minchu Dang 
[Reunification Democratic Party] (Seoul: 1989); and Pyongwha wa tongil tn yomwoneul ango [With 
the Wish for a Peace and Unification of Koreas] (Seoul: n. p., 1989), p. 16.
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Union began to connect the issue of a political relationship with that of 
economic cooperation with South Korea. Moreover, Kim’s visit resulted in a 
joint statement by IMEMO and RDP that contained an understanding that 
regular contacts would take place between the two bodies to promote mutual 
understanding.** Immediately after Kim Young-sam’s first visit to Moscow, 
there was another important step towards political normalisation between the 
two countries - the exchange of ‘consular’ departments. The two sides signed a 
‘protocol of agreement’ in Singapore on 17 November 1989 to upgrade their 
relationship by converting trade missions into consular departments.*^
Kim Young-sam’s second visit to Moscow, in March 1990, was another 
significant step forward in their relations. In contrast to his first visit, he was 
invited to Moscow as the chairman of South Korea’s ruling Democratic Liberal 
Party (DTP). This time Kim Young-sam also led a working-level delegation of 
South Korean officials, including cabinet-level ministers, who were involved in 
practical negotiations for normalisation and economic cooperation between the 
two countries. During the meeting, the Soviet Union demonstrated its 
willingness to embark on a formal political relationship with South Korea, 
which had been basically agreed during Kim Young-sam’s first Moscow visit 
in 1989. Notably, Gorbachev expressed his belief that no obstacle existed to 
diplomatic relations between the two sides. The Joint Communiqué drafted 
during Kim Young-sam’s second visit to Moscow stated that the Soviet Union 
and South Korea had reached an understanding to establish contacts at 
governmental level in the near future.*^ Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not 
provide a clear schedule for the diplomatic nonnalisation process. This
In return, in October 1989, the IMEMO delegation visited Seoul at the invitation of the RDP and 
reaffirmed the agreement contained in the IMEMO-RDP joint statement.
However, it should be noted that the exchange of consular departments did not imply the 
establishment of official consular relations with South Korea. Although the exchange of consular 
departments clearly indicated the existence of political relations between the two countries, bilateral 
relations remained at the non-official level as long as tire Kremlin insisted on the non-official nature of 
the relationship (‘Upgraded ROK-USSR Consular Offices Plamied’, Yonhap, 23 March 1990 in FBIS- 
SOV 90-057, 23 March 1990, pp. 10-11).
For a more detailed account of Kim Young-sam’s second visit to Moscow, see ‘ROK’s Kim Young- 
sam Urges Diplomatic Ties in Visit’ in FBIS-SOV 90-058, 26 Mareh 1990, pp. 19-21.
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indicated that the Soviet leadership was basically attempting to move towards 
diplomatic normalisation with South Korea in the near future, but had to 
consider the North Korean factor continuously and seriously.
Kim Young-sam’s second visit to Moscow in March 1990 was followed 
by the first historic Soviet-South Korean summit meeting between Gorbachev 
and the South Korean President Roh Tae-woo in San Francisco in June 1990, 
which was held between the leaders of two states that did not yet have 
diplomatic relations.*"* The vital step toward full and normal diplomatic 
relations between the two sides was taken during this summit, which could be 
described as a ‘political sensation’.*^  The San Francisco summit in June 1990 
indicated that the Soviet Union had started to pursue a more ‘active’ role in the 
resolution of the Korean problem, including maintenance of the balance of 
power on the Korean peninsula and the encouragement of an inter-Korean 
dialogue. This summit was a decisive event for the forthcoming diplomatic 
normalisation between the two sides, and many bilateral accords were also 
agreed. As a result, Soviet-South Korean relations rapidly developed from non­
political to political relations. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Soviet 
Union still continued to ‘separate politics and economics’ to avoid provoking 
North Korea.
At this point, it should be noted that, as Table 4.1 and 4.2 indicate, trade 
and investment between the Soviet Union and South Korea was increasing 
rapidly.
However, this was not well-arranged summit. Gorbachev met briefly with Roh in San Francisco 
before leaving for the Soviet Union (after the Soviet-US summit in the US) in June 1990.
At the summit, speaking about the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, Gorbachev stated that ‘this issue may arise as bilateral ties develop and in the context of the 
general improvement of the political situation in the region and on the Korean peninsula’ {Itar-Tass, 5 
June 1990). After the summit, Roh Tae-woo also stated that ‘the meeting itself indicates the beginning 
of the normalising process’ (‘Commentary on Meeting’, Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, 5 
June 1990 in FBIS-SOV 90-111, 8 June 1990, p. 24).
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Table 4.1 South Korea’s Trade Volume with the Soviet Union
(million $US)
Year Total Export Import
1980 36 29 7
1984 57 26 31
1985 102 60 42
1986 133 (30.4) 65 (8.3) 68 (61.9)
1987 200 (50.4) 67 (3.1) 133(95.6)
1988 290 (45.0) 112(67.2) 178 (33.8)
1989 600 (106.9) 208 (85.7) 392 (120.2)
1990 889 (48.2) 519(149.5) 370 (-5.6)
This information was compiled by the author from the following materials: ‘Pukbang Tonggye’, 
Pukbang Kyungche (Seoul), June 1991, p. 154; and Lim Yang-taek, ‘Pukbang Chungchaek ui 
hyunwhang kwa palchunbanghyang’, Minchok Chisong (Seoul), August 1989, p. 45. Figures in 
parentheses indicate the year-on-year rate of increase, in percentages.
Table 4.2 South Korea’s Investment in the Soviet Union
(1,000 SUS)
1985-88 1989 1990 Accumulative
Total
Number — 2 4 6
Amount - - 480 11,181 11,661
Source: Korean Bank, cited in Sun-ok Kim, ‘Pukbang Korye Ilban’ [Economic Exchanges with 
Northern Countries: an Overview], Pukbang Kyungche (Seoul), February 1991 , p. 39.
The Soviet Union formalised its diplomatic normalisation with South 
Korea on 30 September 1990 in New York.*^ At last, relations between the two 
sides were upgraded from the ‘economic’ level to the full-scale ‘political’ level. 
For the Soviet side, the Soviet Union became the first major power recognising 
the two Koreas, which gave it a better position on the Korean peninsula than 
other major powers in the region. This meant that Gorbachev’s New Political
For a more detailed account of the process from the San Francisco summit to diplomatic 
normalisation, see the newspaper interview by Kong Ro-myung, then head of the South Korean 
consular department in Moscow, in Chosun Ilbo [New York edition], 21 January 1992, p. 3).
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Thinking on the APR was being implemented successfully/^ For the South 
Korean side, this was regarded as a positive effect from the change in its 
foreign policy direction, the so-called ‘Northern Policy’/^ Thereafter, the two 
sides made several major steps towards the conclusion of a political treaty. In 
other words, the two sides attempted to seek a ‘legal basis’ and a new model of 
bilateral relations in the APR, intended to result in the conclusion of a political 
treaty between the two sides.
First, Gorbachev and Roh Tae-woo, meeting in Moscow on 14 December 
1990 in the second Soviet-South Korean summit, discussed the state of bilateral 
relations and the prospects for their development, as well as a broad range of 
current international problems/^ During the summit, the two sides established a 
legal and institutional framework for their relations by signing inter­
governmental documents that contained provisions for a range of new bilateral 
ties.^ ** The end product was a declaration of ‘General Principles on Relations 
between the Soviet Union and South Korea’ (the so-called ‘Moscow 
Declaration’), which encouraged the further development of cooperation 
between the two countries. Notably, the document included an agreement to 
hold periodic meetings and negotiations at various levels on the development of 
political dialogue on current issues of bilateral relations and other international 
issues. The joint communiqué issued at the Moscow summit covered the basic
Two of the biggest achievements of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking in the APR were the 
diplomatic normalisation process with South Korea, together with the political rapprochement with 
China in 1989.
South Korea first expressed interest in establishing relations with ‘non-hostile’ communist states, 
including the Soviet Union, in January 1971 with the declaration of President Park Chung-hee. This 
became an important cornerstone for the northern policy of South Korea, For a comprehensive analysis 
of South Korea’s Northern Policy, see Byung-joon Ahn, ‘South Korea’s New Nordpolitik’, Korea and 
World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4, 1988, pp. 693-705; and Seung-ho Joo, ‘South Korea’s Nordpolitik and 
the Soviet Union (Russia)’, The Journal o f East Asian Affairs, vol. 7, no. 2, 1993, pp. 404-450.
The South Korean President’s visit to Moscow, the first in the history of relations between the two 
countries, was realised in the middle of December 1990. The Soviet media described this summit as 
‘opening a new page in the history of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea’ 
{Izvestiia, 15 December 1990, p. 7).
Gorbachev stated that ‘the Moscow Declaration will make it possible for relations between the Soviet 
Union and South Korea to rest on a reliable legal basis and these relations have favourable and 
prospects’ (‘Gorbachev Sees Good Prospects’, Moscow Tass, 17 December 1990 in FBIS-SOV 90-241, 
14 December 1990, pp. 12-13).
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principles of future bilateral relations/* The conclusion of the ‘Moscow 
Declaration’ clearly indicated the frirther developed relations between the two 
sides after the diplomatic normalisation. Nevertheless, the communiqué still 
contained a passage expressing the Soviet Union’s intention to maintain a 
normal state-to-state relationship with North Korea. It stated that Moscow’s 
opening of diplomatic ties with South Korea should in no way be seen as an 
abandonment of its 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty obligations.
Secondly, on 19 April 1991, Gorbachev amved on the Cheju Islands (by 
the southern coast of South Korea) on a brief official visit at the invitation of 
the South Korean President while returning from his visit to Japan. This was the 
third Soviet-South Korean summit between Roh and Gorbachev, and the first 
visit by a Soviet head of state to the Korean peninsula.^^ The Soviet media 
reported that the third summit marked a ‘new level’ in relations and symbolised 
the ‘beginning of a new stage’ of political dialogue and economic 
cooperation.^^ During the summit, Gorbachev proposed a ‘Treaty of Good 
Neighbourhood, Partnership and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and 
South Korea’, which would codify and develop the ideas contained in the 1990 
‘Moscow Declaration’ and create a secure legal basis for the further 
development of relations between the two sides.^ "* An agreement to start
For the full text of the joint communiqué, see Appendix 3.
The Soviet-South Korean summit meetings, which were held three times only in ten months (from 
June 1990 to April 1991), greatly contributed to these rapid developments between the two countries 
during the late Gorbachev period. It must be also noted that Kim Il-sung invited Gorbachev to visit 
North Korea on numerous occasions. But, Gorbachev avoided (or postponed) visiting North Korea. At 
the summit, the Soviet Union promised to support South Korea’s bid for UN entry and to cut off 
supplies of plutonium and other nuclear materials to North Korea until the latter agreed to international 
inspection of its nuclear facilities. In return. South Korea promised to carry out previous agreements on 
economic assistance to the Soviet Union and to participate more actively in the development of the 
Russian Far East {Chosun Ilbo [Seoul], 15 April 1991, p. 23).
See Izvestiia, 22 April 1991, p. 4; and Pravda, 23 April 1991, p. 5.
When offered this proposal by the Soviet side, the South Korean President Roh Tae-woo replied that 
the proposal was basically good and should be discussed between the foreign ministers of the two 
countries. Commenting on Gorbachev’s proposal for a new treaty, South Korean foreign minister Lee 
Sang-ok stated that ‘Seoul would not sign it if it contained any clauses with military implications. 
Understandably, South Koreans were suspicious that the proposal might be intended to neutralise the 
US military presence in South Korea’ {Yonhap, 23 April 1991 in FBIS-EAS 91-078, 23 April 1991, p. 
25). South Korea hoped that the pact could be modeled after the treaty signed between West Germany 
and the Soviet Union shortly before German unification in 1990. The Bonn-Moscow treaty, called tire
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drafting this treaty, designed to provide a secure legal basis for further 
developing their relations in the future, was reached during a meeting between 
the two heads of state/^ Progress towards the conclusion of the Soviet-South 
Korean Partnership Treaty was advancing more rapidly than anyone (even the 
South Koreans) had expected. The Cheju summit could be regarded as the 
culmination of improved relations between the two countries during the late 
Gorbachev era.
Thirdly, the two sides continued to make more rapid progress towards the 
conclusion of the Soviet-South Korean Partnership Treaty after the Cheju 
summit. In the middle of August 1991, for instance, the Soviet foreign ministry 
stated that ‘the agreement would be essentially similar to aiTangements recently 
signed by the Soviet Union with many European countries, such as Germany, 
Italy, Romania and France. The treaty was based on the new political situation 
in both Europe and Asia. If South Korea was prepared to accept the ti'eaty in its 
present form then it would embody the essence of both the Helsinki Agreement 
and the Paris Charter for a New Europe, but extended to Asia’.^  ^ However, 
suddenly, no further progress towards the conclusion of the ‘Treaty on Good 
Neighbourhood, Partnership and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and 
South Korea’ could be made after the August coup in the Soviet Union, which 
made the Soviet leadership more focused on its domestic situation rather than 
on foreign issues such as the conclusion of a political treaty. Nevertheless, it is 
obvious that all of the above steps offered a solid foundation for the Russian- 
South Korean Basic Treaty that was concluded in the post-Soviet era (1992).
‘Treaty on Good Neighbourhood, Partnership and Cooperation’, also contains clauses on the restraint 
of military force for purposes other than self-defence {Yonhap, 24 April 1991 in FBIS-EAS 91-079, 23 
April 1991, p. 19).
Vitaliy Ignatenko, spokesman for the Soviet Union, stated that ‘what Gorbachev’s plan [Gorbachev’s 
proposal on the heaty purports] is to “quicken the speed” of developing relations between tlie two 
countries and lay a more solid legal foundation for these relations’ (‘Ignatenko Briefing Reviews 
Summit’, KBS TV Network [Seoul], 20 April 1991 in FBIS-SOV 91-078, 23 April 1991, p. 8).
‘Agreement with ROK Reportedly Prepared’, Moscow Interfax, 13 August 1991 in FBIS-SOV 91- 
157, 14 August 1991, p. 21,
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As seen above, during the Cold War era (from 1945 up to 1984), Soviet 
policy towards South Korea was confined to limited and unofficial economic 
relations. In many respects, this indicated that the Soviet Union did not adopt 
an active policy towards South Korea. Rather, it was passive as a result of 
external factors, especially the US and the North Korean factors, concerning 
South Korea.
By contrast, during the Gorbachev era, Soviet-South Korean relations 
rapidly developed even towards the political treaty as the legal basis of their 
new relations. In other words, Gorbachev’s Korean policy had clear and active 
goals towards South Korea during this period (1985-91).
4.2. In Search of an Economic Partnership Based on Political and Military 
Treaties? (Dec. 91-Dec. 93)
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia’s policy towards the 
Korean peninsula lost momentum. Russia was too preoccupied with its 
domestic problems, which left little room for diplomacy with other countries.
Given these circumstances, Russia followed Gorbachev’s late Korean 
policy, which was mainly based on economic interests on the Korean peninsula. 
To this end, Russia obviously put priority on the development of relations with 
South Korea. Ultimately, Russia sought to evaluate its relations with South 
Korea from diplomatic normalisation to ‘partnership’ relations in the post- 
Soviet era.^  ^ This can be separated into the following two steps: (1) the 
conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty; and (2) the development 
of bilateral agreements in the field of military cooperation.
According to Georgiy Toloraya, the head of the department for Korea at the Russian foreign 
ministry, ‘relations with South Korea are developing in accordance with principles of friendly 
partnership... since the USSR-South Korean relations nonnalised in 1990 we are stepping up a new 
higher stage’ (‘South Korean Foreign Minister Arrives in Moscow for Talks’, Itar-Tass, 26 June 1992 
in FBIS-SOV 92-126, 30 June 1992, p. 17).
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Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea was scheduled for September 1992, together with his visit to Japan, 
one of the President’s aides Yuri Petrov said in an interview to the independent South Korean TV 
company SBS (‘Yeltsin to Visit South Korea in September 1992’, Radio Moscow World Service, 5 
March 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-045, 6 March 1992, p. 14). However, this schedule was cancelled at the 
very last moment, and Yeltsin only visited South Korea in November 1992.
For details of his visit to South Korea, see V. V. Vinogradov, ‘Vizit A. V. Kozyreva v respubliku 
Koreia’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 7, 15 April, 1992, pp. 20-21.
In Seoul, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that ‘the main result of this trip is the 
creation of a solid foundation for a visit to South Korea by the Russian President Yeltsin... the 
forthcoming summit will lead to friendly, neighbourly and regular relations of new quality between 
démocratie Russia and South Korea, whieh will be consolidated in the form of a political treaty. This 
treaty will be called to bring our relations to tlie level which we have now with Western countries’ 
(‘Kozyrev Gives News Conference on ROK Trip’, Tass International Service, 19 March 1992 in FBIS- 
SOV 92-055, 20 March 1992, p. 31). He also stated that ‘the period of the nonnalisation of our 
relations with South Korea is over... we are entering a new era-an era of full-fledged cooperation’ 
{Izvestiia, 20 March 1992, p. 3).
The text of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty consisted of a preamble and 14 clauses, and 
stated that the two countries would continuously develop their cooperative relations as friendly nations. 
Russia and South Korea would work together to overcome the results of shared unfortunate past, and to 
jointly pursue freedom, demoeraey, respect for human rights and market economies as common values. 
The treaty prohibited the use of military force or tlneats between the two countries and stated that they 
would resolve all confliets by peaceful means, official said (‘Text of Relations Pact Approved’, 
Yonhap, 29 Jirne 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-126, 30 June 1992, pp. 18-19).
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The Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty was finally concluded during 
Yeltsin’s visit to Seoul in November 1992. To do so, their relations were in the 
course of full arrangements to prepare and conclude this political treaty by the 
time of Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea in late 1992. Consequently, high level 
politico-economic contacts between the two sides were frequent and mainly 
designed to discuss and coordinate positions over the contents of the Russian- 
South Korean Basic Treaty, which was scheduled to be signed in the autumn 
(September) of 1992.^^ For example, in March 1992, Russian foreign minister j
Andrei Kozyrev paid an official visit to South Korea, which marked the first 
serious phase of the preparation of Yeltsin’s official visit.^^ By the time of , ;
Kozyrev’s visit to South Korea, the two countries seemed to have agreed on the 
basic principles.^**
There were further discussions about the draft on the Russian-South 
Korean Basic Treaty when the South Korean foreign minister visited Russia in 
June 1992. During the meeting, the two foreign ministers finalised almost all 
the text of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty.^*
On 18-20 November 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin paid an 
official visit to South Korea to formalise and strengthen ties that had developed 
in the later Gorbachev years, and also to tiy to resolve several remaining issues 
between the two countries/^ As scheduled, on 19 November 1992, the two 
sides signed the historic Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty, which it was 
hoped would provide a framework of ‘partnership’ relations in the post-Soviet
era/^
As regards the contents of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty, the 
two sides pledged to refrain from using force and to settle all disputes by 
peaceful means in accordance with the UN Charter and agreed to hold regular 
meetings between the heads of state and members of the government to discuss 
bilateral relations and international issues of mutual concern. The two sides also 
signed an agreement on cultural cooperation and an agreement eliminating 
double taxation of incomes.^"* A Memorandum of Mutual Understanding for 
1993, which for the first time in history provided for direct exchanges between 
the defence ministries of Russia and South Korea, was also signed.^^
The conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty demonstrated 
that there had been fundamental changes in Russia’s perceptions and goals in 
its foreign policy, not only towards the Korean peninsula, but also to the 
international environment of Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era. First of all, 
it clearly indicated Russia’s pro-South Korean stance towards the Korean 
peninsula because this ti'eaty was concluded within a year of the collapse of the
This was the first visit to Seoul, the capital of South Korea, by a head of the Russian Federation. 
Even no Soviet leader visited Nortli Korea during the Soviet era. It should be emphasised that South 
Korea also became the first Northeast Asian countiy that Yeltsin visited in the post-Soviet era.
In late April 1993, the Russian Parliament ratified that ‘the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty’. In 
presenting the document, Russian deputy foreign minister Boris Kolokolov stressed that the treaty laid 
down the foundations for qualitatively new relations between the two countries, not only good- 
neighborly, but those of partners as well (‘ROK Treaty Ratified’, Radio Rossii Network, 29 April 1993 
in FBIS-SOV 93-082, 30 April 1993, p. 39).
For the full text of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty, see Appendix 4. See also ‘Vizit B. N. 
El’tsina v respubliku Koreia’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 23-24, 15-31 December 1992, pp. 41-46.
Pravda, 24 November 1992, p. 3.
120
Soviet Union/^ In other words, the process of this political treaty initiated by 
Gorbachev and Roh during the late Soviet era was continued by the Russian 
leadership after the collapse of the Soviet Union and resulted in a kind of full- 
seale friendship and politieal treaty which, to a certain extent, could be 
compared with the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty during the 
early period of Russian foreign policy (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).
Secondly, Russia became the first major power to have full-scale political 
agreements with both North (the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty) 
and South Korea (the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty) on the Korean 
peninsula. This meant that Russia began to develop parallel bilateral relations 
based on the political treaties with the two Koreas for the first time throughout 
the whole history of their relat ions.This  put Russia in a better position on the 
Korean peninsula than other major powers such as China, Japan and the US in 
Northeast Asia. In other words, Russia became the only eountry with 
diplomatic relations with both North and South Korea giving it a unique 
opportunity to maintain a position of influence. In part, this may also explain 
recent movements towards upgraded bilateral relations among other major 
powers with the two Koreas (such as US-North Korean relations and Chinese- 
South Korean relations) since the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean 
Basic Treaty in 1992. In this respect, the conclusion of the Russian-South 
Korean Basie Treaty became the symbol of the end of the Cold War 
atmosphere in the region in the post-Soviet era.
Yeltsin stated that ‘This [his visit to Seoul] was the right step, and the countiy was chosen correctly 
since it sets an example, particularly in refomis, and we can learn from if  (‘Yeltsin Sums up ROK 
Trip’, Itar-Tass, 20 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-226, 23 November 1992, p. 14). 
Komsomol'skaia pravda reported that Yeltsin’s recent visit to South Korea made it possible to 
demonstrate in practice Russian foreign policy’s new approach in the Far East and the partial lifting of 
the veil concealing Russia’s true interests and our part in the Korean problem {Komsomol’skaia 
pravda, 10 December 1992, p. 3). For the South Korean side, Roh Tae-woo’s government seemed 
eager to pursue the final achievement of its foreign policy, the so-called the Northern Policy, before tlie 
end of his regime (by early 1992).
”  Alexei Bogaturov stated that ‘the beaty signed in November 1992, is an effective political balance to 
the Soviet and North Korean ti'eaty of 1961 that is subject to renegotiation and alteration as is 
stipulated by its provisions’ (Alexei Bogaturov, ‘Russia in Northeast Asia: Setting a New Agenda’, 
Korea and World Affairs, vol. 17, no. 2, 1993, p. 308).
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However, it should be noted that, in spite of the historic conclusion of the 
Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty at the first Russian-South Korean summit 
in Seoul in 1992, neither side was completely satisfied with the results of the 
summit/^ Even the process for the preparation of the Russian-South Korean 
Basic Treaty, together with Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea, had not run smoothly 
due to several unresolved differences between the two sides/**
Especially, the existing 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty had 
become a serious obstacle to concluding the Russian-South Korean Basic 
Treaty. As a matter of fact, from the beginning of 1992, the South Korean side 
had demanded that Russia renounce the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship 
Treaty as a pre-condition for the expansion of the economic relationship. South 
Korea asked Russia to break its bond with North Korea, which, on paper at 
least, retained the character of a militaiy alliance."***
Moreover, faced with South Korea’s request on the issue of the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, the Russian leadership even was still 
divided roughly into two groups: pro-South Korean and pro-North Korean 
supporters. Especially, the sudden cancellation at the very last moment of 
Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea (and Japan), scheduled for the middle of 
September 1992, proved that there were serious disagreements over Yeltsin’s 
visit to Japan and South Korea and the forthcoming political treaty with South 
Korea (and also the dispute over the Northern Islands between Russia and
However, Vyacheslav Kostikov, the presidential press secretary, shaiply criticised the attempt to 
diminish die productivity of the president’s visits to South Korea and China. He told that ‘the 
president’s circles assess the results of these visit as very fmitful... the conceptual principles of the 
Russian policy in this region (APR), presented by the Russian President during his visits to tlie ROK 
and the PRC, are based on the strategic course to achieve balance in the world and separate regions and 
on the national interests of Russia... the settlement of Russia’s relations with the countries of this 
region can not be based upon the infringement of the interests of the participants of this general 
political process’ (‘Kostikov Defends Results of Yeltsin’s ROK, PRC Visit’, Interfax, 28 December 
1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-250, 29 December 1992, p. 9).
For example, a high-rairking official from the Russian foreign ministry described the South Korean 
foreign minister’s visit to Moscow (in June 1992) as ‘basically for nothing’ {Rossiiskaia gazeta, 4 July 
1992, p. 6).
For example, one of main reasons for the South Korean foreign minister’s visit to Moscow in June 
1992 was to obtain Russia’s assent to the abolition of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. 
See Izvestiia, 1 August 1992, p. 6.
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Japan) within the Russian leadership. In other words, by the middle of 
September 1992 the Russian leadership had still not arrived at a consensus over 
the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty while pursuing the 
political ti'eaty with South Korea. This indicated that the Russian government 
needed more time to reach a solid consensus on the issue of the 1961 Soviet- 
North Korean Friendship Treaty before concluding the Russian-South Korean 
Basic Treaty, evidence of the domestic power struggle over the foreign policy 
issue. As a matter of fact, together with the Kurile Islands problems, the issue 
of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty had been exploited by 
conservative forces as a means of increasing their influence within Russian 
politics and over the domestic political agenda. Indeed, the battle for control of 
policy concerning these issues demonstrated the extent to which domestic and 
foreign policy in Russia were inextricably linked."**
Given the uncertainties of the Russian domestic scene in the post-Soviet 
era, it was not surprising that there was a lack of consensus over the conclusion 
of the Russian-South Korean Treaty. These problems among the Russian 
leadership arose basically from their different views of the Korean peninsula. 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his reform-minded associates generally 
continued to support the de facto abrogation of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty. In the middle of August 1992, for example, deputy foreign 
minister Kunadze stated that ‘the treaty that has been prepared for signing is a 
document drawn up in full accordance with the present-day requirements of 
international law. In terms of format it is not a treaty of alliance - that is, it is
Regarding the postponement of this trip to South Korea and Japan, most Western analysts on 
Russian-Asian affairs raised the question of Russia’s domestic conshaints for its official position on the 
Northern territorial dispute witli Japan (for example, see Stephen Foye, ‘The Struggle over Russia’s 
Kurile Islands Policy’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 36, 11 September 1992, pp. 34-40; Peggy F. Meyer, 
‘Moscow’s Relations with Tokyo: Domestic Obstacles to a Territorial Agreement’, Asian Survey, vol. 
33, no. 10, 1993, pp. 953-967; and Yakov Zinberg and Reinliard Drifte, ‘Chaos in Russia and the 
Territorial Dispute with Japan’, The Pacific Review, vol. 6, no. 3, 1993, pp. 277-284). Little attention 
was paid to the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty (and also other Korean 
issues) when explaining Yeltsin’s sudden postponement of this trip. Thus, the author would like to put 
the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty as equally important as the Russian- 
Japanese Northern territory dispute as one of the mains reasons of Yeltsin’s sudden cancellation of his 
scheduled visits to Japan and South Korea.
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not aimed against any third party. Russia and South Korea pledge to consider 
each other as friendly states. We are convinced that the treaty will pave the way 
still further for mutually advantageous cooperation’."*^ Georgiy Toloraya, chief 
of the Russian foreign ministry Korean department, also stated that ‘the treaty 
which is intended to crown the Russian President’s stay in Seoul will 
consolidate the process of gravitation between our two countries, which in three 
years has travelled the path from mutual non-recognition and hostility to 
friendly partnership’."*^ For those who had this pro-South Korean stance, the 
conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty would help Russian’s 
domestic economic programmes.
On the contiary, however, the Russian foreign ministiy continued to 
regard the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty as active, despite the 
President’s words."*"* Furthermore, in response to South Korea’s demands, the 
view was expressed within the Russian foreign ministry that Russia as a great 
power should not bow to South Korean demands concerning its relationship 
with North Korea."*  ^Their basic position was, for the Russian interests, the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty should be existed in any form in the 
post-Soviet era. In other words, Russia should have pursued a balanced dual 
policy towards the Korean peninsula for maximising its national interests in the 
region in the post-Soviet era.
Furthermore, the two sides (Russia and South Korea) had fundamentally 
different aims for the outcome of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty. 
Russia’s main aims in concluding the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty were 
based on its economic interests. On the other hand, one of South Korea’s main 
aims in concluding the treaty with Russia was primarily of political origin -
Izvestiia, 14 August 1992, p. 6.
Rossiiskaia gazeta, 28 August 1992, p. 7.
For example, see Izvestiia, 13 August 1992, p. 6.
‘Attempts from whatever quarter to dictate to Russia how to organise its relations with other 
countries are unacceptable to us’ - the Russian foreign ministiy addressed those words the other day in 
a statement to Seoul, or rather to those in the South Korean defence ministiy who had called on 
Moscow to arniul the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid with North Korea. This was 
happening just six weeks before Yeltsin starts his visit to South Korea {Izvestiia, 1 August 1992, p. 6).
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Russia’s positive influence on North Korea, in particular, regarding the North 
Korean nuclear issue. (See Chapter 5.)
These opposite interests gradually led to a growing scepticism among 
South Koreans over relations with Russia. For the Russians, the Russian-South 
Korean Basic Treaty had already generated many difficulties for relations 
between Russia and North Korea at the expense of its relations with South 
Korea, although at first sight the Yeltsin trip to South Korea was quite 
successful, especially in terms of economic cooperation."**  ^ Based on these 
different positions and interests, the results of the conclusion of the Russian- 
South Korean Basic Treaty and the first Russian-South Korean summit were 
inevitably limited."*^
Despite several problems between Russia and South Korea, after the 
conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty their relations gradually 
expanded even towards the conclusion of agreements in the militaiy field. 
Indeed, there were extensive military contacts between the two sides during this 
period of a kind that would have been unthinkable during the Soviet era. For 
example, in early October 1992, an official Russian delegation headed by 
Andrei Kokoshin, Russian first deputy defence minister, arrived in Seoul."*^  
This was the first visit by a Russian military leader to South Korea in the 
histoiy of their military relations. General Yi Yang-ho, ehairman of the South 
Korean Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Russia in September 1993
Yeltsin stated that ‘in my view, this visit has at least a 99 per cent chance of success’. In particular, 
he emphasised the result of economic cooperation with South Korea. He stated that ‘major projects 
worth a total of about $US 20 billion to $US 30 billion have been considered, for example, the 
construction of a gas pipeline from the Republic of Sakha [Yakutia] to South Korea’. Since we don’t 
have the appropriate dock facilities, it is planned to lay this gas pipelme across North Korea, which for 
20 years would not give permission for this. The President made the following statement in connection 
with this development: ‘a representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was in 
Moscow. We obtained only verbal agreement for laying the gas pipeline’ {Izvestiia, 19 November 
1992, pp. 1 and 4).
At the intergovernmental Russian-South Korean Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation 
met in Seoul, Russian science and education minister Boris Saltykov stated that ‘bilateral cooperation 
which began between the two counbies a couple of years ago is developing normally despite tlie pains 
of growing’ (‘Scientific, Technical Cooperation Discussed with ROK’, Itar-Tass, 29 May 1993 in 
FBIS-SOV 93-103, 1 June 1993, p. 18).
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in order to sti'engthen mutual understanding and organise a military exchange 
between the two countries/** The possibility of selling Russian arms to South 
Korea during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93) was even on the agenda.^**
Notably, during the first Russian-South Korean summit in Seoul in 
November 1992, the two ministers of defence signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding and Measures to Develop Ties between the Defence Ministries 
of Russia and South Korea in 1993. Under this memorandum, the two sides 
were to start direct military contacts for the first time in the history of their 
relations. The military memorandum also envisaged exchanges at the level of 
defence ministers, deputy ministers and heads of the General Staffs, visits of 
representatives of military schools and naval vessels.^'
More importantly, during the first summit in November 1992, Yeltsin 
assured South Korea that Russia would discontinue provision of military 
assistance to North Korea,^^ and supported South Korea’s demand to the effect 
that North Korea should permit the inspection of its nuclear fac ilities.T hese  
guarantees could be described as the ftindamentals of Russian-South Korean 
military relations in the post-Soviet era.
‘Russian Militaiy Delegation Arrives in ROK for Talks’, Itar-Tass, 4 October 1992 in FBIS-SOV 
92-194, 6 October 1992, p. 13.
Krasnaia zvezda, 31 August 1993, p. 3,
™ When Russian Vice Premier Alexander Shokliin visited Seoul in August 1993, he told South Korean 
officials that Russia was ready to offer South Korea its most advanced weapons and related systems as 
a way to pay off debts. Alexander Shokhin felt that it would be a mistake for South Korea to buy US- 
made Patriot missiles instead of Russia’s S-300 anti-missile system. He also stated that Russia hoped to 
supply South Korea with defensive weapons to pay the principal and interest on $US 1.56 billion of 
soft loans extended by the state. However, the South Korean govermnent reacted negatively to the 
Russian offer to provide weapons to South Korea to repay the principal and overdue interest on its 
loans {Japan Times [Tokyo], 29 August 1993, p. 5).
According to Grachev, the two defence ministers agreed to extend exchanges to the military- 
technical sphere. He pointed to the possibility of joint participation by Russian and South Korean 
representatives in the two countries’ military exercises as observers (‘Defence Ministers Sign 
Memorandum’, Itar-Tass, 20 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-225, 20 November 1992, p. 12).
Yeltsin stated that ‘Russia will discontinue any military assistance to North Korea’ (‘No More 
Military Aid to DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 19 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-224, 19 November 1992, p. 
10).
”  Russia called on North Korea to join an international convention on non-proliferation of chemical 
weapons and agree to inter-Korean inspections of nuclear facilities (‘Kozyrev Urges DPRK to Agree to 
Nuclear Inspections’, Itar-Tass, 21 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-226, 23 November 1992, p. 15).
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Military cooperation between the two sides on the basis of the 
memorandum of understanding had two significant effects. First, the tense 
atmosphere of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula seemed to be fading away 
as cooperation developed between the former enemies even in the military 
field. In other words, in the post-Soviet era, by concluding the series of bilateral 
political and military treaties, the two sides (Russia and South Korea) attempted 
to adhere to the basic principles of the UN Charter and adopt similar 
approaches to the problems of peace, disarmament and the building a new 
structure of multipolar international relations as a friendly and cooperative 
alliance of nations.^"*
Secondly, the beginning of militaiy cooperation on the basis of the 
memorandum of understanding would inevitably lead to a focus on the issue of 
the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which defined relations 
between the former Soviet Union and North Korea as allies in the context of the 
Cold War system. Russia was about to conclude the military treaty with South 
Korea in the near future, and had to redefine relations with North Korea 
regarding the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. (See Chapter 3.)
In 1993, Russian-South Korean military cooperation was gaining 
m o m e n t u m . I n  May of that year, the signing of a Memorandum on 
Cooperation in the Defence Industry between the South Korean Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Power Engineering and the Russian Committee for the 
Defence Sectors of Industry signalled a specific step towards the involvement
According to Georgiy Toloraya, head of the department for Korea at the Russian foreign ministry, 
‘Yeltsin’s visit would help bring tlie relations between the two countiies on a “higher level, similar to 
those of allies’” (‘South Korean Foreign Minister Arrives in Moscow for Talks’, Itar-Tass, 26 June 
1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-126, 30 June 1992, p. 17)
Russian deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Panov stated that ‘Seoul and Moscow will be starting 
full-scale exchange visits between military personnel this year (1993) in order to get acquainted with 
each other and explore possibilities for future cooperation under an agreement signed between their 
defence ministers in Seoul in November 1992’ (The Korea Herald [Seoul], 5 January 1993, pp. 2 and
5).
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of South Korean businessmen in the transition of Russia factories from 
military-oriented to peacetime production/^
Based on Russian-South Korean militaiy cooperation, the ‘Team Spirit’ 
exercises (joint US-South Korean militaiy exercises) of 1993 were even 
attended by a Russian obseiwer for the first time. Russian defence minister 
Pavel Grachev stiessed that in order to make practical steps in the militaiy field, 
it was necessary to set up working groups in the two defence ministries to plan 
events for the following year. His counterpart. General Lee, noted that South 
Korea regarded Russia as a guarantor of stability in the Asia Pacific Region 
(APR). The two sides agreed to hold joint naval exercises.
What were Russia’s aims and interests in expanding its bilateral ties with 
South Korea in the field of militaiy cooperation and looking for military 
agreement? Two important factors should be considered here: (1) arms sales; 
and (2) conversion of the defence industry.
Especially, when the Russian Vice Premier Alexander Shokhin visited 
Seoul in August 1993, he revealed its official intentions about arms sales^^ to 
South Korea because Russia was not able to repay its loans from South Korea.^^ 
With the Russian economy in a weak position, the government sought to pay 
back its economic debts to South Korea in the form of aims transfers to South 
Korea instead of money. To this end, by concluding the military ti'eaty with 
South Korea, there would be no practical (or real) barriers to deliveries of 
Russian arms to South Korea. As a result, in June 1993, for instance, South 
Korea stated its intention to purchase around 40 Russian high technologies, a
This document envisages cooperation between the two countries’ business communities in the 
aerospace industry, elecb’onics, the development of precise machine-building and new materials 
technologies. The two sides agreed to open information centies and forge direct links between the 
Korean Institute of Scientific-Technical Information and the All-Russian Institute of Inter-Sectoral 
Information ( ‘Defence Industry Signs Cooperation Accords with ROK’, Itar-Tass, 24 May 1993 in 
FBIS-SOV 93-099, 25 May 1993, p. 18).
Vladimir S. Miasnikov, ‘Russian-South Korean Security Cooperation’, The Korean Journal o f  
Defence Analysis, vol. 6, no. 2, 1994, p. 331.
For details of Russia’s arms sales in the post-Soviet era, see Igor Kluipunov, ‘Russia’s Aims Trade 
in the Post-Cold War Period’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 4, 1994, pp. 79-94.
See ‘Shokhin to Discusses Military-Technology Package in ROK’, Radio Rossii Network, 22 August 
1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-161, 23 August 1993, p. 6.
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South Korean official declared at the third session of Russian-Korean 
Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation/**
Russia’s interests in expanding its bilateral ties with South Korea were 
also closely related to the conversion of its defence industiy in the post-Soviet 
era/* In this respect, Russia seemed to regard South Korea as the best possible 
partner/^ In fact, in 1992, the South Korean government, having considered 
Russian proposals for military cooperation, selected a number of projects in six 
fields: astronautics and outer-space research, communications; transport and 
ground-based equipment, ship-building and maritime equipment; chemical 
production and chemical materials, and products of general designation. These 
spheres of cooperation include the production of aircraft, avionics, testing 
equipment, small engines for pilot-less aircraft, the development of super-solid 
materials, ground-to-ship and ship-to-ship missiles, computer software and 
communication facilities.
By contrast. South Korea’s interest in expanding its bilateral ties with 
Russia in the field of military cooperation was mainly based on the political 
question concerning the North Korean factor. In other words, South Korea 
started to be interested in concluding military treaties with Russia when the 
North Korean nuclear issue became an increasingly salient issue in the first half
‘South Korea to Buy Russian High Teclmology’, Itar-Tass, 3 June 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-106, 4 
June 1993, p. 21.
On the conversion of Russian defence industry, see Laure Despres, ‘Conversion of the Defence 
Industry in Russia and Arms Exports to the South’, Communist Economies and Economic 
Transformation, vol. 6, no. 3, 1994, pp. 367-383.
For example, in September 1992, Aleksandr Titkin, the Russian indusby minister, explained that 
‘South Korea has sophisticated teclmology in the field of consumer goods production, while in Russia 
vast capacities are being freed during conversion of the defence indusby. At the same time, Russia has 
high technology in military production of a defensive character in which Seoul is interested’ (‘Indusby 
Minister Visit ROK, Signed Memorandum’, Itar-Tass, 1 September 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-171, 2 
September 1992, p. 8). In October 1992, Andrei Kokoshin, Russian first deputy defence minister, also 
stated that ‘there are favourable opporbrnities for the development of indusbial and commercial 
cooperation between Moscow and Seoul, including implementation of Russian defence indusby 
conversion programmes’ (‘Russian Military Delegation Arrives in ROK for Talks’, Itar-Tass, 4 
October 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-194, 6 October 1992, p. 13).
L. Anosova and G. Matveyeva, South Korea: View from Russia (Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1994), 
p. 229.
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of the 1990s. At the same time, South Korea attempted to expand its military 
relations in the post-Soviet era, in order not to depend on the US totally.
Although there were some mutual advantages in the field of militaiy 
cooperation, such cooperation was just in its initial stages, and remained largely 
dependent on US factors like the Cold War era.**"* Moreover, as regards the 
conversion of Russia’s defence industry, South Korean minister for Science and 
Engineering, Kim Si-chung, at the third session of Russian-Korean Committee 
for Scientific and Technical Cooperation in June 1993, also stated that South 
Korea badly needed scientific information on research carried out in Russia. He 
pointed out that there was a serious information exchange gap.**^
This clearly demonstrated that although Russian-South Korean relations 
had on the whole remained friendly and cooperative during this period (Dec. 
91-Dec. 93), not everything was rosy between the two sides. Rather, in 1993, 
the atmosphere in their relations started to deteriorate.^^ The reasons for the 
problems between the two sides during this period can be summed up as 
follows. First, although there had been frequent high-level political contacts and 
the conclusion of political and military treaties between the two sides including 
the first Russian-South Korean summit, several key issues over which the 
former Soviet Union had confronted South Korea during the Soviet era had not 
been resolved as satisfactorily as South Korea had expected. One of the best 
examples of this was Russia’s handling of the issues surrounding the ‘empty’ 
black box of the Korean Airline flight 007, shot down by a Soviet fighter in
For example, in August 1992, Russian Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokliin in Seoul explicitly referred 
to the US factor in militaiy cooperation between the two sides, stating that ‘since South Korean has a 
close politically ally the US, and it is evidently difficult for the South Korean leaders to take such 
decisions without consultations with the US... this deal [arms sales] should not upset the balance in 
Northeast Asia and in the APR’ (‘Shokhin Discusses Possible Russian Arras Deal with ROK’, Itar- 
Tass, 28 August 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-166, 30 August 1993, p. 19).
‘South Korea to Buy Russian High Teclmology’, Itar-Tass, 3 June 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-106, 4 
June 1993, p. 21.
Georgiy Kunadze, deputy foreign minister and ambassador-designate to South Korea (in December
1993), stated that ‘... the tlrree-year-long diplomatic relations with South Korea have been based on 
stable experiences. We can say that these three years have been a period of getting out of a certain 
‘vain dream’ and excessive expectations...’ (‘Ambassador-Designate to ROK Views Korean Issues’, 
Radio Moscow, 29 December 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-249, 30 December 1993, p. 16).
130
1983/^ Afterwards, there was increasingly growing scepticism among the 
Korean public about Russia’s stance and its intentions.
Secondly, Russia appeared to be dissatisfied with its economic 
cooperation with South Korea.**^  Russian-South Korean trade had continued to 
expand steadily, from $US 1.2 billion in 1992 to $US 1.57 billion in 1993.**** 
However, as Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 indicate, South Korea’s economic trade 
and investment in Russia during this period was insignificant.
Table 4. 3 South Korea’s Share in the Total Volume of Russia’s Foreign
Trade (%)
1992 1993
Total 1.13 2.0
South Korean Exports 1.02 1.92
South Korean Imports 1.21 2.11
Source: Calculated from data of Goskomstat of Russia; and Korea Foreign Trade Association.
South Koreans were also bitterly disappointed with the conclusion of a special state committee in 
Russia that Russia could not be held responsible for the shooting down of the KAL 007. For more 
detailed analysis of the KAL 007 incident, see Alexander Dallin, Blackbox: KAL 007 and the 
Superpowers (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985); Jolm Lepingwell, 
‘New Soviet Revelations about KAL 007’, RFE/RL, vol. 3, no. 17, 26 April 1991, pp. 9-15; and G. M. 
Kornienko, Kholodnaia voina: Svidetel’st\>o ee uchastnika (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia,
1994), pp. 210-233. A source in the Russian foreign ministry admitted that ‘the “black box” from the 
KAL 007 shot down in 1983 over Sakhalin Island, given by Yeltsin to South Korean President Roh, 
was not able to contain all of the cassettes with the parameters of the plane’s flight. Only the “black 
box” itself and copies of tapes made in the plane’s cockpit were handed over to Korean authorities 
(‘Ministry Says ROK Not Given All ‘83 Plane Crash Tapes’, Itar-Tass, 1 December 1992 in FBIS- 
SOV 92-232, 2 December 1992, pp. 5-6).
In the field of economic and trade relations, Russia continued to put strong emphasis on its economic 
relations with South Korea. In particular, during the first Russian-South Korean summit in Seoul in 
November 1992, Yeltsin called for ‘economic partnership’ with South Korea (‘Calls for Economic 
Partnership’, Itar-Tass, 19 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-224, 19 November 1992, pp. 10-11).
1992 and 1993 data are from the Korean Trade Centre.
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Figure 4.1 Foreign Investors in Russia, 1992
South
Korea
North
Korea
China
In v e s to rs
Source: Theodore W, Krasik, ed., Russia & Eurasia: Facts & Figures Animal, volume 18 (Gulf 
Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1993), p. 166.
In the meantime, for the South Korean side, the major problems in its 
economic relationship with Russia are shown in Table 4.4.^ **
Table 4.4 Difficulties in Trading with Russia (for South Korea)
Factor Percentage
Lack of Foreign Currency 12.4%
Bureaucratic Inefficiency 8.8%
Lack of Experience 6.5%
Lack of Information 6.3%
Difference in Trading Ways 6.0%
Possibility of Breaking Contract 5.9%
Difficulty in Selecting Partners 5.3%
Difficulty in Solving Problems 5.3%
Inefficient Communicating Means 5.0%
Difficulty in Communications 4.1%
Source: Survey by the Korean Economic Association for Russia and published by Central Economic 
News (Seoul), 19 April 1992.
™ For the general problems of Russian economic systems in the post-Soviet era, see M. Barabanov, 
‘Sistemnyi kiizis ekonomiki Rossii’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 3, 1995, 
pp. 17-24. For the details of Russia’s problems in world market in the post-Soviet era, see A. El’ianov, 
‘Rossiia na mirovom rynke: nekotorye problemy’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 
no. 11, 1995, pp. 15-30.
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Problems over Russia’s interest payment on Soviet loan put further strain 
on their relations. Table 4.5 gives the details of South Korea’s loans to the 
former Soviet Union.^*
Table 4.5 South Korea’s Economic Assistance Loan to the Former Soviet
Union (billion $US)
Type Terms of Contract
Bank Loan principal: 1 billion US dollars 
maturity: 8 years 
grace period: 3 years 
payment method: equal semi-annual 
payments 
interest: Libor + 1.25, 1.375%
Trade-related Loan principal: 0.47 billion US dollars 
maturity: 2 years 
payment method: equal semi-annual 
payments 
interest: Libor + 1.375%
Total principal: 1.47 billion US dollars
Source; Sang-moon Hahm and Joon-hwan Im, Debt Management and the Russian Debt Problem 
(Seoul: Korea Institute of Finance, 1996), p. 63.
Another significant problem between the two sides during this period was 
that South Korea was less interested in improving relations with Russia than it 
had been with improving relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. 
There were two important factors behind this position: (1) South Korea’s New 
Diplomacy; and (2) Russia’s loss of influence in the international arena.
With the advent of President Kim Young-sam’s administration in South 
Korea, in early 1993, South Korea shifted its towards its strategic interests vis-
” For the details of Russia’s general foreign debts, see B. Pichugin, ‘Vneshnii dolg Rossii: Stat’ia 
pei-vaia’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 6, 1995, pp. 21-31; and B. Pichugin, 
‘Vneslmii dolg Rossii: Stat’ia vtoraia’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 7, 
1995, pp. 65-75.
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à-vis Russia, although the latter still was and will be much more in a mid and 
long-term perspective a crucially important actor for South Korea and 
Northeast Asia/^ This policy was under the slogan of ‘globalisation’ {Segyewha 
in Korean), which placed relatively less emphasis on the ‘Russian factor’ in 
replacing the previous ‘Northern Policy’.
Russia, as a successor state to the former Soviet Union, did not exert as 
much political influence on North Korea to reduce the tension on the Korean 
peninsula as South Korea had expected. For instance, Russia was unable to put 
a great deal of pressure on the North Korean government over the nuclear issue, 
and did not play any significant role in terms of economic issues on the security 
agenda in Northeast Asia. (See Chapter 5 and 6.) As a result, South Korea 
began to seek an improvement in its relations with China, which became the 
second major power to recognise the two Koreas in August 1992.
Besides, it should be noted here that there was an embassy property 
dispute between the two sides during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). As part of 
the consultations which began with the establishment of official relations 
between Seoul and Moscow in 1990, Russia recently called for appropriate 
compensation. Especially, during the round of official bilateral consultations 
which ended in Seoul on 3 June 1993, Russia presented South Korea with proof 
of its ownership rights to the plot of land of the former Russian mission in 
Seoul. For the Russian side, the aim was to settle the issue of Russia’s rights to 
property seized from it by the Seoul government during the years when there 
were no official relations between the two countries. In fact, a discussion of this 
problem had been under way since the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between Seoul and Moscow in 1990. However, in December 1993, South
In May 1993, President Kim Yoimg-sam made a speech on the ‘Pacific Era and South Korea’s New 
Diplomacy’ at the Pacific Basin Economic Councils (PBEC) International General Meeting in Seoul, 
South Korea. In his speech, he laid down a general direction for South Korea’s new diplomacy 
including its new world and future outlooks as well as a new approach to unification. There were five 
fundamentals for South Korea’s new diplomacy: (1) globalism; (2) diversification; (3) multi­
dimens ionalism; (4) regional cooperation; and (5) future orientation (See Sung-joo Plan, ‘Fundamentals 
of Korea’s New Diplomacy: New Korea’s Diplomacy toward the World and the Future’, Korea and 
World Affairs, vol. 17, no. 2, 1993, pp. 229-243).
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Korea turned down Russia’s proposals on ways for the Seoul government to 
pay compensation for Russian-owned land in Seoul which was appropriated in 
the 1870s7^
As seen above, during this early stage of its foreign policy towards the 
Korean peninsula, Russia made considerable active efforts to develop relations 
with South Korea whilst concluding several important political and military 
treaties which would he the new legal foundation for their further relations in 
the post-Soviet era. Nevertheless, in general, Russia did not succeed in 
accomplishing its goals in relation to South Korea, which only proved its 
incapability to conduct an effective foreign policy towards the Korean 
peninsula. Internally, there were continually contradictory and inconsistent 
views on the issue of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty within the upper 
echelons of the Russian leadership. Moreover, as regards the Russian-South 
Korean military treaties, the post-Soviet international system had never been 
favourable for both s i d e s . I n  other words, Russia was not able to have 
paitnership relations with South Korea based on political and military treaties 
while having still relations with North Korea based on the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty. Furthermore, it should be also noted that South 
Korea had still an allied relationship with the US, which was based on the Cold 
War system in the post-Soviet era. This was an extraordinary example of 
relationship building from the previous ideological basis to the post-Soviet 
realities. Russia’s policy towards South Korea had begun to be reactive as the 
result of both internal and external factors.
See ‘ROK Rejects Proposals on Property Compensation’, Itar-Tass, 2 December 1993 in FBIS-SOV 
93-231, 3 December 1993, p. 12.
Although the Cold War was over, Russian-Korean relations were still governed by the basic structure 
of the Cold War system. This meant that Russia should have an appropriate dual policy towards the 
two Koreas like the Soviet era.
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4.3. In Search of a Mutually Constructive and Complementary 
Partnership? (Dec, 93-Dec. 95)
The remarkable success of the former communists and ultra-nationalists in the 
December 1993 parliamentary elections forced Yeltsin’s pro-Western 
government toward a more nationalistic foreign policy direction. As a result, a 
new consensus on Russia’s Korean policy emerged in favour of a more 
balanced stance towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 
95).^  ^ In other words, Russia attempted to reformulate its Korean policy in line 
with its new domestic political forces and institutions and within a new 
international order after the December 1993 parliamentary elections.
In these circumstances, there were still significant developments for 
political and military cooperation on the basis of treaties between Russia and 
South Korea during this period. Especially, several important bilateral treaties 
were concluded between the two sides during this period. First, a memorandum 
on mutual understanding between the Defence Ministries of Russia and South 
Korea and a declaration on Military Cooperation between the two countries 
were signed when South Korean defence minister Yi Yang-ho visited Moscow 
in April 1994. In the words of Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev, these 
documents reflected the intention of the two sides to develop broader 
cooperation and determine the main militaiy events within the framework of 
formal links between the two countries’ military departments in 1994-95.^^
According to Roal’d Savel’ev, acting director of the Centre for Korean Studies, ‘life shows that 
mutual relations with Seoul cannot be built witliout taking into account Pyongyang’s opinion... bias in 
favor of one of the partners could weaken our position in the region as a whole... observing balance in 
mutual relations with the two Koreas is especially important for Russia’ (‘Problems of Ties with ROK, 
DPRK Viewed’, Rossiiskie vesti, 26 May 1994, p. 3 in FBIS-SOV 94-103, 27 May 1994, p. 12).
According to Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov, ‘if ultia-nationalists should grab power, the picture 
could become one-sided again, this time in North Korea’s favour. Ultranationalists would certainly 
drive a worldwide confrontation within the US, with predictable consequences for Moscow’s relations 
with Soutli Korea and North Korea. The Korean peninsula would again become a front of Cold War’ 
(Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov, ‘The Evolution of Russian-Korean Relations: External and Internal 
Factors’ Asian Survey, vol. 34, no. 9, 1994, p. 796).
‘Grachev and ROK: Discuss Cooperation’, Itar-Tass, 29 April 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-083, 29 April 
1994, p. 7.
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At the meeting with the South Korean defenee minister, Russian foreign 
minister Andrei Kozyrev also stressed that ‘not only do we no longer look at 
each other down the barrel of a gun, we are ready to cooperate in setting up 
these relations for the joint security of friendly states and to have full-scale 
military cooperation’/^ This reflected the Russian government’s commitment 
to establishing active military cooperation with South Korea, whilst proposing 
the creation of a new collective security system in the APR.
Secondly, the two sides signed a Joint Russian-Korean Declaration and 
Protocol on Consultations between foreign ministries at the second Russian- 
South Korean summit, held in Moscow in June 1994. In fact, the highest point 
of Russian-South Korean political relations during this period was South 
Korean President Kim Young-sam’s visit to Moscow in June 1994 where he 
and Russian President Yeltsin issued a joint declaration stating that relations 
between the two countries were developing into a ‘constructive mutually 
complementary partnership based on the common values of freedom, 
democracy, legality, respect for human rights and a market e c o n o m y H i s  two 
sessions with Yeltsin produced major results that were summed up in a 13-point 
joint com m unique.T he two sides also agreed to set up a joint committee to 
promote cooperation in trade, investment and technological exchange. Trade 
ministers from the two countries exchanged memoranda of understanding on 
the establishment of the Korea-Russia Trade Committee during their talks in 
Moscow.®* A special place in the talks was reserved for analysis of the situation 
on the Korean peninsula in connection with the issue of nuclear non-
‘Kozyrev Calls for Military Cooperation with ROK’, Itar-Tass, 29 April 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-083, 
29 April 1994, p. 12.
For more details on the contents of the declaration, see ‘Yeltsin, Kim Young-sam Sign Partnership 
Declaration’, Itar-Tass, 2 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-106, 2 June 1994, p. 5; and ‘Vizit Kim Young 
Sam V  Rossiiu’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 13-14, July 1994, pp. 12-16.
Highlighting the results were Russia’s agreement to take part in international sanctions against North 
Korea in cormection with the nuclear issue, Russia’s insurance that its military alliance with North 
Korea has, in effect, become invalid and an agreement to establish a hot-line between Chong Wa Dae 
[the Korean presidential office] and the Kremlin {Hankuk Ilbo [Seoul], 3 June 1994, pp. 1-2). For more 
details of the full text, see Appendix 5.
Yeltsin Pledged Pressure on North Korea: Military Treaty with North Korea a Dead Letter’, Korea 
Newsreview, vol. 23, no. 23, 1994, p. 5.
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proliferation. In fact, North Korea’s nuclear programme overshadowed Kim 
Young-sam’s visit to Moscow in June 1994. Yeltsin also told his South Korean 
counterpart that his government gave a new interpretation to the 1961 Soviet- 
North Korean Friendship Treaty regarding its obligation to help North Korea in 
case of war involving North Korea. (See Chapter 3.)
Thirdly, a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding with Regard to 
Military Contacts Between the Defence Ministries of the Russian Federation 
and South Korea was signed when Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev 
visited South Korea in May 1995. The memorandum provided for the exchange 
of military experts and personnel, sharing military intelligenee and the purchase 
by South Korea of Russian military equipment.®^ Based on those military 
agreements between the two sides, there were frequent contacts in the militaiy 
arena. For instance, just after Grachev’s visit to Seoul in May 1995, the chief of 
staff of the South Korean Air Forees Kim Hong-nae amved in Moscow. As a 
source in the Russian defence minister told the Interfax news agency, he was 
primarily interested in MiG-29 fighters.®"*
What were Russia’s aims in concluding these political and military 
treaties with South Korea during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95)?
Faced with the North Korean nuclear issue, Russia continuously 
advocated the creation of a multilateral conference for an Asian security system 
and looked for support for its proposal from other major powers in the APR (at 
least, in Northeast Asia). In these circumstances, by concluding more political 
and military treaties with South Korea, Russia sought ‘treaty-based support’ 
from South Korea to implement its regional [security and economic] policy in
During the talks, Yeltsin stated that ‘Article 1 of the 1961 Treaty between the Soviet Union and 
North Korea stipulating Moscow’s military intervention can be regarded as dead now’ {Ibid., p. 4).
‘Grachev Signs Military Memorandum’, Itar-Tass, 19 May 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-097, 19 May 
1995, p. 13. Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev even stated in Seoul that ‘Russia has raised the 
question of a regional security system in Northeast Asia and, especially, a sub-regional system at the 
Seoul negotiations. In the words of the minister, the sub-regional system could involve Russia, China, 
Japan, North Korea, South Korea and the US’ (‘Quoted on Regional Security System’, Itar-Tass, 20 
May 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-098, 22 May 1995, p. 14).
‘ROK Air Force Chief of Staff Arrives on Visit: Interested in MiG-29’, Moscow Voice o f Russia 
World Service, 22 May 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-100, 24 May 1995, p. 7.
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the region. Nonetheless, it was obvious that Russia was still more interested in 
expanding its economic relations with South Korea through these political and 
militaiy agreements. In other words, Russia’s real purpose in founding good 
relations with South Korea still mainly originated from its economic interests.
Russia’s arms sales and debts to South Korea were still closely related to 
the new agreements between the two sides. Russia continued to promote arms 
sales to South Korea and to seek South Korean assistance with the conversion 
of its defence industry as before (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). In August 1994, for 
instance. South Korea agreed to accept from Russia, in lieu of repayment of 
part of its $US 1.47 billion debt, high-tech arms such as jet fighter planes and 
rockets. A Russian military-industrial complex spokesman advised that the 
proposed contract was estimated to he worth at least $US 100 million.®^
Also, when defence minister Grachev visited South Korea in May 1995, 
the two sides signed an agreement on the supply of modern weaponry - 
primarily T-80U tanks, BMP-3 infantry combat vehicles, AT-7 anti-tank and 
SA-16 anti-aircraft missiles, ammunition and parts - as payment in kind of its 
deht.®^  A Russian military official reportedly said in May 1995 that ‘this 
document (A Memorandum on Mutual Understanding with Regard to Military 
Contacts Between the Defence Ministries of the Russian Federation and South 
Korea) gives the go-ahead for supplies to Russian military equipment to South 
Korea’.®^
As regards the problem of Russian debts to South Korea, the two sides 
dealt with the repayment problem by rescheduling the outstanding debt in July 
1995. Under this arrangement, payments of $US 450.7 million in arrears ($US 
391.8 million, the amount in arrears through 1993, plus $US 58.9 million in 
interest accrued through 1995) were rescheduled. This amount was repackaged 
into a new loan with a principal (amortisation) payment for the period between
Nezavisiinaia gazeta, 5 August 1994, p. 4.
Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 May 1995, p. 3.
‘Beijing, Seoul Welcome Grachev Security Proposal’, Interfax, 22 May 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-099, 
22 May 1995, p. 8.
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1995 and 1998. At the same time, some other contractual terms such as interest 
rates were also changed. Details of the rescheduled payment plan are shown in 
Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 Payment Schedule for South Korean Loan to Russia
(million $US)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Nov. 99
Principal
and
In terest
391.8 405.2 243.4 230.1 216.3 202.3 143.1
Total $US 1.83 billion: Principal ($US 1.47 billion) + Interest (Î 
billion)
gUS 0.36
Source: Sang-moon Haluii and Joon-hwan Im, Debt Management and the Russian Debt Problem 
(Seoul: Korea Institute of Finance, 1996), p. 64.
In the meantime. South Korea was also interested in developing and 
concluding other bilateral treaties with Russia. For example, during the 
Russian-South Korea summit in Moscow in June 1994, a number of other 
documents were signed, including intergovernmental agreements on 
cooperation in protection of the environment, on preventing incidents at sea 
outside territorial waters, and on the protection of migratory birds, and also a 
protocol on consultations between the Russian foreign ministry and the South 
Korean foreign ministry. In the field of economic agreements. South Korea and 
Russia agreed to jointly develop a natural gas field in Yakutia autonomous 
republic in eastern Siberia to supply gas through a pipeline to Seoul.®® When 
Vladimir Shumeiko, chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation, visited South Korea in November 1994, 
he proposed that there should be documents setting out the principles of 
cooperation between the two parliaments, and put forward the idea of signing a 
joint statement on cooperation.®^ A programme of cultural cooperation between
‘Gas Agreement Signed’, Yonhap, 3 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-107, 3 June 1994, p. 9.
‘Shumeiko (in Seoul) on Russian-ROK Parliamentary Relations’, Itar-Tass, 9 November 1994 in 
FBIS-SOV 94-218, 10 November 1994, p. 8.
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South Korea and Russia for 1995-96 was signed in Seoul/** Russia and South 
Korea signed a memorandum in Seoul on cooperation between the two 
countries in postal and electronic communications, which immediately came 
into force for an unlimited period/*
In late Febmary 1995, Moscow and Seoul signed a five-year agreement on 
economic cooperation in Seoul/^ In July 1995, an agreement between the 
government of the Russian Federation and South Korea on settling part of the 
Foreign Economic Bank’s debt was signed in Seoul by Oleg Davydov, deputy 
Chairman of the Russian government, and Hong Chae-young, deputy prime 
minister of South Korea/^ In September 1995, Russian and South Korean 
prime ministers (Chernomyrdin and Yi Hong-ku) signed a declaration on the 
encouragement of bilateral trade and economic, scientific and technical 
cooperation/"* In November 1995, a draft ‘Memorandum on Mutual 
Understanding Between the Russian Government and South Korean 
Government on Industrial Cooperation’ was approved/^
It should he emphasised that South Korea’s main interest in concluding 
such political, economic and military treaties with Russia was fundamentally 
aimed at providing a legal basis to undermine Russia’s assistance to North 
Korea. For example, when the tensions of the North Korean nuclear crisis 
became acute in 1994, the South Korean side strongly insisted that Russia stop 
supporting North Korea on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship Treaty and that it should even consider abolishing it. (See Chapter
3.)
See ‘ROK Signs Cultural Cooperation Accord with Russia’, Itar-Tass, 13 September 1994 in FBIS- 
SOV 94-177, 13 September 1994, p. 15.
See ‘Memorandum on Communications Singed with ROK’, Itar-Tass, 15 September 1994 in FBIS- 
SOV 94-180, 16 September 1994, p. 12.
See ‘Moscow, Seoul Sign Economic Cooperation Agreement’, Moscow Voice o f Russia World 
Seiwice, 28 February 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-040, 1 March 1995, p. 14.
See Rossiiskaia gazeta, 11 July 1995, p. 1.
See ‘Chernomyrdin, ROK Premier Sign Cooperation Accord’, htterfax, 28 September 1995 in FBIS- 
SOV 95-189, 29 September 1995, p. 24; and ‘Vizit V. S. Chernomyrdina v Respubliku Koreia’, 
Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 10, October 1995, pp. 14-16.
Rossiiskie vesti, 22 November 1995, p. 3.
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Another reason for South Korea’s interest in expanding its ties with 
Russia in the field of political and military cooperation related to South Korea’s 
policy of diversifying its politico-militaiy relations with other major powers 
such as Russia and China in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era. For this 
purpose, in early 1996, for example, South Korea attempted to conclude 
military logistics and procurement agreements with Canada, Russia and 
Romania, A South Korean official of the defence ministry stated that ‘it was 
moving to establish agreements with as many countries as possible on a 
selective basis to diversify its sources of military hardware and software, 
heavily concentrated on the United States’.**^ This was part of a deliberate 
attempt by South Korea to avoid tilting towards the US in the post-Soviet era.
As mentioned above, there were remarkable bilateral developments on the 
basis of their interests and the conclusion of political and militaiy agreements 
between the two sides, although they still had fundamentally different interests 
during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). This meant that there were obvious 
limitations to the development of further relations between the two sides both in 
terms of political and military cooperation. First, the US factor in the Russian- 
South Korean relations should be still considered when examining their 
relations. This demonstrated that the US factor inevitably affected Russia’s 
aims sale to South Korea. Rather, the South Korean defence ministry discussed 
the possibility of using Russian armaments for training and in experimental 
programmes. South Korea’s use of US arms was seen as incompatible with the 
Russian system.^^ Moreover, it should be emphasised that the South Korean 
side could not agree any further military relations with Russia without US 
consent. As Krasnaia zvezda noted, the talks on weapon deals were abruptly
The Korea Times (Seoul), 4 February 1996, p. 3.
According to a high-ranking Soutli Korean military official, ‘it was difficult to include Russian 
militaiy hardware in the arsenal of the South Korean armed forces, because the latter were organised 
and equipped according to the American system’ (‘South Korea May Use Russian Weapons for 
Training’, Itar-Tass, 27 January 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-019, 28 January 1994, p. 9). For tire debate of 
this matter [US factor in Russian-South Korean relations] by the Russian side, see Izvestiia, 24 
February 1996, p. 3.
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put on hold because of pressure from the US. The US government was 
concerned that MiG-29s and S-300 tactical missile interceptors might compete 
against US F-16Ms and Patriots.^®
Secondly, there were still different approaches to the issue of arms sales 
and debt between the two sides. For example, in August 1994, the South 
Korean government partly agreed with Moscow’s proposals to repay a portion 
of its debt in the form of deliveries of Russian armaments. However, according 
to the Yonhap news agency, the South Korean government did not agree that 
Moscow delivered armaments costing almost half of the debt which amounted 
to $US 650 million.^^ South Korea hoped to base these relations on licensing, 
supplies of spares and production of Russian-designed material at South Korean 
plants. Russia did not reject this form of cooperation, but favoured greater 
cooperation on military-technical issues and the delivery of material made in 
Russia.***** As Figure 3.3 shows (See Chapter 3: p. 88.), Russian arms sales to 
South Korea accounted for a very small proportion of its total worldwide arms 
sales.
Thirdly, for the South Korean side, the political value of Russia was 
diminishing rapidly due to its internal instability and weakening international 
position, especially its diminishing ability to influence North Korea’s nuclear 
policy. In the meantime, the Russian side, especially in the rejection of its 
proposed international conference by South Korea, was deeply affected in its 
Korean policy direction. (See Chapters 3 and 5.) This indicated that Russia was 
not able to demonstrate its capacity to influence North Korea when faced with 
the North Korean nuclear crisis and the abolition of the 1961 Soviet-North 
Korean Friendship Treaty. In other words, Russia failed to persuade North 
Korea to rejoin the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and the abolition or
Krasnaia zvezda, 18 September 1993, p. 4.
‘ROK Partly Agrees to Repay Debt with Arms’, Itar-Tass, 5 August 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-152, 8 
August 1994, p. 16.
‘Quoted on Regional Security System’, Itar-Tass, 20 May 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-098, 22 May
1995, p. 14.
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reinterpretation of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which was 
an essential prerequisite for militaiy cooperation between Russia and South 
Korea was not clearly resolved between them during this period. This restricted 
South Korea’s more active consideration of its cooperation with Russia. This 
clearly demonstrated that the theory of military cooperation between Russia and 
South Korea differed from the reality of such cooperation in Northeast Asia in 
the post-Soviet era.
As a result, relations between the two sides were not very satisfactory for 
either side. One of the best examples of this dissatisfaction was the 
postponement of a high-level Russian official’s visit to South Korea. In May 
1994, for instance, the first session of the joint intergovernmental Russian- 
South Korean economic, scientific and technical commission session, planned 
to open in Seoul, was put off at the very last moment.**** Russian Vice Premier 
Aleksandr Shokhin had been scheduled to visit Seoul at this time to discuss a 
wide range of trade and economic relations before the South Korean President’s 
visit to Russia.***^  It should be noted that this situation occuned at a time of 
acute crisis in North Korea. Russia’s proposal for the international conference 
was also rejected immediately prior to his scheduled visit.***^
As regards economic relations between the two sides, the most 
problematic matter was still Russia’s inability to repay loans made by South 
Korea to the former Soviet Union and to Russia. In turn, Russia did not receive 
as much economic benefit from South Korea as it had expected. For example, 
at the end of 1995, the overall amount of South Korean investment was about 
$US 50 million spread over 59 projects, most of which related to the trade and
See Izvestiia, 24 May 1994, p. 4; and ‘ROK-Russian Economic Commission Session Postponed’, 
Itar-Tass, 19 May 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-098, 20 May 1994, p. 8.
Yeltsin sent a personal message to President Kim of the ROK about a postponement of the first 
session of the Russian-South Korean Intergovermnental Commission for Economic Cooperation, 
according to diplomatic sources in Seoul (‘Yeltsin Cites Domestic Problems as Reason’, Itar-Tass, 20 
May 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-098, 20 May 1994, p. 9).
See Ik Joong Youn, ‘Russia and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis’, BASEES conference paper, 
March 1998.
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services sector/**"* The steady expansion of ti'ade and economic cooperation (see 
Figure 4.2) had not heen accompanied by a commensurate growth in direct 
investment in Russia (as Figure 4.3 indicates, South Korea was not one of the 
top 10 investors in Russia).***  ^ Only thirty Russian-South Korean joint ventures 
had been established by early 1995. Overall, South Korean investment in 
Russia was still very modest, standing at only ahout $US 50 million.***^
Figure 4.2 South Korea’s Trade with Russia, 1991-96
1991 1992 1993 Year 1994 1995 1996
Source: Korea Trade Association (KOTRA) (Seoul: 1996), p, 5.
Valentin Moiseev, ‘Russia and the Korean Peninsula’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 
1, Jan.-Feb. 1996, p. 108.
For the details of foreign investment in Russia, see B. Pichugin, ‘Inostraimye chastnye investitsii v 
RossiV, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 12, 1994, pp. 15-25.
Valery Denissov, ‘Russia in the APR: Problems of Security and Cooperation’, International Affairs 
(Moscow), no. 4-5, 1995, p. 75.
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Figure 4.3 Russia’s Top 10 Foreign Investors, 1994
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Source: Kommersant-daily, 1 June 1995, p. 8.
As regards compensation for Russian property in Seoul, in Januaiy 1995, 
after more than four years of negotiations, South Korea agreed to a Russian 
demand to pay compensation for confiscating Russian real estate in the 1870s 
in the centre of Seoul, at one time the location of the Russian mission and later 
the USSR General Consulate/**^
During this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95), Russia attempted to huild up new 
relations with South Korea based on a mutually constructive and 
complementary partnership by concluding several important political and 
militaiy treaties which would be the legal foundation for their relations in the 
post-Soviet era. Nevertheless, Russia did not succeed in establishing its 
relations with South Korea as the Russian side had expected. Rather, their 
relations showed an estimation of how much further their relations could 
develop after the conclusion of the Russian-South Korea Basic Treaty,
At first the Koreans expressed their desire not to return the land parcel to the Russians. They based 
this on the fact that the land had been nationalised and Moscow’s claims had no legal validity. South 
Korea preferred to resolve the dispute based on an exchange of land parcels. Incidentally, the value of 
our ‘former’ land parcel in Seoul is assessed today by specialists as amounting to close to $US 400 
million {Izvestiia, 17 January 1995, p. 3).
146
especially concerning military relations, as the result of hoth internal and 
external factors.
Internally, there obviously existed some contiadictoiy and inconsistent 
views on the issue of the Russian-South Korean economic and military treaties 
within the upper echelons of the Russian leadership. For example, in May 1994 
at the very last moment there was the cancellation of a high-ranking Russian 
official’s visit to South Korea (led by Vice Premier Shokhin) for the first 
session of the joint intergovernmental Russian-South Korean economic, 
scientific and technical commission session. This cancellation of the visit can 
be also understood as follows. The visit was mainly designed to enhance 
Russia’s economic interests in the Korean peninsula. However, those who were 
more interested in Russia’s great power status than in its economic interests in 
the Russian leadership did not seem to consent to the scheduled visit to South 
Korea.***® As mentioned earlier, this situation occurred immediately after 
Russia’s proposal for an international conference was rejected. Externally, the 
post-Soviet international system continued to be unfavourable for the Russian 
side. (See Chapters 5 and 6.)
Russia’s policy towards South Korea had become more reactive for these 
reasons, despite its active efforts.
4.4. A Shaky Partnership? (Dec. 95-Jui. 96)
Unlike previous years, fewer significant bilateral treaties between the two sides 
were concluded during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96).***^
For example, on the one hand, a number of Russian experts believed that South Korea’s experience 
was more appropriate for Russia than America’s or Europe’s. However, on the other hand, Roal’d 
Savel’ev, acting director of the Centre for Korean Studies, believed that ‘Life shows that mutual 
relations with Seoul cannot be built without taking into account Pyongyang’s opinion... Bias in favour 
of one of the partners could weaken our position in the region as a whole’ (Rossiiskie vesti, 26 May 
1994, p. 3).
However, it should be noted that Russia and South Korea plamied to improve the bilateral treaty 
governing legal relations between the two sides, according to consultations between director of the
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In February 1996, Russia and South Korea concluded a protocol to 
promote further economic cooperation, strengthen business contacts and boost 
mutual trust between the business communities of the two countries. Under the 
accord, the two sides would provide active channels for bilateral cooperation 
on, information exchange and materials pertaining to economic development 
policies.**** In March 1996, Russia and South Korea signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding to crack down on the illegal trafficking of narcotics and 
psychotropic substances between the two countries.*** In June 1996, Russia and 
South Korea held talks about signing a mutual legal assistance treaty involving 
criminal matters such as drug and arms trafficking.**^
The reasons why there were no significant political and military treaties 
concluded between the two sides during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96) were as 
follows. First and foremost, after the December 1995 parliamentary election, 
the Russian leadership attempted more vigorously to improve bilateral relations 
with North Korea.**^ Indeed, the looming Russian presidential election meant 
that the Russian leadership needed to demonstrate its good relations with 
former allies such as North Korea in order to sustain its major power status in 
Northeast Asia. In other words, to gain ground in the presidential election, each 
Russian candidate had to emphasise good relations with countries over which
Russian foreign ministry Asia department and director of the Korean foreign ministry European 
department, Russian foreign ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin said. The officials discussed 
prospects of agreements on mutual trips of citizens, on juridical assistance in civil, family, and criminal 
cases, on currency and export contr ol, and on protection of intellectual property (‘Moscow, Seoul Plan 
to Improve Bilateral Legal Basis’, Interfax, 30 January 1996 in FBIS-SOV 96-021, 31 January 1996, p. 
22).
The Korea Times (Seoul), 27 February 1996, p. 8.
The Korea Times (Seoul), 22 March 1996, p. 9.
‘ROK, Russia Initial Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty’, Yonhap, 14 June 1996 in FBIS-EAS 96-118, 
14 June 1996.
The December 1995 parliamentary election confirmed the continuing str ength of the conservative- 
nationalists who constantly rebuked the Yeltsin administration for its emasculated foreign policy. On 
the Korean peninsula, pro-North Korean forces came up to the front after the December 1995 
parliamentary election in full. Indeed, across a broad spectrum of society one found the feeling that 
improved relations with North Korea would enlrance Russia’s position on the Korean peninsula. As 
Valentin Moiseev, deputy director of the first Asian department of the ministry of foreign affairs of 
Russia, believed that the trend of a constructive restoration of bilateral ties with the former Soviet 
Union’s allies was more actively bolstered after the December 1995 parliamentary election, together
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the former Soviet Union had exercised its superpower status during the Soviet 
era.
Another significant reason for the limitation of the political and military 
relations between the two sides during this period was the US and South 
Korean-led ‘four-party talks’/*"* in which South Korea and the US set a new 
rule for dealing with North Korea while excluding again Russia (and Japan) in 
the building of a new peace regime on the Korean peninsula.**^ This repeatedly 
demonstrated the limitations of Russian-South Korean cooperation in both the 
political and military arenas while the US and South Korea solidified their 
military alliance once again on the basis of the 1953 US-South Korean 
Treaty.**^ In turn, South Korea displayed its dissatisfaction with Russia’s policy 
of expanding and raising the level of political, economic and cultural ties 
between Russia and North Korea.
Relations between Russia and South Korea were undergoing an endurance 
test during this period. Russia only proved its incapability to conduct an 
effective foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula. The partnership with 
South Korea was still extremely shaky.
with the appomtment of Primakov as a Russian foreign minister at an early date in 1996 (Valentin 
Moiseev, ‘On the Korean Settlement’, International Affairs [Moscow], vol. 43, no. 3, 1997, p. 67).
Kim Young-sam and Bill Clinton put forward a four-party (two Koreas, China and the US) peace 
proposal on 16 April 1996. For the details of this, see Chapter 6.
In the middle of April 1996, North Korea sent forces into the Joint Security Area (JSA) in the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in violation of the armistice heaty which has maintained peace and stability 
on the Korean peninsula for the past four decades. To maximise the effects of the provocation, the 
North violated the DMZ just days before the parliamentary elections in the South. As regards the ‘four- 
paity talks’, Yevgeniy Primakov stated that ‘relations between Moscow and Seoul are “growing 
pains’” (‘Primakov Comments on Talks with South Korean Counterpart’, Itar-Tass, 7 May 1996 in 
FBIS-SOV 96-090, 7 May 1996), At the inauguration evening of the Korea-Russia Culture Council in 
March 1996, Kunadze also stated that ‘it is important for Koreans to know that Russia is one of the 
greatest countries in the world... Problems are temporary; Russia is forever’ (‘MNU Minister, Russian 
Envoy Inaugurate Culture Council’, Yonhap, 25 March 1996 in FBIS-EAS 96-058, 25 March 1996).
During an interview with Seoid Shinmun, South Korean defence minister Yi Yang-ho stated that 
‘our military has established a firm defense posture by maintaining a perfect posture for an all-out war 
and by developing the ROK-US combined defense posture’. He went on argue that ‘following the end 
of the Cold War, international relations have become more complicated. The situation in neighboring 
counhies is changeable, and conflicts have become diverse, amplifying uncertainty. Based on the 
ROK-US alliance, we will diversify military diplomacy and increase cooperation with neighboring 
countries, including Japan, the PRC and Russia, in order to guarantee national interests’ {Seoul 
Shinmun [Seoul], 12 February 1996 p. 5).
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Chapter 5
Russia and Regional Security Cooperation 
in Northeast Asia:
Focusing on the Issue o f the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
5.1. From a Principal Player to a Major Mediator? (1985-91)
The Soviet Union demonsti'ated little interest in creating or participating in 
regional security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) during the Cold 
War era. Instead, it seemed to focus on concluding bilateral treaties such as the 
Soviet-North Korean Treaty, the Soviet-Chinese Treaty and the Soviet- 
Mongolian Treaty in order to maintain its politico-security influence against the 
US in Northeast Asia.* This meant that, although the Soviet Union was 
reluctant to extend a multilateral alliance comprising pro-American countries of 
the region (the so-called ‘triangular Washington-Tokyo-SeouT relationship),^ it 
did not seem to have a pressing reason to develop regional security cooperation 
with other communist countiies in this region. In reality, the Soviet Union was 
an absolute superpower based on its militaiy [nuclear] capabilities directed
' On Soviet-Chinese treaty relations, see M. L. Titarenko, ed., 40 let KNR (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), pp. 
110-124 and 358-371. On Soviet-Mongolian treaty relations, see G. F. and P. Luvsandorzh, eds., 
Istoriia sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki MNR (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), pp. 91-98 and 196-202. For the 
details of Soviet-North Korean treaty relations, see Chapter 3.
 ^During the Cold War era, security in the entire Northeast Asian region was maintained on the basis of 
a network of bilateral security arrangements with the US playing the central role. Unlike Europe, no 
region-wide security regime was created in Northeast Asia. The security dimension was worse than the 
economic dimension. There was nothing like an Northeast Asian-region equivalent of the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE: fomierly CSCE). See Dong-yoon Shin, Korea-US- 
Japan Security Cooperation (Maxwell AFB, Ala: Air War College, Air University, 1983).
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towards the Korean peninsula and its provision of military equipment to North 
Korea during the Cold War era.^
As regards the nuclear issue in Northeast Asia, the Soviet Union primarily 
regarded the Korean peninsula as a potential nuclear threat to its security 
interests in the Soviet Far East due to both its geographical proximity to the 
Korean peninsula as the Map 5.1 shows and its ideological struggle against the 
US in the region.
Map 5.1 Russia’s Geographical Proximity to the Korean Peninsula
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 ^ For the details of Soviet armed forces during the Cold War era, see M. M. Kiriyana, ed., Voenno- 
tekhnicheskiiprogress i vooruzhennye sily SSSR (Moscow: Voeimoe Izdatel’stvo, 1982); A. I, Sorokin, 
ed., Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily v usloviiakh razvitogo sotsializma (Moscow: Nauka, 1985); and F. 
Scott and W. F. Scott, The Armed Forces o f the USSR, 4"’ ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1989). For the details of how Soviet militaiy power developed during the Cold War era, see A. A. 
Babakov, Vooruzhennye sily SSSR posle voiny: 1945-1986 gg. (Moscow: Voemioe Izdatel’stvo, 1987).
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This led the Soviet Union to view the nuclear challenge as emanating not 
from North Korea’s secret activities, but rather from the presence of the US 
nuclear weapons in South Korea."^
For this reason, the Soviet Union helped Noifh Korea to create a solid 
base for a coincidence of their mutual interests in both the strategic and 
ideological spheres on the Korean peninsula. On the one hand, the Soviet Union 
became a principal supplier of the North Korean nuclear programmes from the 
1950s onwards.^ For example, under the cooperation agreement concluded 
between the Soviet Union and North Korea, a nuclear research centre was 
constructed near the small town of Yongbyon. In 1965 a Soviet IRT-2M 
research reactor was assembled for this centre. From 1965 through to 1973 fuel 
enriched to 10 per cent was supplied to North Korea for this reactor. In early 
1980s, with Soviet assistance. North Korea was able to construct a 5 megawatt- 
electric (Mwe) gas-cooled, graphite moderated nuclear reactor. Fuelled with 
natural uranium, this reactor became operational in 1986.^ North Korea had a 
total of 250 researchers trained at the Dubna Institute.^ As a result, all the 
nuclear facilities in North Korea were built primarily with technological 
assistance from the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. On the other hand,
The North Korean nuclear arms programme probably dated back to the experience of the Korean War 
(1950-53), during the course of which the US issued massive nuclear threats against North Korea. 
Faced with this threat, North Korea appeared to display a keen interest in nuclear weapons. For more 
detailed discussion of North Korea’s motivation for nuclear developments, see Roger Dingman, 
‘Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War’, International Security, vol. 13, no. 3, Winter 1988/89, 
pp. 50-91; Michael J. Mazarr, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Programme: the World Responds, 1989-1992’, 
Korea and World Affairs, vol. 16, no. 2, 1992, pp. 295-297; Curtis A. Gayle, ‘Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation and Lessons from the Korean Example’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 17, no. 1, 1993, 
pp. 45-56; and Hans W. Maull, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme: Genesis, Motives, 
Implications’, Aussenpolitik, vol. 45, no. 4, 1994, pp. 354-356. For details of the history of the US- 
Soviet confrontation over nuclear weapons between the mid-1940s and late 1970s (including the issue 
of nuclear non-proliferation in the world, the US-USSR nuclear talks and the USSR peace initiative), 
see A. A. Roshchin, Mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnost' i iadernoe razoruzhenie (Moscow: 
Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1980).
’ For the details of Soviet nuclear forces and facilities, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Deterrence and the 
Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1990), pp. 71-80; 
V. P. Vizgin, ed., Istoriia sovetskogo atomnogo proekta (Moscow: Yanus-K, 1998); and N. Simonov, 
Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR v 1920-1950-e gody (Moscow: Rosspen, 1996), Chapters 5 and 
6 .
 ^Komsomol'skaia pravda, 13 July 1994, p. 3.
 ^Kyunghyang Shinmun (Seoul), 29 April 1991, p. 13.
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the Soviet Union and North Korea often demanded that the US withdraw its 
nuclear weapons from South Korea.
This clearly demonstrated that the Soviet Union was the sole leading 
power which could influence North Korea’s nuclear programmes within the 
framework of its regional security policy in Northeast Asia.^ In a word, the 
Soviet Union had an absolute dominance over the Korean peninsula in terms of 
security/nuclear matters against the US in Northeast Asia during the Cold War 
era (from 1945 up to 1984).
However, Soviet security policy and the North Korean nuclear issue 
began to change with Gorbachev’s coming to power in 1985. Gorbachev 
attempted to define a new Soviet role in the APR and launched a new approach 
to the problems of regional security and bilateral relations with the USSR’s 
Asian neighbours.^ In this context, the Soviet Union began to seek to cooperate 
with Western powers in international affairs on the basis of his New Political 
Thinking.
It should be emphasised that Gorbachev’s regional security policy in the 
APR centred around his proposals for a collective security system in Asia.’  ^ By
® For the details of Soviet regional security policy in the APR during the Cold War era, see I. I. 
Kovalenko, Sovetskii Soiuz v bor'be za mir i kollektivnuiu bezopasnost’ v Azii (Moscow: Nauka, 1976); 
Noel Gayler, ‘Security Implications of the Soviet Military Presence in Asia’, in Richard H. Solomon, 
ed., Asian Security in the 1980s: Problems and Policies for a Time o f Transition (Cambridge, MA: 
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1980); Hhoshi Kimura, ‘Soviet Strategy in Northeast Asia’, Problems o f 
Communistn, vol. 35, no. 5, 1981, pp. 71-76; Kurt Radtke, ‘Global Shategy and Northeast Asia’, 
Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 1983, pp. 59-75; and Donald Zagoria, ‘The Soviet 
Union’s Military-Political Shategy in the Far East’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 19, no. 2, 1986, pp. 
62-73.
® For a detailed account of Gorbachev’s regional security policy in the APR, see Richard Solomon and 
Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Nuclear Build-up: Nuclear Dilemjnas and Asian Security 
(London: Croom Helm, 1986); Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: Documents and Materials 
(Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1988); Rajan Menon, ‘New Political Thinking and 
Northeast Asian Security’, Problems o f Communism, vol. 38, no. 2, 1989, pp. 1-29; Mikhail Nossov, 
‘The USSR and the Security of the Asia-Pacific Region’, Asian Survey, vol. 29, no. 3, 1989, pp. 252- 
267; Yu-nam Kim, ‘Pereshoika and the Security of the Korean Peninsula’, The Korean Journal o f 
Defence Analysis, vol. 1, no. 1, 1989, pp. 145-165; and V. Vorontsov and A. Muradyan, ‘APR 
Security: Concepts and Reality’, Far Eastern Affairs, no. 6, 1990, pp. 3-9.
For example, the cooperation of the two superpowers during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 confirmed 
how far they had moved from rivalry to reconciliation. See Alvin Rubinstein, ‘Moscow and the Gulf 
War: Decisions and Consequences’, International Journal, vol. 49, no. 2, 1994, pp. 301-327.
' ' For the first time in the speech in which Gorbachev welcomed Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi to 
Moscow on 21 May 1985, and for the second time in his Vladivostok address on 28 July 1986,
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returning to the basic idea of Brezhnev’s Asian collective security system/^ 
Gorbachev sought to bring stability and predictability to international relations 
in the region and to play a significant role in determining the future security 
architecture of the region. Indeed, Gorbachev attempted to take the initiative on 
regional security cooperation, although his attempts at policy change on the 
regional security front were eventually aimed at developing domestic reforms. 
For instance, Gorbachev proposed massive disarmament measures including 
unilateral military cuts, and actively sought détente with the US in Europe as 
well as in the APR. This approach formed the core of New Political Thinking 
and provided a fundamental reason for changing Soviet external behaviour. 
This redefinition in turn brought about revisions in the traditional Soviet 
concept of security (absolute security) and produced new concepts such as 
‘common security’, ‘reasonable security’ and ‘defensive defence
As regards the North Korean nuclear issue, there were inevitably gradual 
changes of Soviet position during the Gorbachev era on the basis of New 
Political Thinking. For example, upon discovering that North Korea was 
building a reactor, the US asked the Soviet Union to urge North Korea to join
Gorbachev proposed to hold an all-Asian (and Pacific) fomm on security. For the details of his 
proposals, see In. V. Vanin, ed., SSSR i Koreia (Moscow: Glavnaia redaktsiia vostoclinoi literatury, 
1988), pp. 320-324.
During the Brezhnev era, the Soviet Union already called for an Asian collective security system. 
Thus, the origins of Soviet proposals for an Asian collective security can be traced back to the 
Brezluiev’s era. Brezlmev’s Asian collective security strategy system was first mooted in 1969. See 
Abdul G. Noorani, Brezhnev Plan for Asian Security: Russia in Asia (Bombay: Jaico Pub. House, 
1975); A. D. Nikonov, ed., Problemy voennoi razriadki (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), pp. 234-259; and O. 
A. Amirov, A. P. Astaf ev, M. lu. Babichev et al., Politika sily Hi sila razuma? (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
politicheskoi literatury, 1989), pp. 393-404. On the difference between Brezlmev’s Asian security 
proposal and Gorbachev’s, see Elisabeth Wislmick, ‘Soviet Asian Collective Security Policy from 
Brezlmev to Gorbachev’, Jom vm/ o f Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 7, no. 3, 1988, pp. 3-28; and Bilveer 
Singh, ‘The Soviet Asian Collective Security System: from Brezhnev to Gorbachev’, Sino-Soviet 
Affairs (Seoul), vol. 12, no. 2, 1988, pp. 169-187.
For a more detailed analysis of New Political Thinking and Soviet regional security in the APR, see 
Michael MccGwire, Perestroika and Soviet National Security (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1991); William T. Tow, ‘Post-Cold War Security in East Asia’, The Pacific Review, vol. 4, 
no. 2, 1991, pp. 97-108; and William Crow Jr. and Alan D. Romberg, ‘Rethinking Security in the 
Pacific’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2, 1991, pp. 123-140.
"  For details of Gorbachev’s nuclear policy, see Daniel Calingaert, Soviet Nuclear Policy under 
Gorbachev: a Policy o f Disarmament (London and New York: Praeger, 1991).
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the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (henceforth, NPT).’^  North Korea finally 
joined the NPT in December 1985, persuaded to do so by the Soviet Union. 
The US also requested the Soviet Union to urge North Korea to allow a 
comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA)'^ safeguards 
inspection in 1984.^^
When requested by the US, Soviet officials seemed to have two tactics to 
persuade North Korea to accept their demands. First, the Soviet Union warned 
that four light-water reactors promised by party leader Konstantin Chernenko a 
year earlier would not be forthcoming unless North Korea complied. Secondly, 
the Soviet Union noticed that North Korea’s acceptance of an IAEA safeguards 
inspection would help to persuade the US to withdraw its nuclear weapons from 
South K orea.Furtheim ore, the Soviet Union also attempted to use economic 
pressure to force North Korea to comply with the proposed IAEA inspection.
Suspicions of North Korea’s nuclear weapon programme became a thorny 
issue in the international arena from the late 1980s.^® North Korea was 
suspected of having removed fuel containing enough plutonium for one or two
By 1984, a US reconnaissance satellite had detected the constraction of a second and larger Soviet- 
style reactor at Yongbyon (Joseph Bermudez, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Programme’, Jane's Intelligence 
Review, September 1991, p. 409). For a more detailed explanation of the origins of the non­
proliferation treaty, see John Simpson, ‘Global non-proliferation Policies: Retrospect and Prospect’, 
Review o f International Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 1982, pp. 69-72.
North Korea joined the IAEA in September 1974, but did not accede to the ‘NPT’ until December 
1985. The NPT has strengthened the IAEA safeguard system. The NPT entered in force from March 
1970. The treaty obliges all parties to refrain from facilitating the acquisition of nuclear explosives. For 
more detailed explanation of the origins of the NPT, see Georges Fischer, The Non-Proliferation o f 
Nuclear Weapon (London: Europa Publications, 1971), pp. 3-18.
The IAEA was founded in 1957 as an international agency attached to the UN as a result of the 
‘Atomic for Peace’ proposal initiated by US President Eisenliower in 1953. This UN agency, with 
headquarters in Vienna, has two main objectives. It is designed to promote the civilian uses of nuclear 
energy and work to prevent the use of nuclear technology or fuels for arms production. For a more 
detailed account of the IAEA non-proliferation and safeguards, see IAEA Safeguards: Aims, Limitation, 
Achievements (Viemia: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1983).
Mazarr-, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Programme’, p. 295.
Selig S. Harrison, ‘Tire North Korean Nuclear Crisis: from Stalemate to Breakthrough’, Arms 
Control Today, vol. 24, no. 9, 1994, p. 19.
Jin-hyun Park divided North Korea’s rruelear development into four periods as follows: (1) first 
phase: nuclear issue emerged (Febrirar-y 1989-August 1991); (2) second phase: basic framework agreed 
(September 1991-February 1992); (3) third phase: implementation and exposure (March 1992- 
Febr-uary 1993); and (4) fourth phase: crisis and the impasse (March 1993-) (Jin-hyun Park, ‘Nuclear 
Conundrum: Analysis and Assessment of Two Korea’s Policy Regarding the Nuclear Issue’, Korea 
and World Affairs, vol. 17, no. 4, 1993, pp. 629-635).
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bombs for its nuclear-weapons programme. However, North Korea vigorously 
denied any plan to build nuclear weapons, saying it was seeking only to build a 
peaceful power industry to generate electricity. Consequently, in February
1989, North Korea’s nuclear programme started to emerge as an important 
policy issue facing South Korea, as well as the international community, when 
the Board of Governors of the IAEA raised the issue of North Korea’s delay in 
endorsing a ‘safeguards agreement’.^ ^
Faced with this situation, the Soviet Union redoubled its efforts to 
persuade North Korea to renounce its nuclear programme. For example, the 
Soviet Union stopped supplying nuclear fuels to North Korea in September
1990.^  ^ Thereafter, North Korea sought to accelerate its nuelear programme 
independently.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that during Gorbachev’s early period (at 
least, up to the 19‘’’ Party Conference in the middle of 1988) the Soviet 
leadership basically still supported the North Korean side over its nuclear 
programme, although they did not want either North Korea or South Korea to 
become a nuclear pow er.G orbachev’s position on the nuclear issue on the 
Korean peninsula in the period fi'om 1985 up to the middle of 1988 can be 
summed up as follows: (1) US nuclear weapons had to be immediately
It should be mentioned that North Korea did not enter into an NPT safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA until 1992, more than 6 years after joining the NPT. Furtheimore, North Korea had placed 
several political conditions on its acceptance of safeguards agreement, including a demand that US 
nuclear weapons be withdrawn from South Korea and a request that the amiual joint US-South Korea 
military exercise [Team Spirit] be cancelled. See Park, ‘Nuclear Conundmm’, pp. 627-647.
Seoul Shinmun (Seoul), 11 July 1991, p. 5.
For example, in January 1986, Gorbachev put forward an ambitious programme to eliminate the 
weapons of mass destiuction including nuclear armaments all over the world before the year 2000. 
However, in the same month, Eduard Shevardnadze, Soviet foreign minister, paid an official visit to 
Nortli Korea and emphasised the necessity for wide cooperation between all socialist countiies, 
including North Korea, in the international arena aimed at nuclear disarmament and counteraction to 
‘imperialist policies’ in that sphere. Those appeals met with a favourable response on the part of North 
Korean leaders. In the course of negotiations in North Korea, Kim Il-sung shessed his full support for 
the Soviet programme and proposed to launch a joint struggle for its full and early implementation 
{Pravda, 22 January 1986, p. 3). Having visited Moscow in October 1986, Kim Il-sung also reaffirmed 
his position and also welcomed the Soviet idea on converting the APR into a nuclear-free zone. 
Commenting on the result of Kim Il-sung’s tour of the Soviet Union, Rodong Shinmun stated that ‘the 
Soviet side fully supported the efforts of North Korea aimed at the withdrawal of the US troops and
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withdrawn from the Korean peninsula as demanded by North Korea; (2) North 
Korea’s proposal on the setting up of a nuclear-free zone fully coincided with 
Soviet policy goals and was seen as a potentially valuable contribution to 
setting up an Asian security system; and (3) the Soviet Union in its status as a 
nuclear power was ready to become the guarantor of a nuclear-free zone.
With the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union 
and South Korea in 1990, the search for a solution to the North Korean nuclear 
problem entered a new phase. At last, South Korea established a ‘direct’ 
negotiation channel with the Soviet Union and the subject of the nuclear 
problem on the Korean peninsula assumed a prominent place on the agenda of 
bilateral and regional discussions as one the most pressing issues. For example, 
in December 1990, when South Korean President Roh Tae-woo paid an official 
visit to the Soviet Union, the two sides for the first time found themselves able 
to exchange opinions on North Korea’s nuclear problem at the highest level. 
Nevertheless, this did not mean that Soviet Union had started to support the 
South Korean side fully regarding the development of nuclear weapons while 
entirely neglecting the North Korean factor.^^
During the very last stages of the Soviet era (1991), Soviet policy with 
respect to the North Korean nuclear issue underwent fundamental changes, in 
the direction of support for the policies of South Korea and a rather indifferent 
attitude towards North Korea’s clandestine nuclear activities. In the course of
nuclear armaments from South Korea and the tiansition of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear free 
zone’ {Rodong Shinmun [Pyongyang], 28 October 1986, p. 3).
At the summit, the Soviet Union agreed not to cooperate in North Korea’s atomic power projects as a 
retaliation for the latter’s refusal to comply with the full-scope safeguard agreement of the IAEA {The 
Korea Herald [Seoul], 16 December 1990, p. 3).
For example, Gorbachev expressed the view tliat it would be incorrect to regard the North Korean 
nuclear issue as the sole problem, arguing that it should be dealt with in a broader context, as a part of 
efforts aimed at making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, as proposed by North Korea. 
Accordingly, Gorbachev expressed his full support for the initiative to resolve the North Korean 
nuclear issue and raised the question of the US military presence in Korea {Izvestiia, 16 December 
1990, p. 5). Also, in September 1990, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze after persuading 
North Korea to accept IAEA inspections at its nuclear facilities, still assured North Korean leaders that 
the Soviet Union would continue to support North Korea’s basic ideas about setting up a nuclear-free 
zone on the Korean peninsula and would raise the question of the US nuclear presence in his contacts 
with the US {Izvestiia, 12 September 1990, p. 5).
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Gorbachev’s visit to Japan, in April 1991, for instance, Gorbachev for the first 
time explicitly expressed his dissatisfaction with North Korea’s non- 
compliance with its international obligations in the nuclear sphere.^'’ Boris 
Pankin, who had succeeded Shevardnadze as Soviet foreign minister, also 
revealed on 1 October 1991 that the Soviet Union had urged North Korea to 
sign the nuclear safeguards accord at an early date and stated that it would 
continue to urge North Korea to do soY
In summary, the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era was the only 
supeipower which could exercise a continuous and significant influence over 
the North Korean nuclear issue, although its position had gradually changed 
from a pro-North Korean to a pro-South Korean policy on the basis of the 
Soviet leader’s New Political Thinking. That was Gorbachev’s active Korean 
policy within the framework of Soviet regional security policy based on his 
reform policies. It is notable that the regional security agenda was led and 
changed by Gorbachev’s policies rather than those of others.
5.2. In Search of a Regional Security Partnership Relations? (Dec. 91-Dec. 
93)
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s basic regional security policy 
in Northeast Asia emphasised cooperation with the West and its neighbour 
states in the region as Gorbachev had done during the late Soviet era.^  ^ Based 
on this assumption, for example, in early 1992 the Russian foreign ministry
See Yorniuri Shinbun (Tokyo), 20 April 1991, p. 3. 
Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 3 October 1991, p. 5.
For the details of the regional security cooperation between Russia and the US during the early years 
of Russian foreign policy, see Victor Mironov, ‘Russia’s National Security Military Doctrine and the 
Outlook for Russian-US Cooperation in tlie Modern World’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 13, no. 1, 
1994, pp. 49-54; and A. G. Arbatov, ed., Rossiia: v poiskakh strategii bezopasnosti (Moscow: Nauka, 
1996), pp. 305-319. For Russia’s basic regional security policy, see also Russian militaiy doctrine. For 
the full text of the Russian military doctrine, see Izvestiia, 18 November 1993. For the details of 
general debate of the Russian military dochine, see V. V. Serebriannikov, et al., Bezopasnost’ Rossii i 
armiia (Moscow: RAN, 1995).
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submitted to the parliament a document which contained the statement that 
‘Russia sees no state as hostile to it and will not use force for any puipose other 
than defence. Russia will seek partnership with the civilised world’.
Despite these pro-Western principles, however, the security situation in 
the APR was still characterised by a substantial number of elements of 
uncertainty. Especially, there was a continuation of the danger of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and of a new amis race in the 
region.^® In this context, the problem of the nuclear issue on the Korean 
peninsula continued to be a serious challenge to the regional security interests 
of neighbouring states, including Russia, during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).^  ^
Finally, the confrontation between North Korea and the IAEA over the nuclear 
issue raised the spectre of war in Northeast Asia and posed an unprecedented 
challenge to the NPT.
‘Committees Reviewing Foreign Policy Priorities’, Interfax^ 21 February 1992 in FBÏS-SOV 92-037, 
25 February 1992, p. 51. However, the views expressed in the Russian foreign ministiy’s document 
were apparently too moderate for the Russian parliament’s increasingly vocal national-patriotic faction. 
Finally, at the middle of June 1992, the document was rejected by Russian parliamentarians as being 
insufficiently ‘concrete’ and ignoring the question of with which countiies Russia enjoyed good or bad 
relations. Reacting to this, the Russian foreign ministry denied the allegations it has no concept. 
Addressmg Russian parliamentarians, deputy foreign minister Kunadze said that he wanted to 
contradict the statement and continued to say that Russian foreign policy was composed of the 
ministry’s daily efforts and long-term diplomatic practice (‘Foreign Ministry Denies Having No 
Concept’, Itar-Tass, 17 June 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-119, 19 June 1992, p. 51).
In fact, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought more uncertainty to the APR because of the 
presence of historical tensions in Northeast Asia. The inability of Russia to play a significant role in the 
post-Soviet era meant that the APR was left with the US. Thus, given the deep uncertainties about the 
reform and the current leadership, there could be little optimism about Russia in the APR. See Gerald 
Segal, ‘Russia as an Asian-Pacific Power’, in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds.. Reshaping 
Regional Relations: Asia-Pacific and the Former Soviet Union (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 
1993), pp. 65-83.
North Korea seemed to have three nuclear reactor facilities. The first reactor facility was built in 
1965 with the help of the Soviet Union. This was a science-oriented facility. The remaining two were 
built with North Korea’s own resources. No foreigner has ever discovered the functions of these 
reactor facilities. Belayev, reporter of the radio station who has lived in North Korea for nearly 10 
years, wrote that in view of this nation’s teclmology level, it was hard to believe that nuclear weapons 
had been developed at these facilities (‘DPRK’s Ability to Make Nuclear Arms Viewed’, Radio 
Moscow, 8 January 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-006, 9 January 1992, p. 4). Russia’s external intelligence 
service, in its first such expose, disclosed that North Korea was developing nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons. The former KGB made the disclosure in a 130-page intelligence report, entitled ‘A 
Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons Is a New Challenge in the Post-Cold War Era’. North 
Korea had been working for many years on the development of nuclear as well as chemical and 
biological weapons. The purpose of their development was military application, the report said, 
Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the external intelligence service told a press conference he did not
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The crisis of the North Korean nuclear issue during this period (Dec. 91- 
Dec. 93) developed in the following way. On 30 January 1992, North Korea 
finally signed and subsequently ratified the safeguards agreement for IAEA 
inspections as provided for in the NPT. This set the wheels in motion for six 
official inspections of Yongbyon fac ilities.(S ee  Map 5.2.)
Map 5.2 Yongbyon in the Korean Peninsula
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believe North Korea ‘currently possesses’ a nuclear bomb though it had the ‘potential’ to develop one 
(‘DPRK Weapons Plan’, Yofihap, 29 Januaiy 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-018, 29 January 1993, pp. 13-14).
In fact, in the middle of Januaiy 1992, North Korean ambassador Son Song-pil told a news 
conference at the Nortli Korean embassy in Moscow that North Korea would sign a safeguards 
agreement to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the end of Januaiy (1992) (‘DPRK 
to Sign Non-proliferation Agreement’, Moscow Tass, 9 January 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-006, 9 Januaiy 
1992, p. 3). For the details of North Korea and the NPT, see Gayle, ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Lessons’, pp. 46-56.
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In February 1992, North Korean representatives meeting with the IAEA in 
Vienna initialled an inspections agreement. The director of the IAEA, Hans 
Blix, visited Yongbyon and the first IAEA inspection team arrived in May
1992. But, in the first half of 1992, the process collapsed. North Korea’s 
decision to stall was a result of it having received few benefits for its 
cooperation once inspections were underway. Alternatively conceived, the 
North Korean government might also have sought to buy time to complete 
work on one or more nuclear w e a p o n s . I n  June 1992, the first inspections 
under this agreement commenced. The IAEA analysed plutonium samples in 
July 1992 and test results from the North Korean ‘hot cells’ (laboratory-scale 
reprocessing units). The IAEA then concluded that North Korea must have 
reprocessed on at least three separate occasions in 1989, 1990 and 1991, but 
North Korea denied this charge. In February 1993, during its sixth visit to 
North Korea, the IAEA was refused permission to inspect two sites at the 
Yongbyon facility. North Korea rejected the IAEA’s intention to cany out a 
special inspection of two military installations on its territoiy.^"  ^On 25 February
1993, the IAEA Board of Governors formally demanded that North Korea 
permit a ‘Special Inspection’ - a visit to a site where the presence of undeclared 
or diverted fissile material was suspected.^^
Nonetheless, on 12 March 1993, North Korea made a decision to 
withdraw from the NPT ‘as a measure to defend its national i n t e r e s t s O n  1 
April 1993, the IAEA referred the dispute to the UN Secretary Council, which 
was charged with dealing with violations of IAEA safeguards. On 10 May 
1993, the Security Council passed a resolution calling for North Korea to stay
Michael J. Mazarr, ‘Going Just a Little Nuclear: Non-proliferation Lessons from North Korea’, 
International Security, vol. 20, no. 2, 1995, p. 95.
According to the North Korean ambassador in Moscow, Son Song-pil, ‘if such a decision is 
nonetheless taken, Pyongyang reserves the right to take corresponding countermeasures’ (‘DPRK 
Ambassador Rejects IAEA Plan to Monitor Sites’, Itar-Tass, 15 February 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-029, 
16 Febmary 1993, p. 14).
North Korea insisted that it was not in position to accept the demands of the IAEA for special 
inspections as the IAEA put forward on the basis of intelligence data obtained from ‘a third party’ 
which above all was hostile to North Korea.
See North Korea News, no. 675, 22 March 1993, pp. 3-4; and Izvestiia, 13 March 1993, p. 3.
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in the NPT and comply with IAEA safeguards, though no penalties for non- 
compliance were speeified. The resolution passed with no votes against (though 
China and Pakistan abstained). North Korea rejected the resolution as 
interference in its internal affairs. The Korean peninsula was in nuclear crisis. 
On 11 June 1993, one day before the three-month notice period ended. North 
Korea announced that it would suspend its withdrawal from the NPT for as 
long as was necessaiy. Thereafter, the Korean peninsula remained under the 
shadow of imminent war between November 1993 and June 1994 before the 
preliminary framework agreement between the US and North Korea was put on 
the negotiating table in June 1994,
Faeed with the North Korean nuclear issue, Russian officials basically 
regarded it as a threat not only to South Korea and the US, but also to Russia 
itself because Russia’s primary objective during the early period of its foreign 
policy was to avoid an international confrontation, and to preserve regional 
stability in the region.^^
Thus, on 12 March 1993 when North Korea announced that it would 
withdraw fiom the NPT, Russia immediately urged North Korea to commit 
itself again to the NPT and to accept the IAEA request for a special inspection 
of the two suspected nuclear facilities near Yongbyon within the framework of 
cooperation with the West and South Korea.^^ The Russian media even labelled 
North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT an ‘unacceptable act of
”  Russian first deputy minister for nuclear energy Vitaliy Konovalov stated that ‘North Korea recently 
(1992) offered Russia to resume cooperation in nuclear engineering, suspended in the second half of 
the eighties... To resume such cooperation with North Korea, it is necessary to observe two 
preconditions - it must yield commercial benefit to Russia, and Pyongyang must scrupulously observe 
all the rules and standards of the IAEA. If such cooperation is resumed, it will include Russia’s 
participation in the construction of several atomic power plants in North Korea’ (‘Official Considers 
Conditions for Resuming Nuclear Cooperation with DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 27 November 1992 in FBIS- 
SOV 92-229, 27 November 1992, p. 7).
The same day (North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT) Russian ministry of foreign affairs issued a 
statement expressing deep concern about the decision. Maintaining that Russia was not in a position to 
remain indifferent to any step undermining tlie global NPT regime, Moscow called upon Pyongyang to 
thoroughly weigh up the possible consequences of its action and reconsider its decision to withdraws 
from the NPT {Izvestiia, 13 March 1993, p. 3). Furthermore, Russia made a decision to stop its nuclear 
support to North Korea during this period. For example, Russia made eight Russian scientists working
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adventurism’.^  ^ Russian foreign minister Kozyrev stated that ‘Russia is using 
all its channels of influence to convince North Korea to revise its decision to 
withdraw from the nuclear NPT’.^ ®^ Also, according to Russian deputy foreign 
minister Grigoriy Berdennikov, ‘North Korea’s declaration of its intention to 
withdraw from the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the first 
precedent of this kind, which threatens to undermine the very regime of the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This decision complicates the situation 
not only in the Far East also in the world as a whole’.
In this respect, it should be noted that some Russian conservatives even 
supported the IAEA’s position on North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT. For 
example, already in September 1992, the Russian parliamentary chairman 
Ruslan Khasbulatov stated that he had also explained to the North Korean 
ambassador his firm position that nuclear weapons should be eradicated from 
the Korean peninsula. The Russian parliament, which was responsible for 
setting foreign policies and implementing them, had already ordered the 
Russian foreign ministry to look into clauses likely to cause trouble in Seoul- 
Moscow relations.
There were two main features of Russia’s actions to resolve the North 
Korean nuclear crisis during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). First, at the regional 
level, Russia supported the IAEA’s decisions and revealed its intention to do all 
it could to prevent such a development on the basis of a key assumption of the
on North Korea’s nuclear development programme return home in May 1993 (‘Diplomacy and Drift’, 
The Bulletin, 5 April 1994, p. 47).
North Korean News, no. 680, 26 April 1993, pp. 3-4.
‘Kozyrev Says Russia Exerting Pressure on DPRK over NPT’, Itar-Tass, 15 April 1993 in FBIS- 
SOV 93-072, 16 April 1993, p. 14. Also, already in November 1992, foreign minister Kozyrev stated 
that Russia, proceeding from its own interests, called on North Korea to join an international 
convention on non-proliferation of chemical weapons and agree to inter-Korean inspections of nuclear 
facilities, ‘such an approach is prompted by the interests of Russia, since it is not interested in the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in this region, just as in all the other ones’ (‘Kozyrev Urges DPRK to 
Agree to Nuclear Inspections’, Itar-Tass, 21 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-226, 23 November 
1992, pp. 15-16).
‘Deputy Foreign Minister on DPRK Nuclear Move’, Moskovskie novosti, no. 15,11 April 1993, p. A 
7 in FBIS-SOV 93-066, 8 April 1993, p. 20.
‘Kliasbulatov: DPRK Treaty Clauses to Be Rejected’, Yonhap, 9 September 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92- 
175, 9 September 1992, p. 15.
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pm-Western approaeh. In doing so, Russia especially attempted to cooperate 
with the US and other western countries concerned, which included the 
exchange of information and closer interaction aimed at elaborating joint steps 
and strategies to cope with the ehallenge/^ For example, in his special 
statement on problems of non-proliferation issued in January 1992, President 
Yeltsin offered his full support for the activities of the IAEA and stressed the 
need for its guarantees to be more e f fec t i ve . In  a similar vein, the ‘Camp 
David’ declaration signed by Yeltsin and Bush on 1 February 1992, whieh was 
one of the first really political significant agreements between Russia and the 
US, implied that the two countries would work together to prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as technologies for their 
produetion."^^ Yeltsin also held talks on the North Korean nuclear issue with 
Clinton at their summit in Vancouver, Canada, in early April 1993. Both 
leaders urged North Korea to return to NPT member sh ip .A couple of weeks 
after North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993, Russia, the US 
and the UK issued a trilateral statement in which they declared that North 
Korea’s intention to leave the NPT might have grave consequences not only for 
peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, but also for security in the Far 
East.^ *^
Secondly, at the bilateral level, the Russian leadership made several 
attempts to influence North Korea in order to persuade it to open up its nuclear
As regards Russia’s role in the North Korean nuclear crisis, Alvin Rubinstein has argued that 
‘although the US has been in the forefront of mobilising international pressure to compel North 
Korea’s adlierence to the NPT and to IAEA inspections, Russia’s tacit support has been important’, 
(Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ‘Russia and North Korea: the End of Alliance?’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 
18, no. 3, 1994, p. 507).
‘Yeltsm Delivers Statement on Disarmament’, Ostankino Television, 29 January 1992 in FBIS-SOV 
92-019, 29 January 1992, p. 2.
Rossiiskaia gazeta, 3 February 1992, p. 3. That clause was reaffirmed in the Charter of Russian-US 
Parhiership and Friendship adopted during Yeltsin’s visit to the US in June 1992.
‘North Korea’s Efforts at Better Relations with Russia Fruitless’, Vintage Point, vol. 16, no. 10, 
1993, p. 18. See also Izvestiia, 6 April 1993, p. 3.
‘We [Russia, the US and the UK] urge North Korea to rehact its statement and to Rilfil its 
obligations toward the Treaty, and its obligations on the guarantees which remain in force. In this 
connection, we firmly support the efforts of the international agency on nuclear energy, aimed at
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development programme based on a key assumption of Russia’s pro-South 
Korean approach towards the Korean peninsula. At the first Russian-South 
Korean summit in Seoul in November 1992, for instance, Yeltsin stated that 
‘Russia fully supports South Korea’s position on the North Korean nuclear 
question’ There were also more direct Russian efforts to avoid an 
international confrontation with North Korea. In January 1992, Igor Rogachev, 
the special envoy of the Russian president, visited North Korea and expressed 
deep concern over its refiisal to sign the safeguards accord. He called for the 
earliest possible settlement of North Korea’s relations with the IAEA through 
the signing and implementation of an agreement on nuclear guarantees
The visit to North Korea of Russian deputy foreign minister Georgiy 
Kunadze in January 1993 was an another major attempt to apply direct pressure 
and to convey Russia’s stance on the issue. At the meeting, Kunadze stated that 
‘We have made it clear to North Korea that we expect it to fully comply with its 
commitments envisaged by the nuclear NPT in particular, concerning the 
agreement with the IAEA on inspections of nuclear objects, and expressed 
concern over possible aggravation of relations between North Korea and the 
lAEA’.^ ® He went on to say that ‘we are naturally extremely interested in, and 
anxious about, the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with 
reference to the Korean peninsula, and this becomes especially topical since the 
signing of the historic START II treaty. While the Great Powers are making the 
decision to cut their nuclear weapons, it is especially important that other 
countries should not begin developing them’.^ ^
implementing its agreement on guarantees with the DPRK’ (‘Statement on DPRK Non-Proliferation 
Treaty Withdrawal’, Itar-Tass, 1 April 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-062, 2 April 1993, pp. 9-10).
Kyunghyang Shinmun (Seoul), 22 November 1992, p. 3.
‘Rogachev, DPRK Talks of Mutual Benefit’, Tass International Service, 18 January 1992 in FBIS- 
SOV 92-013, 21 January 1992, p. 43.
‘Details Nuclear, Military Talks’, Itar-Tass, 1 February 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-020, 2 February 1993, 
p. 9.
‘Kunadze Arrives in DPRK to Discuss New Ties, Disarmament’, Itar-Tass, 29 January 1993 in 
FBIS-SOV 93-020, 2 February 1993, p. 9.
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Nevertheless, it should be noted here that there seemed no real consensus 
among the Russian leadership regarding the North Korean issue, although 
Russian reformers and conservatives generally supported the IAEA’s position 
as mentioned above. For example, since Yeltsin declared his interest in US- 
Russian joint development of a global system of protection against limited 
nuclear stiikes (GPALS) in Januaiy 1992, it had become evident that there was 
significant opposition to the concept in Russia. In general, opponents of 
Russian reformers believed that such a system was a ploy to obtain Russian 
agreement to abandon the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. They feared also 
that the US would exploit Russian science, that a GPALS system would reduce 
strategic stability, and that it could lead to another arms race.^^ This necessarily 
hindered Russia from pursuing a more consistent [pro-Western] regional 
security policy towards the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia.
In spite of Russia’s diplomatic overtures, both at the regional and bilateral 
level, the situation over the North Korean nuclear issue continued to 
deteriorate. In Februaiy 1993, the IAEA intensified the pressure on North 
Korea with the purpose of gaining access to the two suspicious facilities in 
Yongbyon. Reacting to the IAEA initiative. North Korea took the 
unprecedented step of withdrawing from the NPT on 12 March 1993. Then, 
surprisingly (at least, to the Russian side). North Korea started to negotiate over 
the nuclear issue with the US directly.
This meant that in spite of all the former Soviet Union’s traditional ties 
with North Korea and its position as a power whieh had profound and 
diversified interests in the Korean peninsula, Russia’s real capacity to influence 
developments fell short of all expectations in the post-Soviet era. Rather, a 
number of the above attempts made by the Russian side to exert its influence on 
North Korea to induce it to take a more constmetive stand only resulted in the 
worsening of relations between the two former allies, weakening Russia’s role
Scott McMichael, ‘Russian Opposition to a Joint Global Defense System’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 28, 10 
July 1992, pp. 57-62.
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on the Korean peninsula.^^ According to a Russian newspaper, ‘other powers 
are less willing to view Russia as “an autonomous player” whose interests have 
to be taken into account, although Russia is the only country today to have 
established diplomatic relations with both North and South Korea provides us 
with a unique chance to maintain a constmetive and tangible presence on the 
Korean peninsula, which would be in keeping with both our national interests 
and the tasks of achieving a Korean settlement’
In other words, Russia had to move away from its previous position of 
being a principal actor in the North Korean nuclear issue to that of a 
subordinate player during this period (Dee. 91-Dec. 93). It can also be said that 
Russia’s cooperation with the West during the early years of Russian foreign 
policy proved to be inefficient, and despite the rosy expectations of the Russian 
side in teims of international security cooperation.^^ Instead, Russia had to be 
engaged in a more constmetive way in a US-led regional system after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.^^
Furthermore, it was obvious that high-level bilateral contacts between 
Russia and North Korea did not create an atmosphere for finding ways out of 
the nuclear deadlock. Rather, Russia’s bilateral contacts with North Korea 
revealed the depth of contradiction between the two sides, which made it 
difficult for them to continue a productive political dialogue on the issue during 
this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).
For the discussion of Russia’s role in Northeast Asia, see Tnteresy Rossii i ee novaia roF v Severo- 
vostoclmoi Azii’, in M. L. Titarenko, ed., Rossiia i Vostochnaia Aziia: Voprosy mezhdwiarodnykh i 
?nezhtsivilizatsionnykh otnoshenii (Moscow: Fabula-Kuchkovo pole, 1994), pp. 96-118.
Krasnaia zvezda, 29 July 1992, p. 3,
For the details of the growing differences between Russia and the West in the Far East and their 
implications for US policy, see Peggy F. Meyer, et al., Russian Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific 
Region: Two Views (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1996), pp. 3-22.
It should be noted that the US continued to pursue the same security posture in the APR that it 
adopted at the outset of the Cold War. For example, existing bilateral collective defence aiTangements 
with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines allowed it sufficient the flexibility to apply a 
classical balance-of-power strategy in the region in lieu of its Cold War stiategy of containment.
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In the meantime, it should be also noted that North Korea increasingly 
attempted to use its nuclear programme as a ‘bargaining chip’^^  to remove US 
tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, to end US-South Korean military 
exercises, to elicit a non-nuclear pledge from South Korea, to win upgraded 
talks with the US, and to gain important economic and technical aid from South 
Korea, Japan and the US.^^ In this sense, to a large extent, North Korea 
attempted to utilise its nuclear programme to escape from its international 
isolation and to reduce its reliance on Russia in the post-Soviet era.
Despite Russia’s efforts over the North Korean nuclear issue based on a 
pro-Western and pro-South Korean stance, Russia only proved its 
ineffectiveness in seeking a foreign policy that would influence the North 
Korean nuclear crisis as a regional security issue during the early years of 
Russian foreign policy. Russia was no longer one of the major powers in the 
region, able to pursue an active and consistent policy towards the Korean 
peninsula to maximise its national interests, although it did attempt to do so.^  ^
Indeed, the collapse of the Cold War system reduced Russia’s influence on the 
Korean peninsula to one of the major leading powers in terms of the regional 
security issue. Russia started to be isolated and under pressure in the region.
In these circumstances, how could Russia maintain its influence on the 
North Korean nuclear issue? Was there any substitute for the Russian side in 
any new regional security architecture? This naturally led Russia to attempt to 
look for other ways to become involved in the regional security issue.
”  According to Michael J. MazaiT, it refers to ‘an ubiquitous tool of diplomacy’ (Mazarr, ‘Going Just a 
Little Nuclear’, p. 100).
‘The diminution of Russian support for the North and the de facto removal of the Russian nuclear 
umbrella provided a further incentive for North Korea to persist with its nuclear programme’ (Andrew 
Mack, ‘The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula’, Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 4, 1993, p. 342). For 
an overview of North Korea’s foreign policy with regard to the North Korean nuclear issue in the post- 
Soviet era, see B. C. Koh, ‘Trends in North Korean Foreign Policy’, Journal o f  Northeast Asian 
Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 1994, pp. 61-74.
It should be mentioned that even foreign minister Kozyrev stressed that Russia did not wish to be a 
military superpower, but rather a ‘normal great power’ {Nezavisimaia gazeta, 1 April 1992, p. 3).
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5.3. In Search of a Meaningful Role? (Dec. 93-Dec. 95)
Although Russia had abandoned its pro-Western and pro-South Korean stance 
by the end of 1993, its basic policy on the North Korean nuclear issue remained 
generally consistent for the time being: to keep North Korea in the NPT and to 
force it to carry out its obligations vis-à-vis IAEA inspections during this period 
(Dec. 93-Dec. 95). For example, foreign minister Kozyrev urged North Korea 
on 21 March 1994 to abide by controls on nuclear facilities as imposed under 
the international nuclear safeguard ag reemen t . I n  March 1994, the Russian 
foreign ministry issued a statement that ‘We are prepared to support the 
resolution now under discussion in the UN Security Council appealing to North 
Korea to meet its commitments to the IAEA under the NPT. We will also seek 
decisive action by the Security Council in all other instances where threats of 
nuclear proliferation emerge, without double s t a n d a r d s A l s o ,  according to 
Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International 
Affairs, ‘Russia should increase pressure on North Korea to observe the nuclear 
NPT regime
However, unlike previous years (Dec. 91-Dec. 93), Russia could entrust 
its security and place in the international community only to itself, which 
resulted in marked changes in its regional security policy in the APR.'’^  This 
indicated that, despite Russia’s cooperation with the West and South Korea 
during the early years of Russian foreign policy (Dec. 91-Dec. 93), Russia 
gradually realised that it was being excluded from arrangements made to
® ‘Kozyrev Urges DPRK Compliance’, Kyodo, 21 March 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-054, 21 March 1994,
p. 11.
‘Foreign Minister Seeks Multilateral Solution on DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 24 March 1994 in FBIS-SOV 
94-058, 25 March 1994, p. 3; and Izvestiia, 26 March 1994, p. 3.
‘Lukin Says Russia Should Pressure DPRK on NPT Issue’, Itar-Tass, 2 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94- 
107, 3 June 1994, p. 9.
It must be noted that during this period the principal challenges to Northeast Asian security arose 
from: (1) the stand-off on the Korean peninsula, which tlueatened to initiate regional nuclear 
proliferation; (2) China’s refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, particularly if the latter 
appeared about to declare de jure independence; and (3) the continued dispute between Russia and 
Japan over the ownership of the Northern Territories, which obstmcted Japanese fiscal assistance to 
Russia’s ailing economy. For more detailed analysis of Russia’s post-cold war security agenda and
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monitor the North Korean nuclear issue and took this as a sign of US and, to a 
lesser degree, South Korean, Chinese and Japanese neglect of Russia’s interests 
on the Korean peninsula.
In these circumstances, after the December 1993 Russian parliamentary 
election, Russia more actively attempted to find a meaningful role in solving 
the North Korean nuclear issue. To this end, Russia took two major steps; (1) it 
advocated a multilateral conference; and (2) it declared its intention to 
participate in the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO).
Since March 1994, Russia has actively proposed on many occasions that 
the North Korean nuclear crisis should be resolved within the framework of a 
multilateral international conference in accordance with the ‘six plus two’ 
formula (attended by China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, the US, 
representatives of the UN Secretary General and the IAEA Director General). 
In this context, in March 1994, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement 
to the effect that ‘We propose using a multilateral approach, which could be 
centied an international conference attended by China, Japan, North Korea, 
South Korea, Russia, the US and representatives of the UN Secretary General 
and the IAEA director g e n e r a l A l s o ,  in April 1994, during the South Korean 
defence minister’s visit to Moscow, the Russian side issued a new proposal 
concerning the creation of a cooperative security system in the APR,^^ More 
importantly, in June 1994, at the second Russian-South Korean summit in 
Moscow, the Russian side also pronounced itself strongly in favour of the 
proposed multilateral conference. At the summit, President Yeltsin stated that 
Moscow was ‘ready to play and would play an active part in creating
military modernisation, see Alexei Zagorsky, ‘The Post-Cold War Security Agenda of Russia: 
Implications for Northeast Asia’, The Pacific Review, vol. 8, no. 1, 1995, pp. 77-97.
‘Foreign Minister Seeks Multilateral Solution on DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 24 March 1994 in FBIS-SOV 
94-058, 25 March 1994, p. 3. See also Izvestiia, 26 March 1994, p. 3.
‘Grachev (with South Korean foreign minister) on New Proposal for Asia-Pacific Security’, Itar- 
Tass, 29 April 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-084, 2 May 1994, p. 11. See also Kommersant-daily, 29 April 
1994, p. 4.
170
international mechanisms aimed at strengthening a climate of trust, security and 
cooperation in relations between the states of the APR’.^ ^
According to Vladimir Miasnikov, three important issues stood out in 
Russia’s proposal for a multilateral conference: (1) the nuclear-free status of the 
Korean peninsula; (2) noimalisation of North Korea relations with the 
participant countries, i.e. Japan, South Korea and the US; and (3) confidence- 
building measures and improvements in relations between North and South 
Korea.According to foreign minister Kozyrev, Russia’s interests in the North 
Korea’s NPT threat were as following: ‘First, the Korean peninsula is the near 
abroad of Russia. Secondly, if even one countiy refuses to observe the 
nonproliferation regime and gets away with it, then a chain reaction can be 
expected’.
However, it should be emphasised that the ultimate puipose of the Russian 
scheme was to create an overall Asian-Pacific security mechanism for the 
comprehensive settlement of nuclear and other problems on the Korean 
peninsula in order to allow Russia to participate as one of the leading powers in 
the post-Soviet era.^  ^ This involved creating what Yeltsin had called ‘a new 
mechanism of international power’ under the aegis of the UN. Ideally, for the 
Russian side, this new structure ought to replace the bipolar structures 
established during the Cold War in the Far East. In other words, based on this 
new structure, Russia wanted itself to be forced to opt for an indirect 
engagement with the US via a rapprochement with America’s allies in the 
region such as South Korea and Japan, as well as China in the post-Soviet era.^^
‘Yeltsin on Non-Proliferation’, Itar-Tass, 2 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-107, 3 June 1994, p. 5. See 
also Kommersant-daily, 3 June 1994, p. 4.
Vladimir S. Miasnikov, ‘Russian-South Korean Security Cooperation’, The Korean Journal o f 
Defence Analysis, vol. 6, no. 2, 1994, p. 328.
Izvestiia, 18 June 1994, pp. 1-2.
According to Vladimir Lukin, ‘the political crisis on the Korean peninsula, which could assume a 
military-strategic and even a nuclear dimension, is capable of affecting Russia’s national interests to a 
considerably greater degree than the conflict in Yugoslavia... I criticised the US policy only for the 
sequence of moves’ {Izvestiia, 11 June 1994, p. 3).
Alexei D. Bogaturov, ‘Russia in Northeast Asia: Setting a New Agenda’, Korea and World Affairs, 
vol. 17, no. 2, 1993, p. 307.
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In this connection, it should be added that the Russian side had already 
made its intention to create a multilateral dialogue for APR security clearly 
before the North Korean nuclear issue became ‘hot’ in 1993-94. For example, 
at the first Russian-South Korean summit in Seoul in November 1992, Yeltsin 
had already stated that ‘. . . I  think that at the present time it is necessary to 
undertake a number of measures that will give a strong, new impetus to 
cooperation and the political climate in the APR. First, we must begin to set up 
a mechanism for multilateral talks without delaying in the APR as a whole and 
throughout the sub-region. The first step could include multilateral 
consultations by experts on issues of strengthening security in Northeast Asia, 
primarily, on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons... ’
In fact, to a gieat extent, Russia was increasingly afraid of being excluded 
fi'om the consolidation process in the APR in the post-Soviet era. This 
obviously demonstrated that Russia had viewed its proposal of multilateral 
international conference as a vehicle for a broader Asian cooperative security 
process, which might afford it ‘another opportunity’ to be a leading power in 
the region. This meant that Russia still sought a significant, and not secondary 
role for the Korean issue in the name of common prosperity and peace.^^ To 
this end, Russia took a clear position on the following three issues: (1) against 
the US-North Korean bilateral talks; (2) against UN sanctions; and (3) against a 
pro-South Korean stance.
As far as managing the North Korean nuclear crisis was concerned, the 
talks between the IAEA and North Korea gradually switched to talks between 
the US and North Korea since March 1993. There were, for instance, talks 
between them during the first round of high-level US-North Korean dialogue in 
New York in June 1993 and the second meeting between the two sides in July
‘First Round of Yeltsin-Roh Talks: Addresses ROK National Assembly’, Russian Television 
Network, 19 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-224, 19 November 1992, p. 13. See also Izvestiia, 19 
November 1992, p. 4.
For more detailed analysis of Russia’s foreign policy goals in the APR, see Hyon-sik Yon, ‘The 
Russian Security Interests in Northeast Asia’, The Korean Journal o f Defence Analysis, vol. 6, no. 1, 
1994, p. 157.
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1993 in Geneva. As a result, the preliminary agreement between the two sides 
was reached in Geneva during the third round of US-North Korea talks in June 
1994. Finally, on 21 October 1994, the US and North Korea signed a landmark 
accord (the so-called ‘the Geneva Nuclear Accord’ or ‘the 1994 US-North 
Korea Agreed Framework’) hailed as a means of easing nuclear tension on the 
Korean peninsula.^^ This clearly indicated that US-led efforts to persuade North 
Korea to renounce its nuclear ambitions had developed into an intensified 
bilateral dialogue which became the principal channel for the solution of the 
nuclear problem. For those talks between the US and North Korea over North 
Korea’s nuclear issue, however, the Russian side had increasingly become 
dissatisfied with the process and the results of the US-North Korean dialogue 
because Russia was excluded from the negotiations, although the Russian 
foreign ministry welcomed the results of the US-North Korean talks that ended 
in New York on 11 June 1993 and which focused on the problem of nuclear 
safety on the Korean peninsula.^^  ^It was obvious that the US began to grasp the 
initiative as the leading negotiator with North Korea over the nuclear issue in 
place of Russia. Reacting to this, Russia finally concluded that the US-North 
Korea talks were an inadequate attempt to tackle the problem within a bilateral 
ffamework.^^
The agreement was a by-product of the tug of war at high-level talks in Geneva between the two 
sides, which had started more than a year before. It committed North Korea to freezing all current 
nuclear activities and allowing general inspections of its eight declared nuclear sites by the IAEA. Up 
until the Kuala Lumpur agreement on 13 June 1995, the two sides more or less kept their words in the 
Geneva Nuclear Accord, except on the question of which model of LWRs would be supplied to North 
Korea. For more detailed explanation of the Geneva Nuclear Accord, see Kyoung-soo Kim, ‘The 
Geneva Nuclear Accord: Problems and Prospects’, The Korean Journal o f  Defense Analysis, vol. 7, no. 
2, 1995, pp. 141-165. For the full context of the Geneva Nuclear Accord between the US and North 
Korea, see Appendix 6.
‘Russian Foreign Ministry Welcomes US-DPRK Nuclear Talks’, Itar-Tass, 15 June 1993 in FBIS- 
SOV 93-113, 15 June 1993, p. 5.
For example, in April 1994, Russian deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Panov stated that ‘One 
cannot say that this is a bilateral problem only. It concerns the whole world community once at issue is 
North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear NPT’ (‘Russian Take Flexible Stance on Korean Nuclear 
Problem’, Itar-Tass, 13 April 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-072, 14 April 1994, p. 14). The Russian foreign 
ministry’s spokesman Mikhail Demur in also stated that ‘Russia has asked the US to inform it on the 
situation regarding the US-North Korean talks on nuclear issues and their perspectives in more detail. 
But, Russia was not satisfied with information on them [the US-North Korean talks] which was
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As regards UN sanctions applied from the second half of 1993/^ Russia 
gradually decided not to fully support UN sanctions against North Korea, 
measures led by the US and South Korea/^ Although Russia declared that it 
would support sanctions against North Korea, it seemed to regard sanctions as 
an undesirable way to settle the North Korean nuclear problem. In December 
1993, for example, deputy foreign minister Kunadze stated that ‘discussing 
military or economic sanctions at the current stage is not helpful to the 
settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem’. I n  June 1994, the US, Japan 
and South Korea also suggested that the UN Security Council hold urgent 
discussions over the issue of imposing sanctions against North Korea. But, 
Russia did not support fully (or oppose) the adoption of UN sanctions against 
North Korea which were being sought by the US to punish the North Koreans 
for refusing to permit international inspection of their nuclear facilities. Yeltsin 
stated that ‘if things reach the point where North Korea digs in its heels and 
moves toward withdrawing from the non-proliferation Treaty, we will first 
warn North Korea, and then impose sanctions’/^ Similarly, foreign minister 
Kozyrev stated that ‘the time is not yet ripe for international sanctions against 
North Korea’ and also pointed out that ‘the sanctions must be imposed 
gradually and be considered a last resort’. I n  a word, the Russian leadership 
preferred ‘phased s a n c t i o n s t o  the US-led sanction plan.^^
fragmentary’ (‘Moscow Dissatisfied with Information on US-DPRK Talks’, Interfax, 4 October 1994 
in FBIS-SOV 94-193, 5 October 1994, p. 3).
As several attempts to exert pressure on North Korea through diplomatic talks had failed up to the 
second half of 1993, the US submitted the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN General Assembly in 
November 1993 in the hope that international pressure might force North Korea into line.
It should be noted that during the late Soviet era, the Soviet Union followed a policy of a nuclear- 
free zone on the Korean peninsula and endorsed international sanctions against North Korea {Pravda, 8 
August 1991, p. 5).
‘Kunadze: DPRK Sanctions Undesirable’, Yonhap, 18 December 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-242, 20 
December 1993, p. 55.
Segodnia, 3 June 1994, p. 1.
‘Kozyrev Says Sanctions Last Resort’, Interfax, 15 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-116, 16 June 1994, p. 
4. He also stated that ‘if North Korea is stubborn and inflexible, refuses to cooperate with the IAEA 
and withdraws from the NPT, then sanctions are inevitable. We favour their step-by-step introduction 
(Izvestiia, 18 June 1994, pp. 1-2).
‘Russia Supports Phased Sanctions’, Yonhap, 14 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-115, 15 June 1994, p.
2.
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Furthermore, it should be emphasised that in advocating a multilateral 
international conference, Russia had to abandon its previous pro-South Korean 
stance. This meant that Russia attempted to reformulate its Korean policy in 
line with its new domestic political forces and institutions and within the 
context of a new international world order after the December 1993 
parliamentary elect ions.This new trend in Russia’s Korean policy was deeply 
affected by its domestic situation which in turn was closely related to its 
growing isolation from great power negotiations on a general Korean nuclear 
settlement. In this respect, conservatives in the Russian Duma began to believe 
that the Russian foreign ministry - especially foreign minister Kozyrev - should 
not moved too close towards South Korea. In other words, opposition pressure, 
combined with Moscow’s own frustration at its inability to influence events on 
the Korean peninsula, led the Yeltsin government to modify its South Korean- 
oriented foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula and to attempt to develop 
its relations with North Korea. In these situations, from 1994 onwards, the 
Yeltsin government began to move back towards the middle, in an effort to 
‘balance’ Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula.®^^
If Russia succeeded in holding a multilateral conference, it would achieve 
influence and leverage upon both Koreas in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet 
era. If not, it risked further marginalisation. However, responding to the 
Russian conference proposal, which became an international security issue 
involving other major powers (China, Japan and the US) and the two Koreas, 
none of the major powers in the region accepted Russia’s plan (or initiative).
Even foreign minister Kozyrev sharply criticised the US for preparing the draft Security Council 
resolution on sanctions without consulting the Russians, describing the move as ‘perplexing’ and 
‘complicating the matter’ and pledging that ‘Russia would not in any event support the range of 
sanctions which is being put forward without previous agreement with us’ (BBC, SWB, SU/2024, 17 
June 1994, B/9-10).
According to Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov, ‘If ultra-nationalists should grab power, the picture 
could become one-sided again, this time in North Korea’s favour. Ultranationalists would certainly 
drive into a world-wide confrontation within the US, with predictable consequences for Moscow’s 
relations with South Korea and Noi1h Korea. The Korean peninsula would again become a front of 
Cold War’ (Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov, ‘The Evolution of Russian-Korean Relations: External and 
Internal Factors’, Asian Survey, vol. 34, no. 9, 1994, p. 796).
Segodnia, 16 August 1996, p. 9.
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Rather, Russia’s attempts to push ahead with its initiative received a lukewarm 
response.
A South Korean official in the ministi'y of foreign affairs observed that 
this proposal could only delay the process further and complicate 
negotiations.^^
Son Song-pil, North Korean ambassador to Russia, also made a negative 
assessment of Russia’s proposal to apply a multilateral approach in discussing 
the North Korean nuclear issue.®  ^ According to a representative of the North 
Korean foreign ministry, ‘we are concerned that Russia’s proposal for 
multilateral negotiations may complicate the problem’. T h e  North Korean 
foreign minister Kim Young-nam also stated that ‘It is too early to talk about an 
international conference on the subject of the North Korean nuclear 
programme. We are still studying the Russian initiative
Japan was also reluctant to support Russia’s proposal on the multilateral 
conference mainly as a result of its anxiety to follow the US-approach based on 
the US-Japanese security ti'eaty. Japan’s position on the nuclear crisis had also 
been conditioned by its knowledge of the destructive effect that North Korean 
pressure might be exerting on the US-dominated security system in Northeast 
Asia.^^
China similarly opposed Russia’s proposal to hold a multilateral 
conference concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. For its part, China 
suggested that the North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved through talks 
among China, North Korea, South Korea, the US and the IAEA.^° Furthermore,
Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 15 April 1994, p. 3.
‘DPRK Envoy Sceptical over Russian Talks Proposal’, Radio Moscow, 13 April 1994 in FBIS-SOV
94-072, 14 April 1994, p. 14.
Pravda, 2 April 1994, p. 3.
‘Too Early to Talk about Conference’, Itar-Tass, 1 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-110, 8 June 1994, p.
1.
On the Japanese reaction to the North Korean nuclear crisis, see Cluistopher Hughes, ‘The Nortli 
Korean Nuclear Crisis and Japanese Security’, Survival, vol. 38, no. 2, 1996, pp. 79-103.
It should be noted here that the decline of Russian influence on the Korean peninsula opened up a 
good opportunity for China to expand its influence there. For a more detailed account of China’s role 
on the North Korean nuclear issue, see Chang Ya-chun, ‘Peking’s Influence in the Nuclear Crisis on 
the Korean Peninsula’, Issues and Studies, vol. 30, no. 11, 1994, pp. 104-122.
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it should be mentioned that, in autumn 1994, South Korea and China had 
initialled a nuclear cooperation pact which included the means to work together 
in nuclear technology and facility construction and opened the way for South 
Korean exports to China. It laid down safety measures in the event of nuclear 
accidents, joint research areas and exchanges of nuclear experts, and was 
signed during Premier Li Peng’s visit to Seoul in late October 1994.^^
The US played a leading role in rejecting Russia’s proposal of multilateral 
conference. As South Korean scholars have argued, the US role in the APR in 
the post-Soviet era was more likely to be one that Great Britain assumed in 
Europe in the 19‘^’ century balance of power system.^^ Indeed, US-led 
diplomacy had by now effectively removed Russia from the gi'oup of major 
players in the region. Oleg Davydov has argued in this connection that ‘Russia 
lost much of its influence and political leverage in countries such as North 
Korea, Vietnam and Mongolia. Russia’s hasty withdrawal from these countries, 
her ti aditional partners and the breaking off of well-formed cooperation created 
a kind of political vacuum which was quickly filled by the US as it began to 
pursue an assertive diplomacy vis-à-vis the former Soviet allies’.
Russia was virtually ignored by its neighbouring powers in Northeast Asia 
in the post-Soviet era and it was forced to follow rather than lead.^ ^^
Nonetheless, Russia continuously attempted to take an another step to 
guarantee its involvement in any structure designed to reorientate North 
Korea’s nuclear programme, which was based on the the Geneva Nuclear 
Accord. To this end, Russia was keenly interested in participating in the 
framework of the international consortium known as the KEDO,^^ which was a
Korea Newsreview, 29 October 1994, p. 13.
Young-whan Kliil and Kongdan Oh, ‘From Bilateralism to Multilateralism in Seeurity Cooperation 
in the Asia-Pacific’, Korea Observer, vol. 25, no. 3, 1994, p. 419.
Oleg Davydov, ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy in Transition’, Asian Perspective (Seoul), vol. 22, no. 1, 
1998, p. 60.
See Edward A. Kolodziej, ‘The Multilateralisation of Regional Security in Southeast Asia and 
Northeast Asia: the Role of the Soviet Union’, Pacific Focus, vol. 4, no. 1, 1991, pp. 5-37.
KEDO is a multinational consortium led by the three executive members (Japan, South Korea and 
the US) comiected to the construction of LWRs in North Korea. The main purpose of its formation 
concerned the division of the cost of the reactor project among them. KEDO and North Korea were to
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central component of the US-North Korean agreement concluded in Geneva in 
October 1994/^
From July 1994 onwards, Russian officials repeatedly offered to supply 
one or both of the reactors, and to provide components for the project. Russian 
officials were particularly insistent that its previous experience, cooperation and 
advantages in development of the North Korean nuclear programme would be 
well suited for North Korea’s ‘Light Water Reactors’ (LWRs) programme. For 
example, in August 1994, deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Panov stated that 
‘Russia is ready to help settle North Korea’s nuclear problem by supplying 
equipment and technology to Pyongyang to replace graphite moderated reactors 
for light water ones’.^  ^The Russian side even insisted that the Soviet Union had 
signed an agreement with North Korea in 1985 to supply a LWR.^^ In January 
1995, Panov still stressed that ‘Russia can supply LWRs to North Korea itself. 
We used to maintain an active cooperation with North Korea, their experts were 
ti’ained in Russia, know our equipment, speak the Russian language. The 
Russian equipment is reliable and c h e a p W h a t  was more, the Russian side 
insisted that North Korea was willing to take the Russian-made LWRs.'®^
hold a series of further discussion on the details of the reactor project. One of major problems of 
KEDO was how to share the cost of the reactor project among its members. For the detailed discussion 
of the KEDO process, see Michael J. Mazarr, ‘The US-DPRK Nuclear Deal’, Korea and World Affairs, 
vol. 9, no. 3, 1995, pp. 482-509.
In October 1994 in Geneva, the US and North Korea signed an agreement in which North Korea 
pledged to freeze its present nuclear programme in return for two LWRs to replace its graphite­
moderated reactors (heavy-water units). Under this agreement, the US agreed to supply crude oil to 
North Korea to compensate for energy losses and North Korea agreed to allow the IAEA full access to 
all nuclear facilities when the first of the light water reactors had been constmcted.
‘Russia to Offer DPRK Nuclear Reactors Equipment’, Interfax, 17 August 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94- 
160, 18 August 1994, p. 11.
The Soviet govenmient conducted a feasibility study on installing LWRs at Sinpo on the east coast, 
and a deal to deliver tluee 660-megawatt units was signed in 1991. However, Yeltsin suspended the 
project in 1993 after North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, [29 December 1994-95 Jarruary 1995], pp. 14-15).
‘Russia Wants Big Role in Reforaring DPRK Nuclear Program’, Itar-Tass, 25 January 1995 in FBIS- 
SOV 95-016, 25 January 1995, p. 7.
For example, ‘The North Korean side reiterated its irrterest in getting Russian Light Water 
Reactors’, Yevgeniy Afanasyev, director of the first Asian department of the Russian foreign ministry 
told TASS after returning froru North Korea where he had a meeting with North Korean deputy foreign 
minister (‘DPRK Said Intended in Russian LWRs’, Itar-Tass, 31 January 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-021, 1 
February 1995, p. 6).
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Russia’s main reason for seeking to participate in the LWR programme 
was clearly to mitigate its further deteriorating role on the Korean peninsula, 
together with some economic reasons. In other words, after the rejection by 
other powers of the multilateral conference initiative, Russia again made a fresh 
effort to look for an another meaningful role in the Korean issue in Northeast 
Asia.
In this respect, it should be noted that, after the Geneva Nuclear Accord in 
October 1994, Russia gradually changed its position, speaking now of ‘equal 
status’ on the LWR programme among the major powers rather than insisting 
on its ‘significant’ role by the end of 1994. This inevitably led Russia to 
abandon its privileged position in North Korea if only KEDO allowed it to 
participate in the LWR programme. An additional powerful motive for Russia’s 
persistence on the issue was that the LWR programme was closely associated 
with economic benefits for the Russian economy. In reality, Russia was in a 
position that it would be completely excluded from the North Korean nuclear 
programme both politically and economically if it could not participate in 
KEDO.
A final agreement was reached between the US and North Korea at talks 
in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur in June 1995 which centred on 
replacing North Korea’s graphite-moderated nuclear reactor with US-made 
LWRs. This agreement was preceded by a whole series of intensive 
negotiations, the first round of which was held back in June 1993. The US and 
North Korean joint statement noted that the type of LWRs would be determined 
by an international consortium called the KEDO, in which, incidentally, the 
leading role would be played by the US. It had already made its choice - for a 
renewed reactor type based on a US design and US equipment. Thus, North
According to Viktor Mikliailov, Russian minister of nuclear power engineering, ‘Russia is ready to 
consider the issue of its participation in modernisation of North Korea nuclear programme, provided it 
enjoys an equal status in the international consortium’ (‘Participation in North Korea’s Nuclear 
Programme Considered’, Itar-Tass, 6 Febmary 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-025, 7 Febmary 1995, p. 7).
At that time, the total cost of LWRs for North Korea was about $US 4.5 billion.
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Korea preferred the reactors imposed on it by KEDO - and effectively 
Washington - to the Russian reactors it had planned to acquire/
Subsequently, on 15 December 1995 in New York, North Korea and 
KEDO signed a contract for the supply of two 1000-megawatt LWRs/®^  ^ Once 
again, this indicated that Russia’s proposal to supply Russian-made LWRs to 
North Korea was totally rejected by KEDO at the end of 1995.
The following remarks by Russian officials and newspapers clearly 
showed its weakening position on the North Korean nuclear programme and 
KEDO. Russia’s atomic energy minister Viktor Mikhailov stated that ‘Russia 
lost a partner after North Korea signed a contract for the delivery of US-type 
LWRs for its nuclear f a c i l i t y A s  Pravda reported, ‘judging by everything, 
as a result of this knockdown [Russia’s exclusion from KEDO] Russia will not 
be able to retrieve its own enormous influence in the Korean peninsula any time 
soon’.^ °^  Deputy foreign minister Panov also stated that ‘we have not joined it 
[KEDO] yet, because we do not know what we are expected to do there
In addition, it should be noted that the Russian leadership also continued 
to make several attempts to influence North Korea in order to persuade it to 
open up its nuclear development programme based on a balanced dual approach 
towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). For 
example, one of the main purposes of Panov’s visit to North Korea in 
September 1994 was about Russia’s bilateral efforts over the North Korean 
nuclear issue, together with the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean 
Friendship T r e a t y . ( S e e  Chapter 3.) Nevertheless, Russia’s bilateral efforts 
over the issue did not make any progress. Instead, the failure to influence North
Pravda, 16 June 1995, p. 3.
Kommersant-daily, 16 December 1995, p. 4.
‘Russia Loses Money on DPRK-US Nuclear Deal’, Itar-Tass, 14 June 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-115, 
15 June 1995, p. 6.
Pravda, 16 June 1995, p. 3
‘Panov Comment on Supplying Reactors to DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 5 April 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-066, 6 
April 1995, p. 13.
‘Deputy Foreign Minister (Panov) in DPRK for Talks’, Itar-Tass, 22 September 1994 in FBIS-SOV
94-185, 23 September 1994, p. 14.
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Korea directly led Russia to continue to advocate an international conference. 
Deputy foreign minister Panov stated that ‘since the dialogue failed at the 
bilateral level, it must be resolved on the multilateral level’.
All of Russia’s intentions and proposals about the North Korean nuclear 
issue were rejected at a time of acute crisis (1993-94) in the North Korean 
nuclear issue. Russia’s position on the Korean peninsula was seriously 
undermined and it remained outside the circle of influential participants in the 
conflict. Russia’s influence on the Korean peninsula was limited, and so, 
consequently, was its influence in the APR.
There were four important reasons for the failure of Russia’s proposals for 
a multilateral conference and KEDO over the North Korean nuclear issue: (1) 
its lack of internal stability as a leading power; (2) the lack of a security 
mechanism for multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia; (3) the lack of a firm 
Korean policy in the post-Soviet era; and (4) the lack of consensus among the 
top Russian leadership.
Russia’s position in the region was continuously undermined by its weak 
economic condition and endemic political and social crises during this period 
(Dec. 93-Dec. 95). Furthermore, economic and technical factors have become 
increasingly important elements for Great Power Politics in the post-Soviet era. 
In this respect, could Russia match Chinese, Japanese, or the US influence in 
Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era?
Regional security cooperation in Northeast Asia could hardly be seen as 
successful, although the end of the Cold War signalled the start of a new era 
and was greeted with the hope that it would pave the way for greater integration 
at the global level and a new basis for international cooperation.’’® In this 
context, however, it should be mentioned that the Southeast Asian subregion
Rossiiskaia gazeta, 16 June 1994, p. 6.
Problems for the cooperative security system in this region include: (1) the diversity of the region; 
(2) the absence of channels of dialogue; (3) mutual suspicions of intentions; (4) difficulty in 
formulating an acceptable agenda; (5) secrecy and sovereignty; and (6) the fear of eroding other 
security arrangements (Harry Harding, ‘Prospects for Cooperative Security Arrangements in the Asia- 
Pacific Region’, Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 13, no. 3, 1994, pp. 33-34).
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has experienced some progress and embraced some positive region-wide 
security initiatives. For example, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference 
(PMC) first held in 1991 was an approved forum for official dialogue, 
involving not only the six ASEAN member states, but also the so-called seven 
dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the 
EC and the US). In the middle of 1993, ASEAN announced the formation of a 
Regional Forum (ARF) to discuss security issues in Pacific Asia, a tentative 
first step towards the creation of a multilateral security architecture for the 
region.’” Because of the need to develop an Asian mechanism for the conti'ol 
and settlement of disputes and for the prevention of armed conflicts throughout 
the region, the first ministerial conference on the issue of peace in Northeast 
Asia, the ARF, was held in 1994. It included nineteen member countries (the 
six ASEAN countries, their seven dialogue partners and other individual 
countries including Cambodia, China, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Russia and 
Vietnam), The ARF was regarded by the Clinton administi'ation as the security 
equivalent of APEC, the premier institutional framework in the region. (See 
Table 5.1 for the structure of the ARF.)
However, the ‘ASEAN way’ of conflict management and security was 
unstmctured, infonnal and based on consensus.”  ^ In other words, in the 
Northeast Asia subregion, where the interests of four major powers - China,
The only multilateral forum involving all the Northeast Asian nations was the ASEAN Regional 
Foxura (ARF). The ARF may be seen as an extension of the ASEAN approach to cooperative security, 
or ‘ASEAN writ large’ (M. Leifer, ‘The ASEAN Regional Fomm’, Adelphi Paper, no. 302, London, 
1996, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 25). For the details of the ASEAN in the post- 
Soviet era, see Chin Kin Wall, ‘ASEAN: External Security Concerns in a Post-Cold War Era’, The 
Round Table, no. 326, 1993, pp. 169-185. On the Russia’s interests in the ASEAN, see Rafis Abazov, 
‘Dialogue between Russia and ASEAN’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no, 5/6, 1996, pp. 
89-91.
‘ Furthermore, conflicts and competition among countiies in this region were also veiy complicated. 
In Europe, for example, states could go beyond the balance of power to adapt themselves to new 
international changes because of the existence of EC and NATO, but the APR which lacks such a solid 
regional structure seems to have more difficulties in adapting itself to the post-Cold War 
transfonnation (John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution’, International 
Organisation, vol. 46, no. 3, 1992, p. 563). As Gerald Segal has pointed out ‘Northeast Asia is a zone 
with no shared security interests and old hostilities intact in the post-Cold war era. It is a zone in search 
of a regional identity’ (Gerald Segal, ‘Northeast Asia: Common Security or a la carte?’, International 
Affairs [London], vol. 67, no. 4, 1991, pp. 755-767).
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Japan, Russia and the US - intersect, attempts to build meaningful subregional 
security institutions have failed, in spite of various proposals made by 
Russia,”  ^ two Koreas, Canadians and others. Given these circumstances, to a 
large extent, pressure from the IAEA to open undeclared sites to special 
inspection must surely have prompted North Korea to take the extreme step, in 
March 1993, of giving notice that it intended to withdraw fiom the NPT.
Russia did not seem to play ‘two Korean cards’ effectively enough to 
maintain its influence on the North Korean nuclear issue during this period 
(Dec. 93-Dec. 95). In other words, Russia did not efficiently manage its 
relations with the two Koreas to maximise its national interests on the Korean 
peninsula, despite being in a better position than other powers to exercise 
influence over the region through its intense to its formal diplomatic relations 
with the two Korean s t a t e s . I n  this situation, even South Korea no longer 
regarded Russia as a great power which could influence North Korea. In turn. 
North Korea no longer followed Russia’s led in the international arena. Russia
It should be noted that since 1992 when Russia was first invited as a guest state to ASEAN-PMC, it 
has made various proposals for both region-wide and Northeast Asia sub-regional CBMs. For example, 
in July 1992, Kozyrev spoke at the 25"' ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila as a speeial 
guest and declared that Russia intended to be ‘constiaictively engaged’ in the East Asian region. He 
proposed a series of confidence and security building measures to limit naval exercises in designated 
zones of peace and suggested security cooperation with the ASEAN states. He also proposed to 
establish a security regime in the East Asian region. In July 1994, when Russia was invited to the first 
region-wide security forum (ARF), Kozyrev proposed that a centre for the study of conflict be 
established and called for greater transparency in arms sales and military doctrines. Russia has made a 
proposal to ASEAN mmisters to establish cooperation between the CIS and ASEAN. Kozyrev, 
speaking at the ASEAN-Russia consultative meeting in his capacity as the chairman of the committee 
of CIS foreign ministers, said the proposal should be discussed in detail at the level of heads of state 
and heads of goveriunent (‘Brokers ASEAN, CIS Cooperation’, Itar-Tass, 30 July 1995 in FBIS-SOV
95-147, 1 August 1995, p. 9). Kozyrev called for holding an international conference on the non­
nuclear status of the Korean peninsula in his speech at the regional fomm of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations in Bmnei (‘Urge Conference on Korean Status’, Itar-Tass, 1 August 1995 in FBIS- 
SOV 95-148, 2 August 1995, p. 11). In May 1995, when Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev 
visited South Korea, he raised the question of a regional security system [sub-regional system] in 
Northeast Asia. According to him, the sub-regional system could involve China, Japan, North and 
South Korea, Russia and the US (‘Quoted on Regional Security System’, 20 May 1995 in FBIS-SOV
95-098,22 May 1995, p. 14).
For example, China became the second great power to recognise the two Koreas in the Korean 
peninsula in August 1992, but had more influence on the North Korean nuclear issue in the post-Soviet 
era.
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should have had a more consistent new ‘Russian foreign policy concept’ 
towards the Korean peninsula, which was genuinely capable of replacing 
Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking or previous Soviet ideology. Accordingly, 
Russia failed to play a meaningful role as a mediator between the two Koreas, 
having ceded its position mainly to the US in the region.
Table 5.1 Structure of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARE)
Formation July 1994
Members -ASEAN: Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
“ASEAN’s dialogue partners: Austialia, Canada, China, 
European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of 
Korea, United States
-ASEAN’s observers: Cambodia, Papua New Guinea
Primary
Objectives
-To promote confidence-building measures
-To develop preventive diplomacy
-To develop approaches to conflict resolution
Organisation -Annual ministerial meeting 
-Senior offieial meeting (SOM)
-Three intercessional support groups (ISG)
(a) on CBM
(b) on Disaster Relief
(c) on Search and Rescue
(d) on PKO
-No permanent secretariat
Source: http://www.aseaiisec.org/history/asnjpol2.htm (16.04.99), Seo-hang Lee, ‘Security
Regionalism in Northeast Asia: Emerging Framework of Security Dialogue’, IF ANS Review 6 
(December 1998), p. 65 in cited from Eun-sook Chung, ‘Explaining Russia’s Interest in Building 
Security Mechanisms in the East Asia Region: Realism and Neoliberal’, in Ted Hof, ed., 
Understandings o f Russian Foreign Policy (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pemisylvania State 
University Press, 1999), p. 260.
See Olga Alexandrova, ‘Divergent Russian Foreign Policy Concepts’, Aussenpolitik, vol. 44, no. 4, 
1993, pp. 363-372.
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Finally, there still seemed to be no firm consensus on the issue of the 
North Korean nuclear problem in the region during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 
95). For example, as regards UN sanctions against North Korea, in December
1993, deputy foreign minister Kunadze stated that ‘Moscow’s basic position is 
that sanctions are an undesirable way to settle the North Korean nuclear 
problem’.^  In June 1994, Mikliail Beliy, director of the first Asian depaitment 
in the Russian foreign ministry, deelared that ‘Russia believes that tough UN 
sanctions against North Korea is an extreme measure’. A l s o ,  Duma factions 
of communists, agrarians and the LDPR led by Zhirinovskiy expressed 
‘disapproval’ of Russia’s decision to join in the economic sanctions against 
North Korea.^^^ However, foreign minister Kozyrev took a somewhat different 
view from that of those mentioned above. In June 1994, he stated that ‘Russia 
and the US agreed to submit to the UN Security Council’s consideration the 
joint resolution on sanctions against North Korea linked with the nuclear 
programme of this country and hold an international conference on security and 
nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula
Furthermore, it should be emphasised here that Vladimir Lukin, Chairman 
of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, even changed his views 
on the issue of UN sanctions against North Korea as follows. In early June
1994, he stated that ‘Surely, it is better to reach an agreement than impose 
sanctions, but the non-proliferation regime should be maintained very 
s t r i c t l y B u t ,  in late June 1994, he stated that ‘Russia should “more closely 
coordinate” its action with Washington on the issue of a possible introduction 
of sanctions against North Korea. This was discussed today at a closed session
‘Kunadze: DPRK Sanctions Undesirable’, Yonhap, 18 December 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-242, 20 
December 1993, p. 55.
‘Official Comments’, Moscow NTV, 15 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-116, 16 June 1994, p. 5.
‘Duma Factions Issue Statement on Korean Peninsula Situation’, Itar-Tass, 10 June 1994 in FBIS- 
SOV 94-113, 13 June 1994, p. 5.
‘Russia, US Agree on Sanctions against DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 10 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-113, 13 
June 1994, p. 7,
‘Lukin Says Russia Should Pressure DPRK on NPT Issue’, Itar-Tass, 2 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94- 
107, 3 June 1994, p. 9.
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of the Duma Committee for International Affairs’V* Foreign minister Kozyrev 
also changed his previous pro-US stance on the UN sanction as follows; ‘the 
time is not yet ripe for international sanctions against North Korea. Sanctions 
can be intioduced in stages but only after all other possibilities have been 
exhausted’ One of the important reasons for such inconsistent views was 
closely related to the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty 
because the Treaty remained in force until 1996, and measures would be taken 
one year before it expired, so there was still time to think things through. (See 
Chapter 3.)
In sum, during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95), Russia’s several active 
efforts over the issue of North Korean nuclear crisis within the framework of 
the regional security cooperation did not find any meaningful role in the region. 
Russia was no longer one of the major p o w e r s . I n  other words, Russia’s 
policy towards the region became reactive as a result of the internal and 
external factors mentioned above. Russia continued to be isolated and under 
pressure in the region during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95).
5.4. All Uiivited Guest? (Dec. 95-Jul. 96)
After the December 1995 election, there were few striking changes in Russia’s 
basic stance on the North Korean nuclear issue and its regional security policy 
in the region. The appointment of Primakov and Lebed as Russian foreign 
minister and Security Council Secretary, respectively, indicated a more 
pragmatic and professional Russian foreign policy direction, which included its
‘Duma Discusses North Korea behind Closed Doors’, Itar-Tass, 20 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-119, 
21 June 1994, p. 34.
‘Kozyrev Says Time “Not Yet Ripe” for DPRK Sanctions’, Radio Rossii Network, 1 June 1994 in 
FBIS-SOV 94-110, 8 June 1994, p. 5.
So far Moscow has remained ‘outside the circle of active participants’ in the conflict because it 
lacks any opportunities to influence the North Koreans’ position {Izvestiia, 22 March 1994, p. 3).
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security policy over the North Korean nuclear i s s u e I n  other words, 
following the December 1995 parliamentaiy election, a firmer consensus had 
emerged among its foreign policy community that Russia should no longer 
tailor its behaviour to US preferences and that its status as a respected great 
power had to be restored on the Korean peninsula
Surprisingly, Russia repeatedly proposed the convening of a multilateral 
conference during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96). For example, in January 1996, 
a Russian foreign ministry official stated that ‘Russia will join KEDO if  its 
major role in the body is guaranteed and interests of the Russian nuclear 
industry are accounted for’. Yevgeniy Afanasiyev, heading a foreign ministry 
department in charge of Asia stated that ‘we are prepared to discuss specific 
proposals on Russia’s joining KEDO which was established, in particular, to 
ensure substituting graphite-moderated nuclear reactors using light waters’. 
Nevertheless, Russia was once again bitterly disappointed with the fact that it 
was continuously excluded from international talks regarding security on the 
Korean peninsula, thus further damaging its status and weakening its role in the 
region.
In April 1996, South Korea and the US devised new rules for dealing with 
North Korea when they proposed a ‘four-party talks’ among China, South
Russia tried to participate in the APR security forum more actively during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 
96). For example, in July 1996, at the third session of the Regional Fomm of ASEAN on the problems 
of security and at the ASEAN conference that took place in Jakarta, Russia for the first time 
participated as a dialogue partner. Russia’s delegation, led by minister of foreign affairs Primakov, 
participated in a discussion that focused attention on the issues of stiengthening stability and security in 
the region, developing cooperation and deepening integration processes (Abazov, ‘Dialogue between 
Russia and ASEAN’, pp. 87-91).
As regards tire regional security cooperation with the West, for example, Russia attempted to oppose 
the issues of NATO and START II.
‘Moscow to Join Korean Organisation If Guaranteed Major Role’, Itar-Tass, 23 January 1996 in 
FBIS-SOV 96-016, 24 January 1996, p. 17. In April 1996, he (Afanasiyev) continued to state that ‘the 
Russian side intends to adhere to its “all-bracing” initiative to convene a multilateral conference on the 
Korean peninsula issue’ ( ‘Moscow Insists on Participation in Korean Peace Process’, Itar-Tass, 30 
April 1996 in FBIS-SOV 96-085, 1 May 1996, p. 25).
Kim Young-sam and Bill Clinton put forward a four-party peace proposal on 16 April 1996. For a 
more detailed account of the ‘four-party talks’, see B. Meldrirm and J. Cotton, ‘The US-DPRK Agreed 
Framework, KEDO and “Four-Party Talks”: the Vrcissitirdes of Engagement’, Issues and Studies, vol. 
34, no. 11-12, 1998, pp. 121-143.
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Korea, North Korea and the US in order to establish a permanent peace regime 
on the Korean peninsula to replace the existing armistice treaty signed in 1953.
On the one hand, in deciding to propose a ‘four-party talks’, South Korean 
officials seemed to judge that more participants would complicate the process 
and weaken Seoul’s leading role, although Russia’s negative attitude certainly 
became a burden for them in promoting their strategy of creating a permanent 
peace regime on the Korean peninsula.S im ultaneously, on the other hand, 
South Korea also tried to soothe Russia’s discontent over its exclusion from a 
framework for building a new peace regime on the Korean peninsula. For 
instance, the South Korean foreign minister visited Russia to explain the latter’s 
‘four-party talks’, excluding Japan, Russia and the United Nations. Responding 
to the ‘four-party talks’, however, Russian foreign minister Primakov clearly 
stated that ‘relations between Russia and South Korea [were] experiencing 
growing p a i n s I n  many respects, the proposal for ‘four-party talks’, from 
which Russia was excluded, seemed to be strengthening the feeling that it had 
been improperly treated by South Korea.
Russia’s continual insistence on the multilateral conference proposal 
should be seen as part of a strategy to maintain a strong presence in the region. 
In April 1996, for instance, Georgiy Kunadze, Russian ambassador to South 
Korea and former deputy foreign minister, pledged that ‘Russia supports all 
realistic proposals that can ease tensions on the Korean peninsula... We 
supported the proposal for six-party talks in principle. I cannot understand why 
South Korea advanced the proposal for four-party talks’. I n  May 1996, a 
senior Russian diplomat also proposed that Russia’s participation be guaranteed
The Korean Herald (Seoul), 21 April 1996, pp. 1, 4. The White House reaffirmed the US’s 
commitments to Seoul as an ally and categorically rejected the possibility of any talks on a ‘separate 
peace agreement with North Korea’ (Segodnia, 17 April 1996, p. 9).
129 ‘pi-iniakov Comments on Talks with South Korean Counterpart’, Itar-Tass, 7 May 1996 in FBIS- 
SOV 96-090, 7 May 1996, p. 22.
A statement by a Russian foreign ministiy spokesman indicated that ‘Russia could play a more 
positive role than the one envisioned by this initiative’ in efforts to settle the situation on the Korean 
peninsula. The role assigned to Moscow is a modest one - to ‘support’ the President’s initiative 
{Kommersant-daily, 18 April 1996, p. 4).
Hangyore Shinmun (Seoul), 25 April 1996, p. 18.
188
at a multilateral meeting for a permanent peace mechanism on the Korean 
peninsula, insisting that the ‘four-party talks’ suggested by South Korea and the 
US could not guarantee Russia’s interests in the peninsula
In part, Russia was also knocking on ARF’s door and sought to play a 
more active, positive role on the Korean p e n i n s u l a R u s s i a  hosted in April 
1996 two ARF conferences in Moscow aimed at developing a Statement of 
Basic Principles for Security and Stability for the ARFd^ ^* In a speech in Jakarta 
in July 1996, foreign minister Primakov emphasised that Russia was ready to 
develop active ‘partnership’ relations with both the Association (ASEAN) as a 
whole and with each of its member countries. Besides the meetings and 
speeches within the framework of the Forum and ASEAN’s dialogue structure, 
Primakov conducted a full series of meetings with his colleagues from other 
countries. The separate discussions alone numbered fourteen. Russia’s intention 
to broaden cooperation with the largest state in South East Asia was also 
emphasised.
The more active participation of the Russian delegation in the session of 
the ARF and at the conference of ministers of foreign affairs demonstrated 
Russia’s desire not to fall behind the dynamically changing situation and to 
develop an effective approach to the ‘Pacific Ocean Challenge’ with a 
subsequent strengthening of positions in the APR.'^^
T hope that we will soon get the understanding of all parties concerned with the Korean issue about 
the Russia-proposed multination talks for establislinient of a new peace regime on the Korean 
peninsula... We will continue to make efforts to materialise the proposal’, said deputy director general 
Valeriy Denisov of the Russian foreign ministry’s Asian affairs bureau (‘Russia’s Need to Participate 
in Talks on Korea Stressed’, Yonhap, 22 May 1996 in FBIS-EAS 96-102, 22 May 1996).
In May 1996, at a meeting of ARF where Russia was invited for the first time as a dialogue partner 
of ASEAN, Russia, together with China, offered joint proposals on principles ensuring security in the 
region.
‘Track Two’ refers to unofficial meetings, normally hosted by independent research institutes, tiiat 
bring together independent scholars, security specialists, former and current defence and foreign 
ministry officials and serving officials, participating in their ‘private capacities’.
B. Zhiliaev, ‘Partnership with ASEAN’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 4, 1996, p. 42.
It should be mentioned here that China already participated in a number of multilateral regional 
dialogues, including the APEC and ARF, see Juergen Haaeke, ‘China’s Participation in Multilateral 
Pacific Cooperation Forums’, Aussenpolitik, vol. 48, no. 2, 1997, pp. 166-176.
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During this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96), Russia increasingly could not be 
indifferent to the emerging peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula, which 
was closely related to its security interests in the region. However, despite 
Russia’s continuous efforts over the Korean peninsula as the regional security 
issue, Russia did not succeed in achieving its aims in the region. Rather, Russia 
was kept out of the game by other major powers. In other words, although 
Russia sought to be a key regional player in new circumstances in the post- 
Soviet era, especially through regional multilateral cooperation, it had yet to 
find a solid place in Northeast Asia as one of the major political [security and 
military] powers during this period, thus demonstiating its reactive policy 
towards the Korean peninsula.
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Chapter 6
Russia and Regional Economic Cooperation 
in Northeast Asia:
Focusing on APEC and TRADP Issues
6.1. A Partner in Regional Economic Cooperation? (1985-91)
The Soviet Union showed little interest in participating in regional economic 
cooperation based on the concept of self-produced Soviet-type economies 
during the Cold War era/ Thus, there was little effort by the Soviet Union to 
create a regional economic organisation and cooperation among the Asia 
Pacific Region (APR) countries during the Cold War era (from 1945 up to 
1984). Instead, the Soviet Union showed greater interest in the creation of a 
zone of Soviet economies such as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA)^ in Europe and became an important some of economic aid to 
communist countries such as North Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia.^
' For an overview of a Soviet-type economy, for example, see Alec Move, The Soviet Economic 
System, 3'^ '^  edition (Boston and London: Unwin Hyman, 1986); D. V. Valovoi, Ekonomika: vzgliady 
raznykh let (Moscow: Nauka, 1989); and D. V. Valovoi, Otzastoia k razvalu (Moscow: Nauka, 1991).
 ^Non-European communist countiies (Vietnam and Cuba) also joined the CMEA later. On economic 
cooperation among the CMEA countiies, see A. Olshany and L. Zenin, CMEA Countries and 
Developing States: Economic Cooperation (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984); and E. la. Sheinin, 
Sotrudnichestvo stran-chlenov SEV i ego burzhuaznye fa l ’sifikatojy (Moscow: Mezhdmiarodnye 
otnosheniia, 1988).
 ^For the Soviet Union, aid had become an important instrument to achieve its strategic objectives in its 
bloc countries and the Third World. See Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid: the New Aid and 
Trade Policy in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Praeger, 1958); Roger Kanet, ‘Soviet Military 
Assistance to the Third World', in John F. Cooper and Daniel S. Papp, eds.. Communist Nations’ 
Military Assistance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983); and Andrei I. Chekhutov, Nataliya A. 
Ushakova and Leon Z. Zevin, ‘Economic Assistance to Developing Countries’, in Richard Feinberg 
and Ratchik M. Avakov, eds., US and Soviet Aid to Developing Countries: from Confrontation to 
Cooperation (New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1991). For Soviet militaiy and
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In these circumstances, the Soviet Union emphasised its bilateral 
economic relations with North Korea on the Korean peninsula to create a solid 
base for the coincidence of their mutual interests both in the strategic and the 
ideological spheres in Northeast Asia. This meant that the Soviet Union did not 
generally seem to regard the Korean peninsula as of potential economic 
advantage to its national interests. For this reason, through economic aid, the 
Soviet Union was able to maintain its enormous economic, military and 
political influence in North Korea from the late 1940s onwards
At any rate, even in the economic field the Soviet Union was generally 
regarded as a superpower in the context of the Korean peninsula during the 
Cold War era.^ In other words, the Soviet Union was the sole power which 
could influence North Korea’s economic programmes within the framework of 
its regional economic policy in Northeast Asia during the Cold War era, 
although it did not pursue an active economic policy towards North Korea in 
the region.
However, the emergence of the APR as the fastest-rising economic power 
and Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking led to a fundamental change in Soviet 
economic interests in the APR in terms of regional economic cooperation and 
also bilateral economic cooperation with the two Koreas. This meant that 
Gorbachev attempted to take an initiative on regional economic cooperation, 
although his attempts at policy change on the regional economic fi'ont were 
actually aimed at developing domestic economic refonns. Then, the Soviet 
Union sought to play a significant economic role in determining in the region as 
well. This approach shaped the basic nature of Gorbachev’s New Political 
Thinking. In turn, as regards economic relations with North Korea, there were
economic aid and integration with socialist countiies in Europe in 1970s, see A. L, Narochnitskii, ed., 
SSSR i bratskie sotsialisticheskie strany Evropy v 1970-e gody (Moscow: Nauka, 1988).
For more detailed analysis of Soviet aid to North Korea during the Cold War era, see George 
Ginsburgs, ‘Soviet Development Grants and Aid to North Korea, 1945-80’, Asia Pacific Community, 
no. 18, 1982, pp. 42-63; and Erik van Ree, ‘The Limits of Juche: North Korea’s Dependence on Soviet 
Industrial Aid, 1953-76’, The Journal o f  Communist Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, 1989, pp. 50-73.
 ^For an overview of Soviet economic power during the Cold War period, see G. I. Klianin, Dinamika 
ekonomicheskogo razvitiia SSSR (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1991).
192
inevitably gi*adual changes of Soviet position during the Gorbachev era (1985- 
91), especially concerning economic and military aid. (See Chapter 3.)
The primary driving force to weave the APR into a region was the 
dynamic economic growth of the countries of Northeast Asia, which had taken 
place over the course of the previous three decades: Japan from 1960-70, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong in the 1980s.^ In these 
circumstances, one of the main goals of Soviet policy towards Northeast Asia 
and the APR during the Gorbachev era was to establish more organic links with 
the dynamic regional economic order, in order to accelerate the reform process 
within the Soviet Union.^ In other words, Gorbachev and his reformers shifted 
Moscow’s focus towards the importance of economic strength in international 
affairs and recognised Asia’s growing prominence in world affairs. As Table 
6.1 shows, the major economies of the APR have ranked among the world’s 
most impressive in terms of economic growth from the 1970s to the 1990s.
Table 6.1 Average Growth of Real GDP in Selected Countries, 1970-90 
(% per annum)
Area 1971-80 1981-90
World 5.98 5.13
Developed Economies 3.2 2.73
Developing Economies 5.19 3.74
South Korea 9.26 9.24
Singapore 9.07 7.36
Malaysia 8.01 6.01
Thailand 6.8 7.38
Indonesia 8.0 5.06
China --- 9.37
Source: Derived from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1997 
(Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1997).
® See Stuart Sinclair, The Pacific Basin: an Economic Handbook (London: Euromonitor Publications, 
1987).
’ Charles E. Ziegler, ‘Soviet Strategies for Development: East Asia and the Pacific Basin’, Pacific 
Affaii's, vol. 63, no. 4, 1990-91, p. 451.
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The implications of this dynamic economic development for intra-regional 
relations were profound. In particular, the experience of economic growth 
based upon a network of mutual interdependence and cooperation led the 
countries involved to realise the importance of regional economic cooperation.
In this respect, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organisation 
(APEC) was established in Canberra, Australia in November 1989 with the aim 
of coordinating trade and promoting investment cooperation.^ Since then, 
APEC has attempted to become the primary organisation for the promotion of 
free trade and economic cooperation in the APR based upon the concept of 
‘open regionalism’.^  The Seoul APEC Declaration in November 1991 set forth 
a commitment among APEC ministers to meet annually and hold informal 
discussions to strengthen and reaffirm agreed objectives, and to realise the 
goals of free and open trade and investment in the region. Notably, the 
meeting in Seoul also confirmed new members of APEC (China, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong), which marked a significant development of the APEC process.
Given these circumstances, Gorbachev’s regional economic policy 
towards the APR shifted fi’om its previous focus on economic aid to allied 
countries into a policy of active involvement regional economic cooperation
® For the details of the evolution of the APEC process and its basic principles and objectives, see 
Andrew Elek, ‘The Challenge of Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation’, The Pacific Review, vol. 4, no. 
4, 1991, pp. 322-333. According to Peter Drysdale, the cenhal ideas of the APEC were: (1) openness in 
international economic policy and diplomatic approach; (2) evolution m the practice of high-level 
consultation and cooperation; and (3) equality in managing a growing economic partnership (Peter 
Diysdale, ‘Soviet Prospects and the Pacific Economy’, in Peter Drysdale, ed., The Soviets and the 
Pacific Challenge [North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991], p. 11). There were two crucial reasons to be 
set up the APEC. First, APEC was established to compete with other regional economic organisations 
such as the European Union. Secondly, each of the twelve original members (Australia, Brunei, 
Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines 
and the US) had fears about what was seen as a rise in protectionist tendencies.
® See Richard Higgott and Richard Stubbs, ‘Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC 
versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific’, Review o f International Economy, vol. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 518- 
522.
For an analysis of the Seoul APEC Declaration, see Vinod K. Aggarwal, ‘Building International 
Institutions in Asia-Pacific’, Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 11, 1993, pp. 1029-1042.
194
and participation in regional economic organisation.'* The new Soviet approach 
to the APR economies became apparent from Gorbachev’s speeches during the 
second half of the 1980s. Gorbachev, in speeches at Vladivostok'^ and 
Krasnoyarsk'^ in 1986 and in 1988 respectively, signified Soviet interests in 
promoting the development of regional economic cooperation through Soviet 
integration with the APR economies. This also meant that Soviet reformers 
were convinced that full participation in the global economy generally, and the 
APR economies more specifically, was needed for the Soviet Union to 
overcome its technological backwardness and attain tine superpower status, 
based on factors other than military power.'''
These fundamental changes in Soviet economic interests towards the APR 
resulted in two main developments. First, the Soviet Union attempted to project 
a new attitude towards regional economic cooperation and expressed its 
interests in joining the activities of regional economic cooperation 
organisations such as the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC)'^ and the 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC),'^ which were the most
" F o r  the details account of Gorbachev’s regional economic policy towards the APR, see Mikhail 
Gorbachev, Zhizn ' i reformy, vol. 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), pp. 430-470.
In Vladivostok, Gorbachev announced a new regional policy for tlie Soviet Far East, noting that 
economic development there had lagged behind that of the national economy. He specifically 
mentioned the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). Vladivostok could be opened to 
foreigners, and in time might become an international centre of bade, culture and tourism. For the 
details of Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech, see Izvestiia, 29 July 1986, pp. 1-3.
" In Krasnoyarsk in September 1988, Gorbachev reiterated Soviet Union’s willingness to join the 
PECC, and proposed invigorating the role of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific and the Economic Commission for West Asia. Gorbachev also expressed interest in the 
possibility of forming a ‘zone of joint enterprise’ in the Soviet Far East [Nakliodka]. For the details of 
Gorbachev’s Krasnoyarsk speech, see Izvestiia, 18 September 1988, pp. 1-3.
For an explanation of Gorbachev’s efforts for the regional economic cooperation in the APR, see 
Kent Calder, ‘The North Pacific Triangle: Sources of Economic and Political Transformation’, Journal 
o f Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 1989, pp. 3-17; B. Z. Milner, ‘Multinational Economic 
Cooperation in the Soviet Far East’, Sino-Soviet Affairs (Seoul), vol. 14, no. 3, 1990, pp. 43-52; 
Lawrence T. Woods, ‘Delicate Diplomatic Debuts: Chinese and Soviet Participation in the PECC’, 
Pacific Affairs, vol. 63, no. 2, 1990, pp. 210-227; and A. M. Khazanov, et al., Rossiia, Blizhnee i 
Dal’nee Zarubezh’e Azii {Moscov^r. Institut Vostokovedeniia RAN, 1997), pp. 132-154.
PBEC was formed in 1960s. For a brief history of PBEC organisations, see Lawrence T. Woods, 
Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organisations and International Relations (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1993).
The PECC, which was an informal group that brings together representatives of government, 
business and academia, was founded in Canberra in 1980. PECC’s essential features were: (1) support 
for the enliancement of information about policy practices and economic data to assess policy interests;
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comprehensive vehicles for consultations on economic cooperation in Northeast 
Asia and the APR up to the end of the 1980s/'' Finally, the Soviet National 
Committee for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (SOVNAPEC),'^ 
established in 1988 to facilitate interaction with PECC, became actively 
involved in efforts to open up the Soviet Union’s Pacific areas for ti'ade and 
economic cooperation. This meant, in contrast to Gorbachev’s new regional 
economic policy, during the Soviet era (up to the time of Gorbachev’s coming 
to power in the middle of 1980s), that the Soviet Union was generally hostile to 
all regional organisations and that its economic relations with the APR were 
almost exclusively bilateral and limited. However, during the Gorbachev era, 
this hostility towards APR regional organisations was replaced by a willingness 
to recognise and cooperate with organisations such as ASEAN, PECC, APEC, 
and the Asian Development Bank.'^
(2) the opportunity for interchange on policy matters among officials of Pacific countries; and (3) 
encouragement to seek policy convergence tlnough the exploration of common interests and problems 
(Vladimir Ivanov, ‘Soviet Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region and Economic Reforms’, in Peter 
Drysdale, ed.. The Soviets and the Pacific Challenge, pp. 140-141).
"  The Soviet Union was among the non-member economies invited to send observers as guests to the 
sixth PECC plenary meeting held in Osaka in May 1988. On the debate over Soviet observer status for 
the membership of PECC, see Woods, ‘Delicate Diplomatic Debuts’, pp. 210-227.
Yevgeniy Primakov, then Chairman of the newly formed SOVNAPEC, made a brief and effective 
presentation in which he explained the Soviet Union’s interests in participating in the specialist 
working group meetings or task forces of PECC in the context of restructuring the Soviet economy, 
and the need to develop new approaches to international economic relations, especially with the 
economies of the APR. SOVNAPEC established working groups to deal with various PECC task forces 
and forums. In 1989, SOVNAPEC delegations participated in the workshops on fishing and trade 
policies held in Canada, on agricultirral policies in South Korea, on transport, telecommunications and 
tourism in Thailand, and the forum on minerals and energy in the Philippines. In May 1989, a 
SOVNAPEC delegation attended the 22"‘* General Meeting of the PBEC in Taipei in an obserwer 
capacity. In May 1988 and November 1989, SOVNAPEC delegations attended the PECC conferences 
in Osaka and Auckland. In July 1988 and December 1989, representatives of the Institirte of World 
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), took part in the proceedings of the 17“' and 18“' 
sessions of the Pacific Conference on Trade and Development (PAFTAD) held in Indonesia and 
Malaysia respectively (Ivanov, ‘Soviet Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region and Economic Reforms’, pp. 
140-141).
In earlier years, organisations such as the ASEAN and the PECC were criticised as anti-Soviet, 
having the potential to become the Asian equivalent of an EC or NATO alliance. The Soviets feared 
US, Chinese or Japanese participation in or manipulation of these groupings against Soviet interests. 
Under Gorbachev, and in conjunction with improvements in the Sino-Soviet and US-Soviet 
relationships, this apprehension gave way to the recognition that ASEAN, the PECC and other regional 
organisations could be useful in achieving Soviet goals in the APR. In November 1986, the Soviet 
Union sent observers for the first time to the 5“' annual meeting of the PECC in Vancouver, Canada. In 
March 1988, a SOVNAPEC was formed in an attempt to gain entiy into the PECC. However, the
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Secondly, it should be emphasised that Soviet regional economic interests 
and cooperation activities in the APR were ultimately designed to develop the 
Soviet Far East on the basis of Gorbachev’s reform policies/" Gorbachev’s 
speeches at Vladivostok in 1986 and Ki'asnoyarsk in 1988 directly aimed at 
developing the Soviet Far East through its integration with the APR economies. 
In fact, up to the mid 1980s, the Soviet Far East,^' with its core maritime 
province, which in terms of geographical location was an integral part of the 
APR, had remained a closed zone, mainly for the use of its military base.^^ In 
other words, not until the 1980s did the APR in general, and Siberia in 
particular, rank high on the Kremlin’s agenda. It was then that the Soviet 
government began to pay attention to the economic dynamism of the APR and 
even more to the international isolation that Moscow had created for itself by 
its previously misguided policies. In particular, in his speech to the 27"’ CP SU 
Party Congi'ess on 25 Febraary 1986, Gorbachev started to call attention to the 
glowing importance of the Asian and Pacific sectors of Soviet foreign policy.^^ 
In this context, Gorbachev clearly stressed political rather than militaiy means, 
paying more attention to economic cooperation than to political relations. In 
short, Gorbachev’s new regional economic policy towards the region was 
actually aimed at overall economic development in the Soviet Far East and 
Siberia by integrating the Soviet economy into the structure of the rapidly 
developing the APR.
PECC adopted a moratorium on accepting new members, and was willing to act on the Soviet 
application.
On the Soviet Far East under Gorbachev, see Roger Swearingen, ed., Siberia and the Soviet Far East 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987).
On the development of Soviet Far East before Gorbachev’s coming to power, for example, see 
Robert Nortli, ‘The Soviet Far East: New Centre of Attention in the USSR’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 51, 
1978, pp. 195-215; Stuart Kirby, ‘Siberia and East Asia: Economic and General Relations between 
Siberia and Its Far Eastern Neighbours’, Asian Perspective (Seoul), vol. 6, no. 2, 1982, pp. 135-158; 
Theodore Shabad, ‘Siberian Development and Soviet Policy in East Asia’, Asian Perspective (Seoul), 
vol. 6 no. 2, 1982, pp. 122-146; and P. Minakir, O. Renzin and V. Chichkanov, Ekonomika D al’nego 
Vostoka: perspektivy uskoreniia (Kliabarovsk: Kniznoe izdatel’stvo, 1986).
For an explanation of Soviet military in the Soviet Far East during the Cold War era, see Richard 
Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds.. The Soviet Far East Militaiy Build-up: Nuclear Dilemmas and 
Asian Security (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publishing Co., 1986).
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In many respects, Gorbachev’s new approaches towards the APR 
economies were strongly related to the Soviet Union’s gradual ‘isolation’ from 
the world economy since the middle of the 1980s/'' The relative isolation of the 
Soviet economy from trade with Western economies and the extremely limited 
relationships between the Soviet Union and Northeast Asian and Pacific market 
economies was a product of the politics of the Cold War and the closed nature 
of the Soviet economic system, rather than any lack of complementarity in 
economic structures. As a result, the scale of the Soviet Union’s involvement in 
the regional network of economic relations was necessarily limited and 
isolated. For example, the Soviet Union did not become a member of the PECC 
and the APEC during the Gorbachev era.^  ^ As regards the development of the 
Soviet Far East, there were also many problems which hindered it from 
developing as Gorbachev had apparently expected.^"
Given those problems, Gorbachev turned to relations with South Korea to 
implement his economic aims for the Soviet Far East in the APR. Economic 
cooperation with South Korea became one of the most important elements of
See Mikliail Gorbachev, Politicheskii doklad Tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS XVII s ”ezdu 
Kommunisticheskoipartii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Novosti, 1986), pp. 80-96.
Russia has tiaditionally regarded itself as an Eurasian power, uniquely able to project power and 
influence on both the European and Asian continents. That was somewhat obscured during the Cold 
War era, when the standoff with the US in Cential Europe dominated thinking about Soviet foreign 
policy both in the West and in Moscow itself. However, since the end of the Cold War, the Eurasian 
stiain in Russian foreign policy has slowly been reasserting itself. However, Russia faces a daunting 
geopolitical challenge in maintaining its status as an Asian power. Only 8 million of Russia’s 150 
million inhabitants live in the Far East, and they are vastly outnumbered by China’s population of 1.3 
billion. Russia’s Far Eastern provinces are connected to Moscow, 6,000 km and six time zones away, 
only by the thin umbilical cord of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the vagaries of the post-Soviet air 
seiwices (Peter Rutland and Ustina Markus, ‘Russia as a Pacific Power’, Transition, vol. I, no. 17, 
1995, p. 4).
It should be noted that China has already participated in a number of multilateral regional dialogues, 
including the APEC and ASEAN Regional Fomm. China has been a member of the PECC since 1986 
and of the APEC since 1991. See Juergen Haacke, ‘China’s Participation in Multilateral Pacific 
Cooperation Fomms’, Aussenpolitik, vol. 48, no. 2, 1997, pp. 166-176.
For a more detailed account of the general economic problems (stmctural, investment and etc.) of the 
Soviet Far East up to the late 1980s, see V. P. Chichkanov, Dal’nii Vostok: strategiia ekonomicheskogo 
razvitiia (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1988). For the details of the obstacles to Siberian development, see 
Soo-hyun Chon, ‘South Korea-Soviet Trade Relations: Involvement in Siberian Development’, Asian 
Sw^ey, vol. 29, no. 12, 1989, pp. 1185-1187. For an assessment of the implications of Siberian 
development, see Allen S. Whiting, Siberian Development and East Asia: Threats or Promise? 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981).
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New Political Thinking in Northeast Asia, together with Sino-Soviet political 
rapprochement, especially after the 19th Party Conference in 1988/''
Finally, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet 
Union and South Korea in 1990, the two sides entered a new phase of economic 
relations. For example, Gorbachev’s visit to Cheju Islands (on the southern 
coast of South Korea) while returning from his visit to Japan in April 1991 
showed his strong desire to strengthen the Soviet Union’s economic 
cooperation with South Korea.^^ At the summit, for example, as regards the 
APEC, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo invited the Soviet Union to 
participate in a new international economic forum.^^
The Soviet Union seemed to gain increasingly significant economic 
benefits and supports from South Korea during the Gorbachev era. On the 
contrary, for economic relations with North Korea during this period, trade 
between the Soviet Union and North Korea was decreasing rapidly and Soviet 
aid to North Korea nearly stopped after the diplomatic normalisation with 
South Korea in September 1990. (See Chapters 3 and 4.)
This obviously indicated that Gorbachev’s new regional economic policy 
in Northeast Asia started to emphasise relations with South Korea rather with 
North Korea. Simultaneously, however, this also indicated that the Soviet 
Union during the Gorbachev era had begun to lose its enormous economic 
influence over the Korean peninsula.
The Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era still very much retained its 
supeipower status, exercising a continuous and significant influence over 
regional économie issues. As has been already discussed, its focus gradually
For the details of Soviet economic cooperation under Gorbachev, see Tuzluiaia Koreia - 
potentsial’nyi partner’, Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo stran - chlenov SEV, no. 4, 1990, pp. 106- 
109.
This was the third Soviet-South Korean summit between Roh and Gorbachev and was the historic 
first visit by the Soviet head of state to the Korean peninsula. The Soviet media reported that the third 
summit marked a ‘new level’ in relations and symbolised the ‘beginning of a new stage’ of political 
dialogue and economic cooperation {Izvestiia, 22 April 1991, p. 4; and Pravda, 23 April 1991, p. 5). 
For a detailed account of Soviet economic interests in South Korea, see Chapter 4.
Pravda, 23 April 1991, p. 5.
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moved from North Korea towards South Korea. Indeed, Gorbachev actively 
sought economic cooperation with South Korea in line with the Soviet Union’s 
own economic agenda in the region.
6.2. In Search of Regional Economic Benefits? (Dec. 91-Dec. 93)
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, new concepts for Russia’s foreign 
policy and doctrine were exemplified by a strong emphasis on the economic 
aspects of its international relations with the West (and South Korea) .Russ ia  
pursued a strategy of seeking full participation in international financial and 
economic institutions in order to obtain loans to assist in rebuilding its 
economy and to integrate into the global economy.^'
Given these circumstances, Russia vigorously advocated engagement in 
the emerging regional economic organisation and cooperation in the APR 
(especially in Northeast Asia), thus extending the Asian zone of economic 
dynamism to the Russian Far East as Gorbachev had done during the late 
Soviet era.^  ^ For this piupose, Russia continued to stress political rather than 
military means, paying more attention to economic cooperation than to political 
relations in the APR. In the post-Soviet era, the militaiy factor has become less 
decisive, whereas the economic factor has assumed increasing importance in
On the essence of a foreign economic strategy for Russia, see Stepan Sitarian and Leonid Krasnov, 
‘Russia’s Integration into the World Economy: Paths of Further Development of Russia’s Foreign 
Economic Activity’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 5/6, 1996, pp. 179-190.
However, these economic loans from the West and South Korea led eventually to Russia’s debt 
problems. As of September 1994, the contractual amount of Russia’s debt outstanding totalled some 
$US 86 billion in principal and interest, most of which was carried over from the former Soviet Union. 
The Russian debt is composed of the following three parts: (1) Paris Club debt with official lenders 
(about $US 49 billion); (2) London Club debt with commercial banks (about $US 31 billion); and (3) 
Tokyo Club non-bank debt, supplier credits and other debt (about $US 6 billion). Since the 
normalisation of diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union in September 1990, South Korea 
agreed to grant economic assistance loan to the former Soviet Union. The principal of the external 
outstanding loan to Russia totalled $US 1.47 billion (Sang-moon Halnn and Joon-hwan Im, Debt 
Management and the Russian Debt Problem [Seoul: Korea Institute of Finance, 1996], pp. 7-8 and 63).
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the course of building as well as maintaining a new global o r d e r A s  a result, 
Russia’s military presence in the APR diminished substantially from the Soviet 
period. For example, from 1991 through to 1996, the number of combat vessels 
decreased by 60 per cent: from 333 to 100 sh i p s .T h i s  inevitably led to a 
reduction in Russia’s military presence in the Far East, as Table 6.2 shows.
Table 6.2 Soviet/Russian Forces in the Far Eastern Military District
Ground Forces
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93
Tank Divisions 3 3 3 3
Motor Rifle 
Divisions 21 18 18 16
Pacific Fleet
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93
Submarines 120 110 98 86
Principal
Surface
Combatants
77 69 63 54
Source: Derived from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Militaiy Balance, J987-97.
For the details of Russia’s regional economic interests in the APR such as the APEC, see E. 
Grebenshchikov, ‘Tikhookeanskaia regional’naia integratsiia?’, Mirovaia ekonomika i
mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 1, 1993, pp. 86-96.
The economic factor was undeniable, even in the field of security. With the end of the Cold War, this 
tendency has turned to be a reality. See R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World 
Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), pp. 3-22; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound 
to Lead: the Challenging Nature o f  American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), pp. 188-198; 
and Robert J. Lieber, No Common Power: Understanding International Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), pp. 342-343.
Igor Khmelinov, ‘The Cooperation and Role of ROK-Russia for Northeast Peace and Stability’, in 
International Conference on Fifth Years of Military Relation in ROK-Russia: Presents and Prospects, 
Seoul, September 1996, cited in Oleg Davydov, ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy in Transition’, Asian 
Perspective (Seoul), vol. 22, no. 1, 1998, p. 59.
For a comprehensive analysis of Russia’s military [army] reforms and its development in the post- 
Soviet era, see Richard F. Staar, The New Militaiy in Russia: The Myths That Shape the Image 
(Aimapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1996); Armiia v politicheskoi sisteme obshchestva, Klub 
‘Realisty’, no. 15, Moscow, 1996, pp. 79-83 and 104-108; and V. I. Vakurov, ed., Voennye doktriny i 
reformy Rossii v XX veke (Moscow: Megapolis-Veterarr Otchizny, 1997), pp. 12-20, 54-66, 130-137 
arrd 436-490.
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By and large, by decreasing its military presence in the Far East, Russia 
expected to achieve two clearly objectives with the APR economies: (1) to 
develop the Russian Far East/" and (2) to be engaged actively in a regional 
economic cooperation organisation in the APR.
Russia urgently needed to revitalise its national economy and develop the 
Russian Far East instead of building up its military power in the region.^^ Its 
leaders appeared to believe that this objective could be most effectively 
achieved through full-scale involvement of the Siberian and Far Eastern regions 
of Russia in economic cooperation with countries of the APR on the principles 
of open regionalism as well as through the use of its huge industrial, scientific, 
technical and natural potential. In other words, Russia realised that the success 
of its modernisation programme, especially in the less developed Russian Far 
East, depended on cooperation with neighbouring states in the APR.
In these circumstances, Russia continued to emphasise its economic 
relations with South Korea as Gorbachev had done during the late Soviet era. In 
a speech in Seoul, for instance, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that 
‘Russia is boldly opening its Far Eastern frontiers. It is pursuing a moral, open 
and honest foreign policy, in order to strengthen the zone of intensive 
partnership in what is perhaps one of the most promising regions of the world. I 
think that at the present time it is necessary to undertake a number of measures 
that will give a sti'ong, new impetus to cooperation and the political climate in 
the APR’.^ ®
The Russian Far East covers an area of 6.2 million sq. km, an area that comprises 36.4 per cent of the 
territory of the Russian Federation. This vast region houses 8.16 million people, 5.4 per cent of 
Russia’s population, and its economy conhibutes 5 per cent of Russia’s industrial output (P. Minakir, 
ed., Dal’nii Vostok Rossii: ekonomicheskoe obozrenie [Moscow: Progress-Kompleks Ekopress, 1993], 
pp. 11-13).
”  Charles E. Ziegler, ‘Russia in the Asia-Pacific; a Major Power or Minor Participant?’, Asian Swvey, 
vol. 34, no, 6, 1994, p. 535.
‘Addresses ROK National Assembly’, Russian Television Network, 19 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 
92-224, 19 November 1992, pp. 11-13.
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Another pressing motive for Russia’s economy in the APR was to be 
engaged in a region which had recently experienced the fastest economic 
growth in the world, as Table 6.3 shows.
Table 6.3 Average Annual Rate of Growth of Real GDP in Selected 
Countries, 1991-95 (% per annum)
Area 1991-95
World 3.22
Developed economies 1.76
Developing economies 5,52
South Korea 7.50
Singapore 8.58
Malaysia 8.66
Thailand 8.83
Indonesia 7,14
China 12.02
Source: Derived from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1997 
(Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1997).
As regards APEC and regional économie eooperation in the APR, Russian 
officials basically regarded them as vital elements for its post-Soviet 
economy."" In this context, in September 1992, for example, Russia, in the 
shape of the Russian National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(RNCPEC), was admitted to the Council of Pacific Economic Cooperation."'
It should be emphasised here that the Russian leadership made continuous 
attempts to look for South Korea’s help in order to pursue its eeonomic 
programmes based on a key assumption of its pro-South Korean approach
For a discussion of Russia’s possible integration in APR’s economy, see Round Table, ‘Osobennosti 
integratsii Rossii i stran Vostochnoi Azii v sovremeimoe mirovoe khoziaistvo’, Mirovaia ekonomika i 
mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 12, 1997, pp. 53-71.
For an account of Russia and APEC in the APR, see O. Mal’tseva and E. Semenov, 
‘Ekonomicheskaia integratsiia v aziatsko-tikhookeanskom regione’, Mirovaia ekonomika i 
mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 9, 1995, pp. 75-85; and R. Abazov, ‘Politika Rossii v ATR: smena 
paradigm’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 2, 1997, pp. 23-34.
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towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). At the first 
Russian-South Korean summit in November 1992, for instance, President 
Yeltsin called for an ‘economic partnership’ with South Korea and viewed 
South Korea as a substitute economic partner for Japan in the region."^ This 
indicated that Russia seemed to regard South Korea as a country which, either 
in relationship with other major powers in Northeast Asia such as China, Japan 
and the US, or on its own, could play a significant role in advancing Russia’s 
regional economic interests in the region in the post-Soviet era. According to a 
Russian scholar, Mikhail Titarenko, ‘business cooperation between Russia and 
South Korea is given the top priority in our country’."^  A number of Russian 
experts even believed that South Korea’s experience was more appropriate for 
Russia than America’s or Europe’s.""
As regards Russia’s involvement in regional economic cooperation, 
Russia needed to have South Korea’s support to become a member of regional 
economic organisations such as APEC because South Korea had a leading role 
in its creation. South Korea had greater involvement in regional mechanisms in 
the APR including the APEC and ASEAN-PMC from the mid-1980s onwards. 
In this context, at the first Russian-South Korean summit in 1992, the Yeltsin 
government expressed an interest in joining the APEC.""
Oleg Ivanov, ‘Russia - APEC: a New Stage of Cooperation’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 
43, no. 4, 1997, p. 172.
‘Calls for Economic Partnership’, Itar-Tass, 19 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-224, 19 November 
1992, pp. 10-11. See also Izvestiia, 19 November 1992, p. 4. In the summer of 1992, already a high- 
ranking Russian official mentioned that in the APR, South Korea was the most promising partner for 
Russia rather than Japan, because of the Kurile Islands problem, or China, with its tremendously 
blinkered ideological attitudes {Izvestiia, 1 August 1992, p. 6). But, later Russia realised that South 
Korea could not be a substitute for Japan. Russia may find Seoul attractive as an economic partner 
given the possibility of complementarity in the Russian and South Korean economies, but Seoul did 
not have the same level of financial resources as Japan and lacked Tokyo’s regional and international 
influence. Indeed, the Kremlin still played ‘the South Korean Card’ to put pressure on Japan in terms 
of economic relations.
Mikhail Titarenko, ‘Russia in the Far East after the Disintegration of the USSR’, Sino-Soviet Affairs 
(Seoul), vol. 16, no. 3, 1992, p. 21.
Rossiiskie vesti, 26 May 1994, p. 3.
Yeltsin stated that ‘declaring our desire to become a full member of the community of APR 
counhies, we are following - 1 am not hiding this - our national interests. At the same time, they in no 
way contradict the interests of the APR region’s states’ (‘First Round of Yeltsin-Roh Talks [Addresses
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However, it should be noted that other members of APEC appeared 
determined to limit membership to the more highly developed and stronger 
regional economies. In this situation, Russia was only rewarded with ‘pre­
membership’ of APEC. APEC imposed a three-year moratorium on the 
admission of Russia in Seattle in 1993.""
Here, it must be emphasised that the ultimate reason for Russia’s efforts in 
relation to APEC was to maintain its economic influence as one of the major 
powers in this region in the post-Soviet era. Nevertheless, Russia’s regional 
economic activities were quite limited although it attempted to make good 
results based on its pro-Western (and pro-South Korean) stance in its foreign 
policy during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). There were several difficulties for 
the Russian side to achieve these goals in the APR economies during this 
period. First, world trade was becoming increasingly competitive"^ and there 
was a severe lack of internal economic stability."^ (See Tables 6.4.)
ROK National Assembly]’, Russian Television Network, 19 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-224, 19 
November 1992, p. 12).
Mexico and Papua New Guinea were admitted at the Seattle meeting in 1993. More importantly, at 
the Seattle meeting, members recognised that APEC needed to develop a ‘more systematic means of 
addressing the issue of new members’ and imposed a moratorium on future membership while senior 
officials were asked to conduct a study of membership policy and provide recommendations to tlie 
ministers on the criteria for the admittance of future members. (Nicole Gallant and Richard Stubbs, 
‘APEC’s Dilemmas: Institution-Building around the Pacific Rim’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2, 1997, 
p. 207)
For a discussion of how Russia should make its foreign trade more profitable and efficient, see V. 
Spandar’ian, ‘Prioritetnye napravleniia vneslmeekonomicheskoi deiatel’nosti Rossii?’, Mirovaia 
ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 12, 1992, pp. 19-28. For an analysis of new world 
economic pattern of the 1990s, for example, see Shi Min, ‘The World Economic Pattern in the 1990s 
and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’, Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 9, no. 3, 1990, pp. 
50-60.
For Russia’s problems in world market in the post-Soviet era, see A. El’ianov, ‘Rossiia na mirovom 
rynke; nekotorye problemy’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 11, 1995, pp. 15- 
30. For tlie general problems of Russian economic systems in the post-Soviet era, see M. Barabanov, 
‘Sistemnyi krizis ekonomiki Rossii’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 3, 1995, 
pp. 17-24. For an overview of Russian economic problems at this time, see V. A. Man, Ekonomika i 
vlast’: politicheskaia istoriia ekonomicheskoi reformy v Rossii 1985-1994 (Moscow: Delo, 1995), pp. 
22-83; and N. la. Petiakov, Russkaia ruletka (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1998).
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Table 6.4 Annual Economie Indicators of Russia, 1991-93 (%)
Year Growth in GDP Inflation
1991 -5% 93%
1992 -15% 1353%
1993 -9% 896%
Sources: Derived from Russian Economic Trends, vol. 4, no. 4, 1995, p. 112; and The World Bank 
Development Report, 1996, p. 174.
Secondly, the formation of APEC presented another obstacle to Russia, 
which was closely related to its new ‘identity’"" in the APR in the post-Soviet 
era. The Soviet authorities did not view themselves as part of the APR and 
tended to define national interests in Asia in global rather than region-specific 
terms. The Soviet leadership, while pushing ahead with numerous 
propagandistic initiatives and strengthening their military presence, did little 
develop diversified practical ties with Asian countries and failed to participate 
in the economic life of the region."" Thus, Russia inherited from the Soviet 
Union neither an elaborate Asian policy nor a particularly impressive list of 
achievements in terms of the country’s participation in APR affairs.
Thirdly, the general conditions of the Russian Far East held little 
attraction for other major economic powers in the post-Soviet era. The 
widening gap between the Russian Far East and other capitalist APR countries 
represented a major stumbling block for Russia’s smooth engagement into the 
region’s affairs."'
The loss of supeipower status has also entailed a painful effort to identify a new role as an Eurasian 
power, which was closely related to Russia’s isolation in international relations in the post-Soviet era. 
For a discussion of Russian identity during the early years of Russian foreign policy, for example, see 
Peter Ferdinand, ‘Russia and Russians after Communism: Western or Eurasian?’, The World Today, 
vol. 48, no. 12, 1992, pp. 225-229. For a comment on Russian identity in the Tsarist and Soviet eras, 
see Franklyn Griffiths, Arctic and North in the Russian Identity, Working Paper 8 (Toronto: Centre for 
Russian East European Studies, University of Toronto, 1990).
Davydov, ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy in Transition’, pp. 58-59.
For a discussion of economic relations between the Russian Far East and the APR countries, see 
Michael J. Bradshaw, ‘Economic Relations of the Russian Far East with the Asia-Pacific States’, Post- 
Soviet Geography, vol. 35, no. 4, 1994, pp. 234-246. For details of economic problems in the Russian 
Far East during the early years of Russian foreign policy, see Valery K. Zaitsev, ‘Problems of Russian
2 0 6
Fourthly, it was clear that high-level bilateral contacts between Russia and 
North and South Korea did not create a congenial atmosphere for finding ways 
out of Russian economic difficulties. Especially, Russia’s intention to engage 
more deeply in economic contacts with South Korea was hindered by Russia’s 
debts to South K o r e a . I n  the meantime, South Korea increasingly attempted to 
use its economic help to Russia as a ‘bargaining chip’ to reduce or even 
eliminate Russia’s cooperation with North Korea for the issues of the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty and the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
(See Chapters 3 and 5.) Furtheimore, although Russia emphasised its economic 
relations with South Korea, the latter started to put more stress on its relations 
with China.
In these circumstances, Russia’s economic role on the Korean peninsula 
became less and less influential during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). Instead, 
Russia asked South Korea to help Russia’s economic aims such as joining 
APEC and the development of the Russian Far East. In the meantime, Russia 
could no longer give economic assistance to North Korea in the post-Soviet 
era."" Russia actually became a net recipient of economic aid after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, as Table 6.5 indicates.
Economic Reforms and Prospects for Economic Cooperation between the Russian Far East and 
Northwest Pacific Countries’, Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 10, no. 4, Winter 1991/92, pp. 
35-42; and M. L. Titarenko and A. V. Ostiovskii, eds., Rossiiskii D al’nii Vostok i Severo-Vostochnaia 
Aziia: Problemy ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva (Moscow; Editorial URSS, 1998), pp. 38-95.
For the details of Russia’s debts to South Korea, see Chapter 4. For a general account of Russia’s 
foreign debts, see B. Pichugin, ‘Vnesluiii dolg Rossii: Stat’ia pervaia’, Mirovaia ekonomika i 
mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 6, 1995, pp. 21-31; and B. Pichugin, ‘Vneslmii dolg Rossii: Stat’ia 
vtoraia’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 7, 1995, pp. 65-75.
South Korea normalised its diplomatic relations with China in August 1992, and China became the 
second major power to recognise the two Koreas on the Korean peninsula. For a detailed political and 
economic development of Sino-South Korean relations after their normalisation, see, for example, H 
Liu, ‘The Sino-South Korean Normalisation - a Triangular Explanation’, Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 11, 
1993, pp. 1083-1094; C. J. Zhao, ‘Impact of Sino-South Korean Diplomatic Relations on Trade and 
Economic Relations in Northeast Asia’, Chinese Economic Studies, vol. 27, no, 4, 1994, pp. 61-70; and 
Hieyeon Keum, ‘Noimalisation and after: Prospects for the Sino-South Korean Relations’, Korea and 
World Affairs, vol. 20, no. 4, 1996, pp. 572-589.
As regards Russia’s aid to North Korea, Yeltsin intended to cut off all defence assistance and all 
arms sales to North Korea. In Seoul in November 1992, Yeltsin stated that ‘Russia will discontinue any 
military assistance to North Korea. We are ready for cooperation in the military-teclmical field with 
South Korea’ (‘No More Military Aid to DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 19 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-224, 
19 November 1992, p. 10).
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Table 6.5 International Aid to Russia, 1992-95 
($US million)
Pledged Disbursements
1992 23,530 10,300
1993 16,330 6,595
1994 3,820 5,015
1995 3,360 4,175
Total 123,500 74,000*
Source: Lawrence R. Robertson, éd., Russia & Eurasia: Facts & Figures Annual (Gulf Breeze, 
Florida: Academic International Press, 1997), vol. 22, p. 167. * means total the period from 1991 to 
1995
Russia had to move away from its previous position of being a principal 
helper to the North Korean economy to that of a subordinate player after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Ultimately, this led Russia to be engaged in a 
more constructive way in a US-led regional economic system in the post-Soviet 
era. According to a Russian scholar, ‘Russia has not been able to implement the 
concept of compensating abilities which would give Russian an increased 
economic and political presence in exchange for a decreased military presence 
in the region. Consequently, Russia has chosen indirect engagement with the 
US via rapprochement with America’s allies in the region such as South Korea 
and Japan’.""
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned here that unlike other agenda 
(Chapters 3, 4 and 5), virtually all Russian refomiers and conservatives among 
the Russian leadership seemed to be no serious conflict views concerning the 
mentioned two regional eeonomic issues in the APR in the post-Soviet era.""
In spite of all Russia’s active efforts to develop regional economic 
cooperation based on its new pro-Western and pro-South Korean stance,
”  Alexei D. Bogaturov, ‘Russia in Northeast Asia: Setting a New Agenda’, Korea and World Affairs, 
vol. 17, no. 2, 1993, p. 307.
In this respect, Russian conservatives [pro-North Korean forces] even supported Yeltsin’s pro-South 
Korean stance due to Russia’s economic interests in the region.
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Russia’s real capacity to influence developments concerning fell short of all its 
expectations in the early years of Russia, Rather, a number of the attempts 
made by the Russian side to be involved in regional economic issues, together 
with economic help from other countries, only resulted in the worsening of 
relations between the two former allies (Russia and North Korea), weakening 
Russia’s role on the Korean peninsula. In other words, Russia only proved its 
ineffectiveness in seeking a foreign policy that would help its own economy. 
As a result, Russia was no longer one of the major economic powers in the 
region, able to pursue an active and consistent policy towards the Korean 
peninsula in order to maximise its economic national interests. This led Russia 
more seriously to attempt to look for other ways to be involved in regional 
economic issues in the coming years.
6.3. In Search of a Legal Framework for Regional Economic Cooperation? 
(Dec. 93-Dec. 95)
Russia’s basic regional economic policy in Northeast Asia after the December 
1993 parliamentary election continued to emphasise involvement in regional 
economic organisations and multilateral economic cooperation with its 
neighbour states. This indicated that the characteristic feature of Russian 
economic diplomacy after the December 1993 parliamentary election was the 
taking of more purposeful and active steps towards diversification of the 
geographical structure of its economic exchange with other countries in 
Northeast Asia.
Unlike previous years (Dec. 91-Dec. 93), however, Russia’s approach to 
the APR economies changed from its previously passive expeetations to a more 
serious active and sensible policy of step-by-step engagement during this 
period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). This indicated that despite Russia’s cooperation with 
the West and South Korea based on its pro-Western (and pro-South Korean)
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stance during the first years of the change of regime, it was not satisfied with 
the results it was obtaining in the region as a successor state to the former 
Soviet Union. For example, South Korea’s economic investment in the Russian 
economy during that period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93) had not been as substantial as 
the Russian side had expected. (See Chapter 4.)
In these circumstances, by the end of 1993, Russia started to reorient its 
regional economic policy in the APR from its previous passive stance and its 
search for economic assistance hom the West and South Korea towards a more 
positive engagement in the region. To this end, two major active steps were 
taken to maintain Russia’s economic influence in the APR during this period: 
(1) to apply for full membership for the APEC; and (2) to conclude a contract 
for Tumen River Area Development Project (TRADP).
As mentioned earlier, APEC had already imposed a three-year 
moratorium on the admission of Russia in Seattle in 1993. Since the imposition 
of APEC’s moratorium, Russian officials repeatedly expressed their 
government’s wish to be accepted as a frill member of APEC. In November 
1994, for example, deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Panov stated that ‘We 
hope that Russia will become a fully fledged member of APEC after the 
moratorium expires, the more so since the members of that organisation 
recognise the fact that Russia is part and parcel of the APR and is able to 
contribute to the work of APEC’.^ ^
In the end, in March 1995, Russia officially applied for full membership 
of APEC.^^ The message by foreign minister Kozyrev that was attached to the 
application stressed that Russia, which was consistently implementing 
economic reforms and which fully shared the principles of this influential 
organisation, was interested in its earliest and full-fledged inclusion in the Asia- 
Pacific economic space, which would primarily involve tapping of the huge
‘Minister Reiterates Moscow’s Desire to Join APEC’, Itar-Tass, 11 November 1994 in FBIS-SOV 
94-219, 14 November 1994, p. 13.
Kommersant-daily, 18 March 1995, p. 4.
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potential of its Siberian and Far Eastern r eg ions .As  regards Russia’s applying 
for full membership of APEC, deputy foreign minister Panov stated that ‘we 
hope to be the first countiy admitted to APEC once the moratorium ends’.^  ^The 
application for full membership of APEC clearly demonstrated that groups such 
as APEC, PECC and other economic organisations had become a focus of 
Russia’s ‘economic d i p l o m a c y i n  the APR in the post-Soviet era.
To a certain extent, Russia seemed to regard APEC as a worthy 
‘alternative’ to the European Union (EU) which Russia, as an European state, 
could theoretically join but where in practice it had no prospect s .As  a Russian 
scholar had obseiwed, ‘the Asia-Pacific direction remains in the zone of priority 
attention of Russian economic diplomacy... the initiation of action in it was 
devoted not just to opening impressive potentials of foreign economic ties for 
Russia with the dynamically developing countries of the APR, but also to 
partially counterbalance the apparent tilt towards Western Europe and to lower 
the dependence of the domestic economy on relations with the EU, which 
increased during recent y e a r s I n  fact, in the Europeans’ opinion, Russia was 
generally too backward and too large for the EU in the post-Soviet era. This 
indicated that, to a large extent, Russia was considerably threatened with 
remaining isolated, surrounded by the numerous blocs and unions which took 
shape after the collapse of the Soviet Union.'’^
However, it should be noted that APEC was not a political process [and 
organisation] in the broadest context.*’^  Rather, APEC has evolved towards a
‘Moscow Officially Applies for APEC Membership’, Itar-Tass, 17 March 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95- 
054,21 March 1995, p. 16.
^'^Rossiiskaia gazeta, 22 March 1995, p. 6.
See A. Kondakov and P. Smirnov, ‘Economic Diplomacy of Russia’, International Affairs 
(Moscow), vol. 43, no. 2, 1997, pp. 13-29.
‘APEC Seen as EU Alternative for Russia’, Rabochaya Tribuna, 2 December 1997, p. 3 in FBIS- 
SOV 97-336, December 1997.
Kondakov and Smirnov, ‘Economic Diplomacy of Russia’, p. 19.
It should be noted that the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the CMEA had been dismantled with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
For example, according to Helmut Schmidt, the European Union was a political process. It can be 
seen as a political process in at least two fundamental senses. First, the Union, which started as the 
EEC, was devised as a long-teim safety device to prevent any further outbreak of major military
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central intergovernmental organisation for policy coordination and cooperation 
in the 1990s.'’^  In this respect, the issue of membership of APEC has been one 
of the central problems of the 1990s.^^
More importantly, the decisive reason for Russia’s attempt to apply for 
full membership of APEC was that it expected to be recognised by neighbour 
states as one of the major powers which could influence regional economic 
matters, as it was afraid of being excluded from the consolidation of the 
economic integration process in the APR after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
In other words, by becoming a full member of APEC, Russia could claim to be 
an APR economic power and could reap more benefits from full-scale 
économie cooperation with other countries in the region (especially, concerning 
the Russian Far East). In this respect, Russia had viewed APEC as an useful 
multilateral vehicle for a broader Asian cooperative economic process, which 
might afford it ‘another opportunity’ for its economy. To a certain extent, 
Russia preferred indirect engagement in regional economy through the 
multilateral economic organisation because it had not been able to enter the 
Asia-Pacific economic system directly due to mainly the weakness of its 
economic power in the post-Soviet era.
conflict between its member nations. Secondly, the device was installed as an initial step toward the 
long-term eventual goal of political union between the member nations of Western Europe. The union 
started with economic integration at the initial stage out of economic and social necessity, as well as 
expediency. It is a far easier task than political integration (Ungsuh K. Park, ‘The Impact of APEC; a 
Private Sector View’, Koj'ea and World Affairs, vol. 19, no. 4, 1995, p. 635).
The evolution of APEC from a ‘talking shop’ in its earlier stage (1985-95) toward a vehicle for the 
implementation of trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation (from 1995 onwards) made 
APEC potentially more controversial (Chung H. Lee and Charles E. MorTison, ‘APEC and Two 
Koreas’, Pacific Focus, vol. 11, no. 1, 1996, p. 33).
APEC’s membership reflects great diversity: from the most advanced industrial countries, such as 
the US and Japan, to countries whose industrialisation has not seriously taken off as yet, such as Papua 
New Guinea. It includes the model cases of capitalist market economies such as Singapore and Hong 
Kong, as well as China which has yet to experience the fundamental transformation from a basic 
communist economy, partially modified with elements of market economy, toward a full-fledged free 
market economy. Such heterogeneity of APEC’s membership is generally regarded as the greatest 
obstacles to achieving any meaningful degree of trade and investment liberalisation in the region. For 
the detailed explanation of APEC problems including membership, see, for example. Gallant and 
Stubbs, ‘APEC’s Dilemmas’, pp. 203-218.
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In these circumstances, Russia stressed the following two factors when 
applying to become a full member of APEC: (1) its geographical proximity to 
the APR; and (2) the potential of the Russian Far East for the APR economies.
Russia had a strong claim by virtue of its 18,000 km Pacific coastline, 
although being a geographic part of the region did not provide sufficient 
grounds for a claim to membership in APEC. Furthermore, it also had the 
massive economic potential of Siberia and the Russian Far East, which would 
provide not only support for its internal economic reforms, but would also be in 
line with the interests of all the countries of the region.^^
In some sense, however, it should be also noted that Russia’s intention to 
become a full member of APEC seemed to be ‘symbolic’, which was closely 
related to ‘Eurasianism’, together with its practical, economic reasons in the 
post-Soviet era. In other words, if  Russia succeeded in becoming a member of 
the APR economic organisation, it also implied that Russia could be recognised 
as a ‘Eurasian’ power by other members (rather than practical economic 
advantage) in the post-Soviet era.^ ®
However, there were differing reactions to Russia’s intention to become a 
full member of APEC among other members of this economic organisation.
For a detailed explanation of the potentials (natural resources) of Russian Far East, see R. V. Babun, 
Razvitie chernoi metallurgii Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka (Moseow: Nauka, 1987); Mark Valencia, ed.. 
The Russian Far East in Transition: Opportunities for Regional Economic Coopet'ation (Boulder, 
Colrado: Westview Press, 1995); Tsuneo Akalia, ed., Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East: 
Changing Ties with Asia-Pacific (London and New York; Routledge, 1997); A. Granberg and V. 
Ishaev, ‘Progranrma ekonomicheskogo i sotsial’nogo razvitiia Dal’nego Vostoka i Zabaikal’ia; pervye 
shagi’, Ekonornist, no. 9, 1997, pp. 10-19; S. Bystiitskii, V. Zausaev and M. Ledenev, ‘Osobennosti 
privatizatsii na Dal’nem Vostoke’, Ekonomist, no. 2, 1998, pp. 54-60; and S. Bystritskii, V. Zausaev 
and M. Ledenev, ‘Rynochnye preobrazovaniia na Dal’nem Vostoke’, Ekonomist, no. 9, 1998, pp. 49- 
58.
According to Dmitiy Shlapentokh, Eurasianism is a quasi-political and intellectual movement. Its 
representatives state that Russia is a unique blend of Slavic and non-Slavic cultures and eüuiic groups. 
Eurasianists emphasised the historical links of Russia with the East (Dmitiy V. Shlapentokh, 
‘Eurasianism; Past and Present’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 1997, pp. 
129-151). Initially, the paradigm of Eurasianism was created in the 1920s by Russian emigrants in 
Sophia, Prague, Belgrade and Berlin-primarily by Nikolai Tmbetskoy, Pyoti- Savitsky and Georgy 
Vernadsky. The major proposal emphasised that the territory of the former Russian empire or the 
Soviet Union was a specific historical and geographical universe, belonging neither to Europe nor to 
Asia, being a specific unique phenomenon (S. B. Lavrov, ‘L.N. Gumilev i evraziistvo’ [L. N. Gumilev 
and Eurasianism], in L. N. Gumilev, ed., Ritmy Evrazii (Moscow; Ekopress, 1993), p. 9). For an
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Although some APEC members expressed concern about whether Russia 
would be an honest partner - that was, would it be fully open to free trade, 
would dirty tricks be played by state structures, or would it be a politically 
stable countiy?^^
South Korea, in principle, supported Russia’s admission into APEC. For 
example, during the South Korean President’s visit to Moscow in June 1994, 
Kim Young-sam expressed support for Russia’s candidacy.^’ In November 
1994, according to the South Korean foreign minister, the main criteria for 
APEC membership were geographic location and regional economic ties.^^ In 
September 1995, Kim Sok-kyu, ambassador of South Korea to the Russian 
Federation, stated that ‘based on Russia’s possibilities and potential, its 
participation in APEC seems completely justified. Although Russia’s entry into 
APEC is delayed because of the moratorium which will be in effect until the 
end of 1996, it has already secured the strong support of South Korea... South 
Korea was the first country to announce support for Russia’s joining APEC in a 
joint statement by the presidents of the two c o u n t r i e s E v e n  a Russian high- 
ranking official confirmed that ‘the South Korean side [had reiterated] its 
support of the Russian claim for joining APEC’.^ ^^
To a considerable extent, South Korea was in a position to play its unique 
role as a mediator between developed and developing economies in the region.
account of Eurasianism in the post-Soviet era, see also David Kerr, ‘The New Eurasianism: the Rise of 
Geopolitics in Russia’s Foreign Policy’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 47, no. 6, 1995, pp. 977-988.
™ For this reason, for example, at the APEC summit in Bogor (Indonesia) in November 1994, Russia 
inexplicably neglected to participate even as an observer.
‘Kim welcomed Russia’s intention to participate actively and constmctively in all areas of Asia- 
Pacific Economic Cooperation and... Would give favourable consideration to the candidacy of the 
Russian Federation for APEC membership when the matter is taken up at future APEC fora’ (‘Joint 
Communiqué Declares New Bilateral Ties’, Yonhap, 2 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-106, 2 June 1994,
p. 6).
In connection with geographic location and regional economic ties, Seung-joo Han discussed the 
possibility of future membership for Russia, Vietnam and North Korea. ‘Because Russia, a Pacific Rim 
country, is a big military power and has good economic potential, it is time to think about involving 
Russia in APEC’, the South Korean foreign minister said (‘Articles Examine Challenges Facing APEC 
- Views of ROK Foreign Minister’, Suam Karya, 15 November 1994, pp. 1, 8 in FBIS-EAS 95-003, 
15 November 1994).
”  See Problemy D al’nego Vostoka, no. 6, 15 November 1995, pp. 3-9.
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Above all, South Korea could claim with some legitimacy to be an originator of 
the APEC concept. While notions of intergovernmental APR cooperation dated 
back in the academic literature to the late 1960s and entered into governmental 
discussions in the late 1970s, the specific proposal that led to the creation of 
APEC came in a January 1989 Australian-South Korean joint communiqué.^^ 
For the South Korean side, APEC also became a vehicle for association with 
other Asia-Pacific nations, an oppoitunity for maintaining but diversifying its 
relations with the US and a venue for maximising its influence and bargaining 
leverage. Moreover, APEC also provided South Korea with some guarantee of 
being in the same economic grouping as the US, its single most important 
market. South Korea had been concerned about the direction of US trade policy 
indicated by NAFTA, a preferential arrangement hom which South Korea had 
been excluded.^^
In other words. South Korea’s interest in the APEC was based less on the 
projected benefits of economic cooperation itself, but more on the value to the 
South Korean government of its diplomatic and political association with other 
APR countries. There were several reasons for these benefitsri^ (1) by 
associating South Korea with other regional Asian states, it conferred 
legitimacy on the South Korean state. This was regarded as very important to 
South Korea, which for many decades had seen its foreign policy primarily in 
terms of a struggle with North Korea; (2) There was a potential in regional 
cooperation for developing associations with Asian governments with which 
South Korea did not yet have diplomatic relations. In fact, South Korea took the 
lead in negotiating China’s entiy into APEC (along with Taiwan and Hong 
Kong) prior to the second APEC ministerial meeting in Seoul in 1991 and in 
the process augmented its contacts with the mainland government; (3) The
‘Karasin Comments on Talks with ROK Officials’, Interfax, 13 July 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-135, 14 
July 1995, p. 14.
Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC (Washington D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1995), p. 55.
Lee and Morrison, ‘APEC and Two Koreas’, p. 37.
Fnnabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, pp. 73-76.
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association with the APR countries represented a diversification of South 
Korea’s foreign policy, which had been characterised by an asymmetrical 
relationship with the US; and (4) South Korea could gain leverage vis-à-vis 
larger neighbours or trading partners through association with other medium­
sized or smaller countries with similar interests.
In the meantime, in May 1994, Russian first deputy defence minister 
Andrei Kokoshin stated that Russia’s relations with South Korea were a major 
factor helping Russia enter what he called the ‘APR integration system’.^  ^
When Russian Vice Premier Oleg Davydov visited South Korea in July 1995, 
he handed the South Korean President a personal message from Russian 
President Yeltsin, expressing a desire to promote relations between the two 
sides. Notably, the talks also touched on Russia’s integration into the world 
economic community and on Russia’s membership of the World Trade 
Organisation.^^
The US seemed to have an ambiguous attitude towards Russia’s entry into 
APEC. The issue of APEC had been the centrepiece of US regional economic 
policy since the Seattle meeting in 1993. There was widespread concern at the 
possibility of increasing hegemonic direction by the US and APEC was viewed 
as a forum for attempting to influence US behaviour. In this respect, hom the 
perspective of Washington, APEC was another instiument to be used in its 
attempts to force open the markets of Northeastern Asia.^° Furthermore, it was 
true that APEC certainly had done little so far to prevent the US resorting to 
bilateralism in its economic relations with other states of the region.
A Japanese Foreign Ministiy official expressed little enthusiasm over 
Russia’s application for entiy into the APEC forum as follows: ‘I don’t think
‘Deputy Defence Minister Meet His ROK Coimteipart’, Interfax, 4 May 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-087, 
5 May 1994, p. 17.
‘Davydov Hands Yeltsin Message to ROK President’, Itar-Tass, 11 July 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-132, 
11 July 1995, p. 3.
On the US’s role and its economic interest in the APR, see Gilbert Rozman, ‘A Regional Approach 
to Northeast Asia’, Orbis, vol. 39, no. 1, 1995, pp. 65-80. For the US’s role and leadership in APEC, 
see Helen Nesadurai, ‘APEC: a Tool for US Regional Domination?’, The Pacific Review, vol. 9, no. 1, 
1996, pp. 31-57.
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Russia is a country that ought to join’, the Japanese official said. ‘APEC 
comprises economies in the APR, and although Russia partially belongs to the 
region, it seems somewhat different
In principle, China did not seem to oppose Russia’s intention to become a 
member of APEC. For example, a Chinese diplomat argued that neighbouring 
Russia and China possessed a great economic potential and that they should 
actively develop bilateral ties which contributed to the development of the 
whole APR.^^ However, it did not mean that China supported Russia’s intention 
to be a member of APEC as Russia had expected.^^
In general, Russia was regarded as an economically backward country 
which urgently needed more economic assistance from the West and South 
Korea while waiting passively for a positive response. As Izvestiia reported, 
‘Russia is not yet in Europe, but no longer in Asia. Russia will not be 
represented at a major Asia-Pacific fomm whose participants will discuss the 
region’s economic future in the 21^ century. This seems like just deserts for a 
country that, instead of making a breakthrough into Asia, has on its hands a 
dying Trans-Siberian Railroad and moribund business activity in the Russian 
Far East’.^ ^^
‘Official Negative on Russia’s APEC Bid’, Kyodo, 23 March 1995 in FBIS-EAS 95-057, 23 March 
1995. Japan along with Australia, took the initiative in establishing tire economic institutions such as 
PAFTAD, PBEC, PECC and APEC in the APR. For an analysis of Japan’s role in the APEC, see 
Kazuo Takahashi, ‘Japan and the APEC; in Search of Leadership’, in APEC and a New Pacific 
Community: Issues and Prospects (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1995), pp. 139-160; and Funabashi, 
Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC.
‘China Backs Russia’s Intention to Join APEC’, Itar-Tass, 23 March 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-060, 29 
March 1995, p. 14.
For the details of Chinese relations with APEC, see, for example, Gary Klintworth, ‘China’s 
Evolving Relationship with APEC’, International Journal, vol. 50, no. 3, 1995, pp. 488-515; and L. 
Wu, ‘The PRC and APEC: a Planned Excursion for Conciliation’, Issues and Studies, vol. 33, no. 11, 
1997, pp. 95-111. Furthermore, it should be noted that there was serious cooperation between China 
and South Korea in the APR concerning APEC. See lu. Tsiganov, ‘Respublika Koreia i Kitai v 
integratsionnykh protsessakli mirovoi ekonomiki’, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniia, no. 5, 1995, pp. 112-121.
Izvestiia, 9 November 1994, p. 3. APEC’s members were cool towards the entry of new members 
into its ranks. So Russia was still outside this organisation, even though, at different times, 
representatives of Austr alia, South Korea, the US and the ASEAN countries evaluated the prospects for 
its joining favourably. The fact was that there exist within the organisation itself contradictions both 
with respect to the actual problems of trade, economic and investment policies in the APR and with 
respect to the mutual suspicions in coimection with the attempts to set up within the APEC a dictate of
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This inevitably continued to undermine Russia’s role and influence 
towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). On the one 
hand, Russia could no longer be a state which gave economic assistance to 
North Korea. On the other hand, Russia continuously needed to have firmer 
support from South Korea for its economic aims in this region that was the case 
in previous years (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).^^
In the meanwhile, in the 1990s, many APEC member economies 
promoted sub-regional free trade arrangements, such as the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) among Asian countries, the Australia-New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) among Oceanic countries 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among North 
American countries. (See Table 6.6.)
Table 6.6 APEC Sub-Regional Group Economic Statistics, 1994
Group Total
Exports
Exports to 
APR
Exports to 
APR/Total 
Exports (%)
GDP
($US)
APEC 1,918,369 1,405,020 46 1 2 ,1 1 2
NAFTA 730,617 347,826 17 6,928
AFTA 256,540 57,590 6 415
ANZCER 59,394 56,787 1 373
Source: Milnes, Harmonising Sub-regional Arrangements within APEC, 1996.
Such ‘sub-regionalism’^  ^was, by definition, directed against broad-based 
trade liberalisation and as such not only raised anxieties among non-members
the developed countries. The Americans were not concealing their yearning to increase American 
exporting and capital investment in the region and, at the same time, they were placing obstacles in the 
way of the drawing together of Japan and China in the economic sphere to counterbalance the US 
(‘Russian Desire to Join APEC Viewed’, Moscow Delovoy Mir, 14 July 1995, p. 7 in FBIS-SOV 95- 
154-S, 10 August 1995, p. 7).
For the details of Russia’s economic relations with the two Koreas, see Chapters 3 and 4.
For a discussion of sub-regionalism in Asia, for example, see John Ingleson, ed., Regionalism, 
Subregionalism and APEC (Clayton, Vic.: Monash Asia Institute, 1998); and Sergei Medvedev,
218
of sub-regional groupings, but demanded adequate harmonisation between 
these two co n cep ts .T h is  sub-regionalism in the APR was a quite natural 
tendency because the APR covers a vast area and diverse economies exist here 
for geographical and historical reasons. Moreover, differences in political views 
and social systems played a part in the resulting political, economic and social 
disparity among the countries concerned. Hence, it was very difficult to form a 
close entity dedicated to economic cooperation.
For this reason, various ideas have been advanced by scholars and 
government organisations with regard to the setting up of economic spheres, 
including a ‘Northeast Asian economic sphere’ (or an ‘East Asian Economic 
Circle [EAEC]’, or an ‘East Asian economic sphere’, or a Sea of Japan rim 
economic sphere, or a Yellow Sea rim economic sphere) in the APR.^^ 
Northeast Asia, being the centre of the APR economies, embraces China, 
Japan, the eastern part of Russia (the Russian Far East), the Korean peninsula 
and Mongolia. Some favourable conditions existed for establishing such a 
‘Northeast Asian economic sphere’; (1) the economies in this area are highly 
complementary; and (2) the normalisation of relations between Russia and 
China and the development of their economic and commercial ties have not 
only created an important political pre-condition, but have also provided an 
important basis for cooperation among the Northeast Asian economies.
In these circumstances, Russia attempted to become involved in the 
Tumen River Area Development Project (T R A D P ),w hich  was one of the
‘Subregionalism in Northeast Asia: a Post-Westphalian View’, Security Dialogue, vol. 29, no. 1, 1998, 
pp. 89-100.
Park, ‘The Impact of APEC’, p. 634.
See Y. Nagatomi, ‘Economic Regionalism and the EAEC’, Japan Review o f International Affairs, 
vol. 9, no. 3, 1995, pp. 206-211.
Min, ‘The World Economic Pattern in 1990s’, p. 59.
The TRADP is a plan for a multi-billion dollar tiade and hansport mega-complex in the Tumen 
River delta. It is one of the most far-reaching shategic economic ventures ever proposed for Northeast 
Asia and has been widely discussed both at UN sponsored meetings and in the public press. For further 
details, see Andrew Marton, Terry McGee and Donald G. Paterson, ‘Northeast Asian Economic 
Cooperation and the Tumen River Area Development Project’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 68, no. 1, 1995, pp. 
8-33. For a more detailed account of the origins of the TRADP scheme, see Mark J. Valencia,
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central elements in multinational economic developmental projects designed to 
bring together former political and ideological adversaries, such as China, 
Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea and Russia in the post-Soviet era.^  ^
The main aim of the project was to transform an area adjoining North Korea, 
southern Primorskii krai in Russia and China’s Jilin province into a major- 
commercial hub and trade centre like Hong Kong or Singapore in Northeast 
Asia, utilising South Korean and Japanese investment, capital and technology. 
North Korean and Chinese manpower was available, together with Russian and 
Mongolian untapped natural resources. The five Northeast Asian countries 
would all benefit from the programme.^^
As Map 6.1 shows, the TRADP is a geographically specific, transnational 
development project conceived as a symbol of Northeast Asian cooperation and 
dedicated to the ideal of forming a global landbridge hub for the 21^ centur-y.
Map 6.1 Tumen River Delta Area
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‘Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia: the Proposed Tumen River Scheme’, The Pacific Review, 
vol. 4, no. 3, 1991, pp. 263-271.
Of the three regional cooperation schemes in which Russia is involved - the Baltic Sea cooperation, 
tlie Black Sea cooperation and the Northeast Asian cooperation - Northeast Asian cooperation has been 
considered the most critical by botli federal and Far East local goveiiunents. This assessment is 
supported by two important speeches delivered by Gorbachev in Vladivostok (1986) and Krasnoyarsk 
(1988), which declared the Soviet Union a part of tlie Asia-Pacific region and endorsed a full 
commitment to establishing the Union as a member of that community.
It should be noted that Son Sung-pil, North Korean ambassador to Russia, stated that ‘North Korea is 
interested in the participation of Russian business circles in creating a free trade and economic zone on 
its teiritory’ (‘DPRK Seeks Russia’s Participation in Trade Zone’, Itar-Tass, 20 July 1995 in FBIS- 
SOV 95-140, 21 July 1995, p. 10).
220
The significance of the TRADP lies in the fact that it has been driven by a 
political commitment to a restoration and rebuilding of regional identity as well 
as to exploiting economic complementarities, often the principal rationale for 
other regional economic amalgamations around the world. The TRADP, as an 
outcome, can be understood as a reflection of inter-state negotiations mediated 
by local initiatives largely defined by local government and private business 
interests. The TRADP also can be understood as a ‘sub-regionaT economic 
phenomenon, which involves ‘cross-border’ development of neighbouring 
territories, thus providing the platfoim for wider and expanded multilateral 
cooperation in the Northeast Asian region.
In other words, impelled by the growing trend towards economic 
regionalism in the global economy and to the consequent need to create some 
sort of suitable regional structure in the APR, these five countries also tiled to 
promote regional cooperation from the late Soviet era o n w ard s.T h e  evolving 
market of the region, especially between Northeast China and Pacific Russia, 
has been an effective driving force of regional economic integration in the area 
of the Tumen River. Indeed, if the joint development of the area proved 
successful, it would represent a breakthrough in the formation of a Northeast 
Asian economic sphere in the post-Soviet era. The TRADP has since been an 
effective driving force for economic integration in the region.
In May 1995, five states - Russia, China, North and South Korea and 
Mongolia - initiated a formal agreement for the TRADP, with Japan abstaining. 
Finally, in December 1995, five countries signed an agreement of the 
Consultative Committee for Developing Northeast Asia aimed at promoting the 
economic development of the Tumen River and an memorandum of 
understanding on environmental issues.
The TRADP started in 1990. See Joseph M. Ha and Donald B. Hillmuth, ‘Prospects for Regional 
Cooperation in Northeast Asia’, (Seoul), vol. 17, no. 1, 1993, pp. 165-198.
See Joongang Ilbo (Seoul), 15 December 1995, pp. 2-3.
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The signing of this agreement demonstiated the commitment of five 
Northeast Asian countries to the construction of a sub-regional multilateral 
economic development cooperation system for the first time since they 
originally agreed to develop Northeast Asia at the Northeast Asian Conference 
of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) during the final year 
of Soviet rule (1991). The agreement of the Consultative Committee for 
Developing Northeast Asia made provision for further assistance for 
developing the Tumen River region and the establishment of a committee for 
expanding investment. The cost of the project, which would be implemented 
under the auspices of the UNDP, was estimated at $US 30 billion.^^ Indeed, to 
large extent, by signing the documents, the five Northeast Asian countiies set 
up a ‘legal framework’ for international co-operation, creating a ‘Rotterdam of 
Northeast Asia’^  ^with the backing of the United Nations.
As regards Russia’s efforts over this sub-regional economic programme, it 
should be mentioned here that already, in late 1992, Yuri Fadeyev, the Russian 
ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiaiy to North Korea, stated that ‘We 
are planning to establish the Tumen River trade and economic zone on the 
Russia-North Korea-China border and push ahead with large-scale projects if 
there is mutual advantage in doing so, such as building and repairing ships at 
North Korea shipyards based on orders from Russia’. A l s o ,  in September 
1995, Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin stated that ‘It could be 
possible to think about a tri-partite model of economic cooperation among 
Russia, South Korea and North Korea. We could use the production capacities 
we created in the North Korea, North Korean work force, the Russian market 
and South Korean “know-how”
‘Tumaniiaya River Basin Development Accord Signed’, Itar-Tass, 8 December 1995 in FBIS-SOV 
95-238, 12 December 1995, p. 24.
‘Status of Tumen River Project Reported’, Pyongyang KCNA, 15 December 1995 in FBIS-EAS 95- 
241, 15 December 1995.
‘Envoy Seen 1992 as Painful Year in DPRK Relations’, Radio Moscow, 30 December 1992 in FBIS- 
SOV 93-001, 1 January 1993, p. 25.
‘Proposes Tripartite Ties With Koreas’, Interfax, 28 September 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-188, 28 
September 1995, p. 31.
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From Russia’s perspective, the TRADP basically offered the promise of 
economic development in the Russian Far East. Thus, Russia worked out a 
detailed plan for the development of the region, including the building of a 
large international port and a free trade zone in the Tumen River area.^^ 
Nevertheless, Russia’s main reason for seeking to participate in the TRADP 
was clearly to mitigate its further deteriorating economic role in the region, 
together with some political reasons. In reality, Russia was in a position that it 
would be completely excluded from the regional economic cooperation both 
politically and economically if it could not participate in the TRADP.
As regards participating in the TRADP, Russia also required South 
Korea’s interest and support for the Russian Far East, together with the latter’s 
technology and investment. In other words, with regard to Russia’s economic 
policy towards the Russian Far East region (e.g. the TRADP), the Yeltsin 
government continued to expect to use South Korea’s growing economic power 
to develop the area. Simultaneously, however, it should be noted that the 
Russian Far East itself became increasingly interested in developing economic 
relations with North Korea during this period (Dec, 93-Dec. 95).’®° For 
example, in September 1994, Russia’s participation in the international plan 
(the TRADP) resulted in the creation of the Najin special economic zone of 
North Korea.’®’
South Korea’s perceptions of the TRADP earned a geopolitical sensitivity 
in both physical and economic temis - given that South Korea is between the
‘Tumen River Area Agreements Signed’, Beijing Xinhua in English, 7 December 1995 in FBIS-CHI
95-235 , 7 December 1995. It should be also noted that the Russian government approved regulations 
for the Free Economic Zone (FEZ) in Nakliodka in early 1990 (‘Free Enterprise Zone in the Nakhodka 
Area and the Maritime Territory’, Far Eastern Affairs [Moscow], no. 2, 1991, pp. 8-14).
For example, one of the priorities in Russia’s economic relationship with North Korea was the 
preservation of the timber agreement. Local officials were atti acted by cheap North Korean manpower, 
especially in the timber industry. However, in early 1990s the issue of North Koreans working in 
logging camps in the Russian Far East received international attention when human rights violations in 
the camps became widely known. Several hundred of these people, who had been specially selected by 
Pyongyang’s special services, unable to endure their mistreatment at the hands of local guards and 
appalling working conditions, had tried to escape and obtain political asylum in either South Korea or 
Russia {The Korea Times [Seoul], 24 May 1995, p. 3).
Izvestiia, 18 September 1994, p. 3.
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major powers, on the one hand, and it was the intennediary between North and 
South in the region. In other words, what encouraged South Korean planners 
most was their expectation that Northeast Asian regional cooperation would 
yield favourable conditions for Korean unification. In this case, regional 
economic cooperation was considered to be a stimulant to political 
improvement, not vice versa. Apart from this political consideration. South 
Korean conceptions of Northeast Asian regional cooperation could be summed 
up as follows. First, there was a belief that cooperation in the region required a 
quite different approach from that which had been or could have been applied 
elsewhere. This reflected a recognition of the distinctive mixture of states in the 
region. Japan commanded unprecedented economic power in the region. China 
was emerging as a major power after transforming its centrally-planned 
economy to a more profit-driven system. Russia, despite current turmoil in its 
economic transition, remained a major military power with nuclear capability. 
Mongolia, with the long-lost splendour of a fomier world empire, was 
stmggling to promote its economy by abandoning the socialist system and 
seeking a full-scale incoiporation with the capitalist states of the world. The 
presence of superpowers with different economic systems and practices, and 
above all with different levels of economic development, made it more urgent 
for Koreans to promote a distinctive approach to regional cooperation.’®^ 
Secondly, there was a tendency to regard Northeast Asian regional cooperation 
as the symbolisation of globalism among the South Korean leadership.’®^ 
Thirdly, Northeast Asian regional cooperation was considered as a mechanism 
for curbing the dominance of the one nation, in both political and economic
See W. You, ‘The Northeast Asian Rim: a Geopolitical Perspective’, Journal o f  Korean 
Geographical Society, vol. 28, no. 4, 1993, pp. 312-320; and B. Son, Dongbuga gyongjehyopiyokkwon 
hyonsongul wihan sonhyongjayumuyokiidae gusanngwa gu gidae hyokwa [The Idea of Regional 
Economic Cooperation in Nortlieast Asia] (Seoul: KIEF, 1992).
See Y. Kim, Dongbuga singyongjeilsowa hangugui yokhal [South Korea’s Role for New Economic 
Cooperation in Northeast Asia] (Taegu: Kyungbuk National University, 1992), pp. 141-173.
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terms, thereby overcoming obstacles derived from Japanese bilateral 
relations.’®'’
Despite Russia’s two main objectives (APEC and TRADP) for its 
engagement in the APR economies, there were still several important 
difficulties for both Russia and its partners in the region. First, one of the 
biggest obstacles remained the lack of confidence and the significant perception 
gap among APEC countries (Northeast Asian countries as well) on the 
feasibility of regional economic cooperation, which had led the controversial 
membership of the APEC since its inception. In this respect, APEC had become 
an arena of ‘competition for influence’ among the major powers in the region in 
the post-Soviet era.
Secondly, there was the lack of a economic mechanism for multilateral 
cooperation in Northeast Asia. For example, the TRADP had been heavily 
dependent upon the establishment of institutional frameworks from the 
beginning. This reflected a lack of existing economic linkages, except for 
bilateral cross-border trade between China and North Korea and between China 
and Russia on a barter basis. The ‘institutional framework first’ approach was 
most effective once the institutions needed were in full operation. But this took 
a lot of time and negotiations between governments. For example, the TRADP 
has agreed to establish the Tumen River Area Development Corporation, the 
Inter-Governmental Coordination and Consultative Commission, and the 
Tumen River Area Development Coordinating Committee. None of them was 
operational yet, however.’®^ As Tsuneo Akaha argues, ‘if the Russian Far East 
is to be integrated into the APR economy, not only must the region’s market 
forces be allowed to grow, but also institutionalised mechanisms of cooperation 
must be developed to link the fledgling market forces in the Russian Far East to
104 Son, Dongbuga gyongjehyopryokkwon, p. 15.
For the details of the general problems of the TRADP, see Eui-kon Kim, ‘Political Economy of the 
Tumen River Basin Development: Problems and Prospects’, Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 
11, no. 2, 1992, pp. 35-48.
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those of the dynamic APR countries, particularly China, Japan, South Korea 
and the US’.’®®
Thirdly, there were still the problems associated with making the Russian 
Far East a more attractive region for regional economic cooperation and 
development. Several key problems for regional cooperation in the Russian Far 
East could be summed up as follows: (1) differences in the stage of economic 
reform; (2) vaiying legal, social and economic standards; (3) financial 
instability; (4) policy differences and arbitrage; (5) lack of infrastructure; and 
(6) stmctural adjustment costs.’®^ All of the above difficulties obviously 
indicated that Russia was not in a position to implement properly its aims as 
one of the major economic powers in the region in the post-Soviet era.
Based on the above reasons, Russia did not effectively manage its 
relations with the two Koreas to maximise its economic interests on the Korean 
peninsula, despite being in a better position than other powers to exercise 
influence over the region. As a result, Russia’s economic role towards the 
Korean peninsula was seriously undermined. Rather, Russia tried to maintain 
its influence with the Koreas’ assistance in the APR. In this situation, even 
South Korea ignored Russia as a not genuine economic power in the region. In 
turn. North Korea no longer followed Russia’s lead in international economic 
cooperation in the region.
During this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95), Russia’s several active efforts over 
the issue of the Northeast Asian regional economic cooperation did not help to 
identify a mcaningftil role in the region.’®^ Russia’s policy towards the Korean 
peninsula in tenns of regional economic issues inevitably became reactive.
Akaha, Politics and Economics in the Russian Fa?' East, Introduction, p. xix.
107 Campbell, ‘Prospects for Trade and Regional Cooperation’, in Mark J. Valencia, ed., The
Russian Far East in Transition: Opportunities for Regional Economic Cooperation (Boulder, San 
Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 31-35.
So far Moscow had remained ‘outside the circle of active participants’ in the conflict because it 
lacks any opportunities to influence the North Koreans’ position {Izvestiia, 22 March 1994, p. 3).
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6.4. Nothing but Economic Engagement in the Region? (Dec. 95-Jul. 96)
After the December 1995 Russian parliamentary election, there seemed to be 
no fundamental changes in Russia’s regional economic policy in the APR. The 
appointment of Yevgeniy Primakov and Aleksandr Lebed as foreign minister 
and Security Council secretaiy, respectively, in early 1996 continued to 
demonstrate a more activist approach to economic diplomacy in Russian 
foreign policy.’®^ As a result, the objectives of Russian economic revival, 
which had assumed top priority since the presidential election, required an 
increased effort to participate in the APR economies as compared with 
previous years.
As regards the membership of APEC, Russia continuously made an effort 
to become a full member of this regional economic organisation. In February 
1996, for example, deputy foreign minister Panov stated that ‘Russia already 
now fully meets all criteria for being admitted to the APEC Forum... Russia’s 
non-involvement in APEC activities may have negative consequences for our 
future participation in the Forum and for APEC activities as a whole... Russia 
favours joining APEC as a full member and does not regard as convincing the 
argument that the Forum stmcture has not yet been finally fixed’.” ® In 
February-April 1996, Russia’s official applications were presented to join the 
activities of seven of the forum’ working groups (regional energy cooperation, 
preservation of sea resources, fishing, trade and investment statistics, human 
resources, industrial science and technology, and telecommunications).” ’ It 
should be noted that in Manila in 1996 (the fourth APEC summit at Subic 
Bay), ten more countries (Colombia, India, Macao, Mongolia, Pakistan,
At the thii'd session of ASEAN Regional Fomm, foreign minister Primakov put the priorities of 
Russia’s policy in the APR as follows: (1) to develop mutually advantageous or even partnership 
relations with regional countries; (2) to provide stability and security on the Russian Far Eastern 
borders; and (3) to create favourable environment for economic reforms in Russia, with special focus 
on accelerating the economic development in the Far East (‘Rech’ E. M. Primakova na 
postministerskoi konferentsii ASEAN s partnerami po dialogu, 24 iiulia’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 
8, August 1996, p. 38).
‘Panov Says Russia “Meets All Criteria” to Join APEC’, Itar-Tass, 6 Febmary 1996 in FBIS-SOV
96-025, 6 Febmary 1996, p. 20.
Hangyore Shinmun (Seoul), 17 April 1996, p. 2.
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Panama, Peru, Russia, Sri Lanka and Vietnam) formally signified their desire 
to join the APEC, regarded as the most dynamic economic grouping 
worldwide.’”
In February 1996, South Korea still continued to give off positive signals 
for moves by Russia to participate in APEC’s Energy Working Group as an 
informal member.”  ^Russia’s proposed participation in APEC’s working group 
activities required the consent of all member countries, as well as approval at 
APEC’s Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM).” '’ In some respects, by allowing 
resource-rich Russia into the energy group. South Korea hoped to secure easier 
access to Russia’s energy and resource-related infonuation and technology.
In May 1996, at a meeting of representatives of member countries of the 
ASEAN regional forum on security held in Jakarta, Indonesia, Winston Lord, 
US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated that 
‘... It is no secret that it was the US that previously opposed Russia’s admission 
to APEC, which was founded on the United States’ initiative, and it was the US 
that, in order to prevent Russia from joining, managed to secure a moratorium 
on the admission of new members almost immediately after APEC was formed. 
The moratorium expires this year, and in light of the changed situation, Russia 
will have a realistic chance of becoming a member of APEC - an influential 
organisation that includes all the leading countries of the Asian-Pacific 
region’.” ® But, according to Chris Coward, Director of APEC Edunet (at the 
University of Washington, Seattle), ‘APEC has had a moratorium on new 
members for three years and is opening up the discussion on membership at this 
coming summit in Vancouver, Canada. Russia, I believe, has expressed interest 
in joining but my hunch is that the first to gain admittance will be Vietnam’.” ®
In Manila in 1996 (the fourth APEC summit at Subic Bay), ministers adopted the MAPA (Manila 
Action Plan for APEC), which called for the creation of a free economic zone, including the 
elimination of customs barriers, visas, etc. in the region by 2020.
Kyunghyang Shinmun (Seoul), 27 Febmary 1996, p. 3.
The Korea Herald (Seoul), 15 February 1996, p. 8.
Segodnia, 12 May 1996, p. 2.
Email-Inquiry, 7 October 1997 (personal correspondence).
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This indicated that the US still did not hilly support Russia’s intentions in the 
regional economic issue.
Russia was also participating in the TRADP and sought to play a more 
active, positive role in its programme. Basically, South Korea supported 
Russia’s position on the TRADP while signing a memorandum of 
understanding with the UNDP to establish a $US 1 million trust hind for the 
TRADP in April 1996.’”
It was obvious that Russia’s continuous efforts to be hilly engaged in 
regional economic organisations and economic cooperation meant that Russia’s 
economic development in the APR and towards the Korean peninsula was far 
more dependent upon its neighbouring states including the two Koreas than had 
been the case in previous years (Dec. 91-Dec. 95). In other words, Russia’s 
active participation in regional economic cooperation in the APR as a whole 
demonstrated the countiy’s desire not to fall behind a dynamically changing 
situation and to develop an effective approach to the ‘Pacific Ocean Challenge’ 
with a subsequent strengthening of positions in the APR.
During this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96), despite its continuous efforts to be 
involved in regional economic cooperation, Russia did not satisfactorily 
succeed in achieving its aims in the region. In other words, although it sought to 
be a key regional player in new circumstances in the post-Soviet era, especially 
through regional economic multilateral cooperation, it had yet to find a solid 
place in Northeast Asia as one of the major economic powers, thus 
demonstrating its reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula.
The Korea H erald  (Seoul), 5 April 1996, p. 8.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis has attempted to examine and analyse the two main aspects of 
Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula: (1) how Russia has tried to build 
up its new relations with the two Koreas in the post-Soviet era; and (2) how 
Russia has attempted to maintain its role and influence in relation to Korean 
issues in the post-Soviet era.
As argued in preceding chapters, Russia’s foreign policy towards the 
Korean peninsula constantly changed and developed according to several 
periodic stages and evidently without a firm and consistent consensus within 
the top leadership during Yeltsin’s first presidential tenu (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). 
Despite Russia’s continuous initiatives towards the Korean peninsula at both 
bilateral and regional levels, Russia, as a successor state to the former Soviet 
Union, only proved its ineffectiveness in seeking a foreign policy that would 
achieve its aims in the Korean peninsula. It was a period of truly transitional 
Russian foreign policy under new circumstances both in teiuis of its domestic 
and international aspects.
As discussed in preceding chapters, two significant characteristics of 
Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 
91-Jul. 96) can be summed up as follows. First, in spite of Russia’s active 
efforts, especially after the December 1993 parliamentaiy election, its policy 
towards the Korean peninsula had to be ‘reactive’ as a result of both internal 
and external factors. This made clear that Russia was no longer one of the 
major powers, able to pursue an active and consistent policy towards the
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Korean peninsula to maximise its national interests both at the bilateral and 
regional levels in the region, although it attempted to do so continuously.
On the one hand, at the bilateral level, Russia’s intention to establish solid 
legal bases based on treaties with each of the two Koreas did not proceed as its 
government would have wished. Rather, to a large extent, Russia’s intentions 
had constantly to be subject to the two Koreas’ objectives. On the other hand, at 
the regional level, despite Russia’s considerable efforts to be more actively 
involved in relation to Korean issues, Russia did not prove an influential 
[political and economic] power that could replace the former Soviet Union in 
Northeast Asia. This led Russia to attempt to maintain only some minimum 
influence over the Korean peninsula while trying to participate in regional 
organisations such as the APEC and to advocate a multilateral security 
conference.
This reactive tendency in Russian foreign policy towards the Korean 
peninsula eventually led Russia to adjust its gradual ‘balanced’ policy towards 
the Korean peninsula. This meant that Russia’s foreign policy direction and 
behaviour vis-à-vis the two Koreas during this transitional period moved from a 
pro-South Korean policy, which looked for partnership relations with South 
Korea’ and a limited official relationship with North Korea to a more balanced 
policy that demanded the establishment of revived relations with North Korea 
to maintain Russia’s national interests.^ Russia’s approach to a gradual 
balanced policy during this period was due to three factors: (1) disappointment 
with South Korea; (2) reviving interests in North Korea; and (3) Russia’s loss
' Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin’s first presidential terni was influenced by the economic 
importance of South Korea. Russia’s emphasis on its ‘entry into the civilised [world] community’ 
enhanced Soutli Korea’s economic importance. In other words, North Korea’s strategic value to Russia 
became margiiralised. At the same time, South Korea, with its economic prowess and vitality, became 
increasingly valuable to Yeltsin’s reform programme at home.
 ^In the beginning of the post-Soviet era, Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula centred 
on relations with South Korea. As a result, Russian-North Korean relations greatly deteriorated. 
However, gradually there was a growing emphasis on the balance of Russia’s dual Korearr policy on 
the Korearr peirinsula.
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of its status in the region.® Russia’s more balanced policy towards the Korean 
peninsula also reflected changes in Russian foreign policy goals and priorities. 
In this respeet, as discussed, the end of the Cold War atmosphere (an external 
factor) and the continuing post-Soviet domestic conflicts in Russian politics (an 
internal factor) largely directed the general trends and goals in Russian foreign 
policy towards the Korean peninsula.
Thus, the preceding analysis supports the main hypothesis: Russia’s 
foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during this period had to be 
reactive in its several suceessive stages, although Russia did try to conduct an 
active policy towards the Korean peninsula.
Another signifieant characteristic of Russia’s foreign policy towards the 
Korean peninsula during this period (Dee. 91-Jul. 96) was that Russia was not 
able to establish a solid ‘consensus’ within its own leadership regarding 
Korean issues both at the bilateral and regional levels (except on regional 
economic issues). In faet, given the uncertainties on the domestic situation in 
Russia, the laek of consensus - one of Russian foreign policy’s problems - 
within the top leadership regarding Korean issues was not suiprising. In other 
words, the Russian leadership had to maintain relations not only with North and 
South Korea, but also satisfy the liberal and eonseiwative forces within its own 
eountry during this transitional period because Russian foreign policy under 
Yeltsin was also closely related to his power position and the ongoing 
group/factional conflict between the reformers and the conseiwatives. This
 ^ According to Vladimir Miasnikov, ‘to maintain well-balanced relations with both South and North 
Korea appears important for the following reasons. First, Russia’s influence on the Korean peninsula 
and in the whole of Northeast Asian region, as well as its regional weight in relations with China, 
Japan, South Korea and the US proportionally depended on the extent to which Russia managed to 
maintain well-balanced relations with South and North Korea. Secondly, Russia, as the successor to the 
former Soviet Union, has inherited broad economic interests in North Korea, which was a well-familiar 
market of parhiers who, too, for various reasons [technology links in indushy, geographical proximity, 
etc.] were interested in maintaining and developing traditional ties with the Northern neighbour. 
Thirdly, maintenance and improvement of Russia’s military, political and economic positions in North 
Korea would enable Russia to have more solid position in Korea after the reunification. So, for 
political, military-strategic, and economic considerations, Russia’s national interests required to 
maintain smooth and skilfully balanced relations with both Korean states’ (Vladimir S. Miasnikov,
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necessarily hindered Russia from pursuing a more consistent policy towards the 
Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia.
As a matter of fact, behind the scenes a tough ‘domestic struggle’ was 
going on over Korean issues, characterised by rivalry between two 
incompatible viewpoints: a militarising viewpoint and an economic one. 
Indeed, there were different views between reformers and conservatives within 
the Russian leadership and their relative power position was largely responsible 
for the contradictoiy and inconsistent trend of Russia’s foreign policy towards 
the Korean peninsula. This made it difficult to develop a new Russian foreign 
policy concept that could replace Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking, only 
proving its contradictoiy and discrepant policy towards the Korean peninsula 
during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). As a result, Yeltsin’s foreign policy was 
increasingly overtaken by events at home and abroad, and the new Russian 
foreign policy conception became obsolete as a guide for Russian foreign 
policy. Indeed, under Yeltsin, foreign policy seiwed largely as an instrument for 
domestic reform efforts. Thus, the examination of Yeltsin’s foreign policy 
towards the two Koreas largely confirms the proposition that: ‘domestic needs 
and group/factional conflict within the Russian leadership are a useful way of 
explaining Russian foreign policy behaviour’.
The main findings of this study can be summed up as follows. First, as 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4, it was obvious that ‘bilateral treaty’ issues 
became the central aspect of understanding how Russia attempted to build up 
its new relations with each of the Koreas during Yeltsin’s first presidential 
term. In other words, by focusing on the issue of bilateral treaties between 
Russia and each Korea, we were able to see more clearly the changes that took 
place in Russia’s reactive Korean policy during Yeltsin’s first presidential term.
On the one hand, Russia attempted to develop its new relations with North 
Korea whilst looking for a new legal foundation that could replace the 1961
‘Russian-South Korean Security Cooperation’, The Korean Journal o f Defence Analysis, vol. 6, no. 2, 
1994, pp. 339-340).
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Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty in the post-Soviet era. In other words, 
Russia looked for new relations with North Korea: from paity-to-party relations 
to a normal state-to-state relationship. In this respect, the expiration of the 1961 
Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty in September 1996 was the key 
bilateral issue in understanding their relations during this period. The re­
examination of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Treaty, one of the last relics of 
the Cold War in Northeast Asia, raised the question of how previous Soviet- 
allied relations based on the Cold War system could change into new relations 
based on the post-Soviet system.
On the other hand, Russia basically tried to develop its relations with 
South Korea whilst looking for [economic] ‘partnership’ relations based on 
political, economic and military treaties in the post-Soviet era. This meant that 
Russia more vigorously looked for a mutually beneficial partnership with South 
Korea both in terms of economic and political relations. In this respect, several 
important bilateral treaties between Russia and South Korea demonstrated how 
far their previous relations based on the Soviet system had changed into new 
relations based on the post-Soviet system. Especially, the conclusion of the 
Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty signed in 1992 demonstrated a new 
example of relations between the two sides during this transient time. 
Furthermore, the conclusion of military related treaties between the two sides 
also demonstrated how far their relations could develop in the post-Soviet era.
Nonetheless, despite Russia’s efforts. South Korea, as a rising power in 
the region, no longer conceded Russia’s ability to dominate their new relations, 
which only proved the latter’s incapability to conduct an effective foreign 
policy towards the Korean peninsula. Also, despite Russia’s revived interests 
towards North Korea, North Korea equally did not accept Russia’s 
understanding of the way in which their new relations should develop in the 
post-Soviet era.
Secondly, as argued in chapters 5 and 6, it was apparent that the two 
‘regional’ issues had become central to an understanding of how Russia
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attempted to maintain its influence on the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s 
first presidential term. In other words, by focusing on regional issues in relation 
to Korean affairs in Northeast Asia, we were able to see more clearly the 
changes that took place in Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula and its 
international role in the post-Soviet era.
On the one hand, Russia’s security policy in Northeast Asia focusing on 
the North Korean nuclear issue clearly reflected its new security role in the 
peninsula in the post-Soviet era. On the other hand, Russia’s economic policy 
in Northeast Asia focusing on regional economic organisation (APEC) and 
regional economic cooperation (TRAD?) obviously reflected its new economic 
status in the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.
Russia’s role in the international community had been gieatly weakened 
especially after the several proposals rejected by the US and the two Koreas 
during the 1993-96 period (especially, after the December 1993 Russian 
parliamentary election). This meant that although Russia sought to be a key 
regional player in new circumstances in the post-Soviet era, especially through 
regional multilateral cooperation, it had yet to find a solid place in Northeast 
Asia as one of the major political and economic powers during this period, thus 
demonstiating its reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula. Consequently, 
Russia was increasingly isolated and under pressure in the post-Soviet era.
Thirdly, as examined in the preceding chapters, another significant finding 
of this study is that Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula 
developed according to a distinctive ‘sequence of stages’. In this respect, the 
thesis attempted to identify a period within which a new consensus on Russian 
foreign policy emerged within the country’s leadership. We found that the 
results of several Russian elections became a turning point in Russia’s foreign 
policy towards the Korean peninsula. To a large extent, there emerged a certain 
basic agreement on what Russia’s national interests were and how they should 
be pursued after the elections. This also implied that Russia’s policy towards 
the two Koreas had been greatly changed by the effect of Russian internal
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factors, although external factors had also some significant effects on Russia’s 
Korean policy. Indeed, there was an interaction between internal power 
struggles between reformers and conservatives and the various other actors and 
institutions involved in foreign policy decision-making and in the development 
of Russia’s new bilateral approach towards the two Koreas. For those reasons, 
the thesis demonstrated that the domestic situation in Russia had a profound 
impact on the nature of its foreign policy and, similarly, the impact of the latter 
determined significant aspects of domestic policy-making.
Nonetheless, it is necessary to note that there are some limitations in the 
research presented in this thesis. First, there is a certain difficulty in 
establishing an exact ‘périodisation’ in Russian foreign policy towards the 
Korean peninsula during the early post-communist years. In other words, 
although périodisation of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula 
can be a useful way to explain the development of Russia’s reactive Korean 
policy and relations between the two countries, there are some limitations in 
any exercise of this kind. For instance, although the first period (Dec. 91-Dec. 
93) of Russia’s Korean policy based on this analysis has been described as a 
pro-South Korean stance in Russian foreign policy, it should be noted that at 
the end of summer of 1992, the Russian minister of foreign affairs had already 
started to advance the view that Moscow should seek more balanced relations 
with South and North Korea."  ^As regard this, especially, it should be noted that 
there were certain disagreements about Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea and Japan 
in September 1992 within the top Russian leadership.^ To a certain extent, from
Izvestiia, 31 July 1992, p. 6.
 ^According to Hannes Adomeit, to a certain extent, nationalists and Eurasianists started to emerge in 
the second half of 1992 and made an impact on foreign policy (Hannes Adomeit, ‘Russia as a Great 
Power in World Affairs: Images and Reality’, International Affairs [London], vol. 71, no. 1, 1995, p. 
58). According to Rahr, Yeltsin was under siege from all political sides from the middle of 1992. The 
Civic Union was demanding increased participation in government decision-making; local leaders were 
calling for more autonomy from Moscow; and leaders of Central Asian states were putting pressure on 
him not to abandon them economically and to support the establishment of close ties between their 
states and Russia. Yeltsin balancing between left and right begun in the middle of 1992. See Alexander 
Rain', ‘Liberal-Centrist Coalition Takes over in Russia’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 29, 17 July 1992, pp. 22- 
25; and Alexander Rain, ‘Yeltsin Faces New Political Challenges’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 42, 23 October 
1992, pp. 1-5.
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the beginning of 1993 Russia gradually started to reopen its contacts with North 
Korea and exchanged opinions about bilateral and international issues. In some 
sense, it can be argued that Russia’s pro-South Korean stance had essentially 
come to an end by the second half of 1992. In this respect, from some 
perspectives, it can be said that there had been a continuation of Russia’s ‘Two 
Korean Policy’ towards the Korean peninsula.^
Secondly, there is a certain difficulty in ‘grouping’ the Russian top 
leadership based on their views of Russia’s policy towards the Korean 
peninsula throughout the successive stages in relations between the two 
countiies, although Yeltsin’s policy towards the Korean peninsula generally led 
to the polarisation of the Russian leadership into reformers and conservatives. 
The reformers (Kozyrev, Yeltsin and in this connection Chernomyrdin) 
generally viewed Russian-Korean relations in the context of looking for a new 
partnership relationship in the post-Soviet era. A promise of economic benefits 
from the Korean peninsula together with the guarantee of peace and security in 
the region were valued. On the other hand, the conservatives (Khasbulatov, 
Rutskoi and Grachev) emphasised the need to revive Russia’s relations with 
North Korea. These groups began increasingly to emphasise Russia’s relations 
with North Korea when Russia did not achieve its aims with South Korea as it 
had expected, especially in the field of economic relations. However, it was 
quite obvious that both Russian reformers and conseiwatives shared a certain 
consensus to pursue Russia’s national interests in the Korean peninsula after the 
December 1993 Russian parliamentaiy election such as the proposal of the 
multilateral regional security conference and the regional economic interests. In 
this respect, the two groups did not have completely incompatible views of the
® There had been pro-North Korean groups or factions in Russian politics from the beginning of 
Russian foreign policy, although Russia’s Korean policy seemed to pursue pro-South Korean trend 
during the early stage of Russian foreign policy. Russia tided to make efforts to balance the two Korean 
policy on the Korean peninsula which maximise its national interests in the post-Soviet era. In other 
words, Russia has never been given up one part of Korea during this period. A powerful pro-North 
lobby, consisting of military men, diplomats, scholars, and former teclinical advisers to Pyongyang, 
advances such theses, but it is more than matched by an influential pro-South lobby.
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two Koreas. Furthermore, it should be noted that some high-ranking Russian 
officials often altered their position towards the Korean peninsula by changing 
their remarks or comments on Korean issues.
Thirdly, due to the reliance we have necessarily placed upon the analysis 
of documents and the remarks of Russian high-ranking officials, there is a 
difficulty in finding ‘clear evidence’ of the real and not simply declared aims of 
Russia’s Korean policy. In other words, although this thesis employs a variety 
of sources, both primaiy and secondary (materials from Russian, Japanese and 
Korean journals and newspapers, as well as the relevant Western literature), 
including historical archives, personal memoirs, inteiwiews conducted by the 
author, military and economic data, treaties and other official documents, and 
published statements and speeches by governmental officials in the West, 
Russia, North Korea and South Korea, it is still true that this research suffers 
from the limited availability of government-level documents because most of 
the relevant documents fr om Russia and the two Koreas for this recent period 
are not yet accessible to academic researchers. Nonetheless, the advantage of 
the present approach in my opinion outweighs its limitations.
The last, but by no means least important, implication of the present study 
is that studies of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula and their 
relations need to be diversified by creating various innovative approaches even 
that are not yet emerging in the study of foreign policy in general and Russian 
foreign policy in particular. In this connection, the author hopes that the present 
study provides a stimulus for applying diverse approaches to the study of 
Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula. It is believed that the 
contribution of this study is significant, since there are still few major works on 
this particular subject and period.
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Appendix 1
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea. Signed at Moscow on 6 July 1961.’
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the Presidium of the Supreme National Assembly of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Anxious to develop and strengthen the friendly relations between the Soviet 
Union and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea based on the principle of 
socialist internationalism.
Desiring to promote the maintenance and strengthening of peace and security in 
the Far East and throughout the world in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations,
Resolved to extend assistance and support to one another in the event of 
military attack upon either of the Contracting Parties by any State or coalition 
of States,
Convinced that the strengthening of friendship, good-neighborliness and 
cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea is in accordance with the vital interests of the people of both States and 
will best seiwe to promote their further economic and cultural development, 
Have decided for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty and have 
appointed as their plenipotentiaries :
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics: Nikita Sergeevich Khruschev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers 
of the USSR;
The Presidium of the Supreme National Assembly of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea: Kim II Sung, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The two plenipotentiary representatives, having exchanged their full powers, 
found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:
Article 1 : The Contracting Parties declare that they will continue to participate 
in all international action designed to safeguard peace and security in the Far 
East and throughout the world and will contribute to the realisation of these 
lofty aims. Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer anned attack by any 
State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other
' Sbornik deistvuiushchikh dogovorov, soglashenii i konventsii, zakliuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi 
gosudarstvami, vol. 22, 1967, pp. 24-26; an English translation appears in the United Nations Treaty 
Series, vol. 420, no. 6045, pp. 154-158.
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Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with 
all the means at its disposal.
Article 2: Each Contracting Party undertakes not to enter into any alliance or to 
participate in any coalition, or in any action or measure, directed against the 
other Contracting Party.
Article 3; The Contracting Parties shall consult together on all important 
international questions involving the interests of both States, in an effort to 
sti'engthen peace and universal security.
Article 4: The two Contracting Parties undertake, in a spirit of friendship and 
cooperation in accordance with the principles of equal rights, mutual respect for 
State sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-intervention in each other’s 
domestic affairs, to develop and strengthen the economic and cultural ties 
between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, to render each other all possible assistance and to effect the 
necessaiy cooperation in the economic and cultural fields.
Article 5 : The two Contracting Parties consider that the unification of Korea 
should be brought about on a peacefril and democratic basis and that such a 
solution is in keeping both with the national interests of the Korean people and 
with the cause of maintaining peace in the Far East.
Article 6: The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the 
instruments of ratification, which shall take place at Pyongyang. This Treaty 
shall remain in force for ten years. If neither of the Contracting Parties gives 
notice one year before the expiration of the said period that it wishes to 
denounce the Treaty, it shall remain in force for the succeeding five years and 
shall thereafter continue in force in accordance with this provision.
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Appendix 2
Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Korea. Signed at Washington on 1 October 1953.^
The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, 
and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.
Desiring to declare publicly and fonnally their common determination to 
defend themselves against external anned attack so that no potential aggressor 
could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area, 
Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defence for the 
preseiwation of peace and security pending the development of a more 
comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area, 
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1: The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which 
they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party 
toward the United Nations.
Article 2: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of 
them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened 
by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, 
the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter aimed attack 
and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this 
Treaty and to further its purposes.
Article 3: Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific area on 
either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative 
control, or hereafter recognised by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under 
the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace
 ^ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 238, no. 3363, pp. 199-205. This treaty came into force on 17 
November 1954 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Washington, in accordance with 
Article 5. The US ratified the above-mentioned treaty subject to the following understanding: Tt is the 
understanding of the US that neither party is obligated, under Article 3 of the above Treaty, to come to 
the aid of the other except m case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in 
the present Treaty be construed as requiring the US to give assistance to Korea except in tire event of 
an armed attack against teiiitory which has been recognised by the US as lawfully brought under the 
administrative control of the ROK’.
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and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional processes.
Article 4: The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America 
accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about 
the territory of the Republic of Korea as detennined by mutual agreement.
Article 5: This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the 
Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes 
and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been 
exchanged by them at Washington.
Article 6: This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may 
terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.
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Appendix 3
Full Text of Joint Declaration Signed by Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev and Korean President Roll Tae Woo in Moscow on 14 
December 1990.^
M.S. Gorbachev, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Rob 
Tae Woo, president of the Republic of Korea, having met in Moscow on 14 
December 1990, and having discussed the state of, and prospects for, the 
development of bilateral relations, as well as a wide range of current 
international problems: expressing mutual interest in the development of all­
round cooperation between the two countries; acknowledging the importance of 
peace in the Korean peninsula to Northeast Asia to the whole world; 
recognising the Korean nation’s desire for unification and welcoming the 
expansion of contacts between the South and the North, including the latest 
talks between the prime ministers of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, and being steadfastly devoted to the cause of 
building a new, more just, humane, peaceful and democratic international order, 
declare that the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea will be guided in their 
relations by the following basic principles:
-respect for each other’s sovereign equality, temtorial integrity and political 
independence, non-interference in the internal affairs of both states, recognition 
of every people’s right to a free choice of their own path of political and socio­
economic development;
-observance of the norms of international law, respect for the aims and 
principles of the United Nations set out in its charter;
-impermissibility of the use of force or the treat of force and of maintaining 
one’s own security at the expense of other states, and also the resolving of 
disputed international problems and regional conflicts by any means other than 
by reaching political accords on the basis of the reasonable agieement of all the 
interested sides;
-development of broad mutually advantageous cooperation between states and 
peoples, leading to their drawing together and the deepening of mutual 
understanding;
-uniting of the efforts of the world community for the priority resolution of 
global problems; The abatement of the arms race, whether nuclear of 
conventional; the prevention of the ecological catastrophe threatening mankind; 
overcoming poveity, hunger, illiteracy; reducing the dramatic gap in the level 
of development of various countries and peoples;
 ^ Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR, no. 1, 1991, pp. 3-4.
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-creation of a secure and just would in which mankind will be ensured of 
progress and all peoples will be ensured a worthy life in the coming 
millennium.
Proceeding from the above principles and opening a new page in the history of 
their relations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of 
Korea are filled with resolve to build these relations in a spirit of neighborliness 
trust, and cooperation in the interests of the peoples of both states. With these 
aims various interstate agreements will be concluded aimed at establishing and 
improving relations and contacts between the two countries in the political, 
economic, trade, cultural, scientific, human and other spheres. The USSR and 
the Republic of Korea will ensure the priority of generally accepted norms of 
international law in their internal and foreign policies and will conscientiously 
fulfil their treaty obligations.
The presidents support the aspiration of business circles in both countries 
toward deepening fruitful and mutually advantageous cooperation in the sphere 
of economics, trade, industxy, transport, the exchange of advanced technology 
and scientific achievements, and the development of joint enterpreneurship and 
new forms of cooperation, and they welcome the drawing up of and the 
investing in of mutual advantageous projects. The exchange of ideas, 
information, and spiritual and cultural values, the widening of contacts between 
people in culture, the art, science, education, sports, the mass media and 
tourism, and reciprocal trips by citizens of both countries will be encouraged. 
The sides will coordinate their efforts in combating international terrorism, 
organised crime and illegal drug trafficking, and also in environmental 
protection, and to this end they will cooperate in global and regional 
international organisations.
The USSR and the Republic of Korea are devoted to the ideas of the 
establishment in the Asia-Pacific region of equal and mutually beneficial 
relations, based on a balance of interests and the self-determination of peoples, 
and the transformation of Asia and the Pacific into a region of peace and 
consti'uctive cooperation through the process of bilateral and multilateral 
consultations.
The presidents confirm their conviction that the development of relations 
between the USSR and the Republic of Korea facilitates a stiengthening of 
peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, is in line with the positive 
changes taking place there, deepens the processes leading to overcoming 
confrontational thinking and eliminating the cold war in Asia, contributes to 
regional cooperation and helps ease tension and form a climate of trust for the 
sake of the future reunification of South and North Korea.
The USSR favours a continuation of the productive inter-Korean dialogue 
designed to eliminate political and military confrontation between the two 
Korean sides and a just settlement of the Korean problem by peaceful 
democratic means in accordance with the will of the whole Korean people.
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The Republic of Korea, welcoming the whole world’s turn away from the age 
of confrontation and toward reconciliation and cooperation on the basis of 
common human values, freedom, democracy and justice, stresses that the 
success of the Soviet policy of reform is an important factor in future 
international relations as also in the improvement of the situation in Northeast 
Asia and in progress in relations between the two countries.
The presidents proceed from the general understanding that the development of 
ties and contacts between the USSR and the Republic of Korea must in no way 
affect their relations with third countries or the commitments undertaken by 
then in accordance with both multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements. 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Korea have agreed 
to develop a political dialogue at the highest level, and also to hold regular 
meetings and consultations at various other levels on questions of the 
deepening of bilateral relations and on topical international problems.
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Appendix 4
The Full Text of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Russia and Korea 
Signed in Seoul on 19 November 1992. ’^
The Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation,
Desirous of strengthening the bonds of peace and friendship between the two 
countries and of promoting close economic and cultural cooperation between 
their peoples,
Conscious of the traditional relations between their two peoples and determined 
to overcome the consequences of the adverse period of their common history. 
Convinced that future relations between the two countries should be guided by 
the common values of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and 
market economics.
Affirming their conviction that the development of friendly relations and 
cooperation between the two countries and their peoples will contribute not 
only to their mutual benefit but also to the peace, security and prosperity of the 
Asian Pacific region and throughout the world,
Reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations,
Recognising that the Moscow Declaration of 14 December 1990 shall continue 
to govern relations between the two countries,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation shall develop friendly 
relations in accordance with the principles of sovereignty, equality, respect for 
territorial integrity and political independence, non-inteiwention in internal 
affairs and other generally accepted principles of international law.
Article 2
1. The Contracting Parties shall refrain in their mutual relations from the threat 
or use of force and shall settle all their disputes by peaceful means in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The Contracting Parties shall use, to the maximum extent possible, United 
Nations mechanisms to settle international conflict and shall cooperate and 
endeavor to enhance the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of the 
international peace and security.
Article 3
Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 23-24, December 1992, pp. 41-46.
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1. The Conti'acting Parties shall develop cooperation for the promotion of 
stability and prosperity in the Asian and Pacific region.
2. The Contracting Parties shall strengthen their cooperation, including 
exchanges of information, within the fi*amework of international and 
regional organisations.
Article 4
1. The Contracting Parties shall hold consultations on a regular basis between 
their Heads of State, Foreign Minister and other members of their 
Governments, or their representatives to discuss matters concerning bilateral 
relations as well as international and regional issues of mutual interest.
2. The consultations shall normally be held in the Republic of Korea and the 
Russian Federation alternately.
Article 5
1. The Conti'acting Parties shall promote the development of broad contacts and 
ties between their nationals and social organisation.
2. The Contracting Parties shall support contacts and exchanges between the 
parliaments of the two countries.
3. The Contracting Parties shall encourage direct contacts between their 
regional and local governments.
Article 6
1. The nationals of either Contracting Party shall, subject to the laws and 
regulations relating to the entiy and sojourn of aliens, be permitted to enter 
or leave, to travel or stay in the temtory of other Contracting Party.
2. The nationals and juridical persons of either Contracting Party shall, within 
the territory of the other Contracting Party, enjoy full protection and security 
in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.
Article 7
1. The Conti'acting Parties shall promote and develop extensive cooperation 
between the two countries in the economic, industrial, trade and other fields 
to their mutual benefit and on the basis of principles generally recognised in 
international practice.
2. The Contracting Parties shall promote and develop cooperation in the fields 
of, inter alia, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, energy, mining, communication, 
transport and construction.
3. The Contracting Parties shall also promote and develop, on the basis of their 
mutual interest, cooperation in the areas of protecting the environment and 
the rational use of natural resources.
Article 8
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1. The Contracting Parties, recognising that scientific and technological 
cooperation will be of great value in advancing the well-being of their 
peoples, shall develop broad cooperation in the fields of science and 
technology for peaceful purposes.
2. In the scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries, 
special attention shall be devoted to promoting exchanges of scientists and 
the results of scientific and technological research, and encouraging joint 
research projects.
Article 9
The Contracting Parties shall encourage and facilitate diverse and close 
contacts and cooperation between the business communities o f the two 
countries.
Article 10
1. In recognition of their respective centuries-old cultural heritages, the 
Contracting Parties shall promote the development of exchanges and 
cooperation in the fields of the arts, culture and education.
2. The Contracting Parties shall promote the development of exchanges and 
cooperation in the fields of the mass media, tourism and sports, and 
encourage the exchange of young people.
3. The Contracting Parties consider it a matter of special interest to increase the 
knowledge of each other’s languages and cultures in the two countries. Each 
Contracting Parties shall encourage and promote the establishment and 
activities of cultural and educational institutions for the purpose of providing 
all persons concerned with broad access to the language and culture of the 
other Conti'acting Party.
Article 11
Each Contracting Party shall, within its territoi'y, recognise the rights of its 
nationals or citizens originating from the Republic of Korea or the Russian 
Federation to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, 
and to use their own language.
Article 12
The Contracting Parties, deeply concerned about the growing 
internationalisation of crime, shall promote effective cooperation in their efforts 
to combat organised crime, international terrorism, illegal traffic in drugs and 
psychotropic substances, illegal acts aimed against the security of maritime 
navigation and civil aviation, counterfeiting, smuggling including illicit 
transboundary traffic in articles of national, artistic, historical or archeological 
value as well as in animal or plant species under threat of extinction, or parts or 
derivatives thereof.
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Article 13
This Treaty shall not affect the rights and obligations assumed by either
Contracting Party under any international treaties and agreements currently in
force and shall not be invoked against any third State.
Article 14
The Contracting Parties shall conclude treaties and agreements, wherever
necessary, for the implementation of the purposes of this Treaty.
Article 15
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force thirty 
days after the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years and shall continue to be in 
force thereafter until terminated as provided herein.
3. Either Contracting Party may, by giving one year’s written notice to the 
other Contracting Party, terminate this Treaty at the end of the initial ten- 
year period or at any time thereafter.
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Appendix 5
Joint Russian-Korean Declaration and Protocol on Consultations between 
Foreign Ministries Signed in Moscow on 2 June 1994/
1. On 1-3 June 1994 in Moscow, B. N. Yeltsin, president of the Russian 
Federation, and Kim Young-Sam, president of the Republic of Korea, held a 
detailed exchange of views on the state of and prospects for bilateral relations, 
as well as on a wide range of international problems. The presidents noted with 
satisfaction the stable development of Russian-Korean relations in the political, 
economic, cultural and other areas on the basis of the 20 November 1992 
Treaty on the Basic Principles of Relations Between the Russian Federation and 
the Republic of Korea. The presidents stated that relations between the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Korea are shifting to a constructive, 
complementaiy partnership based on the common values of freedom, 
democracy, legality, respect for human rights, and a market economy.
2. Sharing the view that the development and prosperity of states in the modern 
era can be achieved through reforms, the presidents exchanged views on the 
prospects for change in the Russian Federation and Republic of Korea. The 
presidents expressed agreement that the success of political and economic 
reforms in Russia is a fundamental factor of peace and prosperity in the world 
as a whole, and of stability in Northeast Asia and the Pacific basin, in 
particular. President Kim Young-Sam assured President B. N. Yeltsin of the 
Republic of Korea's cooperation in and support for the reforms being carried 
out in Russia.
3. The presidents noted with satisfaction that the international political system 
characterized by enmity and confrontation is a thing of the past and that a 
foundation is being laid for a world order based on nonconfrontation, openness, 
partnership and the desire for cooperation in surmounting the new challenges of 
international security and stability. The presidents reached agreement that both 
states would cooperate closely in dealing with global issues. Hailing the 
growing recognition in the internationalcommunity of the principle of the 
universality of human rights, the presidents agreed to make common efforts for 
the observance and guaranteeing of the principles of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the norms of fundamental agreements on human rights to 
which both states are parties, and also to expand bilateral cooperation in the 
area of human rights.
Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 13-14, July 1994, pp. 13-15.
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4. The presidents expressed satisfaction at the steps being taken to make the 
work of the United Nations more responsive and efficient, and to involve it 
more actively in dealing with important current problems of the international 
community. The presidents were united in the belief that greater attention must 
be given to the United Nations’ peacekeeping and humanitarian diplomacy, 
which are coming to the center of world politics. The Russian Federation 
president expressed and the president of the Republic of Korea responded with 
understanding to Russia's interest in cooperating with the United Nation in the 
context of settling conflicts on the territory of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. President Kim Young-Sam stated that the Republic of 
Korea intends to advance its candidacy to be a nonpermanent member of the 
U.N. Security Council in 1996-1997 in order to participate more actively in 
U.N. activities. President B. N. Yeltsin promised to take a positive view of that.
5. The presidents gave a high assessment to the possibility of the dynamic 
growth of the Asian-Pacific region and agreed to cooperate in turning it into a 
region of peace and prosperity. The presidents expressed the desire that the first 
regional expanded ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] forum on 
security issues that is coming up in Bangkok this July would open the way 
toward the formation in the Asian-Pacific region, through collective efforts and 
on the basis of regard for all participants' interests, a structure of dependable 
security, mutual tiust and mutually advantageous cooperation. President Kim 
Young-Sam welcomed Russia's desire to participate actively and constructively 
in all spheres of Asian-Pacific cooperation and noted that the Republic of Korea 
would appropriately consider the Russian Federation's candidacy to participate 
in the APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation].
6. The presidents share the opinion that dialogue and cooperation among the 
states of Northeast Asia on security issues are essential to the development of 
bilateral and multilateral relations, as well as to ensuring the region's stability 
and prosperity. The presidents agreed to hold bilateral consultations on security 
issues in Northeast Asia.
7. In discussing the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the presidents noted the 
need to continue the dialogue between South and North Korea for the purposes 
of easing tension and strengthening peace, security and stability, and they 
expressed agreement that the unification of Korea should be achieved through 
peaceful, democratic means, on the basis of direct dialogue between the two 
sides. President B. N. Yeltsin, expressing the hope that progress in the dialogue 
between the South and North would help restore mutual trust and promote 
economic, cultural and humanitarian exchanges between South and North 
Korea, spoke in favor of the obseiwance of the 13 December 1991 Agreement 
Between South and North on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and 
Cooperation. The presidents agreed that the existing system of truce in Korea
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should be preserved until a new peace stmcture is worked out in accordance 
with the Agreement Between South and North on Reconciliation, 
Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation.
8. The presidents agreed that any attempt to produce nuclear weapons on the 
Korean Peninsula represented a serious threat to peace and security not only in 
Korea but in Northeast Asia and the whole world. The presidents, sharing the 
opinion that it is necessaiy to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and important 
that the Joint Declaration of South and North on the Denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula be implemented, called on the People's Democratic Republic 
of Korea, as a party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
to strictly and consistently fulfill its commitments under the treaty and the 
control agreement with the IAEA. President B. N. Yeltsin reaffirmed that 
Russia, together with other states, would continue to take an active part in 
efforts of the international community to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. 
President Kim Young-Sam gave a high assessment to Russia's proposal to 
convene a Multilateral Conference on the Security and Nuclear-Free Status of 
the Korean Peninsula.
9. President Kim Young-Sam hailed the steps that have been taken by the 
government of Russia at President B. N. Yeltsin's initiative to overcome the 
legacy of the past in relations between the two states: the restoration of the 
dignity of ethnic Koreans in Russia, the publication of the documents pertaining 
to the 1983 incident involving the South Korean airliner, and the turning over 
of copies of Russian archival documents on the Korean War.
10. The presidents expressed satisfaction at the fundamental expansion of 
bilateral relations in the areas of science, technology, power engineering, 
fishing and construction, and at the steady strengthening of the basis for the 
expansion of those relations. Both presidents particularly noted the importance 
of cooperation in the area of environmental protection.
11. The presidents agreed to make joint efforts to combine the Russian 
Federation's high technologies with the Republic of Korea's potential for 
application and industrial production, and to encourage investments in the joint 
development of Russia's natural resources. In this connection, the presidents 
expressed support for direct business contacts between the Russian Far East and 
the Republic of Korea. The presidents noted the steady growth in bilateral trade 
with satisfaction, and they agreed to continue efforts to strengthen legal and 
organizational foundations in such spheres as transportation, customs and 
industrial standards in order to foster bilateral trade and investments.
12. In order to advance toward constructive and complementary partnership 
between the two countries, the presidents decided to step up political dialogue
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on various levels, including meetings between heads of state and government, 
parliamentary leaders and ministers. The presidents also decided to actively 
encourage exchanges in the sphere of culture, science and tourism.
13. The presidents agreed to establish a "hot line" between the Kremlin and the 
Blue House in order to maintain close contacts between the heads of the two 
states.
For the Russian Federation 
[Signed] B. Yeltsin 
For the Republic of Korea 
[Signed] Kim Young-Sam 
Moscow, the Kremlin 
2 June 1994
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea (hereafter referred to as ‘the Sides’), 
proceeding from the accords reached in talks at the highest level in Seoul in 
November 1992 and Moscow in June 1994, relying on the 19 November 1992 
Treaty on the Basic Principles of Relations Between the Russian Federation and 
the Republic of Korea, striving to deepen mutual understanding on questions of 
bilateral relations and on international problems of a global and regional nature, 
and considering the importance of regular consultations between the Sides and 
their exchange of views and infoimation on key events in the world in the 
context of international organizations and forums, agree to the following:
Article 1: The Sides will hold consultations and exchanges of views on 
questions of bilateral relations, as well as on international problems that are of 
mutual interest.
Article 2: The Sides’ consultations will be regular in nature and will be held on 
various levels. In order to consider urgent issues, working or expert groups may 
be considered by agreement of the Sides.
Article 3: The Sides will support and develop regular working relations 
between corresponding subdivisions and embassies of the two countries for the 
purpose of improving the exchange of information and its more effective 
utilization in their practical activities.
Article 4: The Sides will hold consultations and cooperate in international 
organizations and international forums, and promote the development of 
contacts between the two countries' representatives in third countries and in 
international organizations.
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Article 5: The agenda, time and place of consultations, as well as the makeup of 
delegations, will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The Sides shall 
independently bear expenses for travel to and from places of meeting, as well 
as for stays in the other country, and the receiving Side shall provide premises 
for holding consultations and necessary transportation.
Article 6: This Protocol shall enter into force as of the date of its signing and 
shall remain in effect for five years and be automatically extended for one-year 
periods unless one of the Sides notifies the other Side in writing six months 
prior to the expiration of the current period of its intention to teiminate it.
Done in Moscow, 2 June 1994, in two copies, each in Russian,
Korean and English, with all texts having equal force.
For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Of the Russian Federation 
A. Kozyrev
For the Ministiy of Foreign Affairs 
Of the Republic of Korea 
Han Sung-Joo
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Appendix 6
Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Signed in Geneva on 21 October 
1994/
Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America (US) and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from 
September 23 to October 17, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the 
nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.
Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in 
the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the US and the DPRK and 
upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the US and the 
DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The 
US and the DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the 
nuclear issue:
I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderate reactors 
and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.
(1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the US 
President, the US will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the 
DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 
2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003. The US will organise under its 
leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project 
to be provided to the DPRK. The US, representing the international consortium, 
will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.
- The US, representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the 
conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of 
this document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as 
soon as possible after the date of this document.
- As necessary, the US and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for 
cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
(2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the US 
President, the US, representing the consortium, will make arrangements to 
offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated 
reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.
Andrew Mack, ed., Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 
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- Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and 
electricity production.
- Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this 
document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an 
agreed schedule of deliveries.
(3) Upon receipt of US assurances for the provision of LWR’s and for 
arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its giaphite- 
moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these 
reactors and related facilities.
- The freeze on the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities 
will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this document. 
During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the 
DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.
- Dismantlement of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related 
facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.
- The US and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the 
spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of 
the LWR project, and to dispose of the friel in a safe manner that does not 
involve reprocessing in the DPRK.
(4) As soon as possible after the date of this document, the US and the DPRK 
experts will hold two sets of expert talks.
- At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and 
the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor programme with the LWR 
project.
- At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific aiTangements for spent 
fuel storage and ultimate disposition.
II. The two sides will move toward full normalisation of political and economic 
relations.
(1) Within three months of the date of this document, both sides will reduce 
barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications 
seiwices and financial transactions.
256
(2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other’s capital following 
resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level 
discussions.
(3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the US and the 
DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level.
III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free 
Korean peninsula.
(1) The US will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons by the US.
(2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.
(3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework 
will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.
IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non­
proliferation regime.
(1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapon (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards 
agreement under the Treaty.
(2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR 
project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK’s 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to 
the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by 
the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not 
subject to the freeze.
(3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before 
delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance 
with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, including taking all steps that 
may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the 
Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s 
initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.
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Kang Sok Ju - Head of the Delegation for the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea
Robert L. Gallucci - Head of the Delegation of the United States of America, 
Ambassador at Large of the United States of America
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